Walters v. PSRB

No. 486 June 4, 2025 41

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE

STATE OF OREGON

LUKE HOKULE WALTERS,

Petitioner,

v.

PSYCHIATRIC SECURITY REVIEW BOARD,

Respondent.

Psychiatric Security Review Board

102478; A175054

Submitted June 3, 2024.

Harris S. Matarazzo filed the brief for petitioner.

Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, Benjamin Gutman,

Solicitor General, and Robert A. Koch, Assistant Attorney

General, filed the brief for respondent.

Before Tookey, Presiding Judge, Egan, Judge, and Kamins,

Judge.

KAMINS, J.

Reversed and remanded for proceedings consistent with

this opinion.

42 Walters v. PSRB

KAMINS, J.

Petitioner seeks review of an order by the Psychiatric

Security Review Board (PSRB) following a “five year” juris-

dictional hearing finding him under its jurisdiction, con-

tinuing him on “conditional release,” and denying his com-

munity treatment provider’s request that he be “discharged”

from the PSRB’s jurisdiction. Petitioner contends that he is

no longer under the PSRB’s jurisdiction because he is no lon-

ger affected by a qualifying mental disorder and requests

that the PSRB order his discharge. ORS 161.346(1)(a);

ORS 161.351(1). We agree with petitioner that, based on the

record as a whole, no reasonable person could find that he

continues to have a qualifying mental disorder, and so we

reverse.1

I. BACKGROUND

The PSRB has exclusive jurisdiction over individu-

als with a qualifying mental disorder who are found guilty

except for insanity of a felony and present a substantial dan-

ger to others. ORS 161.327. If the PSRB, however, finds by a

preponderance of the evidence that a person under its juris-

diction “is no longer affected by a qualifying mental disorder,

or, if so affected, no longer presents a substantial danger to

others that requires regular medical care, medication, super-

vision or treatment,” the PSRB must release that person from

its jurisdiction. ORS 161.351(1); ORS 161.346(1)(a);.2

1

Our conclusion that the PSRB failed to establish that petitioner has a quali-

fying mental disorder obviates the need to address petitioner’s second assignment

of error, arguing that, in the event that the PSRB is correct that he has a quali-

fying mental disorder, there is insufficient evidence in the record to support the

PSRB’s determination that petitioner presents a “substantial danger to others.”

2

ORS 161.346(1)(a) provides:

“When the Psychiatric Security Review Board conducts a hearing under

ORS 161.315 to 161.351, the board shall enter an order and make findings in

support of the order. If the board finds that a person under the jurisdiction of

the board * * * [i]s no longer affected by a qualifying mental disorder, or, if so

affected, no longer presents a substantial danger to others, the board shall

order the person discharged from commitment and conditional release.”

ORS 161.351(1) provides:

“Any person placed under the jurisdiction of the Psychiatric Security

Review Board under ORS 161.315 to 161.351 shall be discharged at such

time as the board, upon a hearing, finds by a preponderance of the evidence

that the person is no longer affected by a qualifying mental disorder or, if

Cite as 341 Or App 41 (2025) 43

A “qualifying mental disorder” is defined by the

legislature mostly by what it is not: It does not include

“an abnormality manifested only by repeated criminal or

otherwise antisocial conduct, nor does the term include any

abnormality constituting solely a personality disorder.” ORS

161.295(2).3 By rule, the PSRB has interpreted “qualifying

mental disorder” to mean, as relevant here,

“any diagnosis of a psychiatric condition which is a signifi-

cant behavioral or psychological syndrome or pattern that

is associated with distress or disability causing symptoms

or impairment in at least one important area of an indi-

vidual’s functioning and is defined in the Diagnostic and

Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM 5-TR) of the

American Psychiatric Association.”

OAR 859-010-0005(15)(b); see also ORS 161.387 (the PSRB

“may promulgate such interpretive rules as the board

deems necessary or appropriate to carry out its statutory

responsibilities”).

Petitioner has been under PSRB jurisdiction since

2010, after he assaulted a stranger with a tire iron and

pleaded guilty except for insanity to first-degree assault. At

that time, petitioner believed he was in a “holy war with

the forces of evil” and was diagnosed with schizoaffective

disorder and bipolar I disorder, both “qualifying mental

disorders.” Petitioner was initially placed at Oregon State

Hospital (OSH) and, in 2015, was conditionally released to

Kellogg Creek, a long-term transitional residential treat-

ment program. At the time of petitioner’s conditional release,

several of his treating psychiatrists at OSH noted that he

displayed “little if any symptoms suggestive of ongoing

so affected, no longer presents a substantial danger to others that requires

regular medical care, medication, supervision or treatment.”

