KING v. LUCUS

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

ROBERT CHARLES ANTHONY KING, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) 1:24CV761

)

GUY LUCUS, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM ORDER

THOMAS D. SCHROEDER, District Judge.

This action arises from Plaintiff Robert Charles Anthony

King’s arrest and pre-trial detention in Alamance County, North

Carolina. Before the court are six motions. King has moved for

default against three Defendants: Jaleesa Washington, Guy Lucus,

and Isaac Groves. (Doc. 23 at 2-3.) In the same motion, he also

requests to amend the complaint. (Id. at 3.) Defendants Sean

Boone and Elizabeth Oliver (Doc. 12), Jaleesa Washington (Doc.

35), Justyn Melrose and Hodgin Carrie (Doc. 25), and Christian

Wilson, Dean Culler, Joey England, John P. Paisley, and Terry

Johnson (Doc. 29) have moved to dismiss the complaint. For the

reasons set forth below, King’s motion for default and motion for

leave to amend the complaint will be denied, and the motions to

dismiss will be granted.

I. BACKGROUND

The facts alleged in the complaint are accepted as true for

purposes of the motions to dismiss and are viewed in the light

most favorable to King.

King was arrested on August 12, 2019 by the Alamance County

Sheriff’s Office (“ACSO”), detained pre-trial, and then acquitted

by a jury on September 16, 2022. (Doc. 1 at 8.) He has brought

claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and for “Defamation, Slander,

Liberal [sic], Kidnapping[,] 4th, 5th, 6th, 8th and 14th

Amendment[,] Parental Rights[,] False Imprisonment, False arrest,

[and] Malicious Prosecution” against Guy Lucus, Justyn Melrose,

Isaac Groves, Hodgin Carrie, Dale Doe, Melanie Davis, Terry

Johnson, Sean Boone, Elizabeth Oliver, Jaleesa Washington,

Christian Wilson, Dean Culler, Joey England, and John Paisley.

(Id. at 2-5.)

Lucus, Melrose, Groves, Carrie, Doe, and Davis work for news

media companies. Lucus and Melrose are employed by “High Point

Fox 8 News.” (Id. at 7.) Groves is employed at “Burlington Time

News.” (Id.) Carrie is employed by “WXII 12 News.” (Id.) Doe

and Davis are employed by Mebane Enterprise. (Id. at 2.)

The other Defendants are employed by Alamance County. Sheriff

Terry Johnson is the Sheriff of Alamance County, and Washington,

Wilson, Culler, and England are employed by the ACSO. (Id. at 6-

7.) Boone is the District Attorney of Prosecutorial District 17,

and Oliver is an Assistant District Attorney with the same

district. (Id. at 6.) Finally, John Paisley is an Alamance County

Commissioner. (Id. at 4.)

King alleges generally that the ACSO and the Alamance County

District Attorney did not adequately investigate his case to ensure

he was not wrongfully accused. (Id. at 8.) As to the particular

Defendants, he first alleges that Boone and Oliver violated his

“4th[,] 5th[,] 6th[,] 8th[,] and 14th Amendments [sic] [rights],

Defamation, Slander, Liberal [sic], Kidnapping, Parental

Constitution violation, false Imprisonment, false arrest[,]

Malicious Prosecution[,] 42 [U.S.] Code 1983.” (Id. at 8.) He

further alleges that Johnson, Paisley, Wilson, Culler, England,

and Washington “all violated [his] Constitution[al] right[s] as a

parent [d]etaining [King] against his will and falsely

[i]mprison[ing] [him] over three ‘3’ years of confin[e]ment made

defamation, slander and Liberial [sic] against [him],

Kid[]nap[p]ing 4th, 5th, 6th, 8th, and 14th Amendment, false

arrest, [and] Malicious Prosecuti[on].” (Id.) King alleges he

had proof of his innocence, but these defendants “failed to

c[o]nduct [a] safe investigation nor had any proof of evidence of

time fram[e].” (Id. at 8, 10.) He states he “was in fact in full

legal custody and was award[ed] sole custody by Guilford County

High Point. Alamance never had Jurisdiction over subject matter

nor was [resident] of Alamance county at all.” (Id. at 10.) King

“was not able to get [a] Bail Hearing for three ‘3’ years.” (Id.)

He finally alleges that Lucus, Melrose, Doe, Davis, Groves, and

Carrie “all work at or as a reporter for the News and made a

Defamation Slander Liberal [sic] about the Plaintiff.” (Id. at

9.)

King filed his complaint on September 16, 2024. (Doc. 1.)

II. ANALYSIS

A. Motion for Default

King moved for default judgment on January 15, 2025. (Doc.

23.) He argues that Defendants were served “with the Summonses

December 4th, 2024, by Certified mail tracking.” (Id. at 1.)

Therefore, he contends, Defendants were required to respond to the

complaint by December 26, 2024. (Id.) King asserts that while

Defendants Johnson, Wilson, Culler, England, Paisley, Melrose,

Carrie, Oliver, and Boone did timely respond, the other Defendants

did not. (Id. at 2.) He explains that the summonses for Doe and

Davis were returned to him on December 9, 2024, as undeliverable.

