Keir v. Schoeberl

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

SUSAN KEIR,

Plaintiff, 1:25-cv-56

(ECC/MJK)

v.

CURT SCHOEBERL, et al.,

Defendants.

Susan Keir, Pro Se Plaintiff

John C. Burns, Esq., for Town and County Defendants

Aimee Cowan, Ass’t Att. General, for State Defendants

Hon. Elizabeth C. Coombe, United States District Judge:

MEMORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDER

I. INTRODUCTION

Pro se Plaintiff Susan Keir filed this action against Defendants Curt Schoeberl, Jane

Rascoe, and the Town of Shawangunk (the Town Defendants); Roseann Daw, Tracey Williams,

Christopher Jaros, Jen Metzger, Max Cordella, Bruck Taylor, Clinton Johnson, and the County of

Ulster (the County Defendants); and Michelle Demirian and New York State Attorney General

Letitia James (the State Defendants) (collectively, the Defendants), alleging claims pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff challenges the Defendants’ assessment and collection of property taxes

that has resulted in the commencement of foreclosure proceedings against her property. See

generally Second Amended Complaint (SAC), Dkt. No. 19. The Defendants have moved to

dismiss Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Dkt. Nos.

31, 48, 52. The motions are fully briefed. Dkt. Nos. 47, 51, 57, 58, 60, 61, 67, 68. For the

following reasons, Defendants’ motions to dismiss are granted in part, and the Plaintiff’s Second

Amended Complaint is dismissed pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3) and 12(b)(6).

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On January 13, 2025, Plaintiff filed the original Complaint in this action, as well as a

motion for preliminary injunction. Dkt. Nos. 1, 5. Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint and

amended motion for preliminary injunction on January 16, 2025. Dkt. Nos. 6, 7. On January 31,

2025, Plaintiff filed a “Motion for Leave to File an Amended Complaint and Motion for

Preliminary Injunction.” Dkt. No. 10. On February 7, 2025, the Court denied Plaintiff’s motion

seeking preliminary injunctive relief.1 Dkt. No. 13. U.S. Magistrate Judge Mitchell J. Katz

subsequently granted Plaintiff’s request to amend, and Plaintiff filed the Second Amended

Complaint on February 14, 2025. Dkt. Nos. 14, 19.

III. FACTS2

Plaintiff owns property located in Wallkill, New York. SAC at 15. 3 On an unspecified

date, “state employees registered the Plaintiff’s private property in their office without disclosing

[that] there is no law” mandating such registration. Id. at 6. Plaintiff was “not provided full

disclosure about registering her private property,” nor was she “informed that registering her

private property would allow the Defendants to extort property taxes.” Id. The registration of

Plaintiff’s property “allowed [it] to be reclassified for the sole purpose of taxation.” Id.

1 Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration of the February 7, 2025 Memorandum-Decision and Order

was denied. Dkt. Nos. 18, 24.

2 These facts are drawn from the Second Amended Complaint. The Court assumes the truth of,

and draws reasonable inferences from, the well-pleaded factual allegations, see Lynch v. City of

New York, 952 F.3d 67, 74–75 (2d Cir. 2020), but does not accept as true any legal conclusions,

see Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).

3 Citations to page numbers refer to pagination generated by the ECF system.

Specifically, Plaintiff’s property was “wrongfully re-classified as agricultural, industrial, or

residential.” Id. at 11. The reclassification of Plaintiff’s property was “without permission.” Id.

at 6-7. As a result, Plaintiff was subjected to “unconstitutional direct taxat[ion]” of her property.

Id. at 5, 7-8. Plaintiff was “forced to make unlawful property tax payments for years or risk losing

the property to the state for nonpayment of unlawful taxes.” Id. at 10. Plaintiff’s property is now

the subject of foreclosure proceedings in Ulster County. Id. at 5.

In furtherance of their constitutional violations against Plaintiff, Defendants have

“view[ed] and record[ed] documents containing an all-caps version of [Plaintiff’s] name, and

documents containing [Plaintiff’s] proper name.” SAC at 9. The Defendants have further “stolen

the equity from [Plaintiff’s] private property through use of an electronically reproduced copy of

[Plaintiff’s] deed . . . .” Id. Specifically,

[w]hen the defendants placed the plaintiff’s “document of title” in their records the

attorney created a secret Constructive Quasi “Trust” on the presumption that their

State corporation” has “AN interest in plaintiff’s land, and they now control

plaintiff’s private property rights such as “possession” ect [sic], and plaintiff has

been forced to pay annual fee (tax) in “return” for benefit.

Id. at 10. This caused Plaintiff’s “control of her private property” to be “stripped away;” requiring

Plaintiff to “request permission to enjoy his/her property.” Id.

Liberally construed, the Second Amended Complaint asserts claims for fraudulent

concealment; “fraudulent misrepresentation, personage, and joinder;” deed fraud and conspiracy

to commit deed fraud; theft of equity; mail fraud; intentional infliction of emotional distress; and

Fourteenth Amendment violations of Plaintiff’s due process rights. See generally SAC. In her

prayer for relief Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages, as well as injunctive relief

including an order (1) barring further tax collections against her property; (2) removing the tax

lien currently attached to her property; (3) discharging all debt attached to her property, (4)

removing “anything having to do with” her property from “all local, county, and state files, records

or data bases; and (5) compelling the publication of advertisements in newspapers concerning her

rights over the property. Id. at 15-16.

IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3)

A district court has the inherent power to dismiss a case, sua sponte, if it determines the

court lacks jurisdiction over the matter. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). Notwithstanding the liberal

pleading standard afforded pro se litigants, federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and may

not preside over cases if they lack subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3) (“If the

court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the

action.”) (emphasis supplied); Do No Harm v. Pfizer Inc., 96 F.4th 106, 121 (2d Cir. 2024) (“Once

a federal court determines it lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the complaint

in its entirety.”). “A plaintiff asserting subject matter jurisdiction has the burden of proving by a

preponderance of the evidence that it exists.” Searles v. Robert, No. 21-2836, 2023 WL 7271832,

at *1 (2d Cir. Nov. 3, 2023) (quoting Makarova v. United States, 201 F.3d 110, 113 (2d Cir. 2000)).

This Court has an “independent obligation to consider the presence or absence of subject matter

jurisdiction sua sponte.” In re Tronox Inc., 855 F.3d 84, 95 (2d Cir. 2017) (quoting Joseph v.

Leavitt, 465 F.3d 87, 89 (2d Cir. 2006) (quotation marks omitted)).

The Court has no power to address the merits of a claim if it lacks subject matter

jurisdiction over the claim. Hibbert v. Cap. One Auto Fin., No. 1:23-cv-07538, 2024 WL 3498536,

at *2 (E.D.N.Y. July 22, 2024) (citing El Bey v. Hilton, 15-cv-3188, 2017 WL 3842596, at *3

(E.D.N.Y. Sept. 1, 2017) (“Because the Court has no power to address the merits of a case in the

absence of subject matter jurisdiction over it, a challenge to jurisdiction must be resolved before

reaching any other challenge.”)); see also Polera v. Bd. of Educ., 288 F.3d 478, 481 (2d Cir. 2002)

(“Until we determine whether the District Court properly exercised subject matter jurisdiction . . .

, we cannot address the merits . . .”).

B. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)

To survive a motion to dismiss, “a complaint must provide ‘enough facts to state a claim

to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Mayor & City Council of Balt. v. Citigroup, Inc., 709 F.3d

129, 135 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007)). “Although a

complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, it may not rest on mere labels, conclusions,

or a formulaic recitation of the elements of the cause of action, and the factual allegations ‘must

be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.’” Lawtone-Bowles v. City of New

York, No. 16-cv-4240, 2017 WL 4250513, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 22, 2017) (quoting Twombly, 550

U.S. at 555). The Court must accept as true all factual allegations in the complaint and draw all

reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor. See EEOC v. Port Auth., 768 F.3d 247, 253 (2d Cir.

2014) (citing ATSI Commc’ns, Inc. v. Shaar Fund, Ltd., 493 F.3d 87, 98 (2d Cir. 2007)).

Because Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, her submissions “must be construed liberally and

interpreted ‘to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest.’” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of

Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006).

