Downing v. Knox County, Tennessee

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE

AT KNOXVILLE

SETH DOWNING, )

)

Plaintiff, ) Case No. 3:23-cv-300

)

v. ) Judge Atchley

)

SERGHEY BOTEZAT & KNOX COUNTY, ) Magistrate Judge Poplin

TENNESSEE, )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Before the Court are Defendant/Cross-Defendant Knox County, Tennessee, and

Defendant/Cross-Plaintiff Serghey Botezat’s Joint Motion for Partial Summary Judgment [Doc.

41],1 Botezat’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment [Doc. 42], Botezat’s Motion for Summary

Judgment [Doc. 43], Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant Seth Downing’s Motion for Summary Judgment

[Doc. 46], Knox County’s Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. 49], Downing’s Motion to Accept

Late-Filed Answer [Doc. 53], and the parties’ Joint Motion to Stay [Doc. 66].2 For the following

reasons, Botezat’s Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. 43] is GRANTED, Downing’s Motion

for Summary Judgment [Doc. 46] is DENIED, and Knox County’s Motion for Summary Judgment

[Doc. 49] is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. The Motions for Partial Summary

1 This Motion is also purportedly brought on behalf of “Defendants Knox County Board of Zoning Appeals (‘BZA’)

[and] Knox County Planning Commission (‘Planning Commission’)[.]” [Doc. 41 at 1]. Neither the Knox County

Board of Zoning Appeals nor the Knox County Planning Commission, however, are named as defendants in either the

Amended Complaint [Doc. 24] or the Cross Complaint [Doc. 26 at 10–14]. Accordingly, the Court construes the

Motion as being brought on behalf of only Knox County and Botezat.

2 This Motion is purportedly brought on behalf of the Knox County Board of Zoning Appeals and the Knox County

Planning Commission in addition to Downing, Botezat, and Knox County. [Doc. 66 at 1]. Consistent with the Court’s

decision regarding the Joint Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, see supra note 1, the Court will construe this

motion as being brought on behalf of only Downing, Botezat, and Knox County.

Judgment [Docs. 41–42], the Motion to Accept Late-Filed Answer [Doc. 53], and the Joint Motion

to Stay [Doc. 66] are each DENIED AS MOOT.

I. BACKGROUND

This case concerns whether Seth Downing has the right to appeal a decision made by the

Knoxville-Knox County Planning Commission (“Planning Commission”) to the Knox County

Board of Zoning Appeals (“BZA”) and whether the deprivation of that appeal violated his

constitutional rights.

Downing and Botezat own abutting real property in Knox County, Tennessee.3 [Doc. 47-3

at ¶¶ 2–3]. Downing uses his property as a private residence whereas Botezat wants to use his

property for a 32-unit multi-dwelling development. [Id. at ¶ 2; Doc. 24 at ¶ 20; Doc. 25 at ¶ 20;

Doc. 26 at ¶ 20]. To that end, Botezat sought approval of his development plan from the Planning

Commission. [Doc. 24 at ¶ 20; Doc. 25 at ¶ 20; Doc. 26 at ¶ 20]. Downing objected to Botezat’s

development plan, but the Planning Commission nevertheless approved it. [Doc. 47-3 at ¶¶ 4–5,

7; Doc. 47-5 at 21]. Downing then timely appealed the Planning Commission’s decision to the

BZA pursuant to Section 6.50.08 of the Knox County Zoning Ordinance. [Doc. 47-6 at ¶ 14].

Section 6.50.08 states in full:

Appeal of development plans. In any Zone in which a “development plan” or “plan

for development” must be approved by the planning commission prior to the

construction or alteration of any building or development, any person, firm or

corporation aggrieved by the decision of the planning commission regarding such

development shall follow the following procedure for appeals:

(a) The aggrieved person or entity may file an appeal either to the Board of

Zoning Appeals or to a court of competent jurisdiction within thirty (30)

days of the decision being appealed.

(b) The Applicant for the development plan being challenged may opt out of

the BZA appeal by sending, by certified mail, a notice of demand to have

3 Specifically, Downing owns the property located at 7201 Ball Camp Pike, Knoxville, TN, 37931, and Botezat owns

the property located at 0 Ball Camp Pike, Knoxville, TN, 37931. [Doc. 47-3 at ¶¶ 2–3].

the matter heard by a court of competent jurisdiction to the Knox County

Law Director’s Office, with a copy of said notice sent by certified mail to

the address of the aggrieved appellant(s), within fifteen (15) days of the

filing of the BZA appeal.

(c) In the event that such notice is filed with the Law Director’s Office, the

appellant shall file the appeal with a court of competent jurisdiction within

thirty (30) days of the notice having been mailed.

KNOX COUNTY, TENN., ZONING ORDINANCE § 6.50.08 (2025) (emphasis in original).4 In response,

Botezat exercised his right under Section 6.50.08(b) to opt out of the BZA appeal and require

Downing to appeal, if at all, to a Tennessee court of competent jurisdiction.5 [Doc. 47-4 at ¶ 8].

The effect of Botezat’s decision was significant. While the BZA would have reviewed the

development plan de novo, judicial review of the development plan would be limited to whether

the Planning Commission “acted illegally, arbitrarily, fraudulently, or in excess of its jurisdiction.”

Venture Holdings, LLC v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cnty., 585 S.W.3d 409, 416

(Tenn. Ct. App. 2019). This lawsuit followed. [Doc. 1].

Downing claims that Knox County and Botezat violated his due process, equal protection,

and First Amendment rights by depriving him of his ability to pursue a BZA appeal. [See generally

Doc. 24]. He asks the Court to declare Sections 6.50.08(b) and (c) of the Knox County Zoning

Ordinance (i.e., the provisions addressing a developer’s ability to opt out of a BZA appeal)

unconstitutional and enjoin the County from enforcing them. [Id. at ¶¶ 99–103]. He also asks the

Court to require Knox County to place his appeal back on the BZA’s agenda and to award him

damages. [Id. at ¶¶ 104–05].

4 The Code of Knox County—including the Knox County Zoning Ordinance—can be found at the following link:

https://library.municode.com/tn/knox_county/codes/code_of_ordinances?nodeId=COKNCOTE.

5 Downing has petitioned the Tennessee courts to review the Planning Commission’s decision. As this state case does

not affect the resolution of the motions currently before the Court [see Doc. 23 at 3–10], it is not discussed further.

Botezat responded to these claims with one of his own. [See Doc. 26 at 10–14]. He filed a

Cross-Complaint alleging that Tennessee law does not authorize the BZA to hear appeals

concerning the Planning Commission’s approval of development plans. [Id.]. He seeks a

declaration to the same effect and an injunction preventing Knox County from enforcing Section

6.50.08 against him to the extent it purports to grant the BZA appellate jurisdiction over the

Planning Commission’s approval of development plans. [Id.]. He also seeks a related injunction

preventing Knox County from enforcing Section 6.60.03(C) of the Knox County Zoning

Ordinance which states:

Powers of the board of zoning appeals.

…

(C) To hear and decide in accordance with the provisions of article 4,

“Supplementary regulations,” section 2, “Development standards for uses

permitted on review,” and article 6, “Administration, enforcement and

interpretation,” section 6.50, “Procedure for authorizing uses permitted on

review,” of this ordinance, appeals from the planning commission of decisions

regarding use-on-reviews.

KNOX COUNTY, TENN., ZONING ORDINANCE § 6.60.03(C) (2025) (emphasis in original).

Now, the parties have filed five motions for summary judgment, each of which is ripe for

review. Downing filed a single summary judgment motion wherein he argues that he should prevail

on his constitutional claims as a matter of law. [Doc. 46]. Knox County, on the other hand, filed a

summary judgment motion arguing the contrary. [Doc. 49]. It also filed a joint partial motion for

summary judgment with Botezat wherein they argue that Downing’s denial of a BZA appeal did

not cause a constitutional injury. [Doc. 41]. Finally, Botezat filed both a motion for summary

judgment and a motion for partial summary judgment. Botezat’s summary judgment motion argues

that he should prevail on his crossclaim as a matter of law [Doc. 43] while his partial summary

judgment motion asserts that he is not a state actor who can be held liable for allegedly violating

Downing’s constitutional rights [Doc. 42]. Beyond these dispositive motions, Downing has also

filed a Motion to Accept Late-Filed Answer [Doc. 53] regarding Botezat’s Cross-Complaint, and

the parties have filed a Joint Motion to Stay [Doc. 66]. But as the resolution of the parties’

dispositive motions renders these last two motions [Docs. 53, 66] moot, the remainder of this

Memorandum Opinion and Order will focus on the parties’ motions for summary judgment.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

“Summary judgment is proper where no genuine issue of material fact exists and the

moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Sommer v. Davis, 317 F. 3d 686, 690 (6th

Cir. 2003) (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)). The moving party may satisfy its burden by producing

evidence that demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of material fact or “by ‘showing’ – that

is, pointing out to the district court – that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving

party’s case.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986). When ruling on a motion for

summary judgment, the Court must view the facts contained in the record and all inferences that

can be drawn from those facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Id. (citing

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986)). The Court

cannot weigh the evidence, judge the credibility of witnesses, or determine the truth of any matter

in dispute. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986).

III. ANALYSIS

Downing’s claims are premised on the idea that Knox County and Botezat

unconstitutionally deprived him of his right to have the BZA review the Planning Commission’s

approval of Botezat’s development plan. But as Botezat notes, Tennessee law does not authorize

the BZA to hear appeals regarding the Planning Commission’s approval/denial of development

plans. Accordingly, Downing’s claims must fail while Botezat’s succeed.

Downing asserts that Sections 13-7-108 and 13-7-109(1) of the Tennessee Code Annotated

give him a statutory right to (and a protected property interest in) a BZA appeal of the Planning

Commission’s approval of Botezat’s development plan. [See, e.g., Doc. 55 at 4–10; Doc. 63 at 3].

Section 13-7-109 establishes the authority of boards of zoning appeals, stating in relevant part:

The board of appeals has the power to:

(1) Hear and decide appeals where it is alleged by the appellant that there is

error in any order, requirement, decision or refusal made by the county

building commissioner or any other administrative official in the carrying

out or enforcement of any ordinance enacted pursuant to this part[.]

Tenn. Code. Ann. § 13-7-109(1). As for Section 13-7-108, it defines who may appeal to a board

of zoning appeals, stating:

Appeals to the board of appeals may be taken by any person aggrieved, or by any

officer, department or board of the county affected, by any grant or withholding of

a building permit or by any other decision of a building commissioner or other

administrative official, based in whole or in part upon any ordinance under this part.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 13-7-108. Although neither of these statutes mention planning commissions

by name, Downing contends that they still apply to the Planning Commission because the Planning

Commission qualifies as an “administrative official” under Tennessee law. [Doc. 55 at 4–5].

Downing relies principally on Stone Man, Inc. v. Rutherford County Regional Planning

Commission 1985 Tenn. App. LEXIS 2607 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan 8, 1985) to support this contention.

There, the Tennessee Court of Appeals was called upon to determine, among other things, whether

a quarry operator was required to appeal an adverse planning commission decision to the local

board of zoning appeals before filing suit in a Tennessee court. Id. at *15–20. In finding that such

an appeal was available but not mandatory, the Stone Man Court noted that the Tennessee General

Assembly gave each county “broad discretion to establish a regulatory framework that best meets

its needs[,]” and that “while one county may determine that certain parts of its business can be

conducted by a single official, another county may prefer to establish a board or commission of

local citizens to do the same work.” Id. at *18. Therefore, the Stone Man Court held, a planning

commission’s application and administration of local land use restrictions was still reviewable by

the local board of zoning appeals notwithstanding the fact that a planning commission would not

qualify as an “administrative official” under a “literal reading of the statutes” because holding

otherwise would mean that whether certain decisions could be appealed to a board of zoning

appeals would depend on whether the county gave that authority to a commission or an individual.

See id.

Beyond Stone Man, Downing also relies on State ex rel. Browning-Ferris Industries, Inc.

v. Board of Commissioners, 806 S.W.2d 181 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1990) and Northshore Corridor

Association v. Knox County, 633 S.W.3d 561 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2021). In Browning-Ferris, the

Tennessee Court of Appeals was asked to determine, among other things, whether a county

commission could exercise appellate authority over a planning commission’s issuance or denial of

a building permit. See id. at 188–94. After holding that a county commission lacked such authority,

the Browning-Ferris Court stated in dicta that this decision did not leave those aggrieved by a

planning commission decision without legal redress because “the enabling legislation and the

provisions of § 6.60, entitled ‘Board of Adjustment and Enforcement,’ provide[d] an appropriate

method for appeal to the Board of Adjustment [(i.e., the board of zoning appeals)].” Id. at 194.