(Id.) But he argues that Washington, Lucus, and Groves failed to

respond and moves for default judgment against the three

defendants. (Id. at 2-3.)

Washington is the only Defendant to respond to King’s motion.

She argues that default judgment is not warranted against her

because (1) King did not first obtain entry of default pursuant to

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(a), (2) Washington’s motion to

dismiss is sufficient to preclude default judgment, and (3) King’s

complaint is insufficient to state a claim. (Doc. 37 at 3-7.)

“Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55 is the basic procedure to

be followed when there is a default in the course of litigation.”

Vt. Teddy Bear Co. v. 1–800 Beargram Co., 373 F.3d 241, 246 (2d

Cir. 2004). Rule 55 outlines a “two-step process” for default

proceedings: first, the entry of default pursuant to Rule 55(a),

and second, the entry of a default judgment pursuant to Rule 55(b).

VLM Food Trading Int'l, Inc. v. Illinois Trading Co., 811 F.3d

247, 255 (7th Cir. 2016); Canady v. Erbe Elektromedizin GmbH, 307

F. Supp. 2d 2, 8-9 (D.D.C. 2004).

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(a) provides that the “clerk

must enter” a party's default “[w]hen a party against whom a

judgment for affirmative relief is sought has failed to plead or

otherwise defend, and that failure is shown by affidavit or

otherwise.” Although Rule 55 contemplates that the clerk enter

default as a ministerial act, the district court also enjoys the

inherent power to do so. See City of New York v. Mickalis Pawn

Shop, LLC, 645 F.3d 114, 128 (2d Cir. 2011). Once default is

entered, the party may apply for a default judgment pursuant to

Rule 55(b). If the “claim is for a sum certain or a sum that can

be made certain by computation” and the other party “has been

defaulted for not appearing and [ ] is neither a minor nor an

incompetent person,” the clerk is required to enter a judgment at

the party's request. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(1). Otherwise, “the

party must apply to the court for a default judgment” under Rule

55(b)(2). See Mystic Retreat Med Spa & Weight Loss Ctr. v.

Ascentium Cap. LLC, No. 1:21-CV-00515, 2021 WL 4993088, at *1

(M.D.N.C. Oct. 27, 2021).

King has not satisfied the procedural requirement of Rule 55

because he has submitted only a motion for default judgment without

a request for an entry of default as required by Rule 55(a).

Furthermore, King has not demonstrated that Washington, Lucus, and

Groves were properly served with process. Before entry of default

or default judgment may be entered, “service of process must be

effective under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,” Md. State

Firemen's Ass'n v. Chaves, 166 F.R.D. 353, 354 (D. Md. 1996),

because “[a]bsent waiver or consent, a failure to obtain proper

service on the defendant deprives the court of personal

jurisdiction over the defendant,” Koehler v. Dodwell, 152 F.3d

304, 306 (4th Cir. 1998). Here, King has only asserted that a

summons was mailed to each Defendant. Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 4(c)(1) requires that both a summons and a copy of the

complaint be served on each Defendant. In his Declaration of Proof

of Service filed on December 13, 2024, King stated that “all signed

summons[es]” had been served on Defendants, other than Doe and

Davis, whose summonses were returned to the sender. (Doc. 5.) In

his motion for default, King again asserts that the summonses were

served on Defendants in December 2024 but does not mention copies

of the complaint. (Doc. 23 at 1.) Indeed, Washington argues in

her amended motion to dismiss and in her response to King’s motion

that he only ever attempted to serve her with the summons. (Doc.

36 at 7; Doc. 37 at 5-6.) In a declaration attached to Washington’s

amended motion to dismiss, Annabelle Smith, a paralegal for

Alamance County, explains that she received service of process

that was intended for Washington, and it only included a summons.

(Doc. 35-1 at 1-2.) Failure to serve Defendants with a copy of

the complaint renders King’s attempt at service insufficient.

Washington also has not been entirely unresponsive in this

action. She responded to King’s motion for default and has filed

a motion to dismiss the complaint. It is in the court’s discretion

to grant default judgment “when the ‘adversary process has been

halted because of an essentially unresponsive party.’” Sewell v.

Fid. Nat’l Fin., No. PWG-15-3077, 2016 WL 728012, at *3 (D. Md.

Feb. 24, 2016) (quoting SEC v. Lawbaugh, 359 F. Supp. 2d 418, 421

(D. Md. 2005)), aff’d, 668 F. App’x 510 (4th Cir. 2016) (denying

default judgment when defendants had not been unresponsive,

despite their filings being late). That is not the case here at

least as to Washington, and in any case, the court will not grant

default judgment when effective service has not been demonstrated.

Therefore, King’s motion for default judgment will be denied.

B. Motion for Leave to Amend the Complaint

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(1)(B) provides that a

plaintiff may amend a complaint once as a matter of course within

twenty-one days after the earlier of (1) service of a responsive

pleading or (2) service of a motion under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b), (e), or (f). After that period, a plaintiff may

amend only with either the opposing party’s written consent or

leave of court. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2); Foman v. Davis, 371

U.S. 178, 182 (1962) (noting that “the grant or denial of an

opportunity to amend is within the discretion of the District

Court”). The Fourth Circuit has interpreted Rule 15(a) to provide

that “leave to amend a pleading should be denied only when the

amendment would be prejudicial to the opposing party, there has

been bad faith on the part of the moving party, or the amendment

would have been futile.” Laber v. Harvey, 438 F.3d 404, 426 (4th

Cir. 2006) (citation omitted); see Foman, 371 U.S. at 182 (same).

A claim may be futile “if the proposed change advances a claim or

defense that is legally insufficient on its face,” in which case

“the court may deny leave to amend.” Williams v. Little Rock Mun.

Water Works, 21 F.3d 218, 225 (8th Cir. 1994) (citing Charles A.

Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure: Civil,

§ 1487, at 637 (1991)) (alterations adopted); see Joyner v. Abbott

Labs, 674 F. Supp. 185, 190 (E.D.N.C. 1987). Thus, “[a] motion to

amend a complaint is futile ‘if the proposed claim would not

survive a motion to dismiss.’” Pugh v. McDonald, 266 F. Supp. 3d

864, 866 (M.D.N.C. 2017) (quoting James Madison Ltd. v. Ludwig, 82

F.3d 1085, 1099 (D.C. Cir. 1996)).

In King’s motion for default judgment, he requests to “[add]

injunction [sic] relief to [his] claim.” (Doc. 23 at 1.) This is

not a proper motion, and even if the court were to construe this

request as a motion for leave to amend the complaint, King failed

to attach a proposed amended complaint to his motion in violation

of Local Rule 15.1. His motion is defective on that basis alone.

King seeks injunctive relief requiring all employees of the

ACSO and Alamance County Detention Center to wear body cameras

while on duty, for those entities to install cameras in “cells,

all enclosed rooms, office[s] and control[] rooms,” and for those

camera recordings to be kept at least three years. (Doc. 23 at

3.) King argues that this would “ensure the security, safety and

control[] for All Employees, Pretrial [Detainees], Inmates and

Citizens” and would reduce “Assaults, Misconduct of any person,

Person [sic] being Framed, Accused of any wrongful act as well as

wrongful [sic] charged or conviction.” (Id.) King’s motion was

filed more than twenty-one days after his complaint had been filed.

Therefore, the court considers whether “the amendment would be

prejudicial to the opposing party, there has been bad faith on the

part of the moving party, or the amendment would [be] futile.”

Laber, 438 F.3d at 426.

Even if King’s request to amend the complaint were properly

made, it would plainly be futile. In order to obtain permanent

injunctive relief, “[a] plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) that [he]

has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies available at

law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate for

that injury; (3) that, considering the balance of the hardships

between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is

warranted; and (4) that the public interest would not be disserved

by a permanent injunction.” eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C.,

547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006). Any injunction must also be narrowly

tailored to the facts of the case. See PBM Prods., LLC v. Mead

Johnson & Co., 639 F.3d 111, 128 (4th Cir. 2011).

King cannot show that he will suffer irreparable harm because

this factor requires a showing that there is concrete threat of

future injury. The Supreme Court has explained that “irreparable

injury” is “a requirement that cannot be met where there is no

showing of any real or immediate threat that the plaintiff will be

wronged again.” City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 111

(1983). King has not provided any facts that even suggest he may

be wronged by Defendants in the future. He has been acquitted of

the (unspecified) crime(s) with which he was charged and is no

longer in custody. Indeed, he does not live in Alamance County or

even North Carolina at this time, but in Florida. The relief

requested also is not narrowly tailored to the facts of this case.

He seeks an injunction that would apply to employees of the

Alamance County Detention Center, but neither this entity nor its

employees is a Defendant in this action. The requested injunctive

relief is also overbroad. For example, it would require every

employee, not just law enforcement officers, of the ACSO and the

Alamance County Detention Center to wear body cameras and for “all

enclosed rooms” to have cameras, even those not being used for

interrogation or detention. King has not demonstrated that such

broad relief is at all related, let alone narrowly tailored, to

remedying the claims arising from his arrest and pre-trial

detention. Therefore, King’s amendment is futile, and his request

to file an amended complaint will be denied.

C. Motions to Dismiss

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) provides that a

pleading must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim

showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” A Rule 12(b)(6)

motion to dismiss is meant to “test[] the sufficiency of a

complaint” and not to “resolve contests surrounding the facts, the

merits of a claim, or the applicability of defenses.” Republican

Party of N.C. v. Martin, 980 F.2d 943, 952 (4th Cir. 1992). To

survive such a motion, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual

matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is

plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678

(2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570

(2007)). In considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court “must

accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the

complaint,” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per

curiam), and all reasonable inferences must be drawn in the non-

moving party's favor, Ibarra v. United States, 120 F.3d 472, 474

(4th Cir. 1997). However, the court “need not accept as true

unwarranted inferences, unreasonable conclusions, or arguments.”

