The opinion
Filed 5/20/25; modified and certified for publication 6/10/25 (order attached)
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
UNITED INDIAN HEALTH
SERVICES, INC. / TRIBAL FIRST,
A170950
Petitioner,
v. (No. ADJ10124964)
WORKERS’ COMPENSATION
APPEALS BOARD and DEBORAH
HEMSTEAD,
Respondents.
Deborah Hemsted filed a workers’ compensation claim
against her employer, United Indian Health Service. United
Indian petitioned for a writ of review, challenging a Workers’
Compensation Appeals Board decision denying reconsideration of
an order by the administrative law judge that rejected United
Indian’s claim of tribal sovereign immunity. Having previously
granted United Indian’s petition for a writ of review, we now
reverse the Board’s decision.
1
BACKGROUND
A.
Because Indian tribes are separate sovereigns, they are
immune from suit in state and federal courts absent waiver or
congressional abrogation. (See People v. Miami Nation
Enterprises (2016) 2 Cal.5th 222, 234 (Miami Nation); Self v.
Cher-Ae Heights Indian Community of Trinidad Rancheria (2021)
60 Cal.App.5th 209, 213 (Cher-Ae Heights).) In addition to
protecting tribes from the burdens of litigation, immunity serves
the interests of tribal self-sufficiency, self-governance, and
economic development. (Miami Nation, at p. 235; Cher-Ae
Heights, at p. 213.)
Tribal immunity may also extend to an entity that is
affiliated with an Indian tribe but is not itself a tribe. (Miami
Nation, supra, 2 Cal.5th at pp. 237, 239, 244-248.) To determine
whether a tribal affiliate should be considered an “arm of the
tribe” and therefore entitled to the tribe’s immunity, courts
consider five factors that assess the relationship and
organizational proximity between the tribe and the entity. (Id. at
pp. 244-248.) The arm-of-the-tribe inquiry examines (1) the
affiliate’s method of creation; (2) whether the tribe intended to
share its immunity; (3) the affiliate’s purpose; (4) the level of
control exercised by the tribe over the affiliate; and (5) the
financial connection between the tribe and the affiliate. (Ibid.;
see also In re Internet Lending Cases (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 613,
625 (Internet Lending Cases).) These factors are assessed based
on the circumstances existing at the time of the trial court’s
decision. (See Miami Nation, at pp. 250-251; Internet Lending
Cases, at p. 623.) The entity asserting immunity has the burden
of establishing its claim by a preponderance of the evidence.
(Miami Nation, at p. 248.)
No one factor is dispositive. (See Miami Nation, supra, 2
Cal.5th at p. 248.) The closer the link between the affiliate and
2
the tribe, both formally and practically, the more likely the
affiliate is to be protected by the tribe’s immunity. (Id. at p. 245.)
On the other hand, there are some “ ‘situations in which a tribal
entity may engage in activities . . . so far removed from tribal
interests that it no longer can legitimately be seen as an
extension of the tribe itself.’ ” (Id. at p. 250.) Ultimately, the five
factors reflect the principle that sovereign immunity should be
extended to tribal entities when doing so would, as a practical
matter, promote the federal policy of tribal self-governance and
self-sufficiency. (Ibid.)
Miami Nation illustrates the application of the arm-of-the-
tribe test. It considered whether payday lending companies
affiliated with Indian tribes were protected by tribal immunity.
(Miami Nation, supra, 2 Cal.5th at pp. 229, 250.) Our Supreme
Court held that the affiliates were not entitled to immunity
because, although the tribes intended to share their immunity,
the tribes “relied heavily on outsiders” to both create and manage
the lending businesses. (Id. at pp. 252, 255-256.) The record
“contain[ed] scant evidence that [the] tribe[s] actually control[],
oversee[], or significantly benefit[] from the underlying business
operations of the online lenders.” (Id. at p. 251.) As for the
financial relationship, the evidence suggested that the tribes
received only “minimal” economic benefit from the lending
businesses, and the tribes would not be directly liable for any
judgment against the businesses. (Id. at pp. 253-254.) Given
that the record did not reflect meaningful tribal control or a close
financial relationship, the businesses also were unlikely to
actually achieve their stated purposes of contributing to tribal
economic development and creating opportunities for tribal
members and residents. (Id. at p. 255.) As a result, on balance,
granting immunity to the lending companies would not further
tribal self-governance. (Id. at p. 251.)