3

ORS 161.295, in full, provides:

“(1) A person is guilty except for insanity if, as a result of a qualifying

mental disorder at the time of engaging in criminal conduct, the person lacks

substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality of the conduct or to

conform the conduct to the requirements of law.

“(2) As used in chapter 743, Oregon Laws 1971, the term ‘qualify-

ing mental disorder’ does not include an abnormality manifested only by

repeated criminal or otherwise antisocial conduct, nor does the term include

any abnormality constituting solely a personality disorder.”

44 Walters v. PSRB

bipolar disorder” and was not on any medications for treat-

ment of bipolar disorder.

While at Kellogg Creek in 2016, petitioner’s treat-

ing psychiatrist, Dr. Kim, diagnosed him with schizotypal

personality disorder with narcissistic traits, which she

believed explained why other providers incorrectly diag-

nosed petitioner with schizoaffective disorder and bipolar

disorder with psychotic features, as those diagnoses present

with similar symptoms. Schizotypal personality disorder,

like other personality disorders, is not a qualifying mental

disorder. ORS 161.295(2). In an opinion requested by the

PSRB, Kim opined that petitioner did not present with any

psychotic symptoms at that time or at any point in the pre-

vious nine years. Kim also noted that, other than several

days of treatment with an antipsychotic medication in 2002,

petitioner had never been treated with an antipsychotic or

other psychotropic medication. She wrote that “[her] opinion

is that the symptoms that were interpreted as psychosis[ ]

can be entirely accounted for by [petitioner’s] personality

disorder and an adjustment disorder (in 2002).”

In Kim’s treatment notes, she also wrote that peti-

tioner “does not meet criteria for a bipolar or psychotic dis-

order.” Kim also reported that petitioner “experienced an

episode of adjustment disorder in 2002 following family

stressors and homelessness,” but his symptoms “resolved in

the absence of sustained treatment.” Accordingly, Kim rec-

ommended petitioner be discharged from PSRB jurisdiction,

and petitioner petitioned the PSRB for discharge.

At petitioner’s discharge hearing back in 2017, the

PSRB considered Kim’s recommendation. The PSRB also

considered an evaluation from an independent clinical and

forensic psychologist, Duncan. That evaluation opined that

petitioner continued to have bipolar I disorder, albeit largely

in remission with continued monitoring and support. The

PSRB also considered an opinion from an evaluator from

Clackamas County. The county evaluator recommended

continued jurisdiction, given the lack of agreement between

Kim and Duncan, but also noted that she “had never seen

firsthand evidence of a [qualifying mental disorder]” and that

the symptoms displayed by petitioner “may be attributed to

Cite as 341 Or App 41 (2025) 45

a personality disorder.” The PRSB continued its jurisdiction

over petitioner.

In 2017, petitioner transferred from Kellogg Creek

to a treatment program run by Cascadia. At the time of

transfer, an evaluation at Cascadia concurred with Kim

that petitioner had a diagnosis of “alcohol use disorder, in

sustained remission in a controlled environment, canna-

bis use disorder, and other specified personality disorder.”

That evaluation specifically ruled out bipolar disorder as a

diagnosis.

At Cascadia, petitioner began treatment with a new

psychiatrist, Dr. Mohandessi. In May 2018, Mohandessi

reported that petitioner’s current diagnosis was narcissis-

tic personality disorder and that petitioner did not meet the

criteria for any other psychiatric disorder. Cascadia accord-

ingly petitioned the PSRB for a jurisdictional discharge.

At petitioner’s discharge hearing in 2018, however,

the PSRB again continued its jurisdiction over petitioner,

finding that he continued to suffer from a mental disorder,

“most likely [b]ipolar [d]isorder.” The PSRB based this on the

historical bipolar diagnoses from OSH and Kellogg Creek

(prior to Kim’s diagnosis), as well as a diagnosis reported

by Mohandessi in April, prior to him concluding that peti-

tioner no longer had bipolar disorder.4

In 2019, while still under Cascadia’s care, petitioner

relapsed several times on alcohol and marijuana. In one of

those instances, petitioner drove while under the influence

and ended up climbing a tree in front of a stranger’s home.

Cascadia’s treatment team reported that the incident was

motivated by petitioner’s substance use and inability to set

healthy boundaries around