Young v. LeBlanc

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

ROBERT YOUNG CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS NO. 23-681-SDD-RLB

JAMES LEBLANC, ET AL.

ORDER

Before the Court is the DPSC Defendants’ Motion to Stay all Deadlines and Discovery

Pending Appeal. (R. Doc. 93). The motion is opposed. (R. Doc. 98).

I. Background

On August 8, 2023, Plaintiff filed a complaint in this Court against James LeBlanc, in his

individual and official capacities as the Secretary of the Louisiana Department of Public Safety

and Corrections (“DPSC”),1 and Seth Smith, in his individual and official capacities as the Chief

of Operations of the DPSC (collectively, the “DPSC Defendants”); Tony Mancuso, in his

individual and official capacities as the Sheriff of the Calcasieu Parish Sheriff’s Office; Toney

Edwards, in his individual and official capacities as the Sheriff of Catahoula Parish Sheriff’s

Office (“CPSO”); Eric Stott, in his individual and official capacities as the current warden of the

Catahoula Correctional Center (the “CCC”); Pat Book, the former warden of the CCC, in his

individual capacity; CPSO Sgt. Beason in his individual capacity; CPSO Sgt. Prince in his

individual capacity; CPSO Sgt. Guthrie in his individual capacity; CPSO Dep. Sanchez in his

individual capacity; CPSO Dep. Margie Price in his individual capacity; and unknown CPSO

1 On August 29, 2024, Governor Jeff Landry appointed Gary Westcott as the new Secretary of the DPSC. Gary

Westcott is automatically substituted for James LeBlanc as a defendant in his official capacity. See Fed. R. Civ. P.

25(d).

Deps. Jane and John Does in their individual capacities. (R. Doc. 1). Plaintiff amended his

complaint on October 4, 2023, but he removed none of the defendants from the case. (R. Doc. 5).

Plaintiff, a resident of Calcasieu Parish, Louisiana, alleges that because of damage caused

during Hurricane Laura in 2020, people arrested for criminal offenses in Calcasieu Parish are not

housed in the Calcasieu Parish Jail (a/k/a Calcasieu Detention Center), but are sent to various

other facilities in the State, including CCC. (R. Doc. 5 at 7). Plaintiff alleges that he, in

particular, “was arrested and booked on non-violent charges in Calcasieu Parish” in April 2022,

was transferred to CCC on April 19, 2022, and then was “brutally attacked on August 8, 2022,

by violent DPSC inmates with whom he should not have been housed because of their different

legal status” (i.e., pretrial detainee v. sentenced inmates). (R. Doc. 5 at 7). In general, Plaintiff

alleges that while the CPSO has responsibility over both pretrial detainees and sentenced

inmates, the defendants have all failed to ensure that CCC developed and implemented an

adequate classification plan or appropriate staffing and oversight as required by the applicable

Basic Jail Guidelines. (R. Doc. 5 at 6-7, 22-23).

Plaintiff has brought a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against the named defendants for alleged

8th and 14th Amendment violations while he was a pretrial detainee at the CCC from April 19,

2022 to August 8, 2022. (R. Doc. 5 at 7). In short, Plaintiff alleges that two CCC corrections

officers failed to intervene when he was attacked by other inmates. Based on this allegation, and

others, Plaintiff argues that the defendants were negligent under state law and that the DPSC

Defendants were responsible for the acts and omissions of the CCC corrections officers. Plaintiff

seeks declaratory relief, injunctive relief, attorneys’ fees, and damages.

The original deadline to complete non-expert discovery in this action was set for

December 2, 2024. (R. Doc. 33). Plaintiff sought and obtained an extension of the deadline to

complete discovery, in part, to complete outstanding depositions. (R. Doc. 48). The current

Scheduling Order set, among other things, the deadline to complete non-expert discovery on

February 28, 2025, the deadline to complete expert discovery on May 14, 2025, the deadline to

file dispositive and Daubert motions on May 23, 2025, and trial to commence on December 8,

2025. (R. Doc. 49).

Plaintiff again sought an extension of the Court’s discovery deadline given various

pending discovery motions. (R. Doc. 72). The Court denied the motion, with the caveat that the

Court will provide the parties additional time to conduct additional discovery, including

depositions, as allowed by specific rulings on the timely filed discovery motions. (See R. Doc.

81). The Court has subsequently extended the deadline to file dispositive and Daubert motions to

June 23, 2025 given the filing of the instant motion. (R. Doc. 96).

Through the instant motion, the DPSC Defendants seek a stay of discovery and all

upcoming deadlines pending an appeal of a summary judgment ruling in another civil action,

Murray, et al. v. LeBlanc, et al., No. 21-592-JWD-RLB, ECF No. 215 (M.D. La. Jan.15, 2025),

on appeal, No. 25-30076 (5th Cir. Feb. 18, 2025). The DPSC Defendants argue that while the

Murray case “involves different pre-trial detainee Plaintiffs who were housed at a different

facility,” the DPSC Defendants’ legal defenses remain the same in both cases: “(1) Defendants’

liability for the responsibility for the custody, care, housing, or control of pre-trial detainees are

not warranted and (2) Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity for Plaintiffs’’ pre-trial

detainee claims.” (R. Doc. 93-1 at 3). The DPSC Defendants argue that (1) a stay would pose no

risk or harm to Plaintiff because there are no claims of continuing Constitutional violations, (2)

the LPSC Defendants would suffer hardship and inequity if this matter proceeds before the

Murray appeal is decided given that an appellate ruling in their favor would obviate the need to

incur additional substantial time and effort in this case, and (3) a stay would promote the orderly

course of justice by simplifying the case and avoiding potential inconsistent rulings. (R. Doc. 93-

1 at 5-9).

In opposition, Plaintiffs argue that the DPSC Defendants have not established that a stay

is merited in light of the interlocutory appeal in the altogether separate Murray action. (R. Doc.

98). Highlighting the applicable jurisprudence disfavoring indefinite stays, Plaintiffs argue that

the DPSC Defendants have failed to establish any hardship or inequity should this action

proceed. (R. Doc. 98 at 2-5). Moreover, Plaintiffs argue that the appeal will likely be remanded

on procedural grounds, without any resolution of substantive legal issues, resulting in what will

likely be “a cycle of appeal and remand for several years at least.” (R. Doc. 98 at 5). Similarly,

Plaintiffs further argue that judicial economy will not be served given that the Murray appeal

will not address any legal uncertainty that pertains to this action. (R. Doc. 98 at 6-7). Finally,

Plaintiff argues that he will face “extraordinary hardship, inequity, and prejudice” if an indefinite

stay is issued because of the potential for lost evidence and unavailability of witnesses at trial,

interruption of settlement negotiations with the other defendants, and Plaintiff’s desire to have

his claims timely resolved. (R. Doc. 98 at 8-9).

II. Law and Analysis

A. Legal Standards

The Court maintains broad discretionary power to stay proceedings in the interests of

judicial economy and justice, though the use of this authority “calls for the exercise of judgment,

which must weigh competing interests and maintain an even balance.” Landis v. North American

Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254-255 (1936). The moving party must “must make out a clear case of

hardship or inequity in being required to go forward, if there is even a fair possibility that the

stay for which he prays will work damage to [someone] else.” Id. at 255.

“When determining whether to exercise its discretion to stay proceedings, relevant factors

for the Court to consider include: (1) the potential prejudice to the non-moving party; (2) the

hardship and inequity to the moving party if the action is not stayed; and (3) judicial economy.”

Robinson v. Ardoin, No. 22-211, 2022 WL 1404661, at *1 (M.D. La. May 4, 2022) (citing

Chevallier v. Our Lady of the Lake Hosp., Inc., No. 18-0997, 2019 WL 3381766, at *2 (M.D. La.

July 26, 2019)). A court abuses its discretion, however, by issuing “a stay of indefinite duration

in the absence of a pressing need.” Landis, 299 U.S. at 255.

“A court is within its discretion to grant a stay when a related case with substantially

similar issues is pending before a court of appeals.” Robinson, 2022 WL 1404661, at *1 (quoting

Greco v. Nat’l Football League, 116 F.Supp.3d 744, 761 (N.D. Tex. 2015). However, “[o]nly in

rare circumstances will a litigant in one cause be compelled to stand aside while a litigant in

another settles the rule of law that will define the rights of both.” Landis, 299 U.S. at 255.

Moreover, “before granting a stay pending the resolution of another case, the court must

carefully consider the time reasonably expected for resolution of the ‘other case,’ in light of the

principle that ‘stay orders will be reversed when they are found to be immoderate or of an

indefinite duration.’” Wedgeworth v. Fibreboard Corp., 706 F.2d 541, 545 (5th Cir. 1983)

(quoting McKnight v. Blanchard, 667 F.2d 477, 479 (5th Cir. 1982)).

B. Analysis

Having considered the arguments of the parties, the Court finds it inappropriate to stay

these proceedings pending resolution of the appeal in the Murray case.

