The opinion
IN THE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
PEORIA DIVISION
DAVID A. SMITH,
Plaintiff,
v. Case No. 2:25-cv-02131-JEH-RLH
ALKELA ERVIN et al,
Defendants.
Order
Now before the Court is the Plaintiff’s Amended Motion for Leave to
Proceed in forma pauperis, (D. 7), along with his Amended Complaint against the
Defendants (D. 6).1 For the reasons set forth, infra, the Plaintiff’s Amended Motion
for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis is DENIED and his Amended Complaint is
dismissed with leave to amend within twenty-one days in accordance with this
Order.
I
Plaintiff David A. Smith filed his original Complaint on May 5, 2025, along
with a Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis. (D. 1 & 2). On May 21, 2025,
the Court struck the Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis and the
Complaint because it failed to comply with Civil Local Rule 5.1 and the Court
granted the Plaintiff leave to amend the Complaint and the Motion to Proceed in
forma pauperis within twenty-one days. See 05/21/2025 Text Order. On May 22,
2025, the Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint and an Amended Motion for
1 Citations to the electronic docket are abbreviated as “D. ___ at ECF p. ___.”
Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis with the Court. (D. 6 & 7). The matter is now
fully briefed.
II
“The federal in forma pauperis statute, [28 U.S.C. § 1915], is designed to
ensure that indigent litigants have meaningful access to the federal courts.” Neitzke
v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324 (1989). Section 1915(e) directs a court to screen a
complaint when filed together with a request to proceed in forma pauperis. Luevano
v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 722 F.3d 1014, 1022 (7th Cir. 2013). A court shall dismiss a
case at any time if: 1) the allegation of poverty is untrue; 2) the action is frivolous
or malicious; 3) the action fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or
4) the action seeks monetary relief against an immune defendant. 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2). However, for the reasons set forth below, even if the Court were to find
the Plaintiff is unable to pay the filing fee, his Complaint must be dismissed.
A
The Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard applies when
determining whether a complaint fails to state a claim under Section
1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). Coleman v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm’n of Wis., 860 F.3d 461, 468
(7th Cir. 2017). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) provides that a complaint
must include “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief”. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). A “complaint must contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A plaintiff “must give enough details about the
subject-matter of the case to present a story that holds together.” Swanson v.
Citibank, N.A., 614 F.3d 400, 404 (7th Cir. 2010). And while the Court is obligated
to construe pro se complaints liberally, See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007),
“[t]he protections built in the in forma pauperis system would be meaningless if
persons were allowed to proceed in forma pauperis with complaints that do not
supply sufficient facts from which a reasonable inference could be made that the
rights of the petitioner were violated.” Smith-Bey v. Hospital Adm’r, 841 F.2d 751,
758 (7th Cir. 1988).
B
Plaintiff, David A. Smith, filed this civil rights Complaint against
caseworkers and specialists of the Housing Authority of Champaign County
(“HACC”), naming as Defendants Alkela Ervin, Debra Lee, and Tiffany Robinson.
(D. 6 at ECF p. 1-3). He alleges that the Defendants engaged in a policy or custom
that violated his civil rights which arose out of an incident that occurred on
February 21, 2024. Id. On that day, Plaintiff states that he had an appointment to
receive his payment standard for search of residency. (D. 6 at ECF p. 6). He states
that he could not sit with the caseworker to discuss his concerns and made several
attempts to contact “SF Properties” and four months later he received an email
stating that it was his second notice that he was late, but claims he never received
the first notice. Id.
Against Defendant Alkela Ervin, Plaintiff states she failed to allow him to
sit with a “caseworker [to] discuss rent and calculation of utility allowance”,
“failure to accommodate senior citizen”, “failure to complete inspection”, “held
new voucher for cover up or retaliation”, and “violation of privacy.” Id. ECF p. 2.
Against Defendant Debra Lee, Plaintiff alleges that she “fail[ed] to accommodate
me or protect my complaints”, “disregarded communication with me”, and
“fail[ed] to abide by my civil rights.” Id. at ECF p. 2-3. Against Defendant Tiffany
Robinson, Plaintiff states that she “fail[ed] to give me proper info concerning my
housing and accommodation”, “intentionally lied to me concerning my civil
rights”, “privacy violation”, and “held new voucher for retaliation for my
complaints.” Id. at ECF p. 3. The Plaintiff further states that the Defendants failed
to intervene to protect the Plaintiff from a violation of his civil rights and that the
Defendants conspired together to violate one or more of Plaintiff’s civil rights. Id.
at ECF p. 5. In response to this incident, Plaintiff seeks $8,000,000,000 in damages
for emotional harm, pain and suffering, and loss of enjoyment of life. Id. at ECF p.
7.
C
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege he was
deprived of a federal right, privilege, or immunity by any person acting under
color of state law. Brown v. Budz, 398 F.3d 904, 908 (7th Cir. 2005). Here, the Plaintiff
fails to identify a federal right beyond his “civil rights” or “privacy violation”
generally. (D. 6 at ECF p. 2-3). As a result, his claim would otherwise fail for this
reason alone because he does not identify a “federal right, privilege, or immunity”
that he was deprived of. Brown, 398 F.3d at 908. However, construing his claim
liberally as the Court must, to state a claim arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 where a
policy or custom is alleged to cause the deprivation and the action is “against a
government official acting in his official capacity, [a] plaintiff must sufficiently
allege that there is [either]: ‘1) an express policy that, when enforced, cause[d] a
constitutional depravation; 2) a widespread practice that, although not authorized
by written law, or express municipal policy, [was] so permanent and well-settled
as to constitute a custom or usage with force of the law; [or] 3) . . . that the
constitutional injury was caused by a person with final policy making authority.’”
Zenter v. Dunbar, 205 F. Supp. 2d 924, 925-26 (N.D. Ill. 2002) (citing McTigue v. City
of Chi., 60 F.3d 381, 382 (7th Cir. 1995)). Here, the Plaintiff does not allege an
express policy, and there are not facts in the Complaint that indicate the purported
constitutional injury was caused by a person with final policy making authority.
Accordingly, the Court construes the Plaintiff’s claim as alleging a “widespread
practice” causing a constitutional injury. However, even under this theory, “the
Complaint must allege that an official policy or custom not only caused the
constitutional violation, but was the moving force behind it.” Sims v. Cty. of Bureau,
506 F.3d 509, 515 (7th Cir. 2007) (citing Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469,
479 (1986)). Still, the Plaintiff’s Complaint fails because it does not identify a policy
or custom at issue, and furthermore, the Complaint does not allege a causal
connection between the injury and the policy, nor does it identify the federal right,
privilege, or immunity that the Plaintiff believes he was deprived of. See id.
Therefore, the Complaint fails to contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true,
to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678. Nor
has the Plaintiff pleaded “enough details about the subject-matter of the case to
present a story that holds together.” Swanson v. Citibank, N.A., 614 F.3d 400, 404.
III
For the reasons stated, supra, the Plaintiff’s Amended Motion for Leave to
Proceed in forma pauperis, (D. 7), is DENIED and his Amended Complaint against
the Defendants, (D. 6), is dismissed with leave to amend within twenty-one days
in accordance with this Order.
It is so ordered.
Entered on June 10, 2025
s/Jonathan E. Hawley
U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE