Sheets v. Charlotte County

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

FORT MYERS DIVISION

Andrew Bryant Sheets,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No: 2:24-cv-958-JES-KCD

CHARLOTTE COUNTY, TONY

PRIBBLE, Supervisor of

Security; in their

individual and professional

capacity, LINDA ARMSTRONG-

DEEBLE, Supervisor of

Elections; in their

individual and professional

capacity, JULIE SEARGENT,

in their individual and

professional capacity,

ROBERT CESTARO, in their

individual and professional

capacity, WEISER SECURITY,

in their individual and

professional capacity,

MATTHEW ROEPSTORFF, in

their individual and

professional capacity, and

HECTOR FLORES,

Defendants

OPINION AND ORDER

This matter comes before the Court on review of three motions

to dismiss. Defendants Charlotte County (the County), Tony

Pribble, Robert Cestaro, and Hector Flores filed a motion to

dismiss (Doc. #53) on December 17, 2025, to which Plaintiff Andrew

B. Sheets (Sheets) filed a Response in Opposition (Doc. #68) on

January 6, 2025. Defendant Matthew Roepstorff (Roepstorff) filed

a motion to dismiss (Doc. #79) on January 16, 2025, to which

Sheets filed a Response in Opposition (Doc. #95) on February 6,

2025. Defendant Weiser Security Services, Inc. (Weiser) filed a

motion to dismiss (Doc. #80) on January 21, 2025, to which Sheets

filed a Response in Opposition (Doc. #96) on February 11, 2025.

The motions are decided as follows.

I.

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a Complaint

must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing

that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).

This obligation “requires more than labels and conclusions, and a

formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will

not do.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)

(citation omitted). To survive dismissal, the factual allegations

must be “plausible” and “must be enough to raise a right to relief

above the speculative level.” Id. at 555. See also Edwards v.

Prime Inc., 602 F.3d 1276, 1291 (11th Cir. 2010). This requires

“more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me

accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)

(citations omitted).

In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the Court must

accept all factual allegations in a complaint as true and take

them in the light most favorable to plaintiff, Erickson v. Pardus,

551 U.S. 89 (2007), but “[l]egal conclusions without adequate

factual support are entitled to no assumption of truth,” Mamani

v. Berzain, 654 F.3d 1148, 1153 (11th Cir. 2011) (citations

omitted). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of

action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “Factual allegations that are merely

consistent with a defendant’s liability fall short of being

facially plausible.” Chaparro v. Carnival Corp., 693 F.3d 1333,

1337 (11th Cir. 2012) (citations omitted). Thus, the Court

engages in a two-step approach: “When there are well-pleaded

factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then

determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to

relief.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.

II.

Sheets, acting pro se, makes the following factual

allegations in the Amended Complaint (AC), (Doc. #35), the

operative pleading:

On October 21, 2020, Sheets was kicked out of the Charlotte

County library and subsequently issued a trespass warning for

filming inside the library during the closing of election polls.

Sheets was ejected by Julie Seargent, an elections worker employed

by the County, and Robert Cestaro, a security guard employed by

Weiser. Weiser was a private company hired by the County to provide

security services. Seargent and Cestaro acted at the direction of

Linda Armstrong, a supervisor employed by the County. The AC

alleges that at least one news outlet was allowed to engage in

identical filming without issue.

Tony Pribble, a security manager employed by the County,

directed Deputy Matthew Greenwood to make a police report and to

initiate a process so Sheets would be trespassed. Hector Flores,

an administrator employed by the County, drafted and signed a

trespass warning aimed at Sheets. The trespass warning cited

violation of Rule #8 of County Ordinance 2016-027/Facility Rules,

which reads:

THE FOLLOWING CONDUCT IS PROHIBITED BY COUNTY

ORDINANCE 2016-027

. . .