3
B.
The Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance
Act of 1975 (the Indian Self-Determination Act; 25 U.S.C. § 5301
et seq.) reflects a national policy of advancing Native American
autonomy and control. (See Yellen v. Confederated Tribes of
Chehalis Reservation (2021) 594 U.S. 338, 344 (Confederated
Tribes of Chehalis).) Congress recognized “the obligation of the
United States to respond to the strong expression of the Indian
people for self-determination by assuring maximum Indian
participation in the direction of . . . Federal services to Indian
communities.” (25 U.S.C. § 5302(a); see also 25 U.S.C. §
5301(a)(1).) Accordingly, the Indian Self-Determination Act
seeks to shift responsibility for the administration of federal
Indian benefits from the federal government to Native American
organizations themselves. (See 25 U.S.C. § 5302(b); Confederated
Tribes of Chehalis, at p. 344; see also Cook Inlet Treaty Tribes v.
Shalala (9th Cir. 1999) 166 F.3d 986, 988.) The Indian Self-
Determination Act authorizes an “Indian tribe” to request that
the federal government enter into a self-determination contract
with a tribal organization, which would contract to deliver health
services or other programs to members of the tribe using federal
funds. (See Confederated Tribes of Chehalis, at p. 344; see also 25
U.S.C. § 5321(a).)
The Indian Self-Determination Act recognizes that Indian
tribes may form coalitions or “[i]nter-tribal consorti[a]” to
“participat[e] in self-governance” in the area of Indian health,
including through a tribal organization. (25 U.S.C. § 5381(a)(5).)
A “ ‘tribal organization’ ” includes “the recognized governing body
of any Indian tribe,” as well as “any legally established
organization of Indians which is controlled, sanctioned, or
chartered by such governing body or which is democratically
elected by the adult members of the Indian community to be
served by such organization and which includes the maximum
4
participation of Indians in all phases of its activities.” (25 U.S.C.
§ 5304(l).)
A tribal organization may “perform services benefiting
more than one Indian tribe” pursuant to a self-determination
contract, so long as each tribe first approves the relevant contract
or grant. (25 U.S.C. § 5304(l).) The tribal organization may also
engage subcontractors to carry out the self-determination
contract. (See, e.g., 25 U.S.C. § 5321(a)(2) [requiring that a
contractor ensure “adequate competition for subcontracting”]; 25
C.F.R. § 900.49 [setting standards for subcontracts]; 25 C.F.R. §
900.50 [addressing federal laws applicable to subcontractors]; 25
C.F.R. § 900.189 [referring to “Indian contractors such as those
under subcontract with the California Rural Indian Health
Board”].)
Nothing in the Indian Self-Determination Act impairs or
diminishes a tribe’s sovereign immunity. (25 U.S.C. § 5332(1).)
Further, where “an Indian tribe has authorized another Indian
tribe, an inter-tribal consortium, or a tribal organization to plan
for or carry out programs, services, functions, or activities (or
portions thereof) on its behalf under this title” on Indian health,
“the authorized Indian tribe, inter-tribal consortium, or tribal
organization shall have the rights and responsibilities of the
authorizing Indian tribe (except as otherwise provided in the
authorizing resolution or in this title).” (25 U.S.C. § 5381(b).)
C.
As relevant here, 18 tribes formed a tribal organization
called the California Rural Indian Health Board (Indian Health
Board). The member tribes have authorized the Indian Health
Board to enter into self-determination agreements with the
federal government to provide health services for tribes. The
Indian Health Board is authorized to work with subcontractors to
“perform[] the obligations of the [Indian Health Board]” pursuant
5
to a self-determination agreement. (See 25 U.S.C. § 5329(a)(1),
(c).) United Indian is one such subcontractor.