In Northshore Corridor Association, a residential development plan including an on-site

wastewater treatment plan was approved by the local planning commission and upheld by the local

board of zoning appeals. 633 S.W.3d at 564–66. Groups opposed to the development plan

subsequently petitioned the Tennessee courts to review this approval via a common law writ of

certiorari. Id. at 566. The trial court reversed the board of zoning appeals, finding that a wastewater

treatment plan was not a permitted use in the applicable zone. Id. at 566–67. Following this

decision, the developer, board of zoning appeals, and relevant county filed a joint motion to amend

the judgment, arguing that the dispute concerning the wastewater treatment plant was no longer

justiciable because “‘off-site sewer service’ had been procured for the proposed development.” Id.

at 568. The trial court denied this motion, finding that there was still a live dispute. Id. In affirming

the trial court, the Tennessee Court of Appeals stated that the development plan could not be

altered to remove the on-site wastewater treatment plant “without involvement of the procedural

review process before the [planning commission] and the [board of zoning appeals] and the

accompanying potential for judicial review” because allowing this kind of unilateral alteration

would circumvent “the opportunity for a full administrative review with public input[.]” Id. at 577.

Accordingly, the alternative development plan with off-site sewer services did not render the

dispute concerning the on-site wastewater treatment facility moot because the alternative

development plan was never properly approved. See id.

Although neither Browning-Ferris nor Northshore Corridor Association directly confront

the appellate authority of boards of zoning appeals over planning commission decisions as Stone

Man does, the Court agrees with Downing that they lend support to his position that such authority

exists. The problem Downing faces, however, is that Stone Man, Browning-Ferris, and Northshore

Corridor Association are not the only cases that have touched on the appellate authority of boards

of zoning appeals over planning commission decisions.

In Whittemore v. Brentwood Planning Commission, the Tennessee Court of Appeals

evaluated, among other things, whether a municipal board of zoning appeals has the authority to

review decisions made by a municipal planning commission. 835 S.W.2d 11 (Tenn. Ct. App.

1992). After a municipal planning commission approved a development plan for a regional

shopping mall, a group of neighboring property owners requested that the municipal board of

zoning appeals review that decision. Id. at 12–14. The board of zoning appeals, however, declined

to review the development plan’s approval on the ground that the board lacked the authority to

review the planning commission’s decision. Id. at 14. The neighboring property owners then

brought their case to state court where the trial court upheld the approval of the site plan. See id.

at 13–14. On appeal, the neighboring property owners argued that the board of zoning appeals,

contrary to the board’s belief, had the authority to review the planning commission’s decision and

should have done so. See id. at 14. The Tennessee Court of Appeals disagreed. It held that planning

commissions and boards of zoning appeals are “coequal and independent” agencies, that a

planning commission is not an “other administrative official” whose decisions can be appealed to

the board of zoning appeals, and that the planning commission had an independent grant of

authority to approve the development plan pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated Section 13-4-

104 because it involved alterations to existing roads. Id. at 14–15.

Downing attempts to limit Whittemore’s holding, arguing that it is inapplicable because (i)

this case concerns a county rather than municipal zoning ordinance and (ii) the Planning

Commission lacks the independent grant of authority that was present in Whittemore. [Doc. 55 at

3–4]. The Tennessee Court of Appeals, however, has not read Whittemore so narrowly. To the

contrary, the same panel that decided Whittemore later relied on it for the general proposition that

“[b]oards of zoning appeals do not have the jurisdiction to review local planning commission

decisions.” Robison v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cnty., Appeal No. 01-A-01-9105-

CH-00178, 1992 Tenn. App. LEXIS 731, at *18 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 26, 1992).

The Robinson Court reached this conclusion when discussing the case of Rogers Group,

Inc. v. County of Franklin, Appeal No. 01A01-9110-CH-00378, 1992 Tenn. App. LEXIS 370

(Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 29, 1992). There, a county planning commission denied approval for a

property owner’s quarry development plan. Id. at *6. The property owner then took its case

immediately to the Tennessee courts, bypassing the county board of zoning appeals. Id. at *6–7.

The planning commission argued that because the property owner went straight to court, it had

failed to exhaust its administrative remedies. Id. at *8–9. The Tennessee Court of Appeals

disagreed. It held that the property owner was not required to appeal the denial of its development

plan to the board of zoning appeals because (i) the applicable zoning ordinance—the language of

which is materially identical to Tennessee Code Annotated Sections 13-7-108 and 109(1)6—did

not grant the board of zoning appeals appellate authority over planning commission decisions and

(ii) the property owner’s claim turned on an interpretation of the zoning ordinance, something the

board of zoning appeals lacked the authority to do. Id. at *9–10, *20–21. The Robinson Court—

which was tasked with resolving whether a zoning administrator’s interpretation of a zoning

ordinance had to be appealed to the local board of zoning appeals before being challenged in

court—disagreed with the Rogers Group Court’s conclusion that boards of zoning appeals lack

the authority to interpret zoning ordinances. Robinson, 1992 Tenn. App. LEXIS 731, at *13–18.

But it agreed with the Rogers Group Court, albeit in dicta, that the property owner in Rogers Group

was not required to appeal the denial of his development plan to the local board of zoning appeals,

citing Whittemore for the proposition that “[b]oards of zoning appeals do not have the jurisdiction

to review local planning commission decisions.” Id. at *17–18. Put another way, the Robinson

Court stated that under Whittemore, a county board of zoning appeals lacks the authority to review

a county planning commission’s approval of a development plan. See id.

6 Compare Rogers Group, Inc., 1992 Tenn. App. LEXIS 370, at *8–10, with Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 13-7-108, 109(1).

Whittemore, Robinson, and Rogers Group stand in stark contrast to Stone Man, Browning-

Ferris, and Northshore Corridor Association, and it does not appear that the Tennessee Supreme

Court has ever resolved which group of cases correctly describes the appellate authority of boards

of zoning appeals.7 Consequently, the Court must determine which path the Tennessee Supreme

Court would take if presented the issue. Bear Stearns Gov’t Sec., Inc. v. Dow Corning Corp., 419

F.3d 543, 549 (6th Cir. 2005) (“In applying state law, [federal courts] anticipate how the relevant

state’s highest court would rule in the case and are bound by controlling decisions of that court.”).

After careful consideration, the Court finds that the Tennessee Supreme Court would agree with

Whittemore, Robinson, and Rogers Group and hold that boards of zoning appeals lack the authority

to review a planning commission’s approval or denial of a development plan.

When interpreting statutory provisions, the Tennessee Supreme Court “determine[s] how

a reasonable reader would have understood the text at the time it was enacted.” Lawson v. Hawkins

Cnty., 661 S.W.3d 54, 59 (Tenn. 2023). It undertakes this task by “considering the statutory text

in light of well-established canons of statutory construction” and by giving statutory terms their

“natural and ordinary meaning” absent a statutory definition. Id. Furthermore, the Tennessee

Supreme Court does not interpret statutes in isolation bur rather construes them as a whole, reads

them in conjunction with their surrounding parts, and views them consistently with the statute’s

legislative purpose. Kradel v. Piper Indus., 60 S.W.3d 744, 750 (Tenn. 2001).

Here, the relevant statutes are Tennessee Code Annotated Sections 13-7-108 and 13-7-

109(1). As the Court has previously noted, Section 13-7-108 states:

7 No party has directed the Court to any authority where the Tennessee Supreme Court evaluated whether a board of

zoning appeals possesses the authority to review planning commission decisions. The Court was similarly unable to

find such authority during its own extensive research. In fact, the only other authority that the Court was able to find

directly addressing this issue is a 1980 opinion from the Tennessee Attorney General stating that “[a] regional planning

commission is not an ‘other administrative official’ under [Tenn. Code Ann.] § 13-7-108.” 1980 Tenn. AG LEXIS 22

(Dec. 1, 1980).

Appeals to the board of appeals may be taken by any person aggrieved, or by any

officer, department or board of the county affected, by any grant or withholding of

a building permit or by any other decision of a building commissioner or other

administrative official, based in whole or in part upon any ordinance under this part.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 13-7-108. Similarly, Section 13-7-109(1) states:

The board of appeals has the power to:

(1) Hear and decide appeals where it is alleged by the appellant that there is error

in any order, requirement, decision or refusal made by the county building

commissioner or any other administrative official in the carrying out or

enforcement of any ordinance enacted pursuant to this part[.]

Tenn. Code Ann. § 13-7-109(1). The key language in both statutes is the term “administrative

official.” If a planning commission is not an “administrative official,” then its decisions do not fall

within the statutes’ scope.

The term “administrative official” is not defined in Title 13 of the Tennessee Code

Annotated. Therefore, the Court interprets the term in accordance with its “natural and ordinary

meaning.” Lawson, 661 S.W.3d at 59. Ordinarily, the term “official,” whether proceeded by the

adjective “administrative” or otherwise, refers to an individual rather than a collective body like a

commission. See, e.g., Official, OXFORD ENG. DICTIONARY,

https://www.oed.com/dictionary/official_n1?tab=meaning_and_use#33861077 (last visited June

5, 2025) (defining “official” as “[a] person holding public office or having official duties, esp. as

a representative of a government or administration, or in connection with some public institution

or officially-constituted body, organization, society, etc.”); Official, MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE

DICTIONARY, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/official (last visited June 5, 2025)

(defining “official” as “one who holds or is invested with an office”); Official, BLACK’S LAW

DICTIONARY (12th ed. 2024) (defining “official” as “[s]omeone who holds or is invested with a

public office; a person elected or appointed to carry out some portion of a government’s sovereign

powers”). Consequently, is does not appear that a planning commission is an “administrative

official” under either Section 13-7-108 or Section 13-7-109(1).

This conclusion is bolstered by the presumption of consistent usage. The presumption

states that “[a] word or phrase is presumed to bear the same meaning throughout a text” absent a

material variation in terms. ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE

INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 170 (2012).8 Here, the term “administrative official” is

consistently used throughout Title 13 of the Tennessee Code Annotated to refer to individuals

rather than groups.9 As nothing in either Section 13-7-108 or Section 13-7-109 indicates that these

sections define “administrative official” differently, the Court must presume that the term carries

its general meaning in both sections (i.e., that it refers to individuals rather than groups). SCALIA

& GARNER, supra, at 170.

Accordingly, Tennessee principles of statutory construction dictate that Sections 13-7-108

and 13-7-109(1) do not apply to planning commission decisions because planning commissions

are not “administrative officials.” The Court recognizes that this conclusion leaves open the issue

raised by Stone Man, that whether certain decisions may be appealed to a board of zoning appeals

will depend on who made the decision in the first place. See 1985 Tenn. App. LEXIS 2607, at

*17–19. It, however, is not the Court’s role to expand a statute beyond its plain terms to correct

what might be viewed as a loophole. Halbert v. Shelby Cnty. Election Comm’n, 31 S.W.3d 246,

8 The Tennessee Supreme Court routinely relies on READING LAW when interpreting statutes. See, e.g., State v.

Deberry, 651 S.W.3d 918, 924 (Tenn. 2022); Falls v. Goins, 673 S.W.3d 173, 180 (Tenn. 2023).

9 See, e.g., Tenn. Code Ann. § 13-3-101(j)(2) (“Each full-time or contract professional planner or other administrative

official whose duties include advising the planning commission shall…”); Tenn. Code Ann. § 13-3-201(b)(4) (“The

legislative body of the county shall be responsible for paying the training and continuing education course registration

and travel expenses for each planning commissioner and full-time professional planner or other administrative official

whose duties include advising the planning commission.”); Tenn. Code Ann. § 13-7-106(b)(7) (“Each board of zoning

appeals member and each building commissioner or other administrative official whose duties include advising the

board of zoning appeals shall…”).

248 (Tenn. 2000) (“In construing legislative enactments, the principal goals are to ascertain the

legislative intent and give it effect without unduly restricting or expanding its coverage beyond its

limited scope.”). Furthermore, it is not clear that the issue identified by the Stone Man Court is a

flaw of the statutes rather than a feature, particularly in the context of planning commission

decisions. Planning commissions, like boards of zoning appeals, are statutorily defined multi-

member deliberative bodies that specialize in local land use matters. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 13-

3-101, 104. Their members are well-versed in these issues as Tennessee law requires them to

complete materially identical continuing education requirements to those imposed on board of

zoning appeals members.10 Compare Tenn. Code Ann. § 13-3-101(j)(1), (5), with Tenn. Code Ann.

§ 13-7-106(b)(1), (5). Given the similarities between the two entities and their overlapping

expertise, allowing the decisions of one to be appealed to the other would be unnecessarily

duplicative. Thus, excluding planning commission decisions from review before a board of zoning

appeals serves an important function; it reduces administrative delays by preventing parties from

requesting a do-over before a separate, but materially similar, body. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 13-7-

108, 109(1). Thus, Stone Man does not alter the Court’s conclusion that Sections 13-7-108 and 13-

7-109(1) do not authorize boards of zoning appeals to review planning commission decisions.

Recognizing that the Court may reach this conclusion, Downing argues in the alternative

that Knox County had the authority to grant the BZA appellate authority over Planning

Commission decisions pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated Section 13-7-109(2) which states

that boards of zoning appeals can “[h]ear and decide, in accordance with the provisions of any

10 The primary differences between the two entities’ continuing education requirements are that (1) planning

commission members are required to annually complete at least one hour of education concentrating “on the rights of

private property owners and the relationship of those rights to the public planning process” whereas board of zoning

appeals members are not and (2) planning commission members have the “powers and duties of the planning

commission” as a continuing education subject while boards of zoning appeals members have the “powers and duties

of the board of zoning appeals” as a continuing education subject. Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 13-3-101(j)(1), (5), with Tenn.

Code Ann. § 13-7-106(b)(5).

such ordinance…special questions upon which such board is authorized by any such ordinance to

pass[.]” [Doc. 55 at 9]. The Court is not persuaded. Section 13-7-108 allows only those aggrieved

or affected “by any grant or withholding of a building permit or by any other decision of a building

commissioner or other administrative official” to appeal the at-issue decision to a board of zoning

appeals. If a county could circumvent this limitation by simply designating appeals not within

Section 13-7-108’s scope as “special questions,” then Section 13-7-108 would serve no meaningful

purpose. Accordingly, the Court finds that Section 13-7-109(2) does not authorize Knox County

to grant the BZA appellate jurisdiction over Planning Commission decisions. See Baker v. State,

417 S.W.3d 428, 439 n.11 (Tenn. 2013) (“[A] statute…should be interpreted to preclude any part

from being inoperative, superfluous, void or insignificant.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

Turning to Knox County, it agrees with Botezat that Tennessee law does not grant Downing

a statutory right to appeal the Planning Commission’s approval of Botezat’s development plan to

the BZA. [See, e.g., Doc. 49 at 6–7]. It, however, disagrees with Botezat’s contention that it is not

permitted to grant the BZA appellate authority over certain Planning Commission decisions,

arguing that it possesses such power as a home rule county. [Doc. 52 at 2–4]. The Court is not

convinced. The Home Rule Amendment of the Tennessee Constitution functions primarily as a

shield. It prevents the Tennessee General Assembly from enacting laws that target home rule

counties unless those laws expressly require local approval. Tenn. Const. art. XI, § 9, cl. 2. But

this protection only extends to laws that are “private or local in form or effect[.]” Id. Home rule

counties are still required to comply with laws of general applicability, including the zoning laws

at issue in this case. See Tenn. Const. art. XI, § 9, cl. 3; Tenn. Code Ann. § 13-7-101(a)(1) (granting

“[t]he county legislative body of any county” the authority to regulate zoning “in accordance with

the conditions and the procedure specified in this part” (emphasis added)). Accordingly, Knox

County must comply with Sections 13-7-108 and 13-7-109(1)’s requirements regardless of its

home rule status. See Tenn. Const. art. XI, § 9, cl. 3.

Considering the foregoing, each of Downing’s claims must fail. Neither Knox County nor

Botezat deprived Downing of his right to a BZA appeal without due process of law because

Downing never had such a right. Similarly, neither Knox County nor Botezat deprived Downing

of his First Amendment right to petition the BZA and/or express his views before it because, again,

Downing had no right to present his case to the BZA. Finally, neither Knox County nor Botezat

violated Downing’s equal protection rights in denying him a BZA appeal because he had no right

to a BZA appeal in the first place. Accordingly, Downing’s Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc.

46] is DENIED. Botezat’s Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. 43], on the other hand, is

GRANTED as he has established that Tennessee law does not permit the BZA to review the

Planning Commission’s approval or denial of a development plan. As for Knox County, its Motion

for Summary Judgment [Doc. 49] is GRANTED IN PART to the extent it argues that Downing

lacks a statutory right to a BZA appeal and DENIED IN PART to the extent it argues that the

Knox County Zoning Ordinance is valid as it currently exists. The motions for partial summary

judgment [Docs. 41–42] are DENIED AS MOOT since resolution of the parties’ primary

summary judgment motions fully disposes of this case. For the same reasons, Downing’s Motion

to Accept Late-Filed Answer [Doc. 53], and the parties’ Joint Motion to Stay [Doc. 66] are also

DENIED AS MOOT.

This leaves the issue of remedy. As the Court noted earlier, Botezat requests that Sections

6.50.08 and 6.60.03(C) of the Knox County Zoning Ordinance be declared void to the extent that

they purport to authorize the BZA to exercise appellate authority over Planning Commission

decisions approving development plans and that Knox County be enjoined from enforcing the

same. [Doc. 26 at 13–14 ¶ 17(b), (c); Doc. 43 at 11]. As the Court has concluded that Tennessee

law does not authorize boards of zoning appeals to review planning commission decisions, Botezat

is entitled to his requested declaration. Turning to Botezat’s request for injunctive relief, a party

requesting a permanent injunction must show: (1) that he has suffered irreparable harm; (2) that

legal remedies fail to compensate for the injury; (3) that a balance of the equities supports

injunctive relief; and (4) that the public interest favors a permanent injunction. eBay Inc. v.

MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006). Here, these factors weigh in favor of enjoining

Sections 6.50.08 and 6.60.03(C) of the Knox County Zoning Ordinance.

“An injury is irreparable if it cannot be undone through monetary remedies.” Performance

Unlimited v. Questar Publishers, 52 F.3d 1373, 1382 (6th Cir. 1995). Thus, the first and second

factors really ask a single question: Can Botezat be adequately compensated for the harms resulting

from having the approval of his development plan (and any future development plans) appealed to

the BZA? The Court finds that he cannot. If the Court allowed the challenged provisions of the

Knox County Zoning Ordinance to be enforced, then Botezat would be required to defend his

development plan before a body that has no authority to review the Planning Commission’s

approval of that plan. This unauthorized appeal could result in Botezat’s development plan being

denied despite the Planning Commission (i.e., the body tasked with approving development plans)

finding that it complies with all applicable requirements. In these circumstances, the Court finds

that continued enforcement of Sections 6.50.08 and 6.60.03(C) of the Knox County Zoning

Ordinance would irreparably harm Botezat as monetary remedies would not adequately

compensate him for the harms resulting from the BZA’s unlawful exercise of appellate authority

over the Planning Commission. As for the third and fourth factors, they “merge when the

Government is the opposing party.” Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 435 (2009). Whether these

merged factors weigh in favor of an injunction depends on whether the law sought to be enjoined

is valid because “the public’s true interest lies in the correct application of the law.” Kentucky v.

Biden, 23 F.4th 585, 612 (6th Cir. 2022). Thus, these factors also weigh in favor of enjoining

Sections 6.50.08 and 6.60.03(C) of the Knox County Zoning Ordinance since these sections

attempt to grant the BZA powers that it lacks under Tennessee law. Accordingly, Sections 6.50.08

and 6.60.03(C) of the Knox County Zoning Ordinance will be enjoined pursuant to the terms

described more fully below.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court ORDERS the following:

1. Botezat’s Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. 43] is GRANTED;

2. Downing’s Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. 46] is DENIED;

3. Knox County’s Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. 49] is GRANTED IN PART and

DENIED IN PART;

4. Knox County and Botezat’s Joint Motion for Partial Summary Judgment [Doc. 41] is

DENIED AS MOOT;

5. Botezat’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment [Doc. 42] is DENIED AS MOOT;

6. Downing’s Motion to Accept Late-Filed Answer [Doc. 53] is DENIED AS MOOT;

7. The parties’ Joint Motion to Stay [Doc. 66] is DENIED AS MOOT;

8. The Court DECLARES that Section 6.50.08 of the Knox County Zoning Ordinance is

void to the extent it grants the Knox County Board of Zoning Appeals appellate authority

over the Knoxville-Knox County Planning Commission’s approval/denial of development

plans because Tennessee law does not authorize boards of zoning appeals to exercise such

authority.

9. The Court DECLARES that Section 6.60.03(C) of the Knox County Zoning Ordinance is

void to the extent it grants the Knox County Board of Zoning Appeals appellate authority

over the Knoxville-Knox County Planning Commission’s approval/denial of development

plans because Tennessee law does not authorize boards of zoning appeals to exercise such

authority.

10. Knox County, Tennessee, is PERMANENTLY ENJOINED from enforcing Sections

6.50.08 and 6.60.03(C) of the Knox County Zoning Ordinance—as described in the

preceding paragraphs 8–9—against Serghey Botezat. In other words, Knox County

SHALL NOT allow the approval or disapproval of any development plan presented to the

Knoxville-Knox County Planning Commission by Botezat to be appealed to the Knox

County Board of Zoning Appeals.

A separate judgment will enter.

SO ORDERED.

/s/ Charles E. Atchley, Jr.

CHARLES E. ATCHLEY, JR.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE