The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
NORTHERN DIVISION
SHA’OLA TERRELL, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Case No. 2:22-cv-00047-RAH
) [WO]
ALABAMA STATE UNIVERSITY, )
et al., )
)
Defendants. )
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
INTRODUCTION
On December 3, 2024, the Eleventh Circuit vacated1 this Court’s grant of
summary judgment to Defendants on Plaintiff Sha’ola Terrell’s sex discrimination
claims under the Equal Pay Act (EPA), 29 U.S.C. § 206(d), and the Clarke-Figures
Equal Pay Act (CFEPA), Ala. Code § 25-1-30, and remanded these two claims for
further proceedings in light of the Eleventh Circuit’s intervening decision in Baker
v. Upson Reg’l Med. Ctr., 94 F.4th 1312, 1317 (11th Cir. 2024) (per curiam). For
the reasons below, and after applying the appropriate burden as clarified in Baker,
Defendants’ summary judgment motion once again will be granted.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE
The Court has subject-matter jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28
U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343(a)(4), and supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claim
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). The parties do not contest personal jurisdiction or
venue, and the Court finds adequate allegations to support both. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1391.
1 The Eleventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment as to the EPA claim for retaliation and as to
the Title IX sex discrimination claim.
LEGAL STANDARD
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, a district court “shall grant
summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ.
P. 56(a). To demonstrate that a genuine dispute of material fact exists, a party
opposing a motion for summary judgment must cite “to particular parts of materials
in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information,
affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the
motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials.” Fed. R. Civ.
P. 56(c)(1)(A). “The court need consider only the cited materials, but it may
consider other materials in the record.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3). When considering
a summary judgment motion, a district court must view the evidence in the record
in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draw reasonable inferences
from that evidence in favor of the non-moving party. Sconiers v. Lockhart, 946 F.3d
1256, 1260 (11th Cir. 2020).
BACKGROUND
The underlying facts remain unchanged since the Court’s October 30, 2023,
order granting summary judgment to Defendants on all of Terrell’s claims.
In July 2018, Alabama State University (ASU) sought to fill the position of
Senior Associate Athletic Director for Internal Operations, a position that could be
held by a male or female. It budgeted and advertised a maximum annual salary of
$75,000 for the position. According to the vacancy announcement, the position
reported to the Director of Intercollegiate Athletics, supervised the Director of
Compliance, Compliance Coordinator, and other support staff, and assisted with
supervising head coaches for assigned sports.
Then-ASU Athletic Director Jennifer Williams contacted Plaintiff Sha’ola
Terrell about her interest in the position. Terrell voiced her interest, applied for the
position, and was offered it. Terrell accepted the offer, knowing it paid $75,000, and
began work on October 1, 2018. As had been advertised, she earned an annual salary
of $75,000.
From 2018 until she was terminated, Terrell also served as the Senior Woman
Administrator (SWA) for ASU’s athletic department, a National Collegiate Athletic
Association (NCAA) designation that individual colleges or universities may use “to
promote meaningful representation of women in the leadership and management of
college sports.” (Doc. 27-7 at 1.) This role required her to attend various athletic
conference and NCAA meetings, conferences, and events, complete reports, serve
on conference committees, and create development and equity programming and
plans. Terrell received no additional compensation for the SWA designation or the
duties and responsibilities that came with it, although ASU had budgeted $15,000
for the designation.2 In May 2021, Williams resigned effective July 16, 2021.
ASU hired Dr. Jason Cable as Athletic Director effective August 16, 2021.
Once aboard, Dr. Cable restructured the athletics department. This included the
elimination of the Senior Associate Athletic Director for Internal Operations position
and the distribution of those duties to other positions; revision of the duties of the
Deputy Director of Intercollegiate Athletics position held by Terrance Jones; and the
creation of a new position titled “Senior Associate Athletic Director/Chief of Staff.”
Cable also recommended that Terrell and Jones be non-reappointed. ASU hired
Jacqueline Freeman-Johnson (a female who previously reported to Terrell) to fill the
new Senior Associate Athletic Director/Chief of Staff role.