Giarratano v. Johnson, 521 F.3d 298, 302 (4th Cir. 2008) (quoting

Eastern Shore Mkts., Inc. v. J.D. Assocs. Ltd. P’ship, 213 F.3d

175, 180 (4th Cir. 2000)). Rule 12(b)(6) protects against

meritless litigation by requiring sufficient factual allegations

“to raise a right to relief above the speculative level,” Twombly,

550 U.S. at 555, so as to “nudge[] the[] claims across the line

from conceivable to plausible,” id. at 570. See Iqbal, 556 U.S.

at 678. Thus, mere legal conclusions should not be accepted as

true, and “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of

action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

1. Boone and Oliver

Boone and Oliver move to dismiss King’s complaint pursuant to

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and (6). (Doc. 12.)

They argue that the claims against Boone in his official capacity

are barred by the Eleventh Amendment (Doc. 13 at 6), and that the

claims against both Defendants in their individual capacities are

barred by absolute prosecutorial immunity (id. at 4). Boone and

Oliver also argue that King’s complaint fails to state a claim.

(Id. at 7.)

King responds that the text of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 precludes

prosecutorial immunity because it refers to “every person.” (Doc.

24 at 3.) He also makes a policy argument that absolute immunity

should only extend to an “honest” prosecutor and not to prosecutors

that “abuse their power.” (Id.)

King brings a number of claims in this action, specifically

claims pursuant to § 1983 and the “4th, 5th, 6th, 8th and 14th

Amendment[s],” and what the court presumes to be state law claims

for “Defamation, Slander, Liberal [sic], Kidnapping, . . .

Parental Rights[,] False Imprisonment, False arrest, [and]

Malicious Prosecution.” (Doc. 1 at 5.) He does not specify which

of these claims are being brought against which Defendants, which

is a fatal pleading error. Nevertheless, the court thus assumes

that all of these claims are being brought against Boone and

Oliver.

a. Eleventh Amendment Immunity

As Boone argues, King’s claims against him in his official

capacity are barred by the Eleventh Amendment. The Eleventh

Amendment provides that “[t]he Judicial power of the United States

shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity,

commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by

Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any

Foreign State.” U.S. Const. amend. XI. Although by its terms the

Eleventh Amendment applies to suits brought against a State by

“Citizens of another State,” it is well established that “an

unconsenting State is immune from suits brought in federal courts

by her own citizens as well as by citizens of another State.”

Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663 (1974). It is also well

understood that the Eleventh Amendment bars suits against States

and any State instrumentality properly characterized as an “arm of

the State.” Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Doe, 519 U.S. 425,

429–30 (1997). And “a suit against a state official in his or her

official capacity is not a suit against the official but rather is

a suit against the official’s office. As such, it is no different

from a suit against the State itself.” Will v. Michigan Dept. of

State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989) (citations omitted). Eleventh

Amendment immunity has only limited exceptions: (1) a State may

waive its immunity; (2) Congress may abrogate a State's immunity;

and (3) a plaintiff may sue for prospective injunctive relief

against State officials acting in violation of federal law pursuant

to the doctrine of Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). See Frew

ex rel. Frew v. Hawkins, 540 U.S. 431, 437 (2004) (citing Ex parte

Young, 209 U.S. at 123); Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid

Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 670 (1999).

None of the exceptions to Eleventh Amendment immunity applies

to the § 1983 and intentional tort claims brought in this case.

See, e.g., Will, 491 U.S. at 71 (“[N]either a State nor its

officials acting in their official capacities are ‘persons’ under

§ 1983.”); Nivens v. Gilchrist, 444 F.3d 237, 249 (4th Cir. 2006)

(holding that § 1983 claims against a district attorney in his

official capacity were barred by the Eleventh Amendment); Gunter

v. S. Health Partners, Inc., No. 1:16CV262, 2017 WL 1194227, at *5

(M.D.N.C. Mar. 30, 2017) (“Although the [North Carolina] Tort

Claims act authorizes recovery for negligent torts, intentional

torts committed by agents and officers of the State are not

compensable under the Tort Claims Act.” (citation omitted))

(holding that claim for false imprisonment was barred by sovereign

immunity). Thus, the court will dismiss King’s claims against

Boone in his official capacity pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1). See

South Carolina v. United States, 221 F. Supp. 3d 684, 692 (D.S.C.

Oct. 31, 2016) (“Assertions of governmental immunity are properly

addressed under Rule 12(b)(1).” (citing Smith v. Wash. Metro. Area

Transit Auth., 290 F.3d 201, 205 (4th Cir. 2002))).

b. Failure to State a Claim

The only allegations in the complaint regarding Boone and

Oliver are that they are employed as the District Attorney and

Assistant District Attorney, respectively, in Alamance County and

that they violated King’s “4th[,] 5th[,] 6th[,] 8th[,] and 14th

Amendments [sic] [rights], Defamation, Slander, Liberal [sic],

Kidnapping, Parental Constitution violation, false Imprisonment,

false arrest[,] Malicious Prosecution[,] 42 [U.S.] Code 1983.”

(Doc. 1 at 8.) King further alleges that the Alamance County

District Attorney’s Office generally did not adequately

investigate his case. (Id.)

The nature of King’s “4th[,] 5th[,] 6th[,] 8th[,] and 14th

Amendment[]” claims is unclear. (Id.) He provides no detail about

the kinds of claims he seeks to bring pursuant to these

constitutional amendments, beyond those described by his more

specific claims of “Defamation, Slander, Liberal [sic],

Kidnapping, Parental Constitution violation, false Imprisonment,

false arrest[,] [and] Malicious Prosecution.” (Id.) The court

presumes these more specific claims are brought pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 1983 and under state law.

Defamation is not actionable under § 1983. Garrett v. Aube,

No. 8:18-1449, 2018 WL 3628848, at *2 (D.S.C. May 31, 2018) (citing

Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 697-710 & nn.3-4 (1976)). Defamation,

under North Carolina law, requires the plaintiff to allege that

“the defendant made false, defamatory statements of or concerning

the plaintiff, which were published to a third person, causing

injury to the plaintiff’s reputation.” Cannon v. Peck, 36 F.4th

547, 559 (4th Cir. 2022) (quoting Griffin v. Holden, 636 S.E.2d

298, 302 (N.C. Ct. App. 2006)). Libel and slander are the two

forms of defamation; “libel is written while slander is oral.”

Id. (quoting Tallent v. Blake, 291 S.E.2d 336, 338 (N.C. Ct. App.

1982)).

A § 1983 claim for malicious prosecution is one “founded on

a Fourth Amendment seizure that incorporates elements of the

analogous common law tort of malicious prosecution.” Smith v.

Munday, 848 F.3d 248, 252-53 (4th Cir. 2017) (quoting Lambert v.

Williams, 223 F.3d 257, 262 (4th Cir. 2000)). To demonstrate such

a claim, the plaintiff must show “that (1) the defendant ha[s]

seized plaintiff pursuant to legal process that was not supported

by probable cause and (2) that the criminal proceedings have

terminated in plaintiff’s favor.” Id. at 253 (quoting Massey v.

Ojaniit, 759 F.3d 343, 356 (4th Cir. 2014) (alterations in

original)). Under North Carolina law, to state a common law tort

claim for malicious prosecution, King would similarly need to show

that “the defendant (1) instituted, procured or participated in

the criminal proceeding against the plaintiff; (2) without

probable cause; (3) with malice; and (4) the prior proceeding

terminated in favor of the plaintiff.” Wall v. Gulledge, No. 1:22-

cv-31, 2024 WL 4503823, at *13 (M.D.N.C. Oct. 16, 2024) (quoting

Braswell v. Medina, 805 S.E.2d 498, 506 (2017)).

To establish a § 1983 claim for false arrest or false

imprisonment, the plaintiff “must show that he was seized by [the

defendant] without probable cause.” English v. Clarke, 90 F.4th

636, 646 (4th Cir. 2024). Under North Carolina law, “a cause of

action in tort will lie for false imprisonment, based upon the

‘illegal restraint of one’s person against his will.’ A false

arrest, i.e., one without proper legal authority, is one means of

committing false imprisonment.” Caraway v. City of Pineville, 639

F. Supp. 3d 560, 588 (W.D.N.C. 2022) (quoting Myrick v. Cooley,

371 S.E.2d 492, 494 (1988)).

As for King’s claim that his parental rights under the

Constitution were violated, there is indeed a “fundamental liberty

interest of natural parents in the care, custody, and management

of their child” that is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.

Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982). In order to show

that his procedural due process rights have been violated, King

must show that (1) he had a protected life, liberty, or property

interest (2) of which the defendant deprived him (3) without due

process of law. See Rockville Cars, LLC v. City of Rockville, 891

F.3d 141, 146 (4th Cir. 2018); Sansotta v. Town of Nags Head, 724

F.3d 533, 540 (4th Cir. 2013). On the other hand, “a plaintiff

asserting a § 1983 substantive due process claim must allege both

the deprivation of his life, liberty or property interest by a

state actor, and that the deprivation of this interest was

‘arbitrary in the constitutional sense.’” Callahan v. N.C. Dep’t

of Pub. Safety, 18 F.4th 142, 145 (4th Cir. 2021) (quoting Collins

v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992)). North

Carolina has not recognized a claim for tortious interference with

parental rights. See Bossian v. Chica, 910 S.E.2d 682, 689 (N.C.

Ct. App. 2024). However, the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 700

states that “an action may be maintained by the parent who is

entitled to the custody of a minor child against one who by force

abducts the child from its home, or one who induces the child to

leave its home with knowledge that the parent has not consented.”

Finally, kidnapping is not cognizable as a tort under North

Carolina law or as a § 1983 claim.

King’s allegations are conclusory and do not offer any facts

about the actions of Boone and Oliver as they relate to King’s

claims. He provides no statement made by Defendants that could

have been defamatory or any facts to suggest the charges brought

against him were not supported by probable cause. Indeed, King

does not even state the offense for which he was prosecuted. He

also does not provide any facts whatsoever about how his parental

rights were violated. In fact, his complaint does not allege that

he has children.

The Supreme Court stated in Iqbal that “[t]hreadbare

recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere

conclusory statements, do not suffice” to state a claim. 556 U.S.

at 678. Here, King falls short of even reciting the elements of

the many claims he brings against these defendants and alleges no

facts to plausibly state those claims. Thus, King’s claims against

Boone and Oliver in their individual capacities will be dismissed

pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). See, e.g., Rodgers v. NVR Inc.-Ryan

Homes, No. 3:23-CV-179, 2023 WL 5493602, at *2 (W.D.N.C. Aug. 24,

2023) (dismissing a complaint that “fail[ed] to identify specific

conduct by each Defendant that violate[d] [the plaintiff’s]

rights” and did not indicate “which allegations match[ed] up with

which claimed violation”); Holt v. Stroman, No. 3:12-CV-03539,

2015 WL 1061990, at *3 (D.S.C. Mar. 11, 2015) (dismissing a

complaint that included only “conclusory statements, outline[d]

the relevant law with only vague allusions to the alleged facts,

[and] mentioned a few facts that still [fell] far short of showing

how [the defendant’s] actions [met] the elements of the causes of

action alleged”).

2. Jaleesa Washington

Washington initially moved to dismiss King’s complaint

pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). (Doc. 20.) Twenty-one days later, she

filed an amended motion seeking to dismiss the complaint pursuant

to Rules 12(b)(2), 12(b)(4), 12(b)(5), and 12(b)(6). (Doc. 35.)

Washington argues that her amended motion to dismiss was filed as

of right because it fell within the twenty-one-day window under

Rule 15(a). (Doc. 36 at 2.) Rule 15 applies to pleadings, not

motions to dismiss, but the court in its discretion will consider

Washington’s amended motion to dismiss. In support of her amended

motion, Washington argues that dismissal is appropriate pursuant

to (1) Rule 12(b)(2) because she was never properly served and the

court thus lacks personal jurisdiction over her, (2) Rule 12(b)(4)

because she was not served with a copy of the complaint and was

nevertheless improperly named in it, (3) Rule 12(b)(5) because

service of process, attempted by mailing the summons to

Washington’s former employer, was insufficient, and (4) Rule

12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. (Id. at 5-9.) King did

not respond to either motion.

The court has already determined that service of process was

insufficient as to Washington. When a defendant raises a defense

pursuant to Rules 12(b)(4) and 12(b)(5), the plaintiff bears the

burden of establishing compliance. Ballard v. PNC Fin. Servs.

Group, Inc., 620 F. Supp. 2d 733, 735 (S.D.W. Va. 2009)). And

while King is proceeding pro se and is entitled to a certain

liberal construction of his complaint, Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S.

97, 106 (1976), the court need not ignore clear defects, Bustos v.

Chamberlain, No. 3:09-1760, 2009 WL 2782238, at *2 (D.S.C. Aug.

27, 2009). Even pro se litigants must follow the proper procedural

rules of the court. And it is not the court's role to become an

advocate for the pro se litigant. Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs.,

901 F.2d 387, 391 (4th Cir. 1990). Here, King has failed to carry

his burden. He has not demonstrated that he properly served

Washington; in fact, he has not responded to her motion to dismiss

or amended motion to dismiss.

Alternatively, Washington is also correct that King’s

complaint fails to state a claim against her. The complaint

alleges that she is employed by the ACSO as a detective and that

she “violated [his] Constitution[al] right[s] as a parent

[d]etaining [King] against his will and falsely [i]mprison[ing]

[him] over three ‘3’ years of confin[e]ment made defamation,

slander and Liberial [sic] against [him], Kid[]nap[p]ing 4th, 5th,

6th, 8th, and 14th Amendment, false arrest, [and] Malicious

Prosecuti[on].” (Doc. 1 at 3, 8.) King brings all of the same

claims he brought against Boone and Oliver against Washington. As

with those allegations, this vague and conclusory statement,

bereft of factual support, is insufficient to state a claim

pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). King does not provide any facts about

Washington’s conduct and certainly does not describe how her

conduct would make any of the myriad claims he brings against her

plausible. See, e.g., Rodgers v. NVR Inc.-Ryan Homes, No. 3:23-

CV-179, 2023 WL 5493602, at *2 (W.D.N.C. Aug. 24, 2023); Holt v.

Stroman, No. 3:12-CV-03539, 2015 WL 1061990, at *3 (D.S.C. Mar.

11, 2015).

As for King’s allegation that he was detained pre-trial for

three years, it is not clear whether he seeks to bring a separate

claim challenging the length of his pre-trial detention or whether

this claim is one and the same with his false imprisonment claim.

