Moore v. DCFS Child and Family Services

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

DEMETRIUS D. MOORE,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 3:24-CV-01697-NJR

DCFS CHILD AND FAMILY SERVICES,

MIA GULLEY,

DAVID BONE, UNKNOWN PARTY 1,

UNKNOWN PARTY 2, AMANDA

JANSEN, UNKNOWN PARTY 3,

UNKNOWN PARTY 4, and

MICHAEL BOYD,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

ROSENSTENGEL, Chief Judge:

Plaintiff Demetrius D. Moore, proceeding pro se, filed this action alleging that the

Illinois Department of Children and Family Services (“DCFS”) and others violated his right

to privacy as protected by the Fourth Amendment and his due process and equal protection

rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. (Doc. 3). Moore also makes various state

law claims under the Illinois Parentage Act of 2015, 750 ILCS 46/101 et seq., and the Illinois

Constitution’s privacy clause, along with claims pertaining to his right to be free from

infliction of unnecessary harm and DCFS’s failure to conform to its own customs, policies,

and practices. (Id.).

This matter is now before the Court on Moore’s Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma

pauperis (“IFP”). (Doc. 4). Normally, the fee for filing a complaint and opening a civil case is

$405.00. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1), however, an indigent party may commence a federal

court action without paying required costs and fees by submitting an affidavit asserting their

inability to pay the fees, the nature of the action, and the affiant’s belief that they are entitled

to redress. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). Destitution is not required to proceed without prepaying

fees or costs; an affidavit demonstrating that the plaintiff cannot, because of his poverty,

provide himself with the necessities of life is sufficient. Adkins v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours &

Co., 335 U.S. 331, 339–40 (1948).

Here, the Court is satisfied from Moore’s affidavit that he is indigent. Moore asserts

that he is unemployed, is currently in jail, and has no monthly wages or other source of

income. (Doc. 4). In terms of assets, Moore attests to having no savings, cars, real estate, or

other property. (Id.). Moore lists no dependents, debts, or other financial obligations. (Id.).

Based on the provided financial information, the Court finds that Moore is indigent under

28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1), and thus, grants his Motion for Leave to Proceed IFP. (Doc. 4).

Because Moore has been permitted to proceed without prepayment of the filing fee, the

Court must now screen Moore’s Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and dismiss the

complaint if it is clearly frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim, or is a claim for money

damages against an immune defendant. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see also Hoskins v. Poelstra, 320

F.3d 761, 763 (7th Cir. 2003) (“District judges have ample authority to dismiss frivolous or

transparently defective suits spontaneously, and thus save everyone time and legal expense.”).

Thus, the next step is to examine the allegations in the Complaint.

LEGAL STANDARD

The undersigned is mindful that courts construe pro se claims generously. Buechel v.

United States, 746 F.3d 753, 758 (7th Cir. 2014). Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a), a

complaint must include: (1) a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court’s

jurisdiction; (2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the plaintiff is entitled

to relief; and (3) a demand for the relief sought. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a). The Court accepts the

factual allegations as true, liberally construing them in the plaintiff’s favor. Turley v. Rednour,

729 F.3d 645, 649, 651 (7th Cir. 2013). Conclusory statements and labels, however, are not

enough. The complaint must allege enough facts to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on

its face.” Alexander v. United States, 721 F.3d 418, 422-23 (7th Cir. 2013). That means “a plaintiff

must do better than putting a few words on paper that, in the hands of an imaginative reader,

might suggest that something has happened to her that might be redressed by the law.”

Swanson v. Citibank, N.A., 614 F.3d 400, 403 (7th Cir. 2010). Instead, “the plaintiff must give

enough details about the subject-matter of the case to present a story that holds together.” Id.

at 404.

THE COMPLAINT

In his 64-page Complaint, Moore narrates a troubling and complicated history

regarding the guardianship of his newborn son and his relationship with his son’s mother,

Cierra Whitley. First, his son was born in February 2023 and tested positive for cocaine at

birth, which required an additional week’s stay at the hospital. (Doc. 3, pp. 9-10). After the

birth, Moore and Whitley signed a voluntary acknowledgement of paternity (“VAP”)

indicating that Moore was the biological father, without any genetic testing. (Id.). Whitley

abandoned the baby and left the hospital after two days. (Id.). Before his son was released, a

DCFS caseworker investigated Moore’s home. (Id. at p. 11). A hearing was held in St. Clair

County Circuit Court regarding custody, and Moore’s son was discharged from the hospital

and released to him. (Id. at pp. 13-14). At his request, Moore’s close friend provided both care

and a home to Moore’s son, because Moore lacked the capacity to tend to a newborn by

himself. (Id. at p. 17). Shortly after the baby was released from the hospital, a new DCFS

caseworker, Defendant Mia Gully, began working Moore’s case. (Id. at pp. 15-23). Moore

makes many allegations against Gully as to her lack of professionalism, inappropriate

conduct, retaliation, lack of boundaries, falsification of records, and practice of breaking

confidentiality and DCFS rules that played out over the following months. (Id. at pp. 15-23,

40-53, 57-58).

Around the time of his son’s birth, Moore sought custody of his teenage cousin whose

mother recently passed away. (Id. at pp. 11-13). His teenage cousin also stayed with his close

friend at that time. (Id. at p. 12). According to the Complaint, Whitley also asked Moore to

care for her older son (“A.Q.”) who had no biological relation to Moore. (Id. at p. 18). At

Whitley’s request, Moore temporarily took in A.Q. in April 2023. (Id. at p. 24). A.Q. seemed

to do well at first, but after school let out in May 2023, he began to cause issues in the home.

(Id. at pp. 24-43). Moore detailed many concerning incidents with A.Q., which escalated in

June 2023 after Moore assumed full custody of A.Q. (Id. at pp. 32-34). For example, A.Q. ran

away for two days, so Moore took his phone and discovered disturbing images of A.Q.

posing with guns. (Id. at pp. 35-36). A.Q. became increasingly angry with Moore, and tension

grew between Whitley and Moore too. (Id. at pp. 36-39).

Eventually, on June 21, 2023, A.Q. reported to DCFS that Moore sexually abused him.

(Id. at pp. 39-46). Moore avers that Whitley and A.Q. conspired to concoct this story in an

attempt to deprive Moore of the custody of his newborn son. (Id. at pp. 39-41). The allegations

were initially investigated by DCFS investigator Defendant Michael Boyd, and later by

Defendant Amanda Jansen. (Id. at pp. 40-46, 52-53). A.Q. also spoke with State of Illinois and

East St. Louis police officers regarding his allegations. (Id. at p. 43). A neglect hearing was

held sometime in summer 2023. (Id. at pp. 45-46). In August 2023, Whitley and A.Q.

apparently shot up Moore’s home and, on the same evening, the pair proceeded to commit

two murders for which they were later arrested. (Id. at pp. 48-50, 58).

Eventually, in October 2023, Moore was arrested on a probation violation and then

charged with 12 counts of sexual assault related to A.Q.’s allegations (Id. at pp. 52-53). Moore

expresses dissatisfaction with the investigation by DCFS investigators, Boyd and Jansen, into

these allegations because he claims that the investigators declined to question his suggested

witnesses, and they closed the investigation without a fair, truthful, or thorough process. (Id.

at pp. 40-43, 52-53). While in jail in May 2024, Moore attended a video conference with two

unknown DCFS caseworkers who advised him that a paternity test had been conducted on

his infant son, and he was not the biological father. (Id. at pp. 53-54). Despite being told of a

hearing later that month regarding his son’s paternity, Moore was never brought to court,

and his attorney, Defendant David Bone, refused to visit Moore to inform him of what was

going on in that matter. (Id. at pp. 54-55).

The Complaint includes seven counts for relief and seeks compensatory damages. (Id.

at pp. 59-63). Moore accuses Defendant DCFS, the Circuit Court of St. Clair County, and his

attorney in the custody matter, Defendant Bone, with failing to provide notice of the

proceeding and an opportunity to be heard, failing to provide notice of a paternity test, and

failing to lawfully obtain a DNA sample from him or his infant son for testing in violation of

the Illinois Parentage Act, 750 ILCS 46/101 et seq., and the Illinois Constitution’s privacy

clause. (Id. at pp. 53-57, 59-61). As to Defendant Gully, Moore asserts that she violated his

right to be free from infliction of unnecessary harm by failing to report information to police

that caused his house to be shot up and caused him to be chased at gunpoint by another

person. (Id. at p. 61). Moreover, Moore alleges that Gully violated his right to privacy under

the Fourth Amendment in her role as a DCFS caseworker by inappropriately disclosing

information about his case to others, including A.Q. and his family. (Id. at pp. 62-63). Moore

also brings due process and equal protection claims against both child protective

investigators, Defendants Boyd and Jansen, for failure to investigate the case successfully,

failure to question his suggested witnesses, and ultimately causing his house to be shot up

and a false report to be entered against him. (Id. at p. 62). Lastly, Moore asserts a claim against

DCFS for their policies and practices and to hold them accountable for the conduct of their

employees. (Id. at p. 63).

DISCUSSION

After careful review of the Complaint, the Court does not find a basis for a federal

cause of action. While Moore alludes to several of his constitutional rights—privacy, due

process, and equal protection—his allegations do not substantiate an actionable deprivation

of any of these rights. Without any federal claim, even if Moore states a claim under state-

law, the Court has no basis to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over those claims, as

explained further below.

First, as to the claims against DCFS, it is well-settled that “Congress, in passing

[42 U.S.C.] § 1983, had no intention to disturb the States’ Eleventh Amendment immunity.”

Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 66 (1989). And “a state agency is the state for

purposes of the eleventh amendment.” Kroll v. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ill., 934 F.2d 904, 907 (7th

Cir. 1991). DCFS is a state agency and is subject to the sovereign immunity afforded in the

Eleventh Amendment.1 See Brunken v. Lance, 807 F.2d 1325, 1330 (7th Cir. 1986); see also Woods

v. Ill. Dep’t of Children and Family Servs., 710 F.3d 762, 764 (7th Cir. 2013). Illinois has not

waived its sovereign immunity with respect to § 1983 claims in federal court. See Ryan v. Ill.

Dep’t of Children and Family Servs., 185 F.3d 751, 758 (7th Cir. 1999); see also Sittig v. Ill. Dep’t of

Corr., 617 F. Supp. 1043, 1044 (N.D. Ill. 1985). As such, DCFS may not be sued in federal court

under § 1983. See Ryan, 185 F.3d at 758. Moore’s claims against DCFS are dismissed with

prejudice due to sovereign immunity.2

Moore’s next constitutional claim alleges a violation of his right to privacy at the hands

of Defendant Gully. Moore’s description of Gully’s behavior certainly paints a picture of

rampant unprofessionalism, personal conflict, and possibly even repeated violation of

DCFS’s own policies. He also lists many broad and vague assertions that Gully told him

everything going on in A.Q.’s aunt’s home, Gully told A.Q.’s family everything Moore told

her, Gully started to share information with A.Q.’s family about Moore’s DCFS investigation,

and Gully went back and forth with Moore’s and Whitley’s families about the investigations.

To be sure, the DCFS investigation involved Moore, Whitley, and her son A.Q., so disclosure

of certain information to each of those parties may well have been appropriate. But more

importantly, Moore’s Complaint lacks any facts that allow this Court to determine whether

he had a constitutionally protected privacy interest in the allegedly disclosed information.

1 Notably, Moore only seeks compensatory and punitive damages. He also does not allege any ongoing

constitutional violation or name the director of DCFS in an official capacity for purposes of prospective equitable

relief, which could possibly avoid the sovereign immunity bar. See, e.g., Brown v. Budz, 398 F.3d 904, 917-18 (7th

Cir. 2005).

2 While Moore does not name the St. Clair County Circuit Court in his Complaint as a defendant, he lists the

circuit court in some of his factual narrative and enumerated counts. To be clear, Illinois state courts are also a

part of the State of Illinois and are subject to sovereign immunity as well. Wemple v. All Illinois Judicial Circuits,

778 F. Supp. 2d 930, 933 (C.D. Ill. 2011). Thus, any claims against the circuit court are also dismissed with

prejudice.

From the lack of specific facts, the Court also cannot ascertain whether Gully’s conduct

amounted to a violation of that potential interest. Moore does specifically state that Gully

told Whitley’s cousin, who was Moore’s tenant and Gully’s friend, that Moore planned to

evict him, which caused him to chase Moore down in a truck with a gun. As the facts are

presented, this information does not relate to Gully’s position as a caseworker, does not

appear to have been shared under color of state law, concerns mutual personal relationships

outside of DCFS, and involves information about the potential eviction of a tenant. Thus, the

Court has no basis to deem this information subject to constitutional privacy protections.

Turning to the due process and equal protection3 claims against Defendants Boyd and

Jansen, Moore accuses each child protective investigator of failure to investigate the case

successfully and failure to question any and all of his witnesses causing a false report to be

entered against him. Procedural due process requires a two-fold inquiry: (1) whether the

plaintiff was deprived of a protected interest and (2) what process is due. Pugel v. Bd. of Trs.

of Univ. of Ill., 378 F.3d 659, 662 (7th Cir. 2004). Typically, procedural due process involves

notice and an opportunity to be heard. Id. Substantive due process protects against only the

most egregious and outrageous government action where the government violated a

fundamental right or liberty in an arbitrary or irrational manner. Campos v. Cook County, 932

F.3d 972, 975 (7th Cir. 2019).

As described in the Complaint, A.Q., a child in Moore’s care, reported sexual abuse to

DCFS. Moore’s other children were removed from his home and a safety plan was set in

place, then Moore received a neglect hearing. (Doc. 3, pp. 43-46). This hearing demonstrates

3 Aside from using the words “equal protection,” the Complaint contains no information to indicate any equal

protection violation (i.e., that Moore was treated differently based on his membership in a protected class or from

others similarly situated to him).

some measure of process providing notice and an opportunity to be heard. Moore does not

claim a total lack of due process, but that Boyd and Jansen’s investigations violated his due

process rights.

Defendant Boyd conducted the initial investigation in response to A.Q.’s report.

Moore alleges that Boyd spoke with him and A.Q.’s grandma, lied at the neglect hearing, and

generally expressed disdain for Moore. As to Defendant Jansen, Moore simply alleges that

she visited him in jail after his arrest asking for witness information. The Complaint continues

with conclusory statements that Jansen failed to interview his identified witnesses, denied

him a fair investigation in a suspected child abuse and neglect investigation, unlawfully

discriminated against him as a perpetrator of child abuse and neglect, and closed the

investigation without a full and fair investigation taken only from A.Q.’s word. Clearly,

Moore does not provide enough (or any) specific facts of the conduct by Boyd or Jansen that

amounts to a violation of his constitutional rights. Nor do his due process rights, as Moore

contends, dictate that investigators must question every witness he identifies.

Furthermore, the attachment to his Complaint contains a letter from DCFS dated

September 6, 2023, indicating that the initial investigation resulted in a favorable outcome for

him. (Doc. 3-1, pp. 28-29). After investigation, DCFS categorized the report of abuse from

June 21, 2023, as “unfounded” finding no credible evidence of child abuse or neglect. (Id.). It

is hard to reconcile Moore’s claims of an incomplete and unfair investigation, when that

investigation resolved favorably for him. Of course, A.Q. also spoke to the police. Eventually,

in October 2023, charges were brought against Moore for sexual abuse which led to his arrest,

but the Complaint does not allege that Boyd or Jansen had anything to do with that

investigation.

Moore also asserts a due process claim and an ineffective assistance of counsel claim

for the DNA testing of his infant son and the related underlying state court proceedings. As

an initial matter, this Court lacks jurisdiction to review state-court decisions, including those

involving the termination of parental rights, under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Hadzi-

Tanovic v. Johnson, 62 F.4th 394, 396 (7th Cir. 2023). This doctrine applies to “cases brought by

state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before

the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of

those judgments.” Id. at 399 (quoting Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp., 544 U.S.

280, 284 (2005)). As the Seventh Circuit recently explained, while “the natural temptation for

losing parties to keep fighting and to look for new forums” is understandable, “it is well

established that federal district and circuit courts do not have jurisdiction to review such state

court decisions.” Id. at 396. “The doctrine is limited to federal claims that ‘directly’ challenge

a state court judgment or are ‘inextricably intertwined with one.’” Id. at 399 (quoting Andrade

v. City of Hammond, 9 F.4th 947, 950 (7th Cir. 2021)). To determine whether a plaintiff’s federal

claims are inextricably intertwined with the state court judgment, a district court must ask

whether the plaintiff is alleging an injury caused by the state court judgment. Id.