8. Audio or video recording anywhere inside of

County buildings or conveyances, except during public

meetings as provided below, or as otherwise approved by

the County Administrator. Any audio or video recording

that is conducted outside of County buildings must be

done in an orderly manner and must not interfere with

the use of County facilities by visitors; impede County

employees or County officials in the performance of

their duties; or harass visitors, employees or County

officials. Any person recording another must cease doing

so immediately if any visitor, County employee or County

official who is not directly performing public duties

expresses his or her desire not to be recorded. Anyone

failing to immediately cease audio or video recording

any visitor, employee or County official who is not

directly performing public duties, and who has expressed

a desire not to be recorded, will be immediately

trespassed without warning. (This does not apply to, 1)

Authorized law enforcement personnel, or 2) County

officials, where wither are directly performing public

duties on matters of public concern.) Audio or video

recording of public meetings is permitted provided it

is done in a quiet and orderly manner, does not

interfere with the conduct of the meeting, does not

block the view of any person attending the public

meeting and does not block any aisle, row, ingress or

egress. Rules governing citizen conduct during public

meetings of the Board of County Commissioners can be

found in the Administrative Code and Section 1.12 of

the Rules of Procedure, Board of County Commissioners,

Charlotte County, available online at

www.charlottecountyfl.gov.

. . .

If an individual fails to immediately cease conduct

prohibited by these Rules upon request, a Trespass

Warning may be issued by the County Administrator (or

his or her designee) pursuant to County Ordinance 2016-

027.

(Doc. #53-1, emphasis added.) The bottom of the trespass warning

states that remaining or returning to the County property could

result in arrest. (Id.) It also states that the trespass warning

can be appealed pursuant to Section 1-2-82(c)(6) of the Code of

Ordinances of Charlotte County, Florida.1 (Id.)

1 The trespass warning, the County Ordinance 2016-027/Facility

Rules, and Section 1-2-82(c)(6) of the Code of Ordinances of

Charlotte County, Florida were not attached as exhibits to the

AC. But they were attached by some defendants in their motions to

dismiss. (See Doc. #53-1; Doc. #79-1.) All three are properly

considered herein pursuant to the incorporation-by-reference

doctrine because they are central to Sheets’ claims and Sheets

did not dispute their authenticity in his responses. See Johnson

v. City of Atlanta, 107 F.4th 1292, 1300–01 (11th Cir. 2024). The

Court also takes judicial notice of the ordinances since they are

not subject to reasonable dispute because they can be accurately

and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot

reasonably be questioned. See Bryant v. Ford, 967 F.3d 1272, 1275

(11th Cir. 2020).

On October 23, 2020, a Weiser employee “harasse[d]” Sheets

again. Sheets appealed the trespass warning and found himself in

an administrative court in front of Special Magistrate Matthew

Roepstorff. Sheets asserted First Amendment defenses to the

trespass warning. On November 19, 2020, Special Magistrate

Roepstorff issued an order denying Sheets’ appeal and upholding

the trespass warning. The order explained that the facial

constitutionality of statutes cannot be raised in administrative

proceedings.

On October 20, 2024, Sheets filed this lawsuit. The AC raises

six claims, all under 42 U.S.C. § 1983: (1) First Amendment

Viewpoint Discrimination; (2) First Amendment Prior Restraint;

(3) First Amendment Retaliation; (4) Facial Unconstitutionality

of Rule #8 of County Ordinance 2016-027/Facility Rules; (5) Facial

Unconstitutionality of the appeals process pursuant to Section 1-

2-82(c)(6) of the Code of Ordinances of Charlotte County; and (6)

Failure to Train against Weiser.

All movants seek dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), while Weiser

also moves in the alternative for a more definite statement under

Rule 12(e).2 (Doc. #53, ¶ 9);(Doc. #79, p. 1); (Doc. #80, p.1).

The arguments will be considered in turn.

2 Some defendants also state in a conclusory fashion that Sheets

did not suffer an injury-in-fact. (Doc. #53, p. 3-4.) Such a

conclusory argument without substantive discussion is not

sufficient to properly raise a Rule 12(b)(1) argument. Sapuppo v.

III.

Certain defendants raise immunity defenses, beginning with

judicial immunity and followed by qualified immunity. The Court

analyzes whether either type of immunity is successful before

analyzing any remaining claims.

A. Judicial and Quasi-Judicial Immunity

Special Magistrate Roepstorff argues that he is entitled to

judicial immunity for the claims in Counts 2 and 3, the only

Counts in which he is a named defendant. In Count 2, he is accused

of causing a prior restraint on Sheets’ free press rights by

upholding the trespass order. In Count 3, he is accused of

upholding the trespass order to retaliate against Sheets for

Sheets’ free press activity. Sheets counters that Special

Magistrate Roepstorff is not entitled to judicial immunity because

his role was administrative rather than judicial.

Allstate Floridian Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678, 681 (11th Cir. 2014).

It is noted that “an actual injury can exist when the plaintiff

is chilled from exercising [his] right to free expression or

forgoes expression in order to avoid enforcement consequences. In

such an instance . . ., the injury is self-censorship.” Harrell

v. The Fla. Bar, 608 F.3d 1241, 1254 (11th Cir. 2010)(citation

omitted). See also Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 459 (1974);

Bischoff v. Osceola Cnty., Fla., 222 F.3d 874, 884 (11th Cir.

2000)(construing Steffel to “hold[] that plaintiff had standing

to challenge constitutionality of a Georgia criminal trespass law

because he was warned twice to stop handbilling and was told that

if he engaged in the activity again he would be arrested.”)

Nonetheless, if parties wish to challenge injury-in-fact or any

other aspect of subject-matter jurisdiction, they may file a

properly argued Rule 12(b)(1) motion.

“Judges are absolutely immune from civil liability under

section 1983 for acts performed in their judicial capacity,

provided such acts are not done in the ‘clear absence of all

jurisdiction.’” Roland v. Phillips, 19 F.3d 552, 555 (11th Cir.

1994)(quoting Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 357 (1978)). Quasi-

judicial immunity, a derivative of judicial immunity, is also

absolute and applies to nonjudicial officials acting within the

scope of their authority “when their official duties ‘have an

integral relationship with the judicial process.’” Id. (quoting

Ashbrook v. Hoffman, 617 F.2d 474, 476 (7th Cir. 1980)). “[W]e

determine the absolute quasi-judicial immunity of a nonjudicial

official through a functional analysis of the action taken by the

official in relation to the judicial process.” Id. Thus, “[w]e do

not look to rank, title, or location within the government, but

rather examine ‘the nature of the responsibilities of the

individual official’ to determine whether the official was

exercising a sufficiently judicial function.” Washington v.

Rivera, 939 F.3d 1239, 1243 (11th Cir. 2019)(quoting Cleavinger

v. Saxner, 474 U.S. 193, 201 (1985)).

Special Magistrate Roepstorff was exercising a sufficiently

judicial function, and he is entitled to at least absolute quasi-

judicial immunity. The AC alleges that Special Magistrate

Roepstorff held a hearing, heard argument, and issued an order.

The Eleventh Circuit “ha[s] recognized the authority under Florida

law for special magistrates to adjudicate code violations” through

this very process, which includes the ability to appeal the

special magistrate’s final order to a Florida Circuit Court.

Lindbloom v. Manatee Cnty., 808 F. App'x 745, 751 (11th Cir.

2020)(emphasis added)(citing Club Madonna, Inc. v. City of Miami

Beach, 924 F.3d 1370, 1379 (11th Cir. 2019)).3

Courts have routinely held that similarly situated special

magistrates and their equivalent counterparts are entitled to at

least absolute quasi-judicial immunity. See Cowart v. Stone Duro,

etc., No. 3:24-CV-472-MMH-SJH, 2024 WL 4476156, at *4 (M.D. Fla.

Oct. 11, 2024)(“Applying a functional analysis, Plaintiff's

allegations against Special Magistrate Boeckman are in turn barred

by absolute quasi-judicial immunity.”); Fuller v. Bayona, No. 23-

24251-CIV, 2024 WL 4057602, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 5, 2024). The

Court finds that Special Magistrate Roepstorff was exercising a

judicial function in an adversarial proceeding which could be

appealed to correct error, and which needs performance without

fear of harassment and intimidation. Special Magistrate Roepstorff

is therefore entitled to at least absolute quasi-judicial immunity

as to both counts against him in the AC.

3 Unpublished opinions are not controlling authority and are

persuasive only insofar as their legal analysis warrants.” Bonilla

v. Baker Concrete Const., Inc., 487 F.3d 1340, 1345 n.7 (11th Cir.

2007).

B. Qualified Immunity

Defendants Tony Pribble, Robert Cestaro, and Hector Flores

argue they are entitled to qualified immunity for the conduct

alleged in the AC.4 Sheets disagrees.

“Qualified immunity shields government officials from liability

for civil damages for torts committed while performing

discretionary duties unless their conduct violates a clearly

established statutory or constitutional right.” Hadley v.

Gutierrez, 526 F.3d 1324, 1329 (11th Cir. 2008)(citing Harlow v.

Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). “We apply a two-part

analysis to a government official's assertion of qualified

immunity.” Harbert Int'l, Inc. v. James, 157 F.3d 1271, 1281 (11th

Cir. 1998). First, “[t]o even be potentially eligible for

[dismissal] due to qualified immunity, the official must have been

engaged in a ‘discretionary function’ when he performed the acts

of which the plaintiff complains.” Holloman ex rel. Holloman v.

Harland, 370 F.3d 1252, 1264 (11th Cir. 2004)(quoting Harlow, 457

U.S. at 818). “It is the burden of the governmental official to

make this showing.” Id.

4 While Special Magistrate Roepstorff also moved for qualified

immunity, “[b]ecause we have determined that [he is] entitled to

absolute quasi-judicial immunity, [his] alternative qualified

immunity defense is moot.” Roland, 19 F.3d at 557 n.6.

“[T]o pass the first step of the discretionary function test

for qualified immunity, the defendant must have been performing a

function that, but for the alleged constitutional infirmity, would

have fallen with his legitimate job description.” Spencer v.

Benison, 5 F.4th 1222, 1231 (11th Cir. 2021). “The inquiry is two-

fold: ‘We ask whether the government employee was (a) performing

a legitimate job-related function (that is, pursuing a job-related

goal), (b) through means that were within his power to utilize.’”

Carruth v. Bentley, 942 F.3d 1047, 1054 (11th Cir. 2019)(quoting

Holloman, 370 F.3d at 1264). “A ‘bald assertion by the defendant

that the complained-of actions were . . . within the scope of his

discretionary authority’ is insufficient.” Est. of Cummings v.

Davenport, 906 F.3d 934, 940 (11th Cir. 2018).

Tony Pribble, Robert Cestaro, and Hector Flores do not even

mention the first step of the qualified immunity analysis in their

brief. (See Doc. #53, pp. 12-13.) Rather, the AC identifies Tony

Pribble as a county security manager, Robert Cestaro as a security

guard at Weiser, and Hector Flores as a county administrator. But

these defendants make no showing as to their job titles, job

description/function, or that the complained-of actions were

within their authorized power. Having failed to satisfy their

burden at the first step, the Court is unable to proceed to the

second step. The qualified immunity defense raised by Tony

Pribble, Robert Cestaro, and Hector Flores cannot be determined

on their motion to dismiss.

IV.

The Court next turns to the remaining arguments against the

AC’s other § 1983 claims.5 Section 1983 provides a private cause

of action against any person who, under color of state law,

deprives a person of “any rights, privileges, or immunities

secured by the Constitution and laws” of the United States. 42

U.S.C. § 1983.

A. Count 1: First Amendment Viewpoint Discrimination

In Count 1, the AC alleges that the “decision to trespass

Andrew Sheets for filming in the library, [sic] is viewpoint

restriction on speech.” (Doc. #35, ¶ 55.) Viewpoint discrimination

“occurs ‘when the specific motivating ideology or the opinion or

perspective of the speaker is the rationale for the regulation.’”

Cambridge Christian Sch., Inc. v. Fla. High Sch. Athletic Ass'n,

Inc., 942 F.3d 1215, 1240–41 (11th Cir. 2019)(quoting Rosenberger

v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Vir., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995)).

Count 1 fails to state a claim because the AC does not plausibly

5 The Court only addresses the arguments it can specifically

discern. The motion to dismiss by the County, Tony Pribble, and

Robert Cestaro raises various arguments but fails to specify which

argument applies to which count. Counts 2 and 3 appear

unchallenged so neither is addressed herein.

allege that Sheets was trespassed because of his ideology,

opinion, or perspective. In fact, no ideology, opinion, or

perspective is even identified. Count 1 is dismissed without

prejudice.

B. Count 4: First Amendment Monell Claim

In Count 4, the AC raises a Monell claim against the County,

alleging that Rule #8 of County Ordinance 2016-027/Facility Rules

is unconstitutional on its face under the First Amendment. The

County moves to dismiss, arguing that the rule is not facially

unconstitutional because the library is a nonpublic forum and the

rule is reasonable.

But the relevant question at the dismissal stage is whether

the alleged constitutional violation is sufficiently plead, not

whether there actually was a constitutional violation.6 Maple v.

City of Miami Beach, 663 F. Supp. 3d 1318, 1323 (S.D. Fla.

2023)(citing Randall v. Scott, 610 F.3d 701, 710 (11th Cir.

2010)). While the County may indeed prevail on the merits of the

count, the current issue is whether there is a plausible count.

Since the County has not addressed that issue, the County’s motion

to dismiss this count is denied.

C. Count 5: Unconstitutional Appeal Process

6 That said, the Eleventh Circuit recently held a similar rule did

not facially violate the First Amendment. See Hoffman v. Delgado,

No. 23-13213, 2025 WL 25856, at *2 (11th Cir. Jan. 3, 2025).

In Count 5, the AC raises a Monell claim against the County,

alleging that Section 1-2-82(c)(6) of the Code of Ordinances of

Charlotte County, which establishes the appeal process for

trespass warnings, is unconstitutional on its face under the

First, Fifth, Seventh, and Fourteenth Amendment. The County moves

to dismiss, arguing that the Ordinance is not facially

unconstitutional because the library is a nonpublic forum and that

the AC fails to sufficiently plead violations of the Fifth,

Seventh, and Fourteenth Amendments. The County’s first argument

fails for the reasons stated as to the prior count.

But the Court agrees with the County’s arguments as to the

Fifth, Seventh, and Fourteenth Amendments. The AC offers only a

conclusory allegation that the Ordinance violates the Fifth

Amendment. That is insufficient, so the Fifth Amendment portion

of the claim is dismissed without prejudice. As to the Seventh

Amendment, the AC explains that the alleged violation is based on

the Ordinance’s failure to afford a jury trial option when

appealing a trespass warning. Such a claim fails because both the

Supreme Court and the Eleventh Circuit have long recognized that

“the Seventh Amendment applies only in federal court.” Sowers v.

R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 975 F.3d 1112, 1131 n.9 (11th Cir.

2020)(citation omitted). The Seventh Amendment portion of the

claim is dismissed with prejudice.

As to the Fourteenth Amendment claim, the AC alleges that

the Ordinance violates procedural due process because it lacks a

jury trial option. This claim fails because in Club Madonna the

Eleventh Circuit emphasized that “a violation of procedural due

process does not ‘become complete unless and until the

[municipality] refuses to provide due process.’” Id., 924 F.3d at

1378 (quoting McKinney v. Pate, 20 F.3d 1550, 1562 (11th Cir.

1994) (cleaned up)). A municipality does not refuse to provide

due process when its procedures “entitle[] [individuals] to appeal

[an] order to the Florida State Circuit Court,” and they simply

forego the appeal in lieu of bringing the “arguments to federal

court.” Id. at 1379. In fact, “that procedure satisfies due

process because the Florida Circuit Court has the power to remedy

any procedural deficiencies and cure violations of due process.”

Id. (citing McKinney, 20 F.3d at 1564). Because the Ordinance

entitled Sheets to an appeal before a Florida Circuit Court, the

Ordinance did not violate procedural due process. The Fourteenth

Amendment claim is dismissed with prejudice.

D. Count 6: Failure to Train

In Count 6, the AC raises a Monell § 1983 failure to train

claim against Weiser. Weiser moves to dismiss based on four

arguments: (1) that vicarious liability is not applicable to §

1983 claims; (2) that § 1983 is inapplicable to Weiser because it

is a private company and not a state actor; (3) that any failure

to train claim is insufficiently alleged; and (4) that the AC is

a shotgun pleading.

It is true that Weiser must be considered a State actor to be

held liable under this claim since Ҥ 1983 only provides for

claims to redress State action.” Rayburn v. Hogue, 241 F.3d 1341,

1347 (11th Cir. 2001). Though the AC identifies Weiser as a private

company, “[t]he Eleventh Circuit recognizes three tests for

establishing state action by what is otherwise a private person

or entity: the public function test, the state compulsion test,

and the nexus/joint action test.” Harvey v. Harvey, 949 F.2d 1127,

1130 (11th Cir. 1992). No factual allegations are made, however,

as to which test, if any, establishes Weiser as a State actor.

Having failed to show Weiser is plausibly a State actor, this

Count merits dismissal.

Even if Weiser is a State actor, dismissal is required because

the AC does not adequately plead a failure to train claim. A §

1983 claim “is at its most tenuous where a claim turns on a failure

to train.” Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 61 (2011). Weiser

“is not automatically liable under section 1983 even if it

inadequately trained or supervised its” employees. Gold v. City

of Miami, 151 F.3d 1346, 1350 (11th Cir. 1998). Instead, to

adequately plead a § 1983 failure to train claim, it must be

alleged that Weiser “inadequately trains or supervises its

employees, this failure to train or supervise is a [Weiser]

policy, and that [Weiser’s] policy causes the employees to violate

a citizen's constitutional rights.” Id. (citation omitted).

A failure to train policy is a Weiser policy “only where the

failure to train amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights

of persons with whom the [employee] come into contact.” City of

Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989). Deliberate

indifference occurs when Weiser “knew of a need to train and/or

supervise in a particular area and . . . made a deliberate choice

not to take any action.” Gold, 151 F.3d at 1350. Deliberate

indifference can be shown in two ways: (1) “if the [defendant] is

aware that a pattern of constitutional violations exists, and

nevertheless fails to provide adequate training,” or (2) “if the

likelihood for constitutional violation is so high that the need

for training would be obvious.” Lewis v. City of W. Palm Beach,

Fla., 561 F.3d 1288, 1293 (11th Cir. 2009). “A less stringent

standard of fault for a failure-to-train claim ‘would result in

de facto respondeat superior liability on municipalities,”

Thompson, 563 U.S. at 62 (quoting Canton, 489 U.S. at 392), which

§ 1983 does not allow—as Weiser correctly points out. Knight

through Kerr v. Miami-Dade Cnty., 856 F.3d 795, 819 (11th Cir.

2017)(“This liability is premised on a constitutional violation

carried out by the [defendant] itself and cannot be based on

theories of respondeat superior or vicarious liability.”).

At the very least, Count 6 fails to allege that a failure to

train policy is a Weiser policy. First, no pattern of similar

constitutional violations by untrained Weiser employees is

alleged. At most, the AC mentions that Sheets was “harassed” on

October 23, 2020, by a Weiser employee, days after he was ejected

from the library. But the vague “harassed” allegation does not

plausibly plead that occurrence was similar and, in any event, a

subsequent event cannot establish a prior pattern of violations.

Connick, 563 U.S. at 63 n. 7. Second, it is not alleged that this

is the rare kind of obvious need for training that would support

a finding of deliberate indifference. See Weiland v. Palm Beach

Cnty. Sheriff's Off., 792 F.3d 1313, 1329 (11th Cir. 2015). Count

6 is dismissed without prejudice.

E. Miscellaneous Instructions

A few final notes. Weiser is correct that the AC is a shotgun

pleading. As Weiland teaches, the most common type of shotgun

pleading is one “containing multiple counts where each count

adopts the allegations of all preceding counts, causing each

successive count to carry all that came before and the last count

to be a combination of the entire complaint.” Id. at 1321. That

is exactly what the AC does at the beginning of every count. The

AC is also replete with unintelligible sentences. (See Doc. #35,

p. 10)(“[T]he first amendment viewpoint if to if the if the first

amendment The First Amendment discrimination.”).

Also concerning is the AC’s naming of Matthew Greenwood and

John Does. Greenwood was named as a defendant in the first

complaint, (see Doc. #1), but after Sheets moved to dismiss him,

(Doc. #5), he was dismissed and terminated from this action. (See

Doc. #6.) In the AC, Greenwood was dropped from the caption as an

identified defendant, and at least in one part he is referred to

as “Defendant Deputy Greenwood”, with a strikethrough on the word

“Defendant”. (Doc. #35, ¶ 22.) But in other parts of the AC, he

is still referred to as “Defendant Greenwood.” (Id. ¶¶ 50, 65,

68.) Nothing indicates Greenwood was served the AC.

Similarly, “John Does” were dropped from the AC’s caption as

identified defendants and are only mentioned in the AC once,

albeit under the factual allegations section and not under

“parties”: “John Does are county employees who violated Plaintiffs

[sic] rights.” (Id. ¶ 13.) “As a general matter, fictitious-party

pleading is not permitted in federal court.” Richardson v.

Johnson, 598 F.3d 734, 738 (11th Cir. 2010). A limited exception

to the rule is “when the plaintiff's description of the defendant

is so specific as to be ‘at the very worst, surplusage.’” Id.

(quoting Dean v. Barber, 951 F.2d 1210, 1215 n.6 (11th Cir. 1992)).

If the AC intended to name any John Does as defendants, they are

sua sponte dismissed without prejudice. See id. (affirming

district court’s sua sponte dismissal of John Doe identified as

“Guard, Charlotte Correctional Institute” in pro se complaint).

Accordingly, it is now

ORDERED:

1. The Motion to Dismiss by the County, Tony Pribble, Robert

Cestaro, and Hector Flores (Doc. #53) is GRANTED IN PART

AND DENIED IN PART.

a. Count 1 is dismissed without prejudice.

b. Count 5’s Fifth Amendment claim is dismissed without

prejudice. Count 5’s Seventh and Fourteenth Amendment

claims are dismissed with prejudice.

2. The Motion to Dismiss by Matthew Roepstorff (Doc. #79) is

GRANTED to the extent indicated.

a. Matthew Roepstorff is entitled to absolute quasi-

judicial immunity.

3. The Motion to Dismiss by Weiser Security Services, Inc.

(Doc. #80) is GRANTED to the extent indicated.

a. Count 6 is dismissed without prejudice.

4. Any John Doe Defendants are dismissed without prejudice.

Plaintiff is additionally warned that the Amended

Complaint is a shotgun pleading.

5. Plaintiff may file a second amended complaint within

FOURTEEN (14) DAYS of this Opinion and Order. Failure to

do so may result in closure of the case without further

notice. Any forthcoming complaint shall be limited to

curing the deficiencies addressed herein, including the

counts/parties dismissed without prejudice. In addition,

any forthcoming complaint shall, as consistent with this

Opinion and Order, remove Matthew Roepstorff and the

claims dismissed with prejudice.

DONE AND ORDERED at Fort Myers, Florida, this 10th day of

June 2025,

—_— . 2, _ f

JGHE E. STEELE

5 IOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Copies: Counsel of record

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