The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
SOUTHERN DIVISION
AARON MEIER, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
vs. ) Case No. 6:24-cv-03099-MDH
)
CHRIS DEGASE, )
)
Defendant. )
ORDER
Before the Court is Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment. (Doc. 60). Defendant has
filed suggestions in support (Doc. 61), Plaintiff has filed suggestions in opposition (Doc. 62), and
Defendant has filed his reply. (Doc. 64). The motion is now ripe for adjudication on the merits.
For the reasons stated herein, Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.
BACKGROUND
This case arises from the arrest of Plaintiff on the charge of making a terroristic threat
stemming from an incident in the county courthouse of Douglas County, Missouri on January 4,
2023. Plaintiff is a resident of Ava, Missouri and Defendant is the Sheriff of Douglas County,
Missouri.
On January 4, 2023, Plaintiff was heard by witnesses making statement to the effect of
“that’s why people will burn the courthouse down”, and “burn the courthouse down”. Plaintiff
made these statements shortly after having been found guilty at a municipal ordinance violation
bench trial. Detective Nathan Long investigated the incident and included the results in a probable
cause statement. Detective Long stated that there was probable cause to believe that Plaintiff made
a criminal terroristic threat in violation of Missouri Revised Statute § 574.115. On January 10,
2023, the Prosecuting Attorney for Douglas County advised Defendant to arrest Plaintiff for
making a terroristic threat. Defendant arrested Plaintiff on that same date. Plaintiff was charged
with the class E felony of making a terroristic threat in violation of Mo. Rev. Stat. § 574.120.
Plaintiff was later acquitted. Plaintiff brings suit in this case under a false arrest/malicious
prosecution theory based on the fact he was arrested.
Defendant brings his Motion for Summary Judgment arguing that Plaintiff has failed to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Alternatively, Defendant argues that he is entitled
to qualified immunity. The Court will take each argument in turn.
STANDARD
Summary judgment is proper where, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to
the non-moving party, there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Reich v. ConAgra, Inc., 987 F.2d 1357, 1359
(8th Cir. 1993). “Where there is no dispute of material fact and reasonable fact finders could not
find in favor of the nonmoving party, summary judgment is appropriate.” Quinn v. St. Louis
County, 653 F.3d 745, 750 (8th Cir. 2011). Initially, the moving party bears the burden of
demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.
317, 323 (1986). If the movant meets the initial step, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to
“set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). To satisfy this burden, the nonmoving party must “do more than
simply show there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus.
Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986).
ANALYSIS
First, the Court must resolve an issue with the statement of uncontroverted facts. Plaintiff
in his suggestions in opposition has failed to admit or controvert each separately numbered
paragraph in the movant’s statement of facts as mandated by Local Rule 56(b)(1). Local Rule
56(b)(1) states:
A party opposing a motion for summary judgment must begin its opposing
suggestions by admitting or controverting each separately numbered paragraph in
the movant’s statement of facts. If the opposing party controverts a given fact, it
must properly support its denial in accordance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Unless
specifically controverted by the opposing party, all facts set forth in the statement
of the movant are deemed admitted for the purpose of summary judgment.
Local Rule 56(b)(1). As Plaintiff has not specifically controverted any of the facts set forth in the
statement of uncontroverted facts by Defendant, they will be deemed admitted for the purpose of
summary judgment.
I. Failure to State a Claim
Defendant argues that whether Plaintiff is arguing a false arrest claim under 42 U.S.C. §
1983 or under a malicious prosecution theory, a finding of probable cause would defeat either
claim. Specifically, Defendant asserts that it was objectively reasonable under the circumstances
to infer that Plaintiff intended to frighten those at the Courthouse with his statements about burning
the courthouse down. Plaintiff argues that Defendant’s reliance on an overheard conversation lacks
legal grounding asserting that no affidavit, police report, or credible witness establishes probable
cause for new accusations. Plaintiff also argues that double jeopardy bars any relitigating of this
claim that Defendant is hiding critical evidence that undermines his claims.
A false arrest occurs when there is a confinement without legal justification. Kurtz v. City
of Shrewsbury, 245 F.3d 753, 757 (8th Cir. 2001) (citing Desai v. SSM Health Care, 865 S.W.2d
833, 836 (Mo. Ct.App.1993)). The unlawfulness of the restraint is a key element in a cause of
action for false arrest. Id. A police officer who has probable cause to believe that a suspect has
committed a crime is not liable for a false arrest simply because the suspect is later proven innocent
or the charges are dismissed. Kurtz 245 F.3d at 757 (citing Hannah v. City of Overland, 795 F.2d
1385, 1389 (8th Cir. 1986). Likewise, an action for malicious prosecution must show that the
prosecution lacked probable cause to survive summary judgment. Kurtz 245 F.3d at 757; see also
Sanders v. Daniel Int’l Corp., 682 S.W.2d 803, 807 (Mo. 1984). Probable cause exists “when the
totality of the circumstances at the time of the arrest are sufficient to lead a reasonable person to
believe that the defendant has committed or is committing an offense.” Brown v. City of St. Louis,
Missouri, 40 F.4th 895, 900 (8th Cir. 2022) (quoting Nader v. City of Papillion, 917 F.3d 1055,
1058 (8th Cir. 2019)). “To determine whether an officer had probable cause for an arrest, we
examine the events leading up to the arrest, and then decide “whether these historical facts, viewed
from the standpoint of an objectively reasonable police officer, amount to probable cause.” Id.
(quoting District of Columbia v. Wesby, ---U.S.----, 138 S.Ct. 577, 589, 199 L.Ed.2d 453 (2018).
“The existence of probable cause depends upon the reasonable conclusions be drawn from the
facts known to the arresting officer at the time of the arrest.” Id. (quoting Bell v. Neukirch, 979
F.3d 594, 603 (8th Cir. 2020).
Here, Plaintiff is mistaken regarding his assertion that there is no affidavit, police report,
or credible witnesses that establish probable cause. As submitted as part of his Motion for
Summary Judgment, Defendant has provided the Offense Incident Report, Ms. Overcast’s
Statement, Ms. Osburn Statement, the Probable Cause Statement, the Felony Complaint, the
Felony Information, Defendant’s Affidavit, a copy of Mo. Rev. Stat. §§ 574.115 and 574.120,
sections of Plaintiff’s deposition testimony, and Plaintiff’s Motion to Refile Claim and Address
Issues. (Docs 60-1 through 60-11). In review of the exhibits, they show the offense/incident reports
that details Detective Long’s investigation on January 4, 2023. (Doc. 60-1). The statements from
Ms. Overcast and Ms. Osburn detailing their interaction with Plaintiff stating, “that’s why people
will burn the Courthouse down.” (Docs. 60-2 and 60-3). Detective Long’s Probable Cause
Statement regarding the incident on January 4, 2023, to which he stated he has probable cause to
believe that Plaintiff made a terroristic threat. (Doc. 60-4). Defendant has also supplied the Court
with the Complaint and Request for Warrant by Matthew Weatherman, the Prosecuting Attorney
for Douglas County. (Doc. 60-5). Defendant also has submitted an affidavit in which he states that
on January 10, 2023 “the Douglas County Prosecuting Attorney advised me to arrest [Plaintiff] for
making terroristic threat. Subsequently, I arrested Aaron Meier for making a terroristic threat on
that date.” (Doc. 60-7). After review of the exhibits, the Court finds that there is no genuine issue
of material fact that Defendant had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff on January 10, 2023.
Additionally, Plaintiff misunderstands the doctrine of double jeopardy. The United States
Constitution provides “nor shall any person be subject to the same offense to be twice put in
jeopardy of life or limb.” U.S. Const. amend. V. It protects against the “imposition of multiple
criminal, punishments for the same offense, and then only when such occurs in successive
proceedings. Students for Sensible Drug Pol’y Found v. Spellings, 523 F.3d 896, 899 (8th Cir.
2008) (quoting Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 99, 118 S.Ct.488, 139 L.Ed.2d 450 (1997)
(emphasis in original)). Plaintiff brings this civil action seeking damages for his alleged wrongful
arrest. As this is a civil matter, the doctrine of double jeopardy does not apply.
Lastly, Plaintiff makes a claim that Defendant is hiding critical evidence that undermines
his claims. Plaintiff claims that the video shows no probable cause existed for the alleged threat.
However, Plaintiff fails to explain how this video would create a genuine dispute over the
circumstances leading to Plaintiff’s arrest, or the fact that Defendant arrested Plaintiff for making
a terroristic threat. The exhibits produced are ample evidence that would provide probable cause
under the totality of the circumstances at the time of the arrest of Plaintiff. The Court finds that
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, there are no genuine
issues of material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. For these
reasons, Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment for Failure to State a Claim is GRANTED.
II. Qualified Immunity
Alternatively, Defendant argues that even if probable cause did not exist, he would still be
entitled to qualified immunity for any individual claim theory as long as he had arguable probable
cause to make the arrest. Plaintiff argues that Defendant is not entitled to qualified immunity. The
Court already having granted Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment based on a failure to
state a claim need not further address whether Defendant was entitled to qualified immunity.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.
Summary Judgment is hereby entered in favor of Defendant.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: June 9, 2025
/s/ Douglas Harpool
DOUGLAS HARPOOL
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE