Opinion

Clary v. Pennsylvania State University

Court
District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania
Filed
Jun 10, 2025
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 36.3%

The opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

KANYE CLARY, No. 4:25-CV-00445

Plaintiff, (Chief Judge Brann)

v.

PENNSYLVANIA STATE

UNIVERSITY, MICHAEL

RHOADES, HAPPY VALLEY

UNITED, BLUEPRINT SPORTS

AND ENTERTAINMENT, LLC,

JOHN DOES 1-10, and ABC

CORPORATIONS 1-10,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

JUNE 10, 2025

I. BACKGROUND

On December 20, 2024, Defendants The Pennsylvania State University

(“Penn State”) and Michael Rhoades (“Rhoades”) removed this case from the

Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas to the United States District Court for

the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.1 The parties then filed several motions,

including a motion to dismiss, a motion to remand, and a motion to transfer venue.

The Honorable Chad F. Kenney treated Plaintiff Kanye Clary’s request to

voluntarily dismiss certain counts as a Motion to Amend the Complaint and

subsequently granted that motion on March 7, 2025.2 Penn State’s and Rhoades’s

Motion to Transfer Venue was granted several days later on March 11, 2025.3 But

one aspect of the Motion to Dismiss filed by Penn State and Rhoades on January 17,

2025 remains unresolved: Defendants’ attempt to dismiss Clary’s defamation claim.

For the reasons that follow, that portion of the motion is granted.

II. MOTION TO DISMISS STANDARD

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), courts dismiss a complaint,

in whole or in part, if the plaintiff fails to “state a claim upon which relief can be

granted.” Following the landmark decisions of Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly4 and

Ashcroft v. Iqbal,5 “[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain

sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible

on its face.’”6 The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has instructed

that “[u]nder the pleading regime established by Twombly and Iqbal, a court

reviewing the sufficiency of a complaint must take three steps”: (1) “take note of the

elements the plaintiff must plead to state a claim”; (2) “identify allegations that,

because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of

2 Ord. Grant Motion to Amend, Doc. 20.

3 Ord. Granting Motion to Transfer Venue, Doc. 22.

4 550 U.S. 544 (2007).

5 556 U.S. 662 (2009).

6 Id. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).

truth”; and (3) “assume the[] veracity” of all “well-pleaded factual allegations” and

then “determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.”7

III. DISCUSSION

A. Facts Alleged in the Amended Complaint

1. The Affidavit

Before the Court may recite the relevant facts, it is confronted with the issue

posed by the affidavit submitted alongside Plaintiff’s Brief in Opposition. In that

affidavit, Clary described the purportedly defamatory statements in substantially

more detail. But, when deciding a motion to dismiss, a court generally considers

only the allegations in the complaint, exhibits attached thereto, and facts of public

record.8 Normally, to consider anything beyond those sources, a motion to dismiss

must be converted to a motion for summary judgment.9 But consideration of

materials outside the complaint is not completely barred on a 12(b)(6) motion.

Courts may consider any documents that are integral or explicitly relied upon in the

complaint.10 However, this affidavit is neither integral to the Amended Complaint

nor explicitly relied upon in it. As such, the Court will not consider the information

in the affidavit when deciding the present motion.

7 Connelly v. Lane Construction Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 787 (3d Cir. 2016) (internal quotations

and citations omitted).

8 Mayer v. Belichick, 605 F.3d 223, 230 (3d Cir. 2010).

9 See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(d).

10 Schmidt v. Skolas, 770 F.3d 241, 249 (3d Cir. 2014).

2. The Relevant Facts in the Amended Complaint

While a student at Penn State, Kanye Clary was the captain of the University’s

men’s basketball team; during that time, Michael Rhoades served as the team’s head

coach.11 As captain, Clary “voiced concerns about lax discipline for late arrivals,

disrespect, and lack of accountability for certain players.”12 Rhoades dismissed these

concerns, and the coaching staff began to treat Clary unfairly for raising these

issues.13

Penn State also used Clary’s Name, Image, and Likeness (“NIL”) without his

permission.14 This prompted Clary’s family to complain to Rhoades on January 16,

2024.15 Rhoades then provided Plaintiff a copy of a proposed contract, but he

“refused to sign the contract.”16 Upon this refusal, “the retaliation against him

escalated.”17 Clary “never received a response from the athletic department or

director when these issues were raised.”18

In January 2024, Clary “suffered an in-game concussion,” which Rhoades

used to “further punish” him.19 Rhoades and the other coaches suspended Plaintiff

11 Notice of Removal, Doc.1, Compl., Ex. A ¶¶ 19, 23, 25.

12 Id. ¶¶ 28, 31.

13 Id. ¶ 34.

14 Id. ¶ 35.

15 Id. ¶ 36.

16 Id. ¶¶ 37-38.

17 Id. ¶ 39.

18 Id. ¶ 40.

19 Id. ¶¶ 41, 43.

from the basketball team in February 2024, and he was ultimately dismissed from

the team on February 19, 2024 “on unfounded and meritless grounds.”20

a. The Allegedly Defamatory Statements

“Rhoades spread a false narrative that [Clary] improperly missed classes, but”

these absences were apparently excused due to his concussion.21 Many other players

on the team also “had far more absences” than Plaintiff.22 Rhoades further “spread

false rumors that [Plaintiff] was failing his classes.”23 Again, this was “incorrect” as

Clary “had a single, excused incomplete because he could not finish a videography

assignment due to symptoms from his concussion.”24

Rhoades also “stated that [Plaintiff] used the word ‘bro’ in a disrespectful

fashion,” despite the “entire team[’s] and coaching staff[’s] use[] [of] the term.”25

“Coaches were [also] overheard by players making derogatory statements about

[Clary] behind his back” “at the behest of” Rhoades.26 Further, Rhoades “slandered

[Clary] to an outside coach who called Anthony Clary, [Plaintiff’s] father, and

informed him of the slander.”27 This individual indicated that “he felt uneasy about

the stories he was hea[r]ing about” Clary.28

20 Id. ¶¶ 44-45.

21 Id. ¶ 47.

22 Id. ¶ 48.

23 Id. ¶ 49.

24 Id.

25 Id. ¶ 50.

26 Id. ¶ 51.

27 Id. ¶ 52.

28 Id.

Rhoades further “spread unfounded rumors that [Plaintiff] was going to leave

[Penn State] because he refused to sign the NIL agreement.”29 This “narrative was

spread amongst the coaches, media and teammates, as well as individuals outside

the team.”30 Ultimately, Clary contends that his “dismissal is a fabrication that was

spurred by . . . Rhoades because he was upset about [Clary] speaking out and then

being confronted for using his” NIL and refusing to sign the NIL agreement.31

“The slander by Defendants” “created an onslaught of cyber bullying,

depression, ostracizing, limitation on use of facilities, damage to reputation, and

financial loss.”32 Further, “[t]he slander negatively effected [Plaintiff’s] ability to

find a school of his liking because it created a false stigma that he was a problem

student” at Penn State.33 “This false narrative came into play at every subsequent

school that [Clary] visited and became the topic of every meeting, which made

multiple teams decide not to sign him.”34

Clary’s collegiate portal documentation was also improperly inputted by Penn

State which resulted in coaches being unable to reach Plaintiff and having “to resort

to sending . . . messages via [Clary’s] personal Instagram account.”35

29 Id. ¶ 53.

30 Id.

31 Id.¶ 54.

32 Id. ¶ 56.

33 Id. ¶ 57.

34 Id.

35 Id. ¶ 58.

B. Analysis

Pennsylvania has codified the elements of a defamation claim at 42 Pa.C.S. §

8343. This statute requires plaintiffs to demonstrate: “(1) the defamatory character

of the communication[;]” “(2) its publication by the defendant[;]” “(3) its application

to the plaintiff[;]” (4) “the understanding by the recipient of its defamatory

meaning[;]” “(5) the understanding by the recipient of it as intended to be applied to

the plaintiff[;]” “(6) special harm resulting to the plaintiff from its publication[;]”

and “(7) abuse of a conditionally privileged occasion.”

“Under [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure] 8(a), unlike under the Pennsylvania

pleading standard, the plaintiff need not identify the specific allegedly defamatory

statement.”36 But to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, Clary “must allege at least some

specific statements identifying the speaker, the approximate date, the content, and

the audience.”37 Essentially, Clary should “allege when, how, and to whom the

alleged defamatory statements were made.”38

36 Monge v. Univ. of Pennsylvania, No. 22-2942, 2023 WL 3594471, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

89312, at *7 (E.D. Pa. May 22, 2023) (citing Bank v. Cmty. Coll. of Phila., No. 22-cv-293,

2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 130155, 2022 WL 2905243 (E.D. Pa. July 22, 2022); Rishell v. RR

Ronnelley & Sons Co., No. 06-cv-4782, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38325, 2007 WL 1545622, at

*3 (E.D. Pa. May 24, 2007)).

37 Id. (citing Lee v. Univ. of Pa. Sch. of Dental Med., No. 19-cv-835, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

145977, 2019 WL 4060843, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 27, 2019)).

38 Shen-Sampas v. Klein, No. 25-1637, 2025 WL 1257692, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81563, at *9

(E.D. Pa. Apr. 30, 2025) (citing Litman v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., No. 24-278, 2024 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 120728, 2024 WL 3361596, at *7-8 (E.D. Pa. July 10, 2024)).

With that understanding in mind, the Court’s review reveals significant

deficiencies in the Amended Complaint such that dismissal is warranted. Paragraphs

47, 49-53, and 63 contain the allegations relevant to the defamation claim.

Paragraphs 47 and 49-53 do not identify the audience of the allegedly defamatory

statements and Paragraphs 47 and 49-52 similarly lack any indication as to the

approximate dates the statements were made. Paragraph 50 has a further issue as

Plaintiff does not indicate that the statement is allegedly false, and Paragraphs 51-

52 do not identify the content of the purportedly defamatory statements. Finally,

Paragraph 63 serves as a general summary, but it is far too vague to support this

claim.

IV. CONCLUSION

Given these rather substantial deficiencies, Plaintiff’s defamation claim must

be dismissed. But leave to amend will be provided as Clary apparently has additional

details to submit—they are referenced in the affidavit attached to his Brief in

Opposition.

In accordance with the above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Defendants The Pennsylvania State University’s and Michael

Rhoades’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 7) is GRANTED IN

PART;

a. Count One is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE;

and

2. Plaintiff may file an amended complaint no later than June 24,

2025.

BY THE COURT:

s/ Matthew W. Brann

Matthew W. Brann

Chief United States District Judge

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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