City of Houston v. Ruben Rodriguez and Frederick Okon

Supreme Court of Texas

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No. 23-0094

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City of Houston,

Petitioner,

v.

Ruben Rodriguez and Frederick Okon,

Respondents

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On Petition for Review from the

Court of Appeals for the Fourteenth District of Texas

═══════════════════════════════════════

Argued September 10, 2024

JUSTICE DEVINE delivered the opinion of the Court.

JUSTICE BUSBY filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice

Lehrmann and Justice Devine joined.

When police officers act in good faith while performing

discretionary duties within the scope of their authority, the common law

shields them from personal liability and, in turn, the relevant statutory

waiver of their governmental employer’s immunity from civil suit does

not apply. 1 At issue in this interlocutory appeal is whether an officer

was acting in good faith when, while turning in pursuit of a suspected

felon fleeing in a stolen vehicle, the patrol car hit the street curb and

struck a pickup truck waiting at a stop sign. Relying solely on the

officer’s statement that he “hit the curb due to the brakes not working,”

the court of appeals held that a fact issue precluded summary judgment

for the city because the officer’s testimony was silent about when he

became aware that the brakes were not functioning and the risks of

driving with defective brakes. 2

We disagree and conclude that, as a matter of law, the officer was

acting in good faith when he executed the turn and collided with the

bystander’s truck. Although we indulge every reasonable inference from

the summary-judgment evidence in the nonmovant’s favor, the officer’s

statement does not reasonably support an inference that he had prior

awareness of any defective brakes; indeed, he clarified that he meant

only that his brakes did not stop him, not that they were defective. The

court of appeals’ sua sponte supposition to the contrary was inaccurate

speculation that conflicted with the parties’ positions. We reverse and

render judgment dismissing the case.

I

Early on a Saturday evening, Houston Police Department Officers

Richard Corral and C. Goodman were assisting the Vice Division in

running a sting operation with an undercover female detective posing as

1 TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE §§ 101.021(1), .025; City of Houston v.

Sauls, 690 S.W.3d 60, 65-66 (Tex. 2024).

2 658 S.W.3d 633, 641-42 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2022).

2

a sex worker. After an individual solicited the detective from his vehicle

and paid $40 to engage in sexual activity at a nearby parking lot, Corral

and Goodman drove to the lot to make an arrest. But when the suspect

saw them, he fled in his red Mercedes “at a high rate of speed.” The

officers pursued the suspect, activating their emergency lights and

siren. While Corral focused on driving, Goodman called in the pursuit

and the Mercedes’s license-plate number. Approximately three minutes

into the chase, dispatch relayed that the Mercedes had been reported

stolen.

The pursuit lasted less than ten minutes with the suspect driving

“erratically”; “at a high rate of speed, weaving in-and-out of traffic”; and

“in an exceedingly dangerous manner,” including “driving the wrong

direction” down a service road at one point. Corral tried to stay close

enough to keep eyes on the unidentified suspect while maintaining

enough distance to avoid a collision. As the suspect traveled north on a

one-way, three-lane service road, Corral followed around fifty feet

behind in the middle lane. Suddenly, the suspect turned right onto a

side street, “barely missing” Ruben Rodriguez and Frederick Okon, who

were in a pickup truck waiting at the stop sign to turn north onto the

service road. As Corral followed in pursuit, he noticed the truck and

attempted to avoid it but “hit the curb due to the brakes not working,”

“lost control of the vehicle,” and “struck the bed of the truck.” At the

time of the crash, Corral was traveling thirty-five to forty miles per hour.

The investigating officer found that Corral caused the accident by

making an improper wide turn from the middle lane. The police never

apprehended the suspect but subsequently recovered the stolen vehicle.

