The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MAINE
KIMBERLY D. CROSSON, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) 1:25-cv-00247-LEW
)
MAINE ATTORNEY )
GENERAL, et al., )
)
Defendants )
RECOMMENDED DECISION AFTER REVIEW
OF PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT
Plaintiff filed a complaint and an application to proceed without prepayment of fees.
(Complaint, ECF No. 1; Addendum, ECF No. 3; Application, ECF No. 2.)1 Because
Plaintiff was granted leave to proceed without prepayment of fees, a preliminary review of
Plaintiff’s complaint is appropriate. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).
Following a review of Plaintiff’s complaint, I recommend the Court dismiss the
complaint.
FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS2
In her complaint, Plaintiff recounts several encounters she had with various
members of state, county, and local government, including some law enforcement officers.
She alleges that she is a victim of abuse but did not receive the assistance she requested,
1 Plaintiff originally filed the complaint in the District of New Hampshire, but due to lack of venue, the case
was transferred to the District of Maine. (Order, ECF No. 4.)
2 For purposes of this review, the facts are derived from Plaintiff’s complaint and supporting attachments.
The alleged facts are viewed most favorably to Plaintiff.
that the house in which she resided was declared uninhabitable, that she requested
information from local government to resolve a property-related dispute but did not receive
the information, that she reported harassment and damage to property to law enforcement
but no meaningful action was taken, and that she was denied general assistance benefits
without explanation. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated her constitutional rights,
her civil rights, and her right to privacy.3
LEGAL STANDARD
28 U.S.C. § 1915 is designed to ensure meaningful access to the federal courts for
individuals unable to pay the cost of bringing an action. When a party is proceeding
without prepayment of fees, however, “the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the
court determines,” inter alia, that the action is “frivolous or malicious” or “fails to state a
claim on which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). “Dismissals [under §
1915] are often made sua sponte prior to the issuance of process, so as to spare prospective
defendants the inconvenience and expense of answering such complaints.” Neitzke v.
Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324 (1989).
“A self-represented plaintiff is not exempt from this framework, but the court must
construe his complaint ‘liberally’ and hold it ‘to less stringent standards than formal
pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” Waterman v. White Interior Sols., No. 2:19-cv-00032-
JDL, 2019 WL 5764661, at *2 (D. Me. Nov. 5, 2019) (quoting Erickson v. Pardus, 551
3 Plaintiff named as defendants the Governor and Attorney General of Maine, the Maine State Police and
the involved state troopers, the Penobscot County Sheriff’s Department and the involved officers, the Town
of Garland and its administrators, a Strafford County (New Hampshire) sheriff’s deputy, and other
individuals and entities, including an attorney and a law firm.
U.S. 89, 94 (2007)). “This is not to say that pro se plaintiffs are not required to plead basic
facts sufficient to state a claim.” Ferranti v. Moran, 618 F.2d 888, 890 (1st Cir. 1980).
DISCUSSION
The Court’s jurisdiction over any possible federal claim based on a constitutional
deprivation would be governed by 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which Plaintiff cites, provides that
[e]very person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State ... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States ... to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured . . . .
As the plain language of § 1983 reflects, a claim for the deprivation of a constitutional right
must be based on the conduct of a state actor. Estades-Negroni v. CPC Hosp. San Juan
Capestrano, 412 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 2005). Plaintiff has not alleged any facts that would
support a finding that the private citizens named in the complaint can be considered state
actors. Plaintiff’s attempt to assert a federal constitutional claim against private
individuals, therefore, would fail.
State agencies are not considered persons under § 1983, Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State
Police, 491 U.S. 58, 64 (1989), and under the doctrine of sovereign immunity exemplified
by the Eleventh Amendment, states and state agencies may not be sued by citizens in
federal court, regardless of the form of relief requested, Poirier v. Mass. Dep’t of Corr.,
558 F.3d 92, 97 n.6 (1st Cir. 2009). Because the Maine State Police is an agency of the
state of Maine, the claims against the agency must be dismissed.
Plaintiff also did not describe in her narrative complaint any conduct for some of
the individuals named as Defendants, including the Governor and the Attorney General of
the state of Maine. Plaintiff evidently seeks to impose liability on those officials based on
the conduct of other officials for whom they are ultimately responsible. However,
“[b]ecause vicarious liability is inapplicable to Bivens and § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must
plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official’s own individual
actions, has violated the Constitution.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009).
Because Plaintiff has not described any actions of the Governor or Attorney General for
the state of Maine, Plaintiff has not alleged an actionable claim against them.
Finally, as to the individuals and entities whose conduct and official acts or policies
(respectively) Plaintiff described in her filings, Plaintiff has failed to allege a valid federal
claim. For example, the essence of Plaintiff’s claims against many of the law enforcement
defendants is that they failed to prevent or investigate adequately the wrongful acts of other
private citizens. The claims are not actionable because, absent special circumstances not
present here, there is “no constitutional right to a police investigation, adequate or
otherwise.” Thibeault v. Brown, No. 12-10333-PBS, 2012 WL 1865834, at *4 (D. Mass.
May 21, 2012); see also, Graham v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. I-89, 22 F.3d 991, 995 (10th Cir.
1994). In addition, even if Plaintiff’s allegations regarding the condemnation of her home
and the denial of general assistance could be construed as an attempt to assert procedural
due process claims, the claims would fail because the nonconclusory allegations do not
establish a violation of law. Furthermore, to the extent Plaintiff alleges that the decisions
were erroneous, her filings do not establish a federal procedural due process violation
because Plaintiff does not allege there was an absence of available remedies to challenge
the state or local decision in state court. See Lambert v. Fiorentini, 949 F.3d 22, 28 (1st
Cir. 2020); S. Commons Condo. Ass’n v. Charlie Arment Trucking, Inc., 775 F.3d 82, 89
(1st Cir. 2014).
In sum, Plaintiff’s complaint consists of conclusory allegations and the recitation of
facts that do not support an actionable claim.4 Accordingly, dismissal is warranted.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing analysis, after a review of Plaintiff’s complaint pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1915, I recommend the Court dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint. The Court has
dismissed multiple claims asserted by Plaintiff based on Plaintiff’s lack of prosecution.
Crosson v. Jeffrey Keaten, No. 1:21-cv-00049-LEW; Crosson v. Waterville Police
Department, et al., No. 1:22-cv-00159-LEW; Crosson v. Owner of Property Tim, No. 2:22-
cv-00160-LEW; Crosson v. Rolfe, No. 1:22-cv-00161-LEW; Crosson v. Town of Anson, et
al., No. 1:22-cv-00162-LEW; Crosson v. Town of Augusta, et al., No. 1:22-cv-00163-
LEW; Crosson v. Days Inn, et al., No. 1:22-cv-00164-LEW; Crosson v. Bickford, No. 2:22-
cv-00165-LEW; Crosson v. Hatin, No. 2:22-cv-00166-LEW; Crosson v. Keaton, No. 1:22-
cv-00167-LEW; Crosson v. Keaton, No. 1:22-cv-00167-LEW; Crosson v. Obert, No. 1:22-
cv-00168-LEW; Crosson v. Frey, et al., No. 1:22-cv-00169-LEW; Crosson v. Rodrigue,
No. 1:22-cv-00170-LEW; Crosson v. City of Auburn, et al., No. 2:22-cv-00171-LEW;
4 While the extent of Plaintiff’s intended claim is difficult to discern, to the extent Plaintiff attempts to assert
a claim against an employee or employees of the New Hampshire judicial branch based on dissatisfaction
with the legal proceedings in that state court, Plaintiff’s claims against would be barred because the court
personnel would be protected by absolute judicial immunity. See generally, Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S.
478, 512 (1978).
Crosson v. Somerset County Sheriff’s Dept., et al., No. 1:22-cv-00172-LEW: Crosson v.
Maine State Police, et al., No. 1:22-cv-00173-LEW.
Given Plaintiff’s filing history, I also recommend the Court issue an order placing
Plaintiff on notice that filing restrictions “may be in the offing” in accordance with Cok v.
Family Court of Rhode Island, 985 F.2d 32, 35 (1st Cir. 1993).
NOTICE
A party may file objections to those specified portions of a magistrate
judge’s report or proposed findings or recommended decisions entered
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) for which de novo review by the district
court is sought, together with a supporting memorandum, within fourteen
(14) days of being served with a copy thereof.
Failure to file a timely objection shall constitute a waiver of the right
to de novo review by the district court and to appeal the district court’s order.
/s/ John C. Nivison
U.S. Magistrate Judge
Dated this 9th day of June, 2025.