Moore does not explicitly assert that his custody rights over his infant son were

terminated. He only alleges that genetic testing was performed without his consent, and,

while incarcerated, he was informed that the child was not his biological son. From the

Complaint, the aftermath of that DNA test and the state court outcome are mysteries. But

Moore does indicate that the DNA test was done pursuant to a court order from a case

involving A.Q. (Doc. 3, pp. 56-57). To the extent that Moore is challenging that order or the

outcome of the state-court proceeding related to his paternity or custody rights of his infant

son, the Court cannot review either.

As to his due process claim, it is true that the Due Process Clause protects, “the

fundamental right of parents to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of

their children.” Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66 (2000). Again, the Complaint does not

indicate whether the DNA testing of the child led to a termination of his custody rights.

Additionally, the Complaint indicates that the testing was court-ordered and alludes to the

fact that both Moore and his son’s mother, Whitley, were incarcerated at the time of the

alleged DNA test, so it is unclear who had custody of his son at the time. The only facts

provided are that two unknown caseworkers told him about the DNA test, they mentioned

the child was not biologically his, and they suggested it would be best to give up his right to

his son so “DCFS could go away.” (Doc. 3, p. 54). Moore asserts that some kind of hearing

occurred on May 31, 2024, and he was not brought to that hearing. But he does not mention

what that hearing was meant to entail or its outcome. Based on the facts alleged in the

Complaint, the Court cannot discern a claim for a constitutional due process violation

connected to the alleged DNA test or related proceeding.

Moore also attempts to raise an ineffective assistance of counsel claim as to the DNA

testing and underlying state-court proceedings. First, there is no constitutional guarantee to

effective assistance of counsel in a civil case. Conway v. Henze, 14 F. App’x 645, 651 (7th Cir.

2001). Second, pursuant to § 1983, a plaintiff may bring an action for money damages against a

defendant who has deprived her of a federal constitutional right, if the defendant was acting

under color of state law. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. But “a lawyer representing a client is not, by virtue

of being an officer of the court, a state actor ‘under color of state law’ within the meaning of

§ 1983.” Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 318 (1981); see also Bartole v. Hughes, No. 2:22-CV-

257, 2022 WL 10542267, at *3 (N.D. Ind. Oct. 18, 2022) (“Private defense attorneys—even

appointed public defenders who are paid by the state—are not considered state actors under

§ 1983.”). Perhaps with additional information, Moore could assert a malpractice claim against

his attorney in state court, but he cannot raise these claims under § 1983.

Lastly, Moore raises several claims rooted in state law, such as Count 1 for violation of

the Illinois Parentage Act, 750 ILCS 46/101 et seq., Count 3 for violation of the Illinois

Constitution’s privacy clause due to the paternity testing being performed outside of

established chain-of-custody guidelines, and Count 4 for violation of his right to be free from

infliction of unnecessary harm. As discussed above, there is no viable federal claim that would

support the Court’s jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. And the Complaint does not contain

any allegations that would support diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. The Court will

not address the merits of the state-law claims, because even if the allegations properly stated

any claim, the Court has no original jurisdiction and thus has no basis to exercise supplemental

jurisdiction over those claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367.

CONCLUSION

For these reasons, the Court GRANTS Moore’s Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma

pauperis (Doc. 4) but DISMISSES the Complaint (Doc. 3) for failure to state a claim and lack

of subject matter jurisdiction. Furthermore, Moore’s Motion for Status (Doc. 14) is DENIED

as moot as this Order resolves the status of this case.

Moore will be given an opportunity to amend his Complaint. The Court encourages

Moore to review the Court’s resources for pro se litigants, which can be found at:

https://www.ilsd.uscourts.gov/representing-yourself-pro-se-litigant. In particular, the

Court encourages Moore to review the American Bar Association’s Handbook for Pro Se

Litigants, which explains how to draft a complaint in federal court.

If Moore chooses to amend his Complaint, he shall do so on or before July 14, 2025.

Failure to do so will result in the dismissal of this action.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: June 12, 2025 7 ( )

NANCY J. ROSENSTENGEL

Chief U.S. District Judge

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