If King does seek to bring a separate claim, Washington had no

control over the length of King’s detention and thus could not be

held liable under this theory. See Wilson v. City of New York,

480 F. App’x 592, 594 (2d Cir. 2012) (explaining that the court is

“responsible for deciding whether and for how [long] a defendant

may be detained, not the defendant police officers”). Therefore,

King’s complaint against Washington will be dismissed for

insufficiency of process and service of process and, in the

alternative, for failure to state a claim.

3. Melrose and Carrie

Melrose and Carrie move to dismiss the complaint against them

pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. (Doc.

25.) King did not respond. The complaint states that Melrose

works for “High Point Fox 8 News” and Carrie works for “WXII 12.”

(Doc. 1 at 2.) It then alleges that they “made a Defamation[,]

Slander[,] Liberal [sic] about the Plaintiff.” (Id. at 9.) These

conclusory allegations are insufficient to state a claim. King

does not identify any defamatory statements concerning him made by

Melrose and Carrie and does not explain how any such statements

injured his reputation. Just as with King’s claims against Boone,

Oliver, and Washington, he again fails to describe any conduct

that would make any of the claims he brings against Melrose and

Carrie plausible. Therefore, his claims against Melrose and Carrie

will be dismissed for failure to state a claim.

4. Johnson, Wilson, Culler, England, and Paisley

Johnson, Wilson, Culler, England, and Paisley (“County

Defendants”) move to dismiss the complaint against them pursuant

to Rules 12(b)(2), (5) and (6). (Doc. 29.) They first argue that

the summonses and complaint were not properly served on them and,

therefore, that the complaint should be dismissed for

insufficiency of service of process pursuant to Rules 12(b)(2) and

(5). (Doc. 30 at 7.) County Defendants contend that they were

only served with the summonses and not with copies of the complaint

in violation of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4 and North

Carolina Rule of Civil Procedure 4. (Id. at 7-8.)

County Defendants next argue that any state law claims brought

against Defendants Johnson and Paisley in their official

capacities in this action are barred by governmental immunity.

(Id. at 10-11.) They explain that King has not alleged waiver of

this immunity by either the purchase of liability insurance or

bond. (Id. at 11.) They finally point out that even if King had

alleged waiver of immunity by purchase of a bond, the surety would

need to be joined as a party to this action, and it is not. (Id.)

As for all claims brought against County Defendants in their

individual capacities, they contend that any § 1983 claims are

barred by qualified immunity and any state law claims by public

official immunity. (Id. at 12-13.) County Defendants assert that

qualified immunity bars § 1983 claims against government officials

sued in their individual capacities unless the plaintiff alleges

a violation of clearly established law. (Id. at 12.) They contend

that King “failed to allege any specific violation of law, much

less any specific violation of clearly established law.” (Id.)

County Defendants further argue that public official immunity bars

any state law claims brought against them in their individual

capacities because any challenged conduct occurred while

performing governmental duties involving judgment and discretion,

and no exceptions to this immunity, such as acting outside their

scope of authority, with malice, or corruptly, were alleged in the

complaint. (Id. at 13.)

County Defendants also argue that all claims against them

should be dismissed for failure to plead sufficient facts. They

contend that King’s “allegations are unsupported, incomplete,

incoherent, or altogether non-existent.” (Id. at 15.)

Finally, County Defendants move for dismissal of King’s

defamation, libel, and slander claims because they are not

actionable under § 1983 and are time-barred under state law. (Id.

at 19, 21.) Under North Carolina law, they argue, defamation is

subject to a one-year state of limitations period, and King has

not alleged the publication of a defamatory statement in or after

September 2023, one year prior to the filing of his complaint.

(Id. at 21.) In fact, County Defendants contend that King has not

identified any defamatory statement made or alleged its

publication in the complaint. (Id.)

King has not responded to County Defendants’ motion to

dismiss.

a. Service of Process

As County Defendants point out, it is King’s burden to prove

that service of process was effective. (Id. at 7.); see Ballard

v. PNC Fin. Servs. Group, Inc., 620 F. Supp. 2d 733, 735 (S.D.W.

Va. 2009)). King himself has asserted that Defendants were only

served with summonses and has not otherwise made a showing of

proper service of process. County Defendants, on the other hand,

have submitted three declarations demonstrating that copies of the

complaint were not served on them. (Doc. 30-1 (Declaration of

Terry Johnson); Doc. 30-2 (Declaration of Annabelle Smith); Doc.

30-3 (Declaration of Tory Frink).) Therefore, all claims against

County Defendants will be dismissed for insufficient service of

process pursuant to Rule 12(b)(5).

b. Official Capacity Claims Against Johnson and

Paisley

Alternatively, King’s state law claims against Johnson and

Paisley in their official capacities are also barred by

governmental immunity.1 Johnson is the sheriff of Alamance County,

and Paisley is a county commissioner. By suing these Defendants

in their official capacities, King has in effect sued the office

of the sheriff and the county itself. See, e.g., Hunter v.

McFadden, No. 3:21-CV-63, 2021 WL 1030239, at *1 (W.D.N.C. Mar.

16, 2021); Welton v. Durham County, No. 17-CV-258, 2017 WL 3726991,

1 King brings claims against Johnson in only his official capacity but

does not specify whether the claims against Paisley are brought against

him in his individual or official capacity. The court thus addresses

any possible claims against Paisley in both his individual and official

capacities.

at *6 (M.D.N.C. Aug. 28, 2017). Pursuant to North Carolina law,

“[a] county, as a governmental agency, exercises the police power

of the State and is thus exempt from liability under the common

law rule of governmental immunity.” Baucom’s Nursery Co. v.

Mecklenburg County, 366 S.E.2d 558, 560 (N.C. Ct. App. 1988); see

also Simmons v. Corizon Health, Inc., 122 F. Supp. 3d. 255, 268

(M.D.N.C. 2015) (“[S]heriffs are immune from suit absent a waiver

of immunity.”). A county can waive governmental immunity “by

consenting to suit, purchasing liability insurance, or purchasing

a bond.” Safford v. Barnes, 191 F. Supp. 3d 504, 506 (M.D.N.C.

2016) (citing Sellers v. Rodriguez, 561 S.E.2d 336, 339 (N.C. Ct.

App. 2002)). King has not alleged that any of these waivers of

immunity are present. Therefore, any state law claims against

Johnson and Paisley in their official capacities are dismissed on

the alternative ground of governmental immunity.

c. Specific Claims

Defamation is not actionable under § 1983. Garrett v. Aube,

No.8:18-1449, 2018 WL 3628848, at *2 (D.S.C. May 31, 2018) (citing

Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 697-710 & nn.3-4 (1976)). And King’s

state law claims for defamation, slander, and libel are indeed

time-barred. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-54(3) (2020) (providing one-year

statute of limitations for defamation claims). King alleges he

was acquitted in September 2022 and does not allege any conduct

that occurred after that time. The statute of limitations for any

statement published in 2022, though notably one is not actually

alleged in the complaint, would have expired in 2023, and King’s

complaint was filed in September 2024. Because the statute of

limitations bar can be determined on the face of the complaint,

the court finds them time-barred. Dickinson v. Univ. of N.C., 91

F. Supp. 3d 755, 763 (M.D.N.C. 2015) (“To succeed on a statute-

of-limitations defense at [the motion to dismiss] stage, all facts

necessary to show the time bar must clearly appear ‘on the face of

the complaint.’ ” (quoting Goodman v. Praxair, Inc., 494 F.3d 458,

464 (4th Cir. 2007))). Thus, King’s defamation claims against

County Defendants will be dismissed, in the alternative, as time-

barred.

The complaint alleges that Wilson, Culler and England are

employed by the ACSO, that Johnson is the sheriff of Alamance

County, and that Paisley is an Alamance County Commissioner. (Doc.

1 at 3-4, 6-7.) King asserts that these Defendants “violated [his]

Constitution[al] right[s] as a parent [d]etaining [King] against

his will and falsely [i]mprison[ing] [him] over three ‘3’ years of

confin[e]ment made defamation, slander and Liberial [sic] against

[him], Kid[]nap[p]ing 4th, 5th, 6th, 8th, and 14th Amendment, false

arrest, [and] Malicious Prosecuti[on].” (Id. at 8.) He further

alleges that the ACSO “did not investigate or Interview everyone

to ensure that Plaintiff is not wrongful[l]y accus[]ed.” (Id.)

King states that County Defendants “failed to c[o]nduct safe

investigation nor had any proof of evidence of time fram[e].” (Id.

at 10.)

King’s allegations are insufficient to state any of the many

claims he brings against County Defendants and are entirely

conclusory. He does not provide sufficient facts to demonstrate

that his arrest was without probable cause, and he does not

identify a defamatory statement made by any of the County

Defendants. Nor does King explain how his “Constitution[al]

right[s] as a parent” were violated. (Id. at 8.) Regarding his

claim that he was detained pre-trial for three years, County

Defendants, like Defendant Washington, did not determine or

control the length of King’s detention and thus cannot be held

liable for it. See Wilson, 480 F. App’x at 594. All of the claims

brought against County Defendants, therefore, fail to state a claim

against them.

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated,

IT IS ORDERED that Boone and Oliver’s motion to dismiss (Doc.

12), Washington’s amended motion to dismiss (Doc. 35), Melrose and

Carrie’s motion to dismiss (Doc. 25), and County Defendants’ motion

to dismiss (Doc. 29) are GRANTED, and the claims against these

Defendants are DISMISSED as follows:

1. All claims against Boone, Johnson, and Paisley in their

official capacities are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

2. King’s defamation, slander, and libel claims against

County Defendants are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

3. All other claims against Boone, Oliver, Washington,

Melrose, Carrie, and the County Defendants (Johnson,

Wilson, Culler, England, and Paisley) are DISMISSED

WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that King’s motion for default (Doc.

23) is DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that King’s motion for leave to amend

the complaint (Doc. 23) is DENIED.

/s/ Thomas D. Schroeder

United States District Judge

June 10, 2025