Partee v. Ali

IN THE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

PEORIA DIVISION

JACOB PARTEE,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 1:25-cv-01197-JEH-RLH

RITA ALI, an individual,

Defendant.

Order

Now before the Court is the Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma

pauperis (D. 2), along with his Complaint (D. 1).1 For the reasons set forth, infra, the

Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis (D. 2) is DENIED and his

Complaint (D. 1) is dismissed with leave to amend within twenty-one days if he

believes he can state a claim in accordance with this Order.

I

Plaintiff pro se, Jacob Partee, commenced this action on May 21, 2025, and

filed with it a Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis. (D. 1 & 2). The matter

is now fully briefed.

II

“The federal in forma pauperis statute, [28 U.S.C. § 1915], is designed to

ensure that indigent litigants have meaningful access to the federal courts.” Neitzke

v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324 (1989). Section 1915(e) directs a court to screen a

complaint when filed together with a request to proceed in forma pauperis. Luevano

v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 722 F.3d 1014, 1022 (7th Cir. 2013). As part of that process,

1 Citations to the electronic docket are abbreviated as “D. ___ at ECF p. ___.”

a court shall dismiss a case at any time if: 1) the allegation of poverty is untrue; 2)

the action is frivolous or malicious; 3) the action fails to state a claim on which

relief may be granted; or 4) the action seeks monetary relief against an immune

defendant. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). However, for the reasons set forth below, even

if the Court were to find the Plaintiff is unable to pay the filing fee, his Complaint

must be dismissed for failing to state a claim on which relief may be granted.

A

The Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard applies when

determining whether a complaint fails to state a claim under Section

1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). Coleman v. Lab. & Indus. Rev. Comm’n of Wis., 860 F.3d 461, 468

(7th Cir. 2017). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) provides that a complaint

must include “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is

entitled to relief”. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). A “complaint must contain sufficient

factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its

face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,

550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A plaintiff “must give enough details about the subject-

matter of the case to present a story that holds together.” Swanson v. Citibank, N.A.,

614 F.3d 400, 404 (7th Cir. 2010). And while the Court is obligated to construe pro

se complaints liberally, See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007), “[t]he

protections built in the in forma pauperis system would be meaningless if persons

were allowed to proceed in forma pauperis with complaints that do not supply

sufficient facts from which a reasonable inference could be made that the rights of

the petitioner were violated.” Smith-Bey v. Hosp. Adm’r, 841 F.2d 751, 758 (7th Cir.

1988).

B

Plaintiff alleges one cause of action against Rita Ali, as the Mayor of the City

of Peoria, and is suing her in her individual capacity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for

retaliation under the First Amendment. (D. 1 at ECF p. 2). In support of his claim,

the Plaintiff states as follows. “On or about March 16, 2025, Plaintiff submitted

lawful Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests and sent respectful

correspondence to Defendant Ali regarding matters of government transparency

and local governance.” Id. Plaintiff claims that this constituted protected activity

under the First Amendment. Id. Plaintiff further alleges that, “[i]n response,

Defendant Rita Ali, from her personal email account (ritaalipeoria@gmail.com),

sent an unsolicited and disparaging message to Plaintiff” in which she allegedly

stated:

You are not sincere. You are submitting FOIA requests

attempting to find something inappropriate. You will not

find it because it is not there. Again, stop playing games

and grow up. You are not my constituent yet you

continue to interfere. I tried to work with you but you

have continued to reveal your devious intentions.

Farewell.

Id. at ECF p. 5.

Plaintiff states that this email was not sent in the Defendant’s official

capacity or in furtherance of a legitimate government function, rather, he claims

that it was “personally retaliatory” and “stemmed from Defendant’s animus

toward Plaintiff’s protected activities.” Id. at ECF p. 2. Further, Plaintiff claims the

message’s characterization of Plaintiff’s activities as “games” and “interference”

was designed to demean and discourage further participation, such that it would

“deter a person of ordinary firmness from continuing to engage in similar

protected speech and petitioning activities.” Id. at ECF p. 2-3. As a result, Plaintiff

claims he suffered emotional distress, reputational harm, anxiety and humiliation,

and a chilling effect on his civic engagement and seeks compensatory damages of

up to $25,000, as well as punitive damages, costs, and injunctive or declaratory

relief. Id. at ECF p. 4.

C

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege he was

deprived of a federal right, privilege, or immunity by any person acting under

color of state law. Brown v. Budz, 398 F.3d 904, 908 (7th Cir. 2005). In this case,

Plaintiff alleges that the Defendant, as Mayor, acted under color of state law but

outside of the scope of her legitimate duties. (D. 1 at ECF p. 3). He further states

the alleged message constitutes First Amendment retaliation. Id. To establish a

First Amendment retaliation claim, a plaintiff must show three elements. Holleman

v. Zatecky, 951 F.3d 873, 878 (7th Cir. 2020) (citing Bridges v. Gilbert, 557 F.3d 541,

546 (7th Cir. 2009)). “First, he must show he engaged in First Amendment

Protected Activity. Second, he must show an adverse action was taken against

him. Third, he must show his protected conduct was at least a motivating factor of

the adverse action.” Id. To that end, Plaintiff asserts that he engaged in First

Amendment activity by submitting FOIA requests and that the Mayor’s alleged

email constituted a retaliatory and adverse action that was motivated by the

Plaintiff’s protected activity. (D. at ECF p. 3). Finally, Plaintiff states that the

Defendant’s conduct would chill a person of ordinary firmness from exercising

their First Amendment rights. Id.

Assuming as true that the Plaintiff’s activities satisfy the first and third

elements of a First Amendment retaliation claim, his claim fails as to the second

element. “The standard for determining whether an action is sufficiently adverse

to constitute retaliation is well established: it must be ‘likely [to] deter a person of

ordinary firmness from continuing to engage in protected activity.’” Holleman, 951

F.3d at 880. “This is an objective standard; it does not hinge on the personal

experience of the plaintiff.” Id. In this case, the alleged message from Mayor Ali

does not constitute an adverse action. In the message, she states, “You are not

sincere. You are submitting FOIA requests attempting to find something

inappropriate . . . Again, stop playing games and grow up. You are not my

constituent yet you continue to interfere. I tried to work with you but you have

continued to reveal your devious intentions. Farewell.” (D. 1 at ECF p. 5).

Critically, the email is devoid of any threat or adverse action. Instead, it appears

to be a statement of opinion about the Plaintiff’s activities. Nor would a single

isolated email, without more, deter a person of ordinary firmness from continuing

to engage in protected activity. Holleman, 951 F.3d at 880. Juxtaposing the instant

facts alongside the case law on First Amendment retaliation and what constitutes

an adverse action make this point clear. See Hodgkins ex rel. Hodgkins v. Peterson,

355 F.3d 1048, 1056 (7th Cir. 2004) (observing the threat of arrest is enough); Bart

v. Telford, 677 F.2d 622, 625 (7th Cir. 1982) (observing a campaign of harassment,

though trivial in detail, may have been substantial in gross); Muller v. Conlisk, 429

F.2d 901, 903 (7th Cir. 1970) (observing the threat of sanctions may constitute a

First Amendment injury); Whalen v. Mackenzie, 760 F. Supp. 3d 743, 751 (W.D. Wisc.

2024) (observing several courts have held being cut or suspended from a sports

team can qualify as retaliation); Hoffman v. Dewitt Cnty., 176 F. Supp. 3d 795, 807

(C.D. Ill. 2016) (observing termination of employment makes up a large number of

First Amendment retaliation cases); Chrzanowski v. Bianchi, 122 F. Supp. 3d. 755,

764 (N.D. Ill. 2015) (observing, in some circumstances, investigation could be a

retaliatory action). In this case, the Mayor did not threaten to cutoff the Plaintiff’s

FOIA access, engage in a campaign of harassment against him, or otherwise

threaten to sanction him in any form. This is not enough. For that reason, the

Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to

‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

As a result, the claim is dismissed without prejudice for failing to state a claim

upon which relief can be granted.

III

For the reasons stated, supra, the Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Proceed in

forma pauperis (D. 2) is DENIED and his Complaint against the Defendant (D. 1) is

dismissed with leave to amend within twenty-one days if he believes he can state

a claim in accordance with this Order.

It is so ordered.

Entered on June 11, 2025

s/Jonathan E. Hawley

U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE