“[w]hatever the state of the law now, it was not clearly established in 1993 that prosecutors acting as investigators had a duty to intervene when their fellow officers committed constitutional wrongs.”
How later courts described this case
- “[w]hatever the state of the law now, it was not clearly established in 1993 that prosecutors acting as investigators had a duty to intervene when their fellow officers committed constitutional wrongs.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
TYRONE REYNA,
Plaintiff
No. 24 CV 10815
v.
Judge Jeremy C. Daniel
CITY OF CHICAGO, et al.,
Defendants
ORDER
The defendant, Caren Armbrust’s, motion to dismiss [69] is granted as to Counts IV
and X, and denied as moot as to count XV. If Armbrust wishes to make an amendment
to her answer, she must do so on or before June 25, 2025. The June 11, 2025, status
hearing is stricken.
STATEMENT
This matter comes before the Court on the defendant, Caren Armbrust’s, motion to
dismiss Counts IV and X of the complaint, which alleges she failed to intervene or
prevent other defendants from violating the plaintiff, Tyrone Reyna’s, constitutional
rights.1 (R. 69.)2 This case involves seventeen counts against ten defendants; for the
sake of brevity only those facts relevant to this motion to dismiss are summarized
here. This description of events is drawn from the complaint and is presumed true for
the purpose of resolving the pending motion. Vimich v. Vorwald, 664 F.3d 206, 212
(7th Cir. 2011).
The plaintiff, Tyrone Reyna, spent fourteen years in prison for a murder he did not
commit. (R. 59 ¶ 1.) He was exonerated in October of 2023 and awarded a certificate
of innocence in 2024. (Id. ¶¶ 87–88.) According to the plaintiff, Armbrust was working
as a felony review prosecutor on February 11, 1993, the day the plaintiff was arrested.
(Id. ¶¶ 34, 45.) The plaintiff alleges Armbrust prepared a confession for his signature
without speaking to him. (Id. ¶ 51.) Instead, according to the plaintiff, Armbrust
1 Armbrust also moves to dismiss Count XV, which the plaintiff clarified he is not asserting
against her. (R. 75 at 12–13.) Accordingly, her motion to dismiss is denied as moot as to
Count XV.
2 For ECF filings, the Court cites to the page number(s) set forth in the document’s ECF
header unless citing to a particular paragraph or other page designation is more
appropriate.
relied on information provided by detectives, including defendant Bernard Ryan. (Id.
¶¶ 51–54.) When Armbrust and Ryan presented the confession to the plaintiff for his
signature, he initially refused to sign, professed his innocence, and stated he was
being mistreated by Ryan and other detectives. (Id. ¶ 56.) Ryan then allegedly
slapped the plaintiff. (Id.) The plaintiff, who was sixteen years old at the time, also
alleges that he was denied the presence of his mother or a “youth officer” while the
defendants attempted to obtain his signature on the confession written by Armbrust.
(Id. ¶ 57.) The plaintiff alleges he later signed the confession under duress. (Id.)
Armbrust moves to dismiss the failure to protect claims against her, arguing that she
is entitled to qualified immunity for both claims. (R. 69.) A motion to dismiss under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint,
not the merits of the allegations. McReynolds v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 694 F.3d 873,
878 (7th Cir. 2012). “[D]ismissal of a plaintiff's complaint on qualified immunity
grounds is appropriate if, taking the facts alleged in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff, the defendant is entitled to qualified immunity as a matter of law.” Sabo v.
Erickson, 128 F.4th 836, 843 (7th Cir. 2025). Qualified immunity is an immunity from
suit, not a defense to liability, and should thus be resolved “at the earliest possible
stage in litigation.” Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227 (1991) (per curiam).
Qualified immunity exists to protect public officials from suit unless they violate a
clearly established statutory or constitutional right. Doxtator v. O’Brien, 39 F.4th
852, 863 (7th Cir. 2022). “If the law at that time did not clearly establish that the
[official’s] conduct would violate the Constitution, the [official] should not be subject
to liability or, indeed, even the burdens of litigation.” Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S.
194, 198 (2004). To determine whether a right was clearly established, the Court first
looks to “controlling Supreme Court precedent and [Seventh Circuit] decisions on the
issue.” Kemp v. Liebel, 877 F.3d 346, 351 (7th Cir. 2017).
Armbrust argues that only in 2012 did the Seventh Circuit clearly establish that a
prosecutor had a duty to intervene when acting in an investigative capacity. See
Whitlock v. Brueggemann, 682 F.3d 567, 581 (7th Cir. 2012). This is correct. Courts
in this district have routinely held that no investigative prosecutorial duty to
intervene existed before Whitlock in 2012. See Abrego v. Guevara, No. 23 C 1740, 2024
WL 3566679, at *11 (N.D. Ill. 2024) (“If anything, Whitlock shows that the law was
not ‘clearly established’ back in 1999.”); Cruz v. Guevara, No. 23 C 4268, 2024 WL
4753672, at *9 (N.D. Ill. 2024) (holding that a failure to intervene claim “must be
dismissed” because no duty to intervene existed at the time of the alleged violation);
Wilson v. Est. of Burge, 667 F. Supp. 3d 785, 834 (N.D. Ill. 2023) (dismissing a failure
to intervene claim because the court found no authority “that shows a clearly
established duty in 1993 for prosecutors, even acting in an investigatory function, to
intervene”); Serrano v. Guevara, 315 F. Supp. 3d 1026, 1038 (N.D. Ill. 2018)
(“[w]hatever the state of the law now, it was not clearly established in 1993 that
prosecutors acting as investigators had a duty to intervene when their fellow officers
committed constitutional wrongs.”).
The plaintiff does not dispute that Whitlock is the first case in this circuit establishing
an investigating prosecutor’s duty to intervene. Instead, he argues that Whitlock did
not need to establish this obligation because it “should have been self-evident... even
without direct precedent.” (R. 75 at 10.) According to the plaintiff, it is well
established “that felony review prosecutors working with detectives to obtain
tortured statements and who fabricate evidence are not protected by immunity.” Cd.
at 11.) Here, the plaintiff confuses immunity from acts with immunity from failing to
act. As Armbrust put it, she “does not assert in this motion that she is entitled to
qualified immunity for her alleged direct role in the alleged fabrication and/or
coercion. Rather, [she] contends she is entitled to qualified immunity on [the
pllaintiff’s vicarious liability ‘failure to intervene’ claims in [c]Jount|s] IV and X.” On
this narrow ground addressing this subset of the plaintiff's claims, Armbrust is
correct.
Armbrust’s obligation to intervene was not clearly established in 1998, and as such
she is entitled to qualified immunity on those claims. See Brosseau, 543 U.S. at 198.
Her motion to dismiss is therefore granted as to the plaintiffs failure to intervene
claims.
A$
Date: June 10, 2025
JEREMY C. DANIEL
United States District Judge