3

Rodriguez and Okon sued the City of Houston, alleging that

Corral’s negligent driving caused them personal injuries for which the

Tort Claims Act waives governmental immunity from suit. 3 In response,

the City asserted its immunity in a traditional motion for summary

judgment supported with affidavits from Corral and his supervisor,

Sergeant Kenny Li, Jr. The motion raised two grounds: (1) the Tort

Claims Act waives immunity only when the employee would be

personally liable, and official immunity shields Corral from liability

because he was acting in good faith; and (2) the Act’s emergency

exception to the waiver applies because Corral was not acting recklessly

in responding to an emergency. 4 In response, the plaintiffs attempted

to raise a fact issue that Corral recklessly made an improper wide turn

by attaching deposition excerpts from Corral and the investigating

officer, the police department’s crash and offense reports, and related

accident documents and photos. The trial court denied the motion, and

the City appealed. 5

A divided court of appeals affirmed. 6 The court held that fact

questions prevented summary judgment—specifically, whether and

when Corral knew that his brakes were not functioning properly. 7 The

3 See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE §§ 101.021(1), .025.

4 See id. §§ 101.021(1)(B), .055(2).

5An interlocutory appeal may be taken from an order denying a

governmental unit’s motion for summary judgment that asserts governmental

immunity. Id. § 51.014(a)(8); Sauls, 690 S.W.3d at 68 n.12.

6 658 S.W.3d at 636.

7 Id. at 641-43.

4

court found evidence creating a fact issue in Corral’s statement that he

“hit the curb due to the brakes not working” and his corresponding

failure to discuss any prior awareness of the brakes’ condition. 8

According to the majority, if Corral had been driving with knowledge

that his brakes were deficient, his course of action would have been

reckless and not in good faith. 9 The dissent accused the majority of

“imagin[ing] the existence of a fact” based on this “single statement” and

resting its opinion “not on reasonable inferences but on rank

speculation.” 10 In the dissent’s view, the record provides no suggestion

of any prior awareness that the brakes malfunctioned. 11 Rather, given

Corral’s description of accelerating and slowing the patrol car in pursuit,

“[t]he only reasonable inference on that score is the opposite: that the

brakes were functional.” 12

The City petitioned for review, which we granted. Because the

issue of official immunity is dispositive, we do not reach the City’s

emergency-exception issue. 13

8 Id.

9 Id. at 642-43.

10 Id. at 644-45 (Jewell, J., dissenting).

11 Id. at 645.

12 Id.

13 In our contemporaneously issued opinion in City of Austin v. Powell,

we explore the emergency exception’s scope and contours. ___ S.W.3d ___, ___,

2024 WL ___ (Tex. Dec. 31, 2024) [22-0662].

5

II

A

A city performing governmental functions may not be sued unless

the Legislature waived the city’s governmental immunity. 14 By

enacting the Tort Claims Act, the Legislature determined that a city’s

immunity is waived in a suit for personal injuries proximately caused

by an employee’s negligence in the course and scope of employment and

arising from the operation or use of a motor vehicle but only if “the

employee would be personally liable” under Texas law. 15 And “[t]o the

extent an employee has individual immunity from a tort claim for

damages,” the Act provides that it is not affected by this waiver. 16

One type of “individual immunity” that shields government

employees from personal liability is the common-law affirmative defense

of official immunity. 17 “[P]erhaps most vital in police work,” official

immunity protects officers “when they are performing (1) discretionary

14 City of Houston v. Sauls, 690 S.W.3d 60, 68 (Tex. 2024); see Rosenberg

Dev. Corp. v. Imperial Performing Arts, Inc., 571 S.W.3d 738, 746 (Tex. 2019)

(noting that cities, as political subdivisions, “share the state’s immunity when

performing governmental functions”). The judiciary determines the initial

applicability of governmental immunity, but the prerogative to waive existing

immunity remains with the Legislature, composed of the people’s duly elected

representatives. Rosenberg Dev. Corp., 571 S.W.3d at 741.

15 TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE §§ 101.021(1), .025.

16 Id. § 101.026.

17 See Ballantyne v. Champion Builders, Inc., 144 S.W.3d 417, 422-24

(Tex. 2004) (discussing the history of official immunity in Texas law).

6

duties, (2) in good faith, and (3) within the scope of their authority.” 18

The doctrine promotes the public good by encouraging energetic law

enforcement and allowing officers to make good-faith, split-second

judgments based on their experience and training without fear of

liability for every mistake. 19

Although official immunity is the employee’s affirmative defense,

not the governmental employer’s, 20 the Legislature expressly chose

language making the Act’s waiver of the employer’s immunity from suit

contingent on the fact that “the employee would be personally liable.” 21

As we have consistently recognized, this means that the governmental

employer’s immunity is not waived if its employee is protected by official

immunity. 22 Thus, in a suit against the governmental employer,

18 Sauls, 690 S.W.3d at 69-70; see Travis v. City of Mesquite, 830 S.W.2d

94, 103 (Tex. 1992) (Cornyn, J., concurring) (“Nowhere else in public service is

official immunity more appropriate or necessary than in police work.”).

19 Sauls, 690 S.W.3d at 69; Telthorster v. Tennell, 92 S.W.3d 457, 463

(Tex. 2002).

20 See Sauls, 690 S.W.3d at 70 n.30 (“Official immunity protects

individuals; governmental immunity protects governmental entities.”).

21 TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 101.021(1)(B).

22 See Sauls, 690 S.W.3d at 69; City of San Antonio v. Riojas, 640 S.W.3d

534, 537 (Tex. 2022); Tex. Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Bonilla, 481 S.W.3d 640, 642

(Tex. 2015); Univ. of Hous. v. Clark, 38 S.W.3d 578, 580 (Tex. 2000); City of

Beverly Hills v. Guevara, 904 S.W.2d 655, 656 (Tex. 1995); DeWitt v. Harris

County, 904 S.W.2d 650, 653 (Tex. 1995); K.D.F. v. Rex, 878 S.W.2d 589, 597

(Tex. 1994); City of Lancaster v. Chambers, 883 S.W.2d 650, 658 (Tex. 1994);

City of Houston v. Kilburn, 849 S.W.2d 810, 812 (Tex. 1993). As we have noted,

“we construe statutory language against the backdrop of common law,

assuming the Legislature is familiar with common-law traditions and

principles.” Marino v. Lenoir, 526 S.W.3d 403, 409 (Tex. 2017). The Tort

Claims Act was adopted fifteen years after we recognized a “good faith”

7

governmental immunity and official immunity may be essentially

entwined. 23 But unlike governmental immunity, official immunity is an

affirmative defense that must be pleaded and proved to shield an

employee from personal liability; otherwise, the defense is lost. 24 As a

immunity for public officials. See Texas Tort Claims Act, 61st Leg., R.S.,

ch. 292, §§ 3-4, 1969 Tex. Gen. Laws 874, 875-76 (requiring for the waiver of

sovereign immunity that “such officer or employee would be personally liable

to the claimant in accordance with the law of this state”), repealed and

recodified by Act of May 17, 1985, 69th Leg., R.S., ch. 959, § 1, 1985 Tex. Gen.

Laws 3242, 3303 (codified at TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 101.021);

Ballantyne, 144 S.W.3d at 422 (“Fifty years ago, we recognized a ‘good faith’

immunity for certain public officials.” (citing Campbell v. Jones, 264 S.W.2d

425 (Tex. 1954))).

The original Act had a “tortuous history and a difficult passage.”

J. Bonner Dorsey, Whither the Texas Tort Claims Act: What Remains After

Official Immunity?, 33 ST. MARY’S L.J. 235, 242 (2002); see Joe R. Greenhill &

Thomas V. Murto III, Governmental Immunity, 49 TEX. L. REV. 462, 467-68

(1971) (describing the Act’s history). Although the legislative history does not

inform our decision because the text is clear, we note that the original bill

included a provision that individual immunity does not immunize the

government, but this limitation was removed by committee amendment. See

Tex. H.B. 117, 61st Leg., R.S. (1969) (introduced version) (“[T]he individual

immunity of public officers . . . is hereby preserved to the extent and degree

that such persons presently are immunized; provided, however, that the

individual immunity of such persons shall not operate so as to immunize the

unit of government[.]”); H. Comm. on Judiciary, Bill Analysis, Tex. H.B. 117,

61st Leg., R.S. (1969) (describing this section as the “[s]ame as [the] original

bill except that it removes the limitation that immunity can not immunize the

government”).

23 See DeWitt, 904 S.W.2d at 653 (“Whether the Texas Tort Claims Act

waives sovereign immunity in a given case does not affect whether the

governmental employee may assert official immunity as a defense. On the

other hand, whether the governmental employee is entitled to official

immunity may affect whether the Texas Tort Claims Act’s limited waiver of

sovereign immunity is applicable.” (internal citations omitted)).