Under the self-determination contract, the Indian Health
Board receives funds from the federal government and
distributes them to subcontractors. (See 25 U.S.C. § 5329(a)(1),
(c).) Any subcontract entered into by the Indian Health Board
must specify in writing the work to be performed and the terms of
the contract. (See 25 U.S.C. § 5329(a)(1), (c).) The Indian Health
Board must also manage the operations and monitor the day-to-
day activities conducted pursuant to the contract. (See 25 U.S.C.
§ 5329(a)(1), (c).)
As a subcontractor, United Indian works closely with the
Indian Health Board. At least nine federally-recognized tribes,
all members of the Indian Health Board, passed resolutions
authorizing the Indian Health Board to contract with United
Indian to provide health care services to tribe members. The
resolutions identify the Indian Health Board as a tribal
organization or entity but do not expressly identify United Indian
as a tribal organization, with the exception of a resolution of the
Yurok tribe, which specifically describes United Indian as a
“legally established organization of Indians which currently sub-
contracts with [the Indian Health Board] . . . to provide Indian
health care services.”1
United Indian is a non-profit corporation established under
California law. It was created by several tribes to provide
healthcare services to the Indian people in and around Del Norte
and Humboldt Counties. According to its bylaws, United Indian’s
1 United Indian does not contend that it qualifies as a
“ ‘tribal organization’ ” under the Indian Self-Determination Act
as a “legally established organization of Indians which is . . .
sanctioned . . . by” the governing body of a tribe (in this case, by
resolution). (See 25 U.S.C. § 5304(l); see also 25 U.S.C. § 5381].)
We therefore do not address that question.
6
goals include improving Indian health, raising awareness among
Indians of available health services, helping to develop local,
state, and federal Indian health policies, and expanding access to
dental health programs and to health services for Indian mothers
and children.
United Indian is managed by a board of directors comprised
of a member and an alternate appointed by each federally
recognized tribal government “within the corporation,” as well as
five elected members plus alternates from designated Indian
Community Representative voting areas; the alternates vote
when a member is absent. To be a member of the board or to vote
in corporate elections, the individual must be an “American
Indian” registered to receive services from United Indian.
D.
Hemsted’s claim is based on an injury she sustained in
2014, when she was a medical assistant for United Indian.
Hemsted first received benefits and treatment for her injury
through United Indian’s tribal workers’ compensation system.
After a dispute arose, however, Hemsted filed a claim with the
state workers’ compensation system. United Indian took the
position that, in light of its tribal immunity, California’s workers’
compensation system lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate the claim.
In a March 2024 decision, the workers’ compensation
administrative law judge (ALJ) rejected United Indian’s claim of
sovereign immunity after applying Miami Nation’s five-factor
arm-of-the-tribe test.
With respect to United Indian’s method of creation, the
ALJ found that it was a California non-profit created through the
Indian Health Board and authorized by several tribes, including
federally recognized tribes, to provide health services to their
members. The ALJ observed that eight or nine tribes have
sanctioned United Indian as their health provider. The ALJ
7
noted that most of the tribal resolutions did not specifically
designate United Indian as a tribal organization. Based on these
circumstances, the ALJ concluded that United Indian’s method of
creation weighed against sovereign immunity.
As to the question of intent, the ALJ found no evidence that
the tribes intended to share their sovereign immunity with
United Indian.
The ALJ held that United Indian’s purpose—to serve the
health needs of Indians in Humboldt and Del Norte Counties—
weighed in favor of sovereign immunity.
As for control, the ALJ concluded that “[c]ontrol weighs
against sovereign immunity because the Board [of Directors of
United Indian] consisted of tribal members and others who may
or may not be tribal members.”
With respect to the financial relationship between United
Indian and the tribes, the ALJ found United Indian was not
funded by the tribes, but instead by grants obtained by the
Indian Health Board and distributed to United Indian. The ALJ
reasoned that, because United Indian is incorporated separately
from the tribes, “any action against [United Indian] would not
threaten the tribes’ resources, nor the resources of the members
of the board.” The judge therefore concluded that this factor
weighed against immunity.
In her report on reconsideration, the ALJ recommended
that the Board deny United Indian’s request for reconsideration.
The ALJ appeared to change her view on the funding factor,
stating: “Defendant's argument on Reconsideration with regard
to funding is well made. The[ir] point [that] any monies lost
through suit would not be available to [United Indian] to provide
medical treatment to the tribes weighs in favor of sovereign
immunity.” However, the ALJ’s overall assessment remained
8
that United Indian had failed to establish its entitlement to
sovereign immunity.
Denying United Indian’s reconsideration request, the
Board adopted and incorporated the ALJ’s report on
reconsideration.2 The Board found no abuse of discretion in the
ALJ’s rejection of United Indian’s claim of sovereign immunity.
DISCUSSION
Whether sovereign immunity applies to an entity is a
question of law reviewed de novo. (Miami Nation, supra, 2
Cal.5th at p. 250.) We also apply the de novo standard when
interpreting written instruments, except to the extent that the
interpretation turns on conflicting extrinsic evidence. (See
Internet Lending Cases, supra, 53 Cal.App.5th at p. 622; Campo
Band of Mission Indians v. Superior Court (2006) 137
Cal.App.4th 175, 183.)
Turning to the five Miami Nation factors, we conclude that
the Board and ALJ erred in denying sovereign immunity.
Method of Creation
Considering both the law and the circumstances under
which United Indian was formed (Miami Nation, supra, 2 Cal.5th
at pp. 245-246), the method of creation factor weighs somewhat
in favor of sovereign immunity.
As the ALJ found, several tribes established United Indian
and authorized it via tribal resolution to be their local health care
provider as a subcontractor to the Indian Health Board pursuant
to a self-determination contract under the Indian Self-
Determination Act. This was not a situation in which a tribe
absorbed an independent commercial enterprise previously
unaffiliated with a tribe, as was the case in Internet Lending
2 Because the Board adopted and incorporated the ALJ’s
report, our discussion refers to the ALJ’s findings.
9
Cases. (See Internet Lending Cases, supra, 53 Cal.App.5th at p.
626; see also Miami Nation, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 246.) Instead,
the formation of United Indian served to further self-sufficiency
and self-governance by ensuring that the tribes’ health care
services were administered and managed by tribal organizations
rather than by the federal government. (See 25 U.S.C. § 5302(b).)
Although United Indian was organized under state law rather
than tribal law, which generally weighs against immunity
(Miami Nation, at pp. 245-246), the ALJ properly concluded that
that fact is not dispositive (see Ito v. Copper River Native Ass'n
(Alaska 2024) 547 P.3d 1003, 1023 (Copper River); cf.
Confederated Tribes of Chehalis, supra, 594 U.S. at p. 358
[holding that Alaska Native Corporations are “Indian Tribes”
under the Indian Self-Determination Act]).
In analogous circumstances, the Alaska Supreme Court
recently held that, where several member tribes created a
nonprofit corporation to provide health care using tribal funds
under the Indian Self-Determination Act, the circumstances of
the entity’s creation weighed slightly in favor of immunity
notwithstanding its formation under state law.3 (Copper River,
supra, 547 P.3d at pp. 1023-1024; see also Manzano v. S. Indian
Health Council, Inc. (S.D. Cal. July 7, 2021, No. 20-cv-02130-
BAS-BGS) [nonpub. opn.] (Manzano); Wilson v. Alaska Native
Tribal Health Consortium (D. Alaska 2019) 399 F. Supp.3d 926,
933 (Wilson); Matyascik v. Arctic Slope Native Ass'n, Ltd. (D.
Alaska Aug. 5, 2019, No. 2:19-cv-0002-HRH) [nonpub. opn.]
3 In Miami Nation, our Supreme Court noted that Alaska
courts had taken a different approach to the test for tribal
sovereign immunity, treating the financial relationship factor as
a threshold and therefore potentially dispositive inquiry. (See
Miami Nation, supra, 2 Cal.5th at pp. 237-238.) In Copper River,
however, the Alaska Supreme Court overruled that approach and
adopted a five-factor test mirroring the one endorsed in Miami
Nation. (See Copper River, supra, 547 P.3d at pp. 1015-1022.)
10
(Matyascik).) Similarly here, the circumstances of United
Indian’s creation has a mixed impact on our inquiry but tips
toward immunity.
