Oladoja v. Rehman

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

DALLAS DIVISION

OLUDELE OLADOJA, §

§

Plaintiff, §

§ No. 3:24-cv-2709-K-BN

V. §

§

ZIA REHMAN, §

§

Defendant. §

FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Plaintiff Oludele Oladoja filed this pro se lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

against Zia Rehman, a staff physician at the Dallas County jail, alleging that the

medical care that he received while incarcerated violated the Eighth and Fourteenth

Amendments. See Dkt. No. 3.

United States District Judge Ed Kinkeade referred Oladoja’s lawsuit to the

undersigned United States magistrate judge for pretrial management under 28

U.S.C. § 636(b) and a standing order of reference.

The Court granted Oladoja leave to proceed in forma pauperis under the Prison

Litigation Reform Act and ordered that the complaint be served. See Dkt. Nos. 4-8.

Rehman answered and asserted qualified immunity. See Dkt. No. 11. And, as

ordered, see Dkt. Nos. 13 & 15, Rehman moved for summary judgment on qualified

immunity, see Dkt. Nos. 17 & 18. After he did so, the Court entered an order on

February 26, 2025 to allow Oladoja an opportunity to move for leave to conduct

limited discovery in order to respond to the qualified immunity issues raised in the

summary judgment motion by March 27, 2025. See Dkt. No. 19.

Rehman then advised the Court that he was unable to serve the summary

judgment motion on Oladoja at the last known address that Oladoja provided the

Court. See Dkt. No. 20. The Court’s February 26 order and a response from the clerk’s

office to a copy request made by Oladoja were both then returned as undeliverable.

See Dkt. Nos. 21 & 22.

Considering this record, the undersigned enters these findings of fact,

conclusions of law, and recommendation that the Court should dismiss this action

without prejudice under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b).

Discussion

Rule 41(b) “authorizes the district court to dismiss an action sua sponte for

failure to prosecute or comply with [a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure or] a court

order.” Griggs v. S.G.E. Mgmt., L.L.C., 905 F.3d 835, 844 (5th Cir. 2018) (citing

McCullough v. Lynaugh, 835 F.2d 1126, 1127 (5th Cir. 1988) (per curiam)); accord

Nottingham v. Warden, Bill Clements Unit, 837 F.3d 438, 440 (5th Cir. 2016) (failure

to comply with a court order); Rosin v. Thaler, 450 F. App’x 383, 383-84 (5th Cir.

2011) (per curiam) (failure to prosecute); see also Campbell v. Wilkinson, 988 F.3d

798, 800-01 (5th Cir. 2021) (holding that the text of Rule 41(b) does not extend to a

failure to comply with a court’s local rule insofar as that violation does not also qualify

as a failure to prosecute (discussing Berry v. CIGNA/RSI-CIGNA, 975 F.2d 1188 (5th

Cir. 1992))).

This authority “flows from the court’s inherent power to control its docket and

prevent undue delays in the disposition of pending cases.” Boudwin v. Graystone Ins.

Co., Ltd., 756 F.2d 399, 401 (5th Cir. 1985) (citing Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S.

626 (1962)); see also Lopez v. Ark. Cnty. Indep. Sch. Dist., 570 F.2d 541, 544 (5th Cir.

1978) (“Although [Rule 41(b)] is phrased in terms of dismissal on the motion of the

defendant, it is clear that the power is inherent in the court and may be exercised sua

sponte whenever necessary to ‘achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of

cases.’” (quoting Link, 370 U.S. at 631)); Campbell, 988 F.3d at 800 (“It is well

established that Rule 41(b) permits dismissal not only on motion of the defendant,

but also on the court’s own motion.” (citing Morris v. Ocean Sys., Inc., 730 F.2d 248,

251 (5th Cir. 1984) (citing, in turn, Link, 370 U.S. at 631))).

And the Court’s authority under Rule 41(b) is not diluted by a party proceeding

pro se, as “[t]he right of self-representation does not exempt a party from compliance

with relevant rules of procedural and substantive law.” Wright v. LBA Hospitality,

754 F. App’x 298, 300 (5th Cir. 2019) (per curiam) (quoting Hulsey v. Texas, 929 F.2d

168, 171 (5th Cir. 1991) (quoting, in turn, Birl v. Estelle, 660 F.2d 592, 593 (5th Cir.

Nov. 1981))).

A Rule 41(b) dismissal may be with or without prejudice. See Long v. Simmons,

77 F.3d 878, 879-80 (5th Cir. 1996).

Although “[l]esser sanctions such as fines or dismissal without prejudice

are usually appropriate before dismissing with prejudice, ... a Rule 41(b)

dismissal is appropriate where there is ‘a clear record of delay or

contumacious conduct by the plaintiff and when lesser sanctions would

not serve the best interests of justice.’”

Nottingham, 837 F.3d at 441 (quoting Bryson v. United States, 553 F.3d 402, 403 (5th

Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (in turn quoting Callip v. Harris Cnty. Child Welfare Dep’t,

757 F.2d 1513, 1521 (5th Cir. 1985))); see also Long, 77 F.3d at 880 (a dismissal with

prejudice is appropriate only if the failure to comply with the court order was the

result of purposeful delay or contumacious conduct and the imposition of lesser

sanctions would be futile); cf. Nottingham, 837 F.3d at 442 (noting that “lesser

sanctions” may “‘include assessments of fines, costs, or damages against the plaintiff,

conditional dismissal, dismissal without prejudice, and explicit warnings’” (quoting

Thrasher v. City of Amarillo, 709 F.3d 509, 514 (5th Cir. 2013))).

“When a dismissal is without prejudice but ‘the applicable statute of

limitations probably bars future litigation,’” that dismissal operates as – i.e., it is

reviewed as – “a dismissal with prejudice.” Griggs, 905 F.3d at 844 (quoting

Nottingham, 837 F.3d at 441); see, e.g., Wright, 754 F. App’x at 300 (affirming

dismissal under Rule 41(b) – potentially effectively with prejudice – where “[t]he

district court had warned Wright of the consequences and ‘allowed [her] a second

chance at obtaining service’” but she “disregarded that clear and reasonable order”).

At the outset of this case, the Court advised Oladoja that he must “notify the

Court of any change of address by filing a written Notice of Change of Address with

the Clerk. Failure to file such notice may result in this case being dismissed for want

of prosecution.” Dkt. No. 7, ¶ 5. And he did so early on. See Dkt. No. 9. But Oladoja’s

failure to keep the Court updated as to his address – in addition to leaving the

impression that he no longer wishes to pursue the claims in this lawsuit – has

prevented this action from proceeding and amounts to a failure to prosecute.

A Rule 41(b) dismissal of this lawsuit without prejudice is therefore warranted

under these circumstances and to the extent provided below.

Because the undersigned concludes that lesser sanctions would be futile, as the

Court is not required to delay the disposition of this case until Oladoja elects to follow

the Court’s order to keep his address up to date or otherwise contact the Court, the

Court should exercise its inherent power to prevent undue delays in the disposition

of pending cases and sua sponte dismiss this action without prejudice under Rule

41(b).

And, while it is not apparent based on the record here that dismissal of this

lawsuit without prejudice at this time would effectively be a dismissal with prejudice,

insofar as the recommended dismissal may somehow prejudice Oladoja, these

findings, conclusions, and recommendation provide notice, and the opportunity to file

objections (as further explained below) provides a means to respond, to explain why

this case should not be dismissed for the reasons set out above. See Carver v. Atwood,

18 F.4th 494, 498 (5th Cir. 2021) (“The broad rule is that ‘a district court may dismiss

a claim on its own motion as long as the procedure employed is fair.’ More specifically,

‘fairness in this context requires both notice of the court’s intention and an

opportunity to respond’ before dismissing sua sponte with prejudice.” (citations

omitted)).

Recommendation

The Court should dismiss this action without prejudice under Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 41(b).

A copy of these findings, conclusions, and recommendation shall be served on

all parties in the manner provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of these

findings, conclusions, and recommendation must file specific written objections

within 14 days after being served with a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); FED. R. CIv.

P. 72(b). In order to be specific, an objection must identify the specific finding or

recommendation to which objection is made, state the basis for the objection, and

specify the place in the magistrate judge’s findings, conclusions, and recommendation

where the disputed determination is found. An objection that merely incorporates by

reference or refers to the briefing before the magistrate judge is not specific. Failure

to file specific written objections will bar the aggrieved party from appealing the

factual findings and legal conclusions of the magistrate judge that are accepted or

adopted by the district court, except upon grounds of plain error. See Douglass v.

United Servs. Auto. Assn, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th Cir. 1996).

DATED: May 12, 2025

Le

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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