Williams v. State of Ohio

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

MICHAEL A. WILLIAMS, SR., ) CASE NO. 1:25 CV 700

)

Plaintiff, ) JUDGE DONALD C. NUGENT

)

Vv. )

) MEMORANDUM OF OPINION

STATE OF OHIO, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

Pro se Plaintiff Michael A. Williams, Sr. brings this action to challenge his divorce and

child custody action currently pending in the Lorain County Domestic Relations Court. He

names as Defendants the State of Ohio, Lorain County, Lorain County Children Services, Lorain

County Domestic Relations Court Judge Sherry Glass, Lorain County Domestic Relations Court

Magistrates Sam Bradley and Brandon Oliver, his spouse Rachel T. Williams, Russell Boyd,

Patti Joe Boyd, Rainelle Henry, Anna Cachione-Rufo, Jim Miller, Andrew Lipian, Christina

Doran and John/Jane Does 1-3. In the Complaint, he contends he is being denied parenting time

with his minor children. He asserts eighteen claims for relief and seeks monetary damages and

an order from this Court for the Defendants to follow the existing child custody and parenting

order.

Plaintiff filed an Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis. (Doc. No. 2). That

Application is granted.

Factual and Procedural Background

Plaintiff's Complaint is nearly devoid of factual allegations. He filed for divorce against

his wife, Rachel Williams, on January 10, 2024. See Williams v. Williams, No. 24DU093473

(Lorain Cty Comm. PI. Ct. Dom Rel Div. filed Jan. 10, 2024). He states, without explanation,

that his wife removed the children from him on January 15, 2024. He provides no explanation

for this statement. The Court takes notice of a companion case Plaintiff filed in this Court in

which he claimed his wife telephoned police on January 15, 2024 and reported that Plaintiff had

committed domestic violence. See Williams v. City of Lorain, No. 1:25 CV 642 (N.D. Ohio

filed Apr. 1 2025)(Brennan, J.). Plaintiff was charged with domestic violence and his wife was

granted a temporary protection order.

Plaintiff states he was denied all access to his children until June 28, 2024. At that point

the Domestic Relations Court ordered supervised visitation to take place. On September 17,

2024, the Domestic Relations Court ordered that Plaintiff would have unsupervised parenting

time pursuant to a standard visitation schedule. In December 2024, Plaintiff's access to his

children was disrupted. He does not explain that statement; however, the Domestic Relations

Court docket gives no indication that the court terminated his visitations. See Williams v.

Williams, No. 24DU093473 (Lorain Cty Comm. Pl. Ct. Dom Rel Div. filed Jan. 10, 2024). To

the contrary, the Domestic Relations Court stated that the September 17, 2024 child custody

order is still in place. Jd. It is possible that his wife is denying Plaintiff contact with the children.

Plaintiff asserts eighteen claims: (1) denial of substantive due process, (2) denial of equal

protection, (3) civil conspiracy under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), (4) parental alienation, (5) aiding and

abetting civil rights violations, (6) conversion of parental time, (7) state-created danger, (8)

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complicity in violating orders, (9) conspiracy to interfere with civil rights, (10) failure to

investigate and protect minors, (11) failure to train and supervise (Monell), (12) denial of access

to the courts, (13) denial of procedural due process, (14) interference with familiar association,

(15) racial discrimination against black fathers, (16) retaliation, (17) deliberate indifference to

child safety, and (18) Monell liability. He seeks compensatory and punitive damages. He asks

this court to declare that the Defendants violated his rights, and order the Domestic Relations

Court to enforce its orders and restore his access to his children.

Standard of Review

Although pro se pleadings are liberally construed, Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364,

365 (1982) (per curiam); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), the Court is required to

dismiss an in forma pauperis action under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) if it fails to state a claim upon

which relief can be granted, or if it lacks an arguable basis in law or fact. Neitzke v. Williams,

490 U.S. 319 (1989); Lawler v. Marshall, 898 F.2d 1196 (6th Cir. 1990); Sistrunk v. City of

Strongsville, 99 F.3d 194, 197 (6th Cir. 1996). A claim lacks an arguable basis in law or fact

when it is premised on an indisputably meritless legal theory or when the factual contentions are

clearly baseless. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327.

A cause of action fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted when it lacks

“plausibility in the Complaint.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 564 (2007). A

pleading must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is

entitled to relief.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 677-78 (2009). The factual allegations in the

pleading must be sufficient to raise the right to relief above the speculative level on the

assumption that all the allegations in the Complaint are true. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. The

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Plaintiff is not required to include detailed factual allegations, but must provide more than “an

unadorned, the Defendant unlawfully harmed me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A

pleading that offers legal conclusions or a simple recitation of the elements of a cause of action

will not meet this pleading standard. Jd. In reviewing a Complaint, the Court must construe the

pleading in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff. Bibbo v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 151

F.3d 559, 561 (6th Cir. 1998)

Discussion

As an initial matter, Plaintiff asks this Court to order the Lorain County Domestic

Relations Court to enforce its own orders and restore his access to his children. This federal

court lacks authority to order a state court to issue orders in state cases on questions of purely

state law. See Commodities Exp. Co. v. Detroit Int'l Bridge Co., 695 F.3d 518, 527 (6th Cir.

2012)(principles of comity and federalism require the federal courts to accord respect to state

court proceedings and recognize that they should have the final say over the law they are best

suited to apply).

In addition, all of Plaintiff's claims are stated as legal conclusions. The “Factual

Background” section of his Complaint consists of seven general sentences. His “Claims for

Relief” section is simply a list of legal claims with no explanation of the factual basis for these

claims. This is not sufficient to state a plausible claim for relief.

Furthermore, none of the Defendants is subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To

establish a prima facie case under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Plaintiff must assert that a person acting

under color of state law deprived him of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the

Constitution or laws of the United States. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535 (1981).

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Generally to be considered to have acted “under color of state law,” the person must be a

state or local government official or employee. Plaintiff's wife, Rachel Williams, is a private

citizen and not a government official. A private party may be found to have acted under color of

state law to establish the first element of this cause of action only when the party “acted together

with or ... obtained significant aid from state officials” and did so to such a degree that its actions

may properly be characterized as “state action.” Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937

(1982). An individual may also be considered a state actor if he or she exercises powers

traditionally reserved to a state. Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 352 (1974).

Merely being a participant in litigation does not make a private party a co-conspirator or joint

actor with the state. Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 28 (1980). Plaintiff fails to allege facts that

suggest Rachel Williams can be considered to be a state actor for purposes of § 1983.

Four of the Defendants are absolutely immune from suit. The State of Ohio is immune

from suit under the Eleventh Amendment. Latham v. Office of Atty. Gen. of State of Ohio, 395

F.3d 261, 270 (6th Cir. 2005); Bouquett v. Clemmer, 626 F. Supp. 46, 48 (S.D. Ohio 1985).

Judge Glass and Magistrates Bradley and Oliver are absolutely immune from civil suits for

money damages that arise from decisions they made from the bench or actions they took in

connection with a case pending before them. Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 9 (1991); Barnes v.

Winchell, 105 F.3d 1111, 1115 (6th Cir. 1997). While there are some very limited exceptions to

absolute judicial immunity, Plaintiff fails to allege facts to suggest that any of them would apply

in this case.

The Lorain County Children Services is not sui juris, meaning it is not a legal entity

separate from the County that can sue or be sued in its own right. Loper v. Cuyahoga Cty.

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Children & Family Servs., No. 1:18 CV 1598, 2019 WL 1597552, at *5 (N.D. Ohio Apr. 15,

2019) (Cuyahoga County Children and Family Services is not sui juris and cannot be sued in its

own right); Wilson v. Trumbull Cty. Dep't of Job & Family Servs., No. 4:12 CV 02163, 2013

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 154926, 2013 WL 5820276, at *3 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 29, 2013) (finding that

“numerous district courts” have found that county agencies are not sui juris, and granting motion

to dismiss of defendant Trumbull County Adult Protective Services because the county agency

lacks the capacity to be sued) (collecting cases). The claims against his Defendant fail to state a

claim as a matter of law.

Plaintiffs Complaint contains no facts that pertain to Russell Boyd, Patti Joe Boyd,

Rainelle Henry, Anna Cachione-Rufo, Jim Miller, Andrew Lipian or Christina Doran. He does

not even identify who these people are and how they may be connected to the child custody

matter. Plaintiff cannot establish the liability of any Defendant absent a clear showing that the

Defendant was personally involved in the activities which form the basis of the alleged

unconstitutional behavior. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 371 (1976); Mullins v. Hainesworth,

No. 95-3186, 1995 WL 559381 (6th Cir. Sept. 20, 1995). The Complaint simply contains no

facts which reasonably associate these Defendants to any of the Plaintiffs claims.

Finally, Plaintiff seeks to hold Lorain County responsible for the actions of County

employees. A municipality cannot be held liable for the actions of its officers and employees

under a theory of respondeat superior. Monell v. Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 692- 94

(1978). Plaintiff may only hold a local government entity liable under § 1983 for the entity’s

own wrongdoing. Id. A local government entity violates §1983 where its official policy or

custom actually serves to deprive an individual of his or her constitutional rights. Jd. A

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“municipal policy” includes “a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially

adopted and promulgated.” Powers v. Hamilton County Pub. Defender Comm’n, 501 F.3d 592,

607 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 690). A “custom” for purposes of Monell

liability must “be so permanent and well settled as to constitute a custom or usage with the force

of law.” Monell, 436 U.S. at 691. It must reflect a course of action deliberately chosen from

among various alternatives. City of Oklahoma v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 823 (1985). In short, a

“custom” is a legal institution not memorialized by written law. Feliciano v. City of Cleveland,

988 F.2d 649, 655 (6th Cir. 1993).

To state a claim for relief against a municipality under § 1983, Plaintiff must: (1) identify

the municipal policy, (2) connect the policy to the municipality, and (3) show that his particular

injury was incurred due to execution of that policy. Alkire v. Irving, 330 F.3d 802, 815 (6th Cir.

2003). Plaintiff states that “Lorain County is liable for judicial misconduct and systematic denial

of access to remedies.” (Doc. No. 1 at Page ID #: 2). This statement is far too general to identify

a specific policy that reflects a decision by the County. Instead, it appears to be an attempt at

respondeat superior liability which is prohibited by Monell.

Plaintiff also lists a claim for “failure to train and supervise (Monell).” (Doc. No. | at

PagelD #: 3). A municipality may be held liable only where there is essentially a complete

failure to train employees in an area where prior incidents demonstrate an obvious need for

training, or where the training that is provided is so reckless or grossly negligent that future

misconduct is almost inevitable or would properly be characterized as substantially certain to

result. Hays v. Jefferson Cnty., Ky., 668 F.2d 869, 874 (6th Cir.1982). Plaintiff's claim is not

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supported by factual allegations that would suggested that the City of Lorain can be held liable

for failing to train or supervise its employees.

Conclusion

Accordingly, Plaintiff's Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (Doc. No. 2) is

granted. This action is dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1915(e). The Court certifies, pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that an appeal from this decision could not be taken in good faith.!

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DONALD C. NU Ws 7

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Dated: hm [0 LOLs

! 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) provides:

An appeal may not be taken in forma pauperis if the trial court certifies that it is not

taken in good faith.

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