On January 25, 2022, Terrell filed suit.
DISCUSSION
The EPA prohibits wage discrimination on the basis of sex and “forbids the
specific practice of paying unequal wages for equal work to employees of the
opposite sex.” Miranda v. B & B Cash Grocery Store, Inc., 975 F.2d 1518, 1526
(11th Cir. 1992); 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1). As recently clarified by the Eleventh Circuit
in Baker v. Upson Reg’l Med. Ctr., 94 F.4th 1312, 1317 (11th Cir. 2024) (per
curiam), EPA claims are analyzed under a two-step framework.
Under the framework, to establish a prima facie case, a plaintiff must
demonstrate “that an employer pays different wages to employees of opposite sexes
‘for equal work on jobs the performance of which requires equal skill, effort, and
responsibility, and which are performed under similar working conditions.’”
Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 195 (1974) (quoting 29 U.S.C. §
206(d)). After a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden then shifts to the
employer to prove that the difference in pay is justified by one of the EPA’s four
exceptions: “(1) a seniority system; (2) a merit system; (3) a system which measures
2 The record does not reveal whether this budgeted amount was intended to cover salary or
expenses associated with the position such as travel expenses to many of the events that the
position-holder had to attend.
earnings by quantity or quality of production; or (4) a differential based on any factor
other than sex.” Baker, 94 F.4th at 1317 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Brock v. Ga. Sw. Coll., 765 F.2d 1026, 1036 (11th Cir. 1985)); see also 29 U.S.C. §
206(d)(1). The defendant bears the burden of proof for these exceptions because
they constitute affirmative defenses. Corning Glass Works, 417 U.S. at 196–97;
Gosa v. Bryce Hosp., 780 F.2d 917, 918 (11th Cir. 1986) (per curiam).
CFEPA is the state-law equivalent to the EPA. It prohibits Alabama
employers from “pay[ing] any of its employees at wage rates less than the rates paid
to employees of another sex or race for equal work,” unless “payment is made
pursuant to” (1) “[a] seniority system”; (2) “[a] merit system”; (3) “[a] system that
measures earnings by quantity or quality of production”; or (4) “[a] differential based
on any factor other than sex or race.” Ala. Code § 25-1-30(b). The Eleventh Circuit
has concluded that “it is appropriate to analyze a CFEPA claim similarly to an EPA
claim.” Williams v. Ala. State Univ., No. 23-12692, 2024 WL 5202087, at *4 (11th
Cir. Dec. 23, 2024).
A. Terrell’s Prima Facie Case
Terrell claims Defendants violated the EPA and the CFEPA by paying her
less than her male co-workers for equal or greater work. Terrell advances four
comparators, but mainly focuses on Terrance Jones, then-Deputy Director of
Intercollegiate Athletics. Terrell argues that wage discrimination occurred, in part,
because Jones was paid $20,000 more than her.
ASU argues that Terrance Jones is not a proper comparator because Terrell
and Jones held different positions and did not perform substantially similar work.
ASU also asserts that Jones’ position—Deputy Director of Intercollegiate
Athletics—performed contract administration, a key difference compared with
Terrell’s position.
The Court agrees that Jones is not a sufficient comparator. First, Terrell held
a different position from Jones. Terrell served as the Senior Associate Athletic
Director of Internal Operations while Jones served as the Deputy Director of
Intercollegiate Athletics. Even though both positions required the same
qualifications—a master’s degree, at least five years of relevant intercollegiate
athletics experience, demonstrated knowledge of the operation of intercollegiate
athletics programs, and a flexible work schedule—they are different positions.
Second, the two positions performed different duties. As the Deputy Director
of Intercollegiate Athletics, Jones’ job responsibilities included the following:
planning, implementation, administration, direction, and supervision of the Athletic
Department; providing daily operations management over the athletic programs and
projects, including administrative support for coaching staff; assisting in managing
the day-to-day operations of the Division of Athletics (Division) in contract
negotiations; reviewing all contracts concerning the Division; supervising coaching
staff and overseeing sports programs; representing ASU at institutional, conference,
and NCAA meetings; and serving on both the internal and external committees.
While as the Senior Associate Athletic Director of Internal Operations,
Terrell’s position reported to the Director of Intercollegiate Athletics and required
her to supervise the Director of Compliance, the Compliance Coordinator, and other
support staff; assist with supervising head coaches for assigned sports; evaluate
ASU’s efforts to maintain institutional control of the athletic program; make
appropriate recommendations to the Director and Deputy Director of Intercollegiate
Athletics regarding NCAA governance matters as well as NCAA, Southwestern
Athletic Conference, and institutional policies and legislation; oversee the day-to-
day operations of the compliance, athletic academic advising, sports medicine, and
strength and conditioning departments; serve as liaison for all eligibility functions
and processes including the eligibility certification process; and serve “as an athletic
contact for Authorized Eligibility Signature in the office of the Deans, Registrar, and
Financial Aid, and perform other duties as assigned.” (Doc. 23-21.) Also, Terrell
served as ASU’s SWA, a role for which ASU budgeted $15,000 but for which she
did not receive compensation.
Given the different job positions and the responsibilities attendant to each, the
Court finds that Terrell has failed to satisfy “the heavy burden of proving ‘substantial
identity of job functions’” between her and Jones. Waters v. Turner, Wood & Smith
Ins. Agency, Inc., 874 F.2d 797, 799 (11th Cir. 1989) (citation omitted). It is true
that Jones received a higher salary and shared some similar responsibilities
compared with Terrell. These responsibilities included supervising other
individuals, representing ASU’s athletic department, and engaging in managerial
and supervisory responsibilities within the athletic department. Even so, broad
similarities between a fraction of the comparator’s job and plaintiff’s job are
inadequate. ASU’s Deputy Director of Intercollegiate Athletics position held
broader and different managerial and supervisory responsibilities compared with the
Senior Associate Athletic Director of Internal Operations position. Ultimately,
Terrell fails to sufficiently show that her position as Senior Associate Athletic
Director of Internal Operations required equal skill, effort, and responsibility to
perform as Jones who held the position of Deputy Director of Intercollege Athletics.
See Miranda, 975 F.3d at 1533.
As for the argument that Terrell had more responsibilities than Jones because
of the SWA designation, the SWA designation only further distances Jones as a
proper comparator. None of the evidence suggests that Jones had a similar
designation.
As a result, Jones is not a proper comparator for purposes of establishing a
prima facie case for wage discrimination under the EPA and CFEPA.
To a much lesser extent, Terrell advances Lonnie Brown, Ronald Brown, and
Derrick Magee as comparators. They are not.
First, as to Lonnie Brown, Terrell admits that ASU paid Brown $75,000
annually—the same salary as Terrell—and “had far less work and responsibilities.”
(Doc. 25-1 at 12.) As such, Terrell has not shown that ASU paid Lonnie Brown
more for equal work, and she has conceded their respective jobs did not require equal
skill, effort, and responsibility under similar working conditions. Working less for
the same pay does not make an individual an appropriate comparator. See Blackman
v. Fla. Dep’t of Bus. & Pro. Regul., 599 F. App’x 907, 910 (11th Cir. 2015) (per
curiam) (concluding that a male was not an appropriate comparator for a female
plaintiff because of dissimilarity in job responsibilities, even though the male
comparator was her subordinate, was paid more, and worked less). Accordingly,
Lonnie Brown is not an appropriate comparator.
Second, as for Ronald Brown, Terrell makes similar concessions as she does
with Lonnie Brown. Specifically, she concedes that Ronald Brown reported to
Terrell and “had far less work and responsibilities.” (Doc. 25-1 at 12.) Although
ASU paid Ronald Brown a higher salary,3 Terrell again concedes their respective
jobs did not require equal skill, effort, and responsibility under similar working
conditions. Therefore, Ronald Brown is also not an appropriate comparator.
Third and finally, Terrell states that Derrick Magee earned a salary of $75,000
and “had far less responsibilities than [her] position” while she “had significantly
3 According to ASU, Brown received a higher salary than Terrell because a “reversion was not
made by payroll[,] and Brown continued to receive the Assistant Vice President salary after
February 6, 2015[,] until his non-reappointment from the University.” (Doc. 44 at 6 n.2) (citation
omitted).)
more responsibilities” compared to Magee. (Doc. 25-1 at 12–13.) Here again,
Terrell fails to show that ASU paid Magee more for equal work, and she concedes
that their jobs did not require equal skill, effort, and responsibility under similar
working conditions. (Doc. 46 at 2.) Magee is not an appropriate comparator.
Terrell failed to establish that ASU paid different wages to employees of
opposite sexes for equal work on jobs the performance of which requires equal skill,
effort, and responsibility, and which are performed under similar working
conditions. Terrell therefore has failed to make out a prima facie case for wage
discrimination on the basis of sex under either the EPA or CFEPA. As a result,
ASU’s motion for summary judgment is due to be granted as to these two claims.
B. ASU’s Affirmative Defense
Even if Terrell had made a prima facie case for wage discrimination under
both the EPA and CFEPA, ASU is still due summary judgment because of ASU’s
affirmative defense—it relied on a “factor other than sex” in determining Terrell’s
salary. Baker, 94 F.4th at 1317 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Brock
v. Ga. Sw. Coll., 765 F.2d at 1036). Specifically, ASU argues that Terrell’s salary
was not based upon gender because “the salary was pre-determined and advertised
based upon ASU’s budget.” (Doc. 44 at 7.) That is, the position was budgeted and
advertised at $75,000, that males and females equally could apply for it, and that
Terrell applied for and accepted the position knowing that it paid $75,000 annually.
The “any factor other than sex” affirmative defense to a wage discrimination
claim under the EPA is a “broad” and “catch-all exception.” Corning Glass Works,
417 U.S. at 198, 204. Factors “other than sex” include (1) “unique characteristics of
the same job;” (2) “an individual’s experience, training, or ability;” or (3) “special
exigent circumstances connected with the business.” Glenn v. Gen. Motors Corp.,
841 F.2d 1567, 1571 (11th Cir. 1988). “So long as subjective business justifications
. . . are not overly subjective so as to render them incapable of being rebutted, they
are legitimate factors to be considered.” Schwartz v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 954 F.2d
620, 623 (11th Cir. 1991) (per curiam) (citation omitted).
The Court finds that ASU has sufficiently met the “any factor other than sex”
affirmative defense, a defense for which it bears the burden of proof. Corning Glass
Works, 417 U.S. at 196–97. ASU’s business justifications “are not overly
subjective,” Schwartz, 954 F.2d at 623, because Terrell’s salary was pre-determined
(before Terrell even applied for it) and budgeted, was publicly advertised for any
prospective applicant to see—males and females alike—and Terrell applied for and
accepted the position knowing that it paid only $75,000. In fact, two of Terrell’s
proposed male comparators—Brown and Magee—also held positions paying the
same pre-determined, budged salary amount of $75,000. As such, ASU is also
entitled to summary judgment on Terrell’s wage discrimination claims under the
EPA and CFEPA because it has sufficiently met the “any factor other than sex”
affirmative defense. Baker, 94 F.4th at 1317 (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting Brock v. Ga. Sw. Coll., 765 F.2d at 1036).
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, it is ORDERED as follows:
(1) The Motion for Summary Judgment (doc. 21), as applicable to Counts
One and Two, is due to be and is hereby GRANTED.
(2) Plaintiff Sha’ola Terrell’s wage discrimination claims under the Equal
Pay Act (EPA), 29 U.S.C. § 206(d), and the Clarke-Figures Equal Pay Act (CFEPA),
Ala. Code § 25-1-30, are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
(3) A separate judgment will issue.
DONE, on this the 16th day of June 2025.
R. Ll Lon JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
* As for the SWA designation, any more money that may be owed as part of the designation relates
to Terrell’s prima facie case for wage discrimination. As discussed above, there is no indication
in the record Jones received any similar designation.