24 Brown & Gay Eng’g, Inc. v. Olivares, 461 S.W.3d 117, 128 (Tex. 2015)

(“[O]fficial immunity is an affirmative defense that must be pled and proved

8

result, a plaintiff could meet its “burden of affirmatively showing waiver

of [governmental] immunity” under the Act, 25 including that the

employee would be personally liable, without affirmatively negating

official immunity. For that reason, we conclude that a governmental

employer bears the burden to assert and prove its employee’s official

immunity, in a manner analogous to an affirmative defense, to preclude

enforcement of the Act’s waiver of governmental immunity on that

ground. 26

The City raised its governmental immunity via a traditional

summary-judgment motion, attaching evidence to conclusively establish

Corral’s official immunity and to affirmatively negate his personal

liability under Texas law. 27 In this appeal, only the good-faith element

by the party asserting it.”); Clark, 38 S.W.3d at 580 (“Because official immunity

is an affirmative defense, to obtain summary judgment on official immunity,

the governmental employee must conclusively prove each element of the

defense.”); Phillips v. Phillips, 820 S.W.2d 785, 789 (Tex. 1991) (“As a general

rule, an affirmative defense must be pleaded or it is waived.”).

25 City of San Antonio v. Maspero, 640 S.W.3d 523, 528 (Tex. 2022); see

City of Austin v. Powell, ___ S.W.3d ___, ___, 2024 WL ___ (Tex. Dec. 31, 2024)

[22-0662, slip op. at 4] (describing as the “foundational rule” that a plaintiff

suing the government bears the burden to affirmatively show a waiver of

immunity).

26 By contrast, a plaintiff bears the burden to negate the Tort Claims

Act’s “various exceptions or caveats that function as a withdrawal of the

waiver.” Rattray v. City of Brownsville, 662 S.W.3d 860, 866 (Tex. 2023). For

example, a plaintiff would bear the burden to negate the application of the Act’s

emergency exception. See, e.g., Powell, ___ S.W.3d at ___ [22-0662, slip op. at

8] (noting that the Act’s emergency exception “withdraws” the waiver of

immunity (citing TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 101.055(2))).

27 See TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(c); Town of Shady Shores v. Swanson, 590

S.W.3d 544, 551 (Tex. 2019) (noting that a jurisdictional challenge to the

9

of the official-immunity defense is at issue. 28 Our review is de novo, and

we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovants by

indulging every reasonable inference and resolving any doubts in their

favor. 29 But we do not disregard necessary contextual evidence or

“evidence and inferences unfavorable to the [nonmovants] if reasonable

jurors could not.” 30

B

The foundation of the court of appeals’ analysis is the statement

in Corral’s affidavit that he “hit the curb due to the brakes not working.”

From this, the court inferred that a fact question exists about Corral’s

awareness of the brakes’ defective nature prior to this event and if the

evidence so proved, Corral would not be acting in good faith. 31 The City

waiver of an entity’s governmental immunity may be raised via a traditional

summary-judgment motion); cf. Powell, ___ S.W.3d at ___ [22-0662, slip op. at

6] (“[A] plea [to the jurisdiction] may mirror a traditional motion for summary

judgment by attaching evidence in an effort to conclusively negate

jurisdiction.”).

28 The City presented evidence establishing that Corral was performing

a discretionary duty within the scope of his authority by pursuing the suspect

in a high-speed chase while on duty, which the plaintiffs do not contest. See

City of Lancaster v. Chambers, 883 S.W.2d 650, 655, 658 (Tex. 1994) (holding

that “engaging in a high-speed chase” while “on duty, in a squad car” is

generally a discretionary act within the scope of an officer’s authority).

29City of Houston v. Sauls, 690 S.W.3d 60, 70 (Tex. 2024); Alamo

Heights Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Clark, 544 S.W.3d 755, 771 (Tex. 2018).

30 Alamo Heights, 544 S.W.3d at 771.

31 658 S.W.3d 633, 642 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2022) (“By

driving a vehicle with brakes that ‘were not working’, countervailing public

safety concerns rose to a significant level,” and “a reasonably prudent police

officer would not have believed that the need to which he was responding

outweighed the risks of his course of action.”).

10

does not dispute that if this inference were reasonable, summary

judgment would be improper. Absent this inference, however, the

court’s analytical edifice crumbles.

The reasonableness of the inference turns on the reasonably

inferable meaning of Corral’s statement. Although “not working” may

mean defective or not functioning, 32 the term may also signify that

something is insufficient or not up to the task to accomplish an intended

result. 33 The record establishes that Corral intended the latter

meaning: the brakes were functional, but their use did not accomplish

his intended result of stopping the car before it hit the curb.