The DPSC Defendants are correct that an indefinite stay will not subject Plaintiff to any

threat of immediate danger or physical harm. That said, an indefinite stay in this action pending

the resolution of the appeal in Murray will potentially prejudice Plaintiff given the significant

amount of time that may be required to resolve that appeal. Delays in this action pending the

resolution of the appeal in Murray may result in further loss of evidence. See Clinton v. Jones,

520 U.S. 681, 707-708 (1997) (“[A] lengthy and categorical stay takes no account whatever of

the respondent’s interest in bringing the case to trial . . . delaying trial would increase the danger

of prejudice resulting from the loss of evidence, including the inability of witnesses to recall

specific facts, or the possible death of a party.”). Indeed, the CPSO Defendants have already

represented that they could not locate the following documents and information in discovery:

video footage of the underlying altercation; certain unusual occurrence reports; certain “missing

logbooks” that “were likely destroyed by water damage”; and certain versions of Prisoner

Housing Agreements in light of the recent deaths of a former CCC Warden. (See R. Doc. 87 at 2-

3). In addition, an indefinite stay would prejudice Plaintiff as it would interfere with ongoing

settlement negotiations with the other defendants and further delay in the resolution of his

claims.

In contrast, the LPSC Defendants will not face undue hardship or inequity if this action is

not stayed pending the Murray appeal. In short, the LPSC Defendants have not articulated any

“pressing need” justifying an indefinite stay. See Landis, 299 U.S. at 255. The LPSC Defendants

vaguely argue that “the legal issues [as to liability and qualified immunity] in this case will

become clearer and more definite” after the Murray appeal is resolved. (See R. Doc. 93-1 at 6-7).

The LPSC Defendants do not identify any specific legal issue to be resolved by the Fifth Circuit

that would be applicable to this action.

In denying summary judgment in Murray, the district judge stated the following in the

written ruling following oral argument: “Crittindon v. LeBlanc, 37 F.4th 177, 191 (5th Cir.

2022), establishes that DOC has responsibility over the local jails once they house DOC

prisoners. Further, numerous questions of material fact preclude summary judgment in favor of

either party.” Murray, No. 21-592, ECF No. 215. There does not appear to be any dispute that, in

all likelihood, the Murray appeal will likely result in an order vacating the denial of summary

judgment based on qualified immunity and remanding the action to the district judge for

reconsideration based on the summary judgment record. (See generally R. Doc. 98-3) (oral ruling

in Murray denying Plaintiffs’ Motion to Certify the Defendants’ Notice as Frivolous); see also

Traweek v. LeBlanc, No. 21-30096, 2022 WL 2315444, at *4 (5th Cir. June 28, 2022) (vacating

district judge’s order denying summary judgment based on qualified immunity and remanding

for the district court to reconsider). While on appeal, the LPSC Defendants specifically sought to

have the appeal remanded to direct the district court to vacate the summary judgment ruling with

citations to record evidence. See Murray, et al. v. LeBlanc, et al., No. 25-30076, ECF No. 25 (5th

Cir. Apr. 4, 2025), denied, ECF No. 33 (5th Cir. Apr. 18, 2025).

In short, this is not a situation where the party seeks a stay based on the potential

resolution of an articulable substantive legal issue on appeal. See Humphrey v. LeBlanc, Civil

Action No. 20-233-JWD-SDJ (M.D. La. Jan. 22, 2024) (staying overdetention case where there

were three pending petitions in similar cases seeking Fifth Circuit en banc review of the

Crittindon decision); see also McNeal v. LeBlanc, 93 F.4th 840 (5th Cir. 2024) (denying petition

for rehearing en banc). Here, the LPSC Defendants have not even attempted to articulate how

any specific legal issues that pertain to this action will “become clearer and more definite” after

the Murray appeal is resolved. (See R. Doc. 93-1 at 6-7).

The LPSC Defendants have not identified any cognizable prejudice that they face should

this case move forward while the Murray appeal is decided. Finally, moving forward with the

instant action will not interfere with the interest of judicial economy. The parties will have the

opportunity to file their summary judgment motions based on the applicable law and facts of this

case. To the extent a decision in the Murray appeal has any applicability to this action after

summary judgment briefs are submitted, the appropriate party may seek leave to file

supplemental briefing or other appropriate relief from the district judge in an effort to preclude

inconsistent rulings.

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons,

IT IS ORDERED that the DPSC Defendants’ Motion to Stay all Deadlines and

Discovery Pending Appeal (R. Doc. 93) is DENIED.

Signed in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, on June 11, 2025.

S

RICHARD L. BOURGEOIS, JR.

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE