Fenderson v. Munoz

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

PEORIA DIVISION

AMOS FENDERSON, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Case No.: 1:24-cv-01200-JEH

)

)

CRISTIAN MUNOZ, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

Order

This cause is before the Court on Defendants Zachary Behrends, Cristian

Munoz, and Kristine Pierson’s motion for summary judgment.

I

A

Despite being provided with a notice from the Court advising him of the

consequences for failing to respond to Defendants’ motion for summary

judgment, Plaintiff has failed to respond to Defendants’ motion for summary

judgment, and the deadline for him to do so under the Local Rule has now passed.

As a result, Plaintiff has failed to submit any evidence with which to create a

genuine issue of material fact sufficient to defeat Defendants’ motion for summary

judgment.

Local Rule 7.1(D)(2)(b)(6) provides that “[a] failure to respond to any

numbered fact [contained within a motion for summary judgment] will be deemed

an admission of the fact.” Id. Therefore, Plaintiff has admitted all of the relevant

facts that show that Defendants are entitled to summary judgment, and the Court

incorporates those facts herein. Parra v. Neal, 614 F.3d 635, 636 (7th Cir. 2010), as

revised (July 19, 2010) (internal citations omitted) (“At summary judgment, the

plaintiffs filed an opposition to the defendants’ motion but did not bother to

respond to their statement of material facts. The district court thus accepted the

defendants’ statement of material facts as true. We do as well.”).

Despite Plaintiff’s failure to respond, the Court is cognizant that

“[s]ummary judgment cannot be granted by default even if there is a complete

failure to respond to the motion.” Boyd v. Habeck, 2013 WL 518966, * 1 (E.D. Wis.

Feb. 12, 2013) (citing Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 56(e) advisory committee note to 2010

amendments). Accordingly, the Court has reviewed the evidence submitted by

Defendants in order to determine whether a genuine issue of material fact exists

that would preclude summary judgment in Defendants’ favor. The Court finds

that no such disputed fact exists and that Defendants are entitled to judgment as

a matter of law. Abbot v. Gale, 896 F.2d 323, 326 (8th Cir. 1990) (holding that where

a defendant denies the allegations of the complaint and a plaintiff then fails “to

respond with evidence in support of [her] claim,” the court is justified in granting

summary judgment).

B

With that in mind, the undisputed facts demonstrate the following. On

September 5, 2023, Plaintiff Amos Fenderson was booked into the Peoria County

Jail (the Jail) after being arrested for (allegedly) sexually assaulting two employees

at the OSF Saint Francis Medical Center earlier that day. After intake and

processing, Plaintiff was placed on suicide watch because the arresting officers

had noted Plaintiff’s suicidal ideation on his booking slip.

The following morning, Plaintiff claimed to have “swallowed a battery.”

Based upon his representation that he had swallowed a battery, medical

professionals at the Jail examined Plaintiff, but they determined that no medical

intervention was necessary. For the remainder of the day, the staff at the Jail

regularly monitored Plaintiff.

On September 7, 2023, Plaintiff underwent a medical intake review with the

Jail’s medical staff. As noted supra, Plaintiff had initially reported that he had

swallowed batteries, but Plaintiff subsequently reported that he had swallowed

batteries, dice, and baggies with white, brown, and black powder. Plaintiff made

these allegations despite the fact that he had no access to these items while he was

in the Jail. As before, the Jail’s medical staff did not recommend any medical

intervention; rather, the plan was to continue to monitor Plaintiff for signs of any

abnormal physical issues.

Later that day, Plaintiff was seen for a follow-up examination by the Jail’s

medical staff. During this examination, the medical staff did not note that Plaintiff

had or was suffering from any apparent medical issues. Moreover, Plaintiff did

not report to the Jail’s medical staff that he was suffering from any adverse effects

related to any object(s) that he had purportedly swallowed.

On May 30, 2024, Plaintiff filed this case under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that

the named Defendants violated his Constitutional rights when he was detained at

the Jail in early September 2023. Before the Court had the opportunity to conduct

a merit review of Plaintiff’s Complaint, that is required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915A,

Plaintiff filed a motion seeking leave to file an Amended Complaint. Therefore,

the Court conducted a merit review of Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint and found

that his Amended Complaint stated a medical claim in violation of his Fourteenth

Amendment Due Process rights against Jail Superintendent Kristine Pierson, Jail

Sergeant Cristian Munoz, and Jail Correctional Officer Zachary Behrends.1

Defendants have now moved for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s Due Process

claim against them.

II

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) provides that summary judgment shall

be granted if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material

fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a);

Ruiz-Rivera v. Moyer, 70 F.3d 498, 500-01 (7th Cir. 1995). The moving party has the

burden of providing proper documentary evidence to show the absence of a

genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986).

Once the moving party has met its burden, the opposing party must come forward

with specific evidence, not mere allegations or denials of the pleadings, which

demonstrates that there is a genuine issue for trial. Gracia v. Volvo Europa Truck,

N.V., 112 F.3d 291, 294 (7th Cir. 1997). “[A] party moving for summary judgment

can prevail just by showing that the other party has no evidence on an issue on

which that party has the burden of proof.” Brazinski v. Amoco Petroleum Additives

Co., 6 F.3d 1176, 1183 (7th Cir. 1993).

Accordingly, the non-movant cannot rest on the pleadings alone, but must

designate specific facts in affidavits, depositions, answers to interrogatories or

admissions that establish that there is a genuine triable issue; he must do more

than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material fact.

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 261 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting)

1 According to the allegations contained within his Amended Complaint, Plaintiff

told Superintendent Pierson, Sgt. Munoz, and C/O Behrends that he had

swallowed foreign objects and that he was in pain as a result, but none of these

three individuals took any actions to help him.

(quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986));

Hot Wax, Inc. v. Turtle Wax, Inc., 191 F.3d 813, 818 (7th Cir. 1999). Finally, a scintilla

of evidence in support of the non-movant’s position is not sufficient to oppose

successfully a summary judgment motion; “there must be evidence on which the

jury could reasonably find for the [non-movant].” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252.

III

A

As the Court explained in the Merit Review Order, Plaintiff was a pretrial

detainee during the relevant time, and therefore, Plaintiff’s medical claim against

Defendants arises under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.

Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 135 S. Ct. 2466, 2475 (2015). “[M]edical-care claims brought

by pretrial detainees under the Fourteenth Amendment are subject only to the

objective unreasonableness inquiry identified in Kingsley.” Miranda v. County of

Lake, 900 F.3d 335, 352 (7th Cir. 2018) (citing Kingsley, 576 U.S. 389 (2015) (“[P]retrial

detainees (unlike convicted prisoners) cannot be punished at all, much less

‘maliciously and sadistically.’” (citations omitted)); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535

(1979) (“For under the Due Process Clause, a detainee may not be punished prior

to an adjudication of guilt in accordance with due process of law.”)).

In evaluating a detainee’s medical care claim, “[t]he first step . . . ‘asks

whether the medical defendants acted purposefully, knowingly, or perhaps even

recklessly when they considered the consequences of their handling of [the

plaintiff’s] case.’” McCann v. Ogle County, Illinois, 909 F.3d 881, 886 (7th Cir. 2018)

(quoting Miranda, 900 F.3d at 353). The second step asks, “whether the challenged

conduct was objectively reasonable.” Id. “This standard requires courts to focus on

the totality of facts and circumstances faced by the individual alleged to have

provided inadequate medical care and to gauge objectively—without regard to

any subjective belief held by the individual—whether the response was

reasonable.” Id.; Huertas v. Milwaukee County Common Counsel, 2020 WL 819273, *

4 (E.D. Wis. Feb. 19, 2020).

In particular, the denial of medical care for an objectively serious medical

condition violates a pretrial detainee’s due process rights if it is “objectively

unreasonable” in the totality of the facts and circumstances, and if jail personnel

act “purposefully, knowingly, or perhaps even recklessly when they consider[ ]

the consequences of their handling of [the detainee’s] case.” Miranda, 900 F.3d at

353-54. The required mental state is more than mere negligence but “less than

subjective intent—something akin to reckless disregard” for the detainee’s serious

medical needs. Id. (quoting Gordon v. County of Orange, 888 F.3d 1118, 1125 (9th Cir.

2018). A medical professional may show this level of reckless disregard for a

serious health risk without “literally ignor[ing]” the detainee. Sherrod v. Lingle, 223

F.3d 605, 611-12 (7th Cir. 2000) (explaining, in Eighth Amendment context, that a

prison official may exhibit “disregard of a serious risk” if, for example, “a patient

faces a serious risk of appendicitis, [and] the prison official gives the patient an

aspirin and an enema and sends him back to his cell”). The detainee can prove that

the medical professional had the requisite mental state by proving that he received

treatment “‘so inadequate that . . . no minimally competent professional would

have so responded under those circumstances.’” McWilliams v. Cook County, 2018

WL 3970145, * 9-10 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 20, 2018) (quoting Collignon v. Milwaukee County,

163 F.3d 982, 989 (7th Cir. 1998)).

“Put another way, the treatment must have been ‘so far afield of accepted

professional standards as to raise the inference that it was not actually based on a

medical judgment.’” McWilliams, 2018 WL 3970145, at * 10 (quoting Norfleet v.

Webster, 439 F.3d 392, 395-96 (7th Cir. 2006)). “If a ‘need for specialized expertise

either was known by the treating physicians or would have been obvious to a lay

person, then the obdurate refusal to engage specialists permits an inference that a

medical provider was deliberately indifferent to the inmate’s condition.’”

McWilliams, 2018 WL 3970145, at * 10 (quoting Pyles v. Fahim, 771 F.3d 403, 412 (7th

Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Smith v. Kapotas, 2020 WL 553619, *

3–4 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 4, 2020).

B

As noted supra, Plaintiff failed to respond to Defendants’ motion for

summary judgment, and therefore, he has admitted all of the facts contained

within Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. These facts show that Plaintiff

was evaluated—more than once—by the Jail’s medical staff after he represented

that he had swallowed a foreign object(s). Each time, the Jail’s medical staff

determined that no medical intervention was necessary.

Moreover, because Plaintiff had suicidal ideations when he arrived at the

Jail, the Jail’s staff monitored Plaintiff throughout the night of his arrival and the

next day after he claimed to have swallowed a foreign object(s). However, at no

time did Plaintiff appear to be in any medical distress. Therefore, even if Plaintiff

told Defendants that he had swallowed a foreign object(s) and even if he had

reported to them that he was in pain, the Jail’s medical staff evaluated Plaintiff on

at least two occasions based upon his self-reporting of swallowing objects and of

being in pain and determined that no medical intervention was necessary.

Therefore, Defendants cannot be said to have acted objectively unreasonably

under the undisputed facts of this case, which is necessary for Plaintiff to proceed

on and to prevail on his Due Process claim against them.

IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED:

1. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment [27] is GRANTED.

2. Accordingly, the Clerk of the Court is directed to enter judgment,

with prejudice, in Defendants Zachary Behrends, Cristian Munoz, and Kristine

Pierson’s favor and against Plaintiff.

3. In addition, the Clerk of the Court is directed to enter judgment,

without prejudice, in all other named Defendants’ favor and against Plaintiff.

4. All other pending motions are denied as moot, and this case is

terminated. All deadlines and settings on the Court’s calendar are vacated.

5. If he wishes to appeal this judgment, Plaintiff must file a notice of

appeal with this Court within thirty (30) days of the entry of judgment. Fed. R.

App. P. 4(a)(4).

6. If he wishes to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal, Plaintiff’s

motion for leave to appeal in forma pauperis must identify the issues that he will

present on appeal to assist the Court in determining whether the appeal is taken

in good faith. Fed. R. App. P. 24(a)(1)(c); Celske v. Edwards, 164 F.3d 396, 398 (7th

Cir. 1999) (an appellant should be given an opportunity to submit a statement

of his grounds for appealing so that the district judge “can make a responsible

assessment of the issue of good faith.”); Walker v. O’Brien, 216 F.3d 626, 632 (7th

Cir. 2000) (providing that a good faith appeal is an appeal that “a reasonable

person could suppose . . . has some merit” from a legal perspective).

7. If he chooses to appeal, Plaintiff will be liable for the $605.00

appellate filing fee regardless of the outcome of the appeal.

It is so ordered.

Entered: May 14, 2025

s/Jonathan E. Hawley

U.S. District Judge