As an initial observation, the plaintiffs neither pleaded nor

alleged that the brakes were defective. And in Corral’s deposition, the

plaintiffs sought to clarify the meaning of his statement that his brakes

were not working:

[Plaintiffs’ Counsel]: Okay. Were your brakes working at

that point [of making the turn]?

[Corral]: I would say not—I mean, I tried to brake as hard

as I could.

[Plaintiffs’ Counsel]: Okay. Well, I mean, clearly the

brakes didn’t stop you, but were they working?

[Corral]: Yes.

32 See Working, WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY

(2002) (“adequate to permit work to be done”); Work, THE AMERICAN HERITAGE

DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (5th ed. 2016) (“To function; operate”).

33 See Work, WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (2002)

(“to produce a desired effect or result”; “to function or operate according to plan

or design”); Work, THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH

LANGUAGE (5th ed. 2016) (“To have the desired effect or outcome; prove

successful”).

11

Corral also confirmed this understanding in the Houston Police

Department Crash Questionnaire by marking “no” to the question “did

faulty equipment cause the crash?” 34

The plaintiffs attached both pieces of evidence to their

summary-judgment response, and they never argued in the lower courts

that the brakes were defective—in fact, they never even mentioned the

brakes. And in this Court, the plaintiffs expressly acknowledged that

“[t]here is no indication that the brakes on Officer Corral’s cruiser were

not working.” The court of appeals nevertheless injected uncertainty

into what was undisputed, relying on a sua sponte construction of

Corral’s statement as meaning that the brakes were defective. 35

The statement’s textual context, which we have repeatedly

emphasized is “a primary determinant of meaning,” 36 also reinforces

Corral’s intended meaning. In his affidavit, Corral made the statement

34 All caps omitted.

35 Because our adversary system relies on courts to serve as neutral

arbiters, not advocates, they must exercise caution to avoid manufacturing

factual disputes not identified by the parties. Pike v. Tex. EMC Mgmt., LLC,

610 S.W.3d 763, 782 (Tex. 2020). When it is unclear whether matters are truly

contested, a court should rely on the tools provided by our rules. For example,

the City requested oral argument, where the court of appeals could have

inquired into the parties’ positions on the condition of the brakes and the

meaning of “not working.” See TEX. R. APP. P. 39.1 (providing a right to oral

argument unless the court decides it is unnecessary). But the court denied the

request. Although this may have saved the parties from expending additional

resources in that court, it ultimately required the litigants and the judiciary to

consume resources for an appeal to this Court to address what was factually

undisputed.

36 See, e.g., Morath v. Lampasas Indep. Sch. Dist., 686 S.W.3d 725, 735

n.35 (Tex. 2024) (quoting Brown v. City of Houston, 660 S.W.3d 749, 754 (Tex.

2023)).

12

after describing how he turned, accelerated, and decelerated his patrol

car while pursuing the suspect in a high-speed chase without

mentioning any operational trouble or defective brakes. We agree with

the dissent in the court of appeals that considering the affidavit in its

entirety—along with the undisputed summary-judgment evidence—the

“only reasonable inference” is “that the brakes were functional.” 37

Finally, even if Corral had intended to communicate that he hit

the curb because his brakes were defective, as the court of appeals

concluded, 38 that statement alone would not give rise to a reasonable

inference that he was aware of any defect before that point. Stating that

a defect caused an event says nothing about one’s prior awareness.

Inferring prior awareness is no more plausible than inferring no prior

awareness—either inference would be a pure guess, which is no evidence

to raise a fact question about the officer’s prior awareness. 39

In sum, the court of appeals erroneously inferred an issue of

material fact to preclude summary judgment when the parties did not

37 658 S.W.3d 633, 645 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2022) (Jewell,

J., dissenting).

38 Id. at 641 (noting that “Officer Corral did not provide any further

explanation regarding how his brakes’ deficient condition contributed to his

driving, his decision-making, or the cause of the collision”).

39 See Ford Motor Co. v. Ridgway, 135 S.W.3d 598, 601 (Tex. 2004)

(“Evidence that is so slight as to make any inference a guess is in legal effect

no evidence.”); cf. McAllen Hosps., L.P. v. Lopez, 576 S.W.3d 389, 395 (Tex.