Intent
The ALJ concluded the tribes had no intent to share their
sovereign immunity with United Indian. The record contained no
tribal documents stating the tribes’ intent to extend sovereign
immunity to United Indian. (See Miami Nation, supra, 2 Cal.5th
at p. 246.) Instead, the ALJ noted tribal resolutions that
explicitly recognize that the Indian Health Board is a tribal
organization under the Indian Self-Determination Act, which
confers upon the Indian Health Board the same rights and
responsibilities as those held by the tribes themselves. (See 25
U.S.C. § 5332(1).) Apart from a resolution of the Yurok Tribe,
which recognizes that “United Indian Health Services, Inc. . . . , is
a legally established organization of Indians,” the resolutions do
not address the tribal organization status of United Indian, a
subcontractor to the Indian Health Board. Nor does the record
contain documents directly indicating the Indian Health Board
intended to share its immunity with United Indian. Because the
burden of proof is on the entity claiming immunity, a silent
record generally weighs against immunity. (Miami Nation, at p.
246.)
We note, however, that even absent express statements of a
tribe’s intent, tribal intent may be inferred from the tribe’s
actions or other circumstances. (Miami Nation, supra, 2 Cal.5th
at p. 246.) And as United Indian asserts, it may be possible to
infer the intent to share tribal immunity based on the fact that
the tribes established and sanctioned United Indian to provide
healthcare services to tribe members under a federal system
intended to further tribal self-governance. (See, e.g., Copper
River, 547 P.3d at p. 1025; 25 U.S.C. § 5381). Accordingly,
11
although the ALJ’s conclusion is reasonable, based on the scant
evidence available, it weighs only somewhat against immunity.
Purpose
We agree with the ALJ that United Indian’s provision of
health care serves a purpose central to tribal self-sufficiency and
self-governance, weighing in favor of sovereign immunity. (See,
e.g., Ransom v. St. Regis Mohawk Educ. & Community Fund
(N.Y. 1995) 86 N.Y.2d 553, 560.) In cases where a tribal entity
provides health services to tribe members pursuant to the Indian
Self-Determination Act, other courts have given strong weight to
this factor. (See, e.g., Copper River, supra, 547 P.3d at pp. 1022-
1023; Wilson, supra, 399 F. Supp. 3d at p. 934; Barron v. Alaska
Native Tribal Health Consortium (D. Alaska 2019) 373 F. Supp.
3d 1232, 1240 (Barron); see also Skull Valley Health Care, LLC v.
Norstar Consultants LLC (D. Utah Aug. 2, 2023, No. 2:22-cv-
00326) [nonpub. opn.] (Skull Valley Health Care); Manzano,
supra, 20-cv-02130-BAS-BGS; Matyascik, supra, 2:19-cv-0002-
HRH.)
Tribal Control
The control factor also weighs in favor of sovereign
immunity. The tribes participate in the management and control
of United Indian in at least three respects.
First, under United Indian’s bylaws, each participating
tribe that is federally recognized shall select a representative to
serve a term of office on the Board of Directors designated by the
tribe. The Board of Directors “control[s], oversee[s], and
conduct[s] the affairs and business” of United Indian, hires and
removes employees, and does “whatever else may be necessary in
the conduct of the business of the corporation in order to
accomplish its purpose.” Shirley Laos, a tribal representative on
the Board of Directors at the time she testified, confirmed that
the Board of Directors does in practice oversee United Indian, by,
12
for example, voting on resolutions, approving insurance
contracts, receiving reports, and discussing litigation.
Second, pursuant to each tribe’s authorizing resolution, the
tribes retain approval power over the contracts between United
Indian and the Indian Health Board for provision of health care
services. (See 25 U.S.C. § 5304(l).)
Third, as a party to a self-determination agreement, the
Indian Health Board, a tribal organization, must manage the
day-to-day operations, manage all funds, and monitor all
activities conducted under the agreement, although the record
does not indicate how closely the Indian Health Board monitors
those activities in practice. (See 25 U.S.C. § 5329(a)(1), (c); see
also Miami Nation, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 250 [explaining that
“arrangements on paper do not necessarily illuminate how
businesses operate in practice”].)
