The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
FOREMOST INSURANCE COMPANY,
GRAND RAPIDS, MICHIGAN,
CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:24-CV-00684
Plaintiff,
(MEHALCHICK, J.)
v.
MICHAEL B. STEELE and SARAH
BROWN and KEVIN LEE PRICE,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM
Plaintiff Foremost Insurance Company, Grand Rapids, Michigan (“Foremost”)
initiated this lawsuit on April 22, 2024, by filing a complaint (“Complaint”) against Michael
B. Steele (“Steele”), Sarah Brown (“Brown”), and Kevin Lee Price (“Price”) (collectively,
“Defendants”). (Doc. 1). Foremost seeks declaratory relief in the form of a declaration that
(1) it owes no insurance coverage to Steele and has no duty to defend or indemnify Steele in
an underlying tort action and (2) defense counsel that Foremost has assigned to Steele in the
underlying action may withdraw his appearance. (Doc. 1, at 14). Presently before the Court
are two motions for entry of a default judgment filed by Foremost against Price and Steele
respectively. (Doc. 18; Doc. 20). For the following reasons, the motions shall be GRANTED.
(Doc. 18; Doc. 20).
I. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The following factual summary is taken from Foremost’s Complaint. (Doc. 1). There
is one other lawsuit (“Brown Litigation”) relevant to this matter that implicate Foremost’s
interests as an insurer. (Doc. 1, at 7-12). The Brown Litigation involves Steele, Brown, and
Price. (Doc. 1, at 7). On October 5, 2023, Brown filed a complaint (“Brown Complaint”) in
the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County against Price and Steele asserting claims of
negligence and negligence per se. (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 15-17). Brown alleges that on August 6, 2023,
she was outside of her residence at 65 Barney St. in Larksville, PA. (Doc. 1, at 7-8). At the
same time, Price was outside of the property he rents from Steele located at 71 Barney St. in
Larksville, PA with his dog Miami (“Miami”). (Doc. 1, at 7-8). Without provocation, Miami
suddenly got loose and attacked Brown, causing her injuries. (Doc. 1, at 8). Brown alleges
that on December 13, 2022, Miami previously got loose and bit two children and thus has a
history of attacking humans without provocation. (Doc. 1, at 9). Price also posts “Beware of
Dog” signs on his property. (Doc. 1, at 9). Brown additionally contends that Steele knew that
Miami was dangerous because when Steele collects rent from Price, he does not enter the
residence due to the danger of Miami’s presence. (Doc. 1, at 9). According to Brown, both
Steele and Price “realized the risk that the dangerous dog, Miami posed to society and acted
in conscious disregard or reckless indifference to that danger” by failing to properly secure the
dog and/or allowing the dog to remain on the subject property. (Doc. 1, at 9). After the
incident, the Larksville police cited Price for violations of the Pennsylvania Dog Law and
Larksville Borough Ordinances. (Doc. 1, at 8).
Foremost insured Steele under the Dwelling Fire One Policy Vacant or Unoccupied,
policy number 381-0091679411-07. (Doc. 1, ¶ 11). Under the Foremost policy, Foremost is
required to insure Steele for accidents, including bodily injuries to other persons and medical
costs related thereto as well as property damage, at covered premises. (Doc. 1, ¶ 14). One such
covered premise is 71 Barney St. in Larksville, PA, the property that Defendant Price rented
from Defendant Steele when the incident leading to the Brown Litigation occurred. (Doc. 1,
¶¶ 13, 18). The Foremost policy includes premises liability limits of $100,000 per accident and
medical payment limits of $500 per person. (Doc. 1, ¶ 13). The Foremost policy also includes
certain exclusions. (Doc. 1, at 6). For example, the Foremost policy explicitly excludes
coverage for bodily injury or property damage that results from the actions that occur on
insured premises of (1) any animal which the insured (or the insured’s family member or
employee) is aware has a prior history of biting or attacking humans or other animals or (2)
any dog that is deemed dangerous as defined by Pennsylvania Public Law 784, as amended.
(Doc. 1, at 6).
Foremost alleges that it does not owe coverage, a duty to defend, or a duty to
indemnify Steele under the Foremost policy because according to Brown’s complaint in the
Brown Litigation, Brown does not allege that the accident occurred on covered premises.
(Doc. 1, ¶ 23). Foremost further asserts that there is no coverage available to Steele because
the exclusions related to dangerous animals apply because Steele was aware of Miami’s
history of attacking and biting people and Miami is deemed dangerous under Pennsylvania
Public Law 784, as amended. (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 24-26). Consequently, Foremost alleges that Steele
is not entitled to coverage related to the Brown Litigation, and the counsel it has thus far
provided to Steele should be permitted to withdraw. (Doc. 1, at 14).
On April 22, 2024, Foremost filed its Complaint for Declaratory Judgment pursuant
to the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 USC § 2201, (“DJA”) seeking that this Court declare
that Foremost has no duty to cover, indemnify, or defend Steele in the related state court
proceedings and that Foremost is entitled to cease providing Steele representation in the
Brown Litigation. (Doc. 1, at 14). On November 13, 2024, Foremost filed its motions for
entry of default judgment against Price and Steele, respectively. (Doc. 18; Doc. 19). Price and
Steele have not addressed those motions and thus, the matter is ripe for disposition.
II. DISCUSSION
At Foremost’s request, the Clerk of Court has entered a default against Steele and
Price. (Doc. 15; Doc. 16). A plaintiff who prevails by default must still demonstrate that they
are entitled to the relief they seek. See DIRECTV Inc. v. Pepe, 431 F.3d 162, 165 (3d Cir. 2005).
Here, Foremost requests a declaratory judgment that it has no duty to defend or indemnify
Steele or Price as a result of pending state court litigation. (cite). According to Pennsylvania
law, an insurer’s duty to defend or indemnify an insured in litigation is triggered by the
language and factual allegations in the underlying complaint. Kvaerner Metals Division of
Kvaerner U.S., Inc. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 908 A.2d 888, 896 (Pa. 2006); see Leithbridge
Co. v. Greenwich Ins. Co., 464 F. Supp. 3d 734, 739 (E.D. Pa. 2020) (“In determining whether
the underlying litigation falls within the scope of the insurer's duties to defend or indemnify,
a court must examine only those factual allegations made within the “four corners” of the
underlying complaint.”). As such, “[t]he duty to defend commences when, comparing the
factual allegations of the complaint with the terms of the policy at issue, a complaint alleges
facts that potentially bring at least one claim alleged in the action within the coverage of the
policy.” State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Seprish, No. 3:23-CV-1153, 2024 WL 1538439, at *1
(M.D. Pa. Mar. 11, 2024), report and recommendation adopted, No. 3:23-CV-01153, 2024 WL
1887061 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 30, 2024) (citing Mutual Benefit Ins. Co. v. Haver, 725 A.2d 743, 745
(Pa. 1999)). When a claimant has a policy that provides coverage for accidents that occur on
a certain premises, as the parties do here, “[i]n order to trigger coverage under the policy
issued . . . there must be a claim for bodily injury caused by an accident and the bodily injury
must occur at or on the designated premises.” Foremost Ins. Agency Grand Rapids, Michigan v.
Himmel, No. CV 1:09-2575, 2012 WL 13001558, at *10 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 15, 2012), report and
recommendation adopted in part, rejected in part, No. 1:09-CV-2575, 2012 WL 13001585 (M.D.
Pa. June 1, 2012). This Court has found that when “the clear and unambiguous terms of the
policy do not provide for off-site injuries and [] [when] the injuries which occurred in this case
occurred off-site[,]” an insurer owes no duty to defend or indemnify the insured. Himmel, 2012
WL 13001558, at *10 (granting summary judgment to an insurance company and finding that
the insurer owes no defense or indemnity obligations to an insured when the insured’s dog bit
a plaintiff in an underlying suit on a neighbor’s property because the bite did not occur on the
insured’s property, as per the insurance agreement).
Here, the insurance policy at issue, as attached to Foremost’s complaint, extends
coverage only to injury resulting from bodily injury that occurs on premises listed on the
policy’s Declarations page. (Doc. 1-3). In relevant part, the Foremost policy states:
Coverage F — Premises Liability
If a claim is made or a suit is brought against you for damages because of bodily
injury or property damage, caused by an accident on your premises to which
this coverage applies and that occurs during the Policy Period shown on the
Declarations Page, we will:
1. Pay up to the Limit of Liability shown on the Declarations Page for
the compensatory damages for which you are legally liable; and
2. Provide a defense at our expense by attorneys of our choice.
(Doc. 1, at 5; Doc. 1-3).
The Medical Payments section of the Foremost policy includes similar limitations based upon
premises:
Coverage G — Medical Payments to Others applies only to a person on your
premises with your permission. Medical Payments to Others does not apply to
any resident, renter, tenant, roommate, roomer, or boarder. “Premises” is
defined as follows:
1. The dwelling that is described on the Declarations Page;
2. The other structures including sidewalks, driveways, or other private
approaches that serve that dwelling; and
3. The grounds where that dwelling is located
(Doc. 1, at 5-6; Doc. 1-3).
Premises is defined in the Foremost policy as follows:
1. The dwelling that is described on the Declarations Page;
2. The other structures including sidewalks, driveways, or other private
approaches that serve that dwelling; and
3. The grounds where that dwelling is located.
(Doc. 1, at 4; Doc. 1-3).
The Foremost policy explains that Premises does not mean:
1. Dwellings that are not described on the Declarations Page;
2. Other structures including sidewalks, driveways, or other private
approaches, which solely serve a swelling that is not described on the
Declarations Page; or
3. The grounds that are immediately adjacent to the dwellings that are not
described on the Declarations Page even if located on the same parcel of land
or at the same address as your dwelling described on the Declarations Page.
(Doc. 1, at 4; Doc. 1-3).
The Brown Complaint filed against Steele and Price in state court alleges that on
August 6, 2023, Brown was outside of her residence at 65 Barney St. in Larksville, PA when
Price was outside of the property he rents from Steele located at 71 Barney St. in Larksville,
PA with Miami. (Doc. 1, at 7-8). Without provocation, Miami got loose and attacked Brown
on her property, causing her to be injured. (Doc. 1, at 8). On the face of the complaint, the
injuries took place at 65 Barney St. in Larksville, PA, which is not an insured premise, as
defined by the Foremost policy. Because the actions underlying the state court complaint
involve a dog bite that occurred on a property other than that dwelling listed on the
Declaration Page of the Foremost policy, Steele and Price are not entitled to defense or
indemnification by Foremost. (Doc. 1, at 4-8). Thus, given Steele and Price’s repeated failures
to answer, respond or defend this case, the Court will GRANT Foremost’s motions and enter
declaratory judgments in favor of Foremost against Steele and Price, providing that Foremost
has no duty or obligation to defend or indemnify Steele or Price under their State Farm policy
number 381-0091679411-07 in the Brown Litigation.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Foremost’s motions for entry of default judgment are
GRANTED. (Doc. 18; Doc. 20).
An appropriate Order follows.
BY THE COURT:
Dated: June 16, 2025 s/ Karoline Mehalchick
KAROLINE MEHALCHICK
United States District Judge