2019) (“When circumstantial evidence ‘is susceptible to multiple, equally

probable inferences, requiring the factfinder to guess in order to reach a

conclusion[,]’ it is in legal effect no evidence.” (quoting Suarez v. City of Texas

City, 465 S.W.3d 623, 634 (Tex. 2015))).

13

dispute the underlying fact and the evidence did not reasonably give rise

to that inference.

C

We now turn to whether the City met its burden as the traditional

summary-judgment movant. We conclude that the City conclusively

established Corral’s good faith in making a wide turn while pursuing a

suspect fleeing in a stolen vehicle and that the plaintiffs failed to raise

a fact issue controverting the City’s proof.

The standard for an officer’s good faith in a high-speed pursuit

case is whether “a reasonably prudent officer, under the same or similar

circumstances, could have believed that the need to immediately

apprehend the suspect outweighed a clear risk of harm to the public in

continuing the pursuit.” 40 No magic words are required to satisfy this

holistic inquiry; rather, the summary-judgment proof must sufficiently

assess particularized need–risk factors with reference to specific facts. 41

The focus is “on the objective facts and information the officer knew and

perceived, not on whether the officer had subjectively considered and

assessed certain factors.” 42

The “need” aspect of this balancing test refers to the urgency of

police intervention, which is balanced against the “risk” aspect of the

countervailing public-safety concerns. 43 The “need” factors include the

40 City of Houston v. Sauls, 690 S.W.3d 60, 72-73 (Tex. 2024) (quoting

City of Lancaster v. Chambers, 883 S.W.2d 650, 656 (Tex. 1994)).

41 Id. at 74-75.

42 Id.

43 Id. at 73.

14

seriousness of the crime to which the officer is responding, the necessity

of the officer’s immediate presence to prevent injury or loss of life or to

apprehend a suspect, and the availability of any alternative courses of

action to achieve a comparable result. 44 The “risk” factors address the

nature, severity, and likelihood of any harm that the officer’s actions

could cause and whether such risk would be clear to a reasonably

prudent officer. 45 As we recently reiterated, this standard “does not

place an onerous burden on law enforcement” because the touchstone is

“what a reasonable officer could have believed” under the

circumstances. 46

To establish good faith, the City relied on affidavits from Corral

and his supervisor, which provide similar accounts of the relevant

events. 47 In their affidavits, the officers opined that a reasonable officer,

under the same or similar circumstances, could have believed that the

need to pursue the suspect, who was recklessly fleeing in a stolen

vehicle, outweighed the risks of making a wide turn in pursuit. And the

44 Id. (quoting Wadewitz v. Montgomery, 951 S.W.2d 464, 467 (Tex.

1997)).

45 Id. (quoting Wadewitz, 951 S.W.2d at 467).

46 Id. at 75 (quoting City of San Antonio v. Riojas, 640 S.W.3d 534, 539

(Tex. 2022); and Wadewitz, 951 S.W.2d at 467 n.1).

47 Sergeant Li “was one of many supervisors monitoring the chase over

the radio” and, as an officer for over a decade, has been involved in “dozens of

high-speed chases.” He based his opinions on his “knowledge, skill, experience,

training, and education as a police officer”; personal conversations with Corral;

a review of Corral’s affidavit and body-camera footage; and an evaluation of

the events and circumstances of the accident.

15

officers substantiated those conclusions by assessing the need–risk

factors based on Corral’s perception of the facts at the time of the event.

In addressing the need factors, both officers detailed the events

leading up to the accident and discussed the seriousness of the suspect’s

alleged crimes. Corral explained that by the time he made the turn, he

knew the suspect had committed two felonies and a misdemeanor—

“theft of a motor vehicle,” “evading officers with a motor vehicle,” and

“solicitation of prostitution”—and was “driving in an exceedingly

dangerous manner.” 48 Given the purported offenses and the danger

from the suspect’s reckless driving, the officers opined that Corral’s

immediate presence was required to apprehend the suspect. They also

implicitly discounted other alternatives by noting that Corral “lacked

sufficient information to discontinue the pursuit and arrest the

[unidentified] suspect at another time” and “would not be able to track

down the suspect through [the stolen] vehicle[’s] records.” 49

48 See City of San Antonio v. Maspero, 640 S.W.3d 523, 531-32 (Tex.

2022) (“[W]e have long recognized that fleeing suspects may pose an even

greater danger to the community.”); Tex. Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Bonilla, 481

S.W.3d 640, 645 (Tex. 2015) (“DPS’s summary-judgment evidence detailed the

specific circumstances giving rise to pursuit and emphasized the potential

danger to the public due to the subject vehicle’s erratic and unsafe activity.”).