The ALJ reasoned that the control factor weighs against
sovereign immunity “because the Board [of Directors] consisted of
tribal members and others who may or may not be tribal
members.” This was legal error. As Hemsted herself explained,
the tribes appoint a majority (nine) of the board members. The
fact that they do not appoint the remaining five does not
undercut the tribes’ majority control of the board or the other
ways, discussed above, in which they may exercise control. (Cf.
Miami Nation, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 247 [“[a]n entity’s decision
to outsource management to a nontribal third party is not
enough, standing alone, to tilt th[e] [control] factor against
immunity.”])
Financial Relationship
Finally, the financial relationship factor likewise weighs in
favor of immunity. Miami Nation makes clear that where a
judgment against the tribal entity would significantly reduce
tribal resources, sovereign immunity is appropriate, even if the
13
tribe’s treasury is not directly affected. (Miami Nation, supra, 2
Cal.5th at pp. 247-248; see also Copper River, supra, 547 P.3d at
p. 1025.) The ALJ found that United Indian is funded by the
Indian Health Board, which receives federal funding through a
self-determination agreement. As the ALJ further noted, a
judgment against United Indian would reduce the money
available to provide medical treatment to tribal members. Thus,
subjecting United Indian to liability for state workers’
compensation claims (and potentially other types of claims, if
tribal immunity is denied) would undercut United Indian’s ability
to carry out its self-governance purpose and reduce funds
available for tribal health care. (See Copper River, at pp. 1025-
1026.)
In Copper River, the Alaska Supreme Court concluded that
this factor weighed in favor of immunity where the inter-tribal
non-profit health care organization received federal funding, for
the benefit of its member tribes, to provide health care services
for tribe members. (Copper River, supra, 547 P.3d at p. 1026.)
Even though the organization’s non-profit status meant the tribes
themselves were formally insulated from a judgment against the
organization, such a judgment would undermine tribal self-
sufficiency because it “would be effectively paid from the member
tribes’ federal healthcare funding.” (Ibid.; see also Wilson, supra,
399 F.Supp.3d at p. 936; Barron, supra, 373 F.Supp.3d at pp.
1239-1240; Skull Valley Health Care, supra, No. 2:22-cv-00326;
Manzano, supra, No. 20-cv-02130-BAS-BGS; Matyascik, supra,
No. 2:19-cv-0002-HRH.)
***
In sum, although there is no express evidence that United
Indian’s participating tribes intended to share their immunity,
the remaining factors reflect that United Indian is an arm of the
tribes that it serves. Ultimately, because United Indian’s
existence, purpose, and operations are central to tribal self-
14
governance, extending tribal immunity to United Indian would
further the self-governance and autonomy policies that such
immunity is intended to promote. (See Miami Nation, supra, 2
Cal.5th at p. 250; Copper River, supra, 547 P.3d at p. 1026;
Barron, supra, 373 F.Supp.3d at pp. 1239-1240; Skull Valley
Health Care, supra, No. 2:22-cv-00326; cf. Pink v. Modoc Indian
Health Project (9th Cir. 1998) 157 F.3d 1185, 1187.) For the same
reason, denying sovereign immunity to United Indian would
impair tribal self-sufficiency by reducing its member tribes’
health care resources. (See, e.g., Copper River, at p. 1026;
Matyascik, supra, No. 2:19-cv-0002-HRH.) Accordingly, we hold
that United Indian is entitled to sovereign immunity.
DISPOSITION
The Board’s opinion and order denying United Indian’s
petition for reconsideration is reversed. The matter is remanded
to the Board for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
BURNS, J.
WE CONCUR:
JACKSON, P.J.
CHOU, J.
United Indian Health Services, Inc. / Tribal First v. Workers’ Compensation Appeals
Board and Deborah Hemstead (A170950)
15
Filed 6/10/25
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
UNITED INDIAN HEALTH A170950
SERVICES, INC. / TRIBAL FIRST,
Petitioner, (No. ADJ10124964)
v. ORDER CERTIFYING
WORKERS’ COMPENSATION OPINION FOR
APPEALS BOARD and DEBORAH PUBLICATION AND
HEMSTEAD, MODIFYING OPINION
Respondents.
THE COURT:
The opinion in the above-entitled matter, filed on May 20, 2025, was
not certified for publication in the Official Reports. On June 6, 2025, a
request for publication was received from the California Lawyers Association,
Workers’ Compensation Section Unpublished Cases Review Committee,
pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 8.1120(a). We accepted the
request for publication for filing.
For good causing appearing, this court grants the publication request
and orders the opinion certified for publication pursuant to California Rules
of Court, rule 8.1105(b), (c).
Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 8.264(c)(1), the opinion filed on
May 20, 2025, shall be MODIFIED as follows:
1
1. All introductory signals in the opinion are changed from italicized
to non-italicized.
2. On page one, a new sentence is added to the end of the first
paragraph:
Under the “arm of the tribe” test set forth in People
v. Miami Nation Enterprises (2016) 2 Cal.5th 222,
234 (Miami Nation), United Indian is entitled to
sovereign immunity.
3. On page two, the citation that follows the first sentence of
the first paragraph is replaced as follows:
(See Miami Nation, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 234; Self
v. Cher-Ae Heights Indian Community of the
Trinidad Rancheria (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 209, 213
(Cher-Ae Heights).)
4. On page two, in the second paragraph, the second and
third sentences are replaced with the following combined
sentence and citation:
To determine whether a tribal affiliate should be
considered an “arm of the tribe” and therefore
entitled to the tribe’s immunity, courts examine
five factors that pertain to the relationship
between the affiliate and the tribe: (1) the
affiliate’s method of creation; (2) whether the tribe
intended to share its immunity; (3) the affiliate’s
purpose; (4) the level of control exercised by the
tribe over the affiliate; and (5) the financial
connection between the tribe and the affiliate. (Id.
at pp. 244-248; see also In re Internet Lending
Cases (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 613, 625 (Internet
Lending Cases).)
2
5. On page eight, the fourth full paragraph is replaced in its
entirety as follows:
With respect to the financial relationship between
United Indian and the tribes, the ALJ concluded
that this factor weighed against immunity. The
ALJ explained that United Indian was not funded
by the tribes but, instead, by grants obtained by
the Indian Health Board and distributed to United
Indian. Also, because United Indian is
incorporated separately from the tribes, “any action
against [United Indian] would not threaten the
tribes’ resources, nor the resources of the members
of the board.”
6. At the bottom of page 10, the last sentence of the last
paragraph, continuing into page 11, is replaced as follows:
Similarly, here, the circumstances of United
Indian’s creation have a mixed impact on our
inquiry but tip toward immunity.
7. On page 11, in the first full paragraph, the second and
third sentences are replaced as follows:
The record contains no tribal documents stating
the tribes’ intent to extend sovereign immunity to
United Indian. (See Miami Nation, supra, 2
Cal.5th at p. 246.) By contrast, tribal resolutions
explicitly recognize that the Indian Health Board
is a tribal organization under the Indian Self-
Determination Act, which confers upon the Indian
Health Board the same rights and responsibilities
as those held by the tribes themselves.
8. On page 12, the first sentence of the third paragraph is
replaced as follows:
First, under United Indian’s bylaws, each
participating tribe that is federally recognized
3
selects a representative to serve a term of office on
the Board of Directors designated by the tribe.
9. In the same paragraph identified in item 8, the third
sentence is replaced as follows:
Shirley Laos, a tribal representative on the Board
of Directors, confirmed that the Board of Directors
does in practice oversee United Indian by, for
example, voting on resolutions, approving
insurance contracts, receiving reports, and
discussing litigation.
The modifications make no change to the judgment.
BURNS, J.
WE CONCUR:
JACKSON, P.J.
CHOU, J.
United Indian Health Services, Inc. / Tribal First v. Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board and Deborah Hemstead
(A170950)
4
Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board Case No. ADJ10124964.
Michael Arthur Robinson for Petitioner.
Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board, James Thomas Losee, for Respondent Workers’
Compensation Appeals Board.
Deborah Hemstead, in pro. per., for Respondent Deborah Hemstead.
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