“Nonetheless, to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a pro se plaintiff must support [her]

claims with ‘specific and detailed factual allegations, not stated in wholly conclusory terms.’”

Wightman-Cervantes v. ACLU, No. 06-cv-4708, 2007 WL 1805483, at *1, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. June

25, 2007) (quoting Friedl v. City of New York, 210 F.3d 79, 85–86 (2d Cir. 2000)).

V. DISCUSSION

A. Constitutional Claims

1. Subject Matter Jurisdiction

This Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s challenges to the assessment

and imposition of local taxes on her property. The Tax Injunction Act (TIA) provides that “[t]he

district courts shall not enjoin, suspend or restrain the assessment, levy or collection of any tax

under State law where a plain, speedy and efficient remedy may be had in the courts of such State.”

28 U.S.C. § 1341; Campaniello v. New York State Dep’t of Tax’n & Fin., 737 F. App’x 594, 596

(2d Cir. 2018) (“The TIA is meant to strictly limit federal courts from interfering with local tax

matters . . . . This prohibition is jurisdictional and strips the federal courts of subject matter

jurisdiction.”) (citation omitted); Pan v. City of Niagara Falls, No. 23-7513, 2025 WL 1169057,

at *2 (2d Cir. Apr. 22, 2025) (“The Tax Injunction Act severely limits the power of federal courts

to interfere with state taxation proceedings.”); Roberts v. NYS Dep’t of Tax’n & Fin., No. 1:22-cv-

0208, 2022 WL 1004246, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 4, 2022) (“[T]he TIA bars taxpayers from

challenging the payment of state taxes in a federal district court.”). The TIA “has been interpreted

to cover local taxes[.]” Luessenhop v. Clinton Cnty., New York, 466 F.3d 259, 266 (2d Cir. 2006).

“The principal purpose of the Tax Injunction Act [is] ‘to limit drastically federal district court

jurisdiction to interfere with so important a local concern as the collection of taxes.’” California

v. Grace Brethren Church, 457 U.S. 393, 408-09 (1982) (quoting Rosewell v. LaSalle National

Bank, 450 U.S. 503, 522 (1981)); see also Hibbs v. Winn, 542 U.S. 88, 107 (2004) (“In sum, this

Court has interpreted and applied the TIA only in cases Congress wrote the Act to address, i.e.,

cases in which state taxpayers seek federal-court orders enabling them to avoid paying state

taxes.”).

“Two conditions must be satisfied to invoke the protection of the TIA: first, the surcharges

must constitute ‘taxes,’ and second, the state remedies available to plaintiffs must be ‘plain, speedy

and efficient.’” Ass’n for Accessible Meds. v. James, 974 F.3d 216, 221 (2d Cir. 2020) (quoting

Travelers Ins. Co. v. Cuomo, 14 F.3d 708, 713 (2d Cir. 1993) (footnote omitted), rev’d on other

grounds, 514 U.S. 645 (1995)). “The Supreme Court has previously determined in other litigation

related to the TIA that New York does provide ‘plain, speedy and efficient’ forums for individuals

to bring constitutional challenges to its tax laws.” Abuzaid v. Mattox, 726 F.3d 311, 316 (2d Cir.

2013) (quoting Tully v. Griffin, Inc., 429 U.S. 68, 76–77 (1976)); Glob. Leadership Found. v. City

of New York, No. 21-cv-10942, 2022 WL 2788398, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. July 15, 2022) (same).

Under the related doctrine of comity, federal courts are restrained “‘from entertaining

claims for relief that risk disrupting state tax administration,’ including claims for damages” if

state court remedies are plain, adequate, and complete. Glob. Leadership Found. v. City of New

York, No. 22-2095, 2023 WL 3144043, at *1 (2d Cir. Apr. 28, 2023) (quoting Levin v. Com.

Energy, Inc., 560 U.S. 413, 417 (2010)). “While the TIA bars injunctive and declaratory relief, ‘it

is the principle of comity that prevents a taxpayer from seeking damages.’” DeMartino v. New

York State Dep’t of Tax’n & Fin., No. 22-720, 2023 WL 2563967, at *4 (2d Cir. Mar. 20, 2023)

(quoting Dorce v. City of New York, 2 F.4th 82, 97 (2d Cir. 2021)); see also Casciani v. Town of

Webster, 501 F. App’x 77, 80 (2d Cir. 2012) (“Actions under § 1983 seeking damages related to

the collection of state taxes are barred by the principle of comity so long as there is a procedurally

adequate state alternative procedure for challenging the assessment.”). The comity doctrine is more

expansive than the Tax Injunction Act. Levin, 560 U.S. at 417.

Here, Plaintiff requests that the court “bar any future tax collection” and “remove any tax

liens from” her property are “precisely the type of suit the [TIA] was designed to limit.” Staten v.

Vill. of Monticello, No. 14-cv-4766, 2015 WL 6473041, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 26, 2015) (quoting

Bernard v. Village of Spring Valley, 30 F.3d 294, 297 (2d Cir. 1994)). Likewise, the principles of

comity warrant dismissal of Plaintiff’s parallel claims for compensatory damages due to lack of

subject matter jurisdiction. Plaintiff’s invocation of Fourteenth Amendment due process rights do

not render the TIA or the comity doctrine inapplicable. Specifically, the Second Amended

Complaint asserts a violation of Plaintiff’s due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment

relative to state-court foreclosure proceedings initiated against her property. SAC at 11.

Conceivably, the Court might exercise jurisdiction over a Fourteenth Amendment due process

claim challenging some conduct by the Defendants preceding a state-court foreclosure. Here,

however, Plaintiff’s claim is grounded in her challenge to the particular taxes assessed against her

property that resulted in the initiation of foreclosure proceedings:

This illegal property tax process is a violation of the constitution and plaintiff’s due

process, as there has been no court hearing, no judgment, no adjudication of all

facts, and no consideration given for the actual laws regarding the tax in the first

place.

SAC at 7 (emphasis added). Thus, even liberally construed, the Court lacks jurisdiction over

Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment due process claim. See Marvin v. Allen, No. 23-CV-5947, 2024

WL 4290722, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 2024) (“[W]here a plaintiff “object[s] to [his] own tax

situation,” federal courts routinely dismiss constitutional claims, including claims sounding in due

process.”); Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 570 U.S. 595, 597 (2013) (“It is beyond

dispute that “[t]axes . . . are not ‘takings[.]’” (quoting Brown v. Legal Foundation of Wash., 538

U.S. 216, 243, n. 2 (2003)).

Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims premised on challenges to her local taxes

are dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See Neary v. Driscoll, No. 2:24-cv-00736,

2024 WL 1704715, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 19, 2024) (dismissing plaintiff’s claims challenging town

and county’s “billing and tax collection practices” for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant

to the TIA and related principles of comity); Sandstrom v. Wendell, No. 1:23-cv-00405, 2024 WL

1242415, at *4 (W.D.N.Y. Mar. 22, 2024), appeal dismissed, No. 24-956, 2024 WL 5516312 (2d

Cir. Oct. 23, 2024) (granting motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction where

plaintiff attempted to enjoin county defendants from assessing taxes); Stankovic v. Frankel, No.

12-cv-3215, 2012 WL 2700648, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. July 6, 2012) (dismissing claims challenging

“local tax matters” for lack of subject matter jurisdiction).

2. Merits

Generally, in the absence of subject matter jurisdiction, the Court does not reach the merits

arguments contained in a motion to dismiss, and the claims lacking jurisdiction in this case would

be dismissed without prejudice pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). Humphrey v. Syracuse Police

Dep’t, 758 F. App’x 205, 206-07 (2d Cir. 2019) (explaining, where a court dismisses a complaint

for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the court does “not have the power to reach the merits and

dismiss the claims against the defendants for failure to state a claim . . . .”) (citing Carter v.

HealthPort Technologies, LLC, 822 F.3d 47, 54-55 (2d Cir. 2016)).

Here, to the extent any of Plaintiff’s claims are not jurisdictionally barred by the TIA or

doctrine of comity, they are nevertheless subject to dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6). At the outset,

Plaintiff’s claims are grounded in “Redemptionist” and “Sovereign Citizen” theories that have

been consistently recognized as frivolous by the courts. Redemptionists claim, among other

things, that when “[a] person’s name is spelled . . . with initial capital letters and small letters, [it]

represents the real person . . . . Whenever a person’s name is written in total capitals, however, . .

. only the strawman is referenced, and the flesh and blood person is not involved.” McLaughlin v.

CitiMortgage, Inc., 726 F.Supp.2d 201, 210 (D. Conn. 2010) (citations and punctuation omitted).

Likewise, Sovereign Citizens are “a loosely affiliated group who follow their own set of laws and,

accordingly, do not recognize federal, state, or local laws, policies or regulations as legitimate.”

United States v. DiMartino, 949 F.3d 67, 69 (2d Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks and citation

omitted)). “Theories presented by redemptionist and sovereign citizen adherents have not only

been rejected by the courts, but also recognized as frivolous and a waste of court resources.”

Muhammad v. Smith, No. 3:13–cv–760 (MAD/DEP), 2014 WL 3670609, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. July 23,

2014) (collecting cases).

Plaintiff’s challenge in this case is grounded in her position that, as a general matter, the

local and state “tax collection system[s]” stands in violation of the federal Constitution to the extent

they impose direct taxes; that the state courts have no jurisdiction over foreclosure proceedings

against her property and are “fictitious entities;” and that documents containing “all-caps” versions

of her name, including her deed, constitute “fraudulent misrepresentation[s].” Even when read

with the “special solicitude” required for pro se pleadings, these allegations do not invoke viable

legal theories on which Plaintiff can rely in her constitutional challenges. See Bendeck v. U.S.

Bank Nat’l Ass’n, No. 17-cv-0180, 2017 WL 2726692, at *6 (D. Haw. June 23, 2017) (collecting

cases that have rightly have rejected the argument that “differences in capitalization of a person’s

name create separate legal entities”); Gravatt v. United States, 100 Fed. Cl. 279, 282 (Fed. Cl.

2011) (noting that “[s]o-called sovereign citizens believe that they are not subject to government

authority and employ various tactics in an attempt to, among other things, avoid paying taxes,

extinguish debts, and derail criminal proceedings”).

Moreover, as the Defendants argue in their motion papers, the Second Amended Complaint

suffers from a variety of pleading deficiencies. A plaintiff seeking relief under § 1983 must allege

facts showing the defendants’ personal involvement in the alleged constitutional deprivation. See

Spavone v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Corr. Serv., 719 F.3d 127, 135 (2d Cir. 2013) (“‘It is well settled in

this Circuit that personal involvement of defendants in alleged constitutional deprivations is a

prerequisite to an award of damages under § 1983.’” (quoting Colon v. Coughlin, 58 F.3d 865, 873

(2d Cir. 1995))). As a corollary of the personal involvement requirement, complaints that rely on

“group pleading” and “fail to differentiate as to which defendant was involved in the alleged

unlawful conduct are insufficient to state a claim.” Adamou v. Cty. of Spotsylvania, Va., No. 12-

cv-7789, 2016 WL 1064608, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 14, 2016) (citing Atuahene v. City of Hartford,

10 F. App’x 33, 34 (2d Cir. 2001) (observing that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 “requires, at

a minimum, that a complaint give each defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and the

ground upon which it rests,” and that a complaint fails to meet that minimum where it “lump[s] all

the defendants together in each claim and provide[s] no factual basis to distinguish their

conduct”)).

Here, the Second Amended Complaint repeatedly refers to actions taken by “the

defendants,” and contains only a very general description of each named defendant’s purportedly

unconstitutional job duties. It fails, however, to address in what way each defendant participated

in the allegedly unconstitutional acts giving rise to the violations against Plaintiff. Plaintiff’s

general references to the Defendants fail to satisfy the requirement that litigants plead “precisely

who did what and how such behavior is actionable under the law.” Demuth v. New York State

Police, No. 3:18-cv-0796, 2018 WL 5924605, at *4 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 30, 2018).

Accordingly, to the extent any of Plaintiff’s claims are not properly dismissed for lack of

subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(h)(3), they are dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6)

for failure to state a claim.

B. State Law Claims

Plaintiff’s remaining claims sound in state law. Since there is no diversity of citizenship

between the parties, the only basis for this Court’s continuing jurisdiction over those claims is

supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (providing that “in

any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction, the district courts shall have

supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to the claims in the action within

such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of

the United States Constitution.”). The Court “may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction .

. . if . . . the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 1367(c)(3). “Courts must consider ‘the values of judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and

comity’ when deciding whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction.” Kroshnyi v. U.S. Pack

Courier Servs., 771 F.3d 93, 102 (2d Cir. 2014) (quoting Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484

U.S. 343, 350 (1988)). “[I]n the usual case in which all federal-law claims are eliminated before

trial, the balance of factors to be considered under the pendent jurisdiction doctrine . . . will point

toward declining to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims.” Carnegie-Mellon

Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 n.7 (1988).

Here, judicial economy weighs in favor of dismissing the state law claims. This case is in

its early stages; discovery has not occurred; and Plaintiffs’ state-law claims are best addressed by

a state court. Accordingly, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over those

claims.

VI. LEAVE TO AMEND

Generally, the Court will afford a pro se plaintiff an opportunity to amend “unless the court

can rule out any possibility, however unlikely it might be, that an amended complaint would

succeed in stating a claim.” Abbas v. Dixon, 480 F.3d 636, 639 (2d Cir. 2007) (internal quotation

marks omitted). However, leave to amend pleadings is properly denied where amendment would

be futile. See Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000); see also Ruffolo v.

Oppenheimer & Co., 987 F.2d 129, 131 (2d Cir. 1993) (“Where it appears that granting leave to

amend is unlikely to be productive, . . . it is not an abuse of discretion to deny leave to amend.”);

Myers v. Sperazza, 11-cv-292, 2012 WL 6690303, at *1 (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 21, 2012) (dismissing

pro se complaint without leave to amend because “there is no indication a valid claim can be stated

and the court has determined that leave to amend the complaint would be futile”).

Here, the deficiencies with Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint, including most

significantly this Court’s lack of subject matter jurisdiction and the frivolous legal theories on

which Plaintiff mounts her challenge, cannot be cured with better pleadings. Thus, although the

Court is cognizant of Plaintiff’s pro se status, allowing Plaintiff an opportunity to further amend

would be an exercise in futility. See, e.g., Sandstrom v. Wendell, No. 1:23-cv-00405, 2024 WL

1242415, at *9 (W.D.N.Y. Mar. 22, 2024), appeal dismissed, No. 24-956, 2024 WL 5516312 (2d

Cir. Oct. 23, 2024) (declining to grant leave to amend where Court lacked jurisdiction over

Plaintiff’s challenges to assessment of local taxes); see also Dieujuste v. Sin, 731 F. Supp. 3d 440,

454 (E.D.N.Y.), reconsideration denied, 734 F. Supp. 3d 232 (E.D.N.Y. 2024), and aff’d, 125

F.4th 397 (2d Cir. 2025) (declining to grant leave to amend where plaintiff was “an adherent to

the ‘sovereign citizen’ movement” and sought “to assert legally frivolous claims,” noting that court

“has the inherent power to dismiss without leave to amend or replead ‘where the substance of the

claim pleaded is frivolous on its face[.]’”) (quotation omitted).

VII. CONCLUSION

For these reasons, it is hereby

ORDERED that Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint, Dkt. No. 19, is sua sponte

DISMISSED without prejudice pursuant to Rule 12(h)(3), to the extent it challenges the

assessment and payment of local taxes against her property, and it is further

ORDERED that, to the extent any of the federal claims raised in Plaintiff's Second

Amended Complaint are not subject to dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction,

Defendants’ motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), Dkt. Nos. 31, 48, 52, are GRANTED, and

these claims are DISMISSED with prejudice pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim,

and it is further

ORDERED that the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff's

state-law claims, and those claims are DISMISSED without prejudice, and it is further

ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court is directed to enter judgment accordingly and close

this action.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 16, 2025

(ie

Elizabeth C. Coombe

U.S. District Judge

14