49 See Sauls, 690 S.W.3d at 75 (reaffirming that alternative courses of

action may be implicitly discounted instead of explicitly addressed); Bonilla,

481 S.W.3d at 645 (“Although not explicitly addressing alternatives to pursuit,

the trooper implicitly discounted the viability of other alternatives based on

his stated belief that immediate action was necessary and his inability to

identify the driver at that time.”). The plaintiffs point out that Corral

acknowledged in his deposition that he “could have gone straight to avoid any

kind of collision and just given a description where the subject was heading

to.” But consistent with his affidavit, Corral explained that he nevertheless

“was just trying to catch up to the suspect and keep eyes on him.”

16

Regarding the risk aspect of the standard, we have explained that

it is not necessary to expressly identify risks that are generally present;

they “can be addressed through describing the facts and circumstances

that affected the risks.” 50 Here, the officers described the conditions

that minimized the risks: although it “was already dark outside,” the

“weather was clear and roads were dry” with light to medium Saturday

traffic. 51 The officers also noted Corral’s efforts to mitigate the risks: he

activated the patrol car’s lights and siren for the entire pursuit, he

“repeatedly” used his air horn so that cars would yield to his vehicle, he

focused on driving safely while his partner communicated on the radio,

and he tried to “keep enough distance to avoid a collision” without

allowing the suspect to evade capture. 52

No doubt, there are obvious and significant risks associated with

pursuing a suspect who is recklessly driving at a “high rate of speed”

and then makes a “sudden” turn. 53 The plaintiffs focus on the risks

50 Sauls, 690 S.W.3d at 75.

51 See Univ. of Hous. v. Clark, 38 S.W.3d 578, 586 (Tex. 2000) (noting

that the summary-judgment evidence addressed the specific circumstances

present that affected the general risk of colliding with another vehicle by

“assessing such facts as the time of day and traffic, weather and road

conditions”).

52 Although the test does not inquire into an officer’s subjective good

faith, Corral’s efforts are part of the objective circumstances that mitigated

risks. See Sauls, 690 S.W.3d at 73 (“This good-faith test, perhaps inaptly

named given the subjective connotations, is ‘one of objective legal

reasonableness, without regard to whether the government official involved

acted with subjective good faith.’” (quoting City of Lancaster v. Chambers, 883

S.W.2d 650, 656 (Tex. 1994))).

53 Maspero, 640 S.W.3d at 531 (“[A]ll high-speed car chases involve

obvious risk of serious injury to bystanders.”); Telthorster v. Tennell, 92 S.W.3d

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arising from Corral’s improper wide turn from the middle lane of the

service road while speeding. 54 By no means should these risks be

minimized, and public safety should not be “thrown to the winds in the

heat of the chase.” 55 And because of the “inherent risks that high-speed

driving poses to those utilizing public streets and highways,” we crafted

the particularized need–risk factors “in an attempt to tailor a test that

would better weigh th[ose] risks.” 56

As we must acknowledge, however, speeding and making turns in

a manner that would be improper and unreasonable in everyday driving

are “ordinarily ‘part and parcel of a police chase.’” 57 While it should go

without saying, it bears emphasizing that what may be unreasonable in

one context could be justifiable in another, especially in the heat of a

high-speed pursuit when officers must make split-second decisions

457, 463 n.1 (Tex. 2002) (identifying concerns about the risks to the general

public and bystanders that high-speed pursuits present).

54 The side street had a posted thirty-five miles-per-hour speed limit,

but the record does not indicate the service road’s speed limit. The plaintiffs

assert that “surely [Corral] was going much faster” than thirty-five to forty

miles per hour on the service road because that was the speed at the time of

the crash after Corral had hit the brakes and gone over the curb. And Corral

acknowledged in his deposition that he did not remember how fast he was

going on the service road as he approached the turn.

55Clark, 38 S.W.3d at 584 (quoting Travis v. City of Mesquite, 830

S.W.2d 94, 98 (Tex. 1992) (plurality opinion)).

56 Telthorster, 92 S.W.3d at 463-64.

57 City of Austin v. Powell, ___ S.W.3d ___, ___ (Tex. Dec. 31, 2024)

[22-0662, slip op. at 28] (quoting Maspero, 640 S.W.3d at 532).

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under intense pressure. 58 On this record, we conclude that the City

substantiated its officers’ opinions that a reasonably prudent officer

under the circumstances of the heat of this chase could have believed

that the need to turn while speeding to maintain pursuit of an

unidentified fleeing suspect outweighed the risks. To slow down and not

make the turn would equate to discontinuing the pursuit, which Corral

implicitly discounted given the stated need for police intervention and

his inability to apprehend the suspect at another time. This evidence is

sufficient to satisfy the City’s summary-judgment burden to establish

its officer’s good faith under the requisite holistic inquiry. The burden

then shifted to the plaintiffs to present evidence raising a fact issue as

to that matter.

When the burden shifts on good faith, a plaintiff may defeat

summary judgment only by satisfying an “elevated standard of proof.” 59

It is not enough to show that reasonable officers could disagree on the

issue; a plaintiff “must show, with ‘reference to each aspect of the need

and risk balancing test,’ that no reasonably prudent officer ‘in the

defendant’s position could have thought the facts were such that they

justified defendant’s acts.’” 60 In previous cases, we have considered

58 See City of Houston v. Sauls, 690 S.W.3d 60, 79 (Tex. 2024) (“Good

faith does not require that the officer made the best decision or eliminated all

risk, especially when the officer has acted in the heat of an emergency

response[.]”); Clark, 38 S.W.3d at 583 (“Police officers must make their

decisions about pursuing a suspect rapidly and while under pressure.”).

59 Sauls, 690 S.W.3d at 75 (quoting City of Lancaster v. Chambers, 883

S.W.2d 650, 656 (Tex. 1994)).

60 Id. at 75-76 (footnote omitted) (quoting Clark, 38 S.W.3d at 587; and

Chambers, 883 S.W.2d at 657).

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whether expert testimony was more than conclusory to satisfy this

burden and defeat summary judgment. 61 But the plaintiffs here did not

present any expert testimony. Instead, they relied on deposition

transcripts and documentary evidence showing that Corral significantly

damaged the truck’s bed, made an improper wide turn, exceeded the

speed limit, and could have gone straight instead of turning while

providing dispatch with a description of the direction the subject was

heading.

At most, this evidence raises a question about Corral’s negligence

or is some evidence that a reasonably prudent officer could have made a

different decision. 62 But it does not satisfy the elevated standard of

showing that no reasonably prudent officer could have believed that

Corral was justified in making the turn to pursue a felony suspect who

was actively endangering the public. We therefore hold that the

plaintiffs failed to controvert the City’s proof.

61 Id. at 79 (holding that the expert’s “opinion is ‘a one sided analysis’

insufficient to satisfy the [plaintiffs’] elevated burden and defeat summary

judgment” (quoting City of San Antonio v. Ytuarte, 229 S.W.3d 318, 321 (Tex.

2007))); Clark, 38 S.W.3d at 587 (concluding that because the expert

“testimony on good faith is not substantiated with reference to each aspect of

the need and risk balancing test, it is conclusory and is insufficient to

controvert the defendant’s proof on good faith”); see Wadewitz v. Montgomery,

951 S.W.2d 464, 466 (Tex. 1997) (“[A]n expert witness’s conclusory statement

that a reasonable officer could or could not have taken some action will neither

establish good faith at the summary judgment stage nor raise a fact issue to

defeat summary judgment.”).

62 See Sauls, 690 S.W.3d at 80 (observing that “evidence of negligence

alone” or “that a reasonably prudent officer could have made a different

decision” is “not enough to controvert proof of good faith”).

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III

As a matter of policy, the Legislature has determined that when

a vehicular accident occurs during a high-speed chase while an officer is

acting in good faith and protected by official immunity, the victim—

rather than the city and its taxpayers—must bear the cost of his or her

personal injuries. 63 Here, the City conclusively established that its

officer made a wide turn during a high-speed chase in good faith, and

the plaintiffs failed to controvert the City’s proof. Because the officer

would be protected from personal liability by official immunity, the

City’s governmental immunity was not waived under the Tort Claims

Act. Accordingly, we reverse the court of appeals’ judgment and render

judgment dismissing the case.

John P. Devine

Justice

OPINION DELIVERED: December 31, 2024

63 See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 101.021(1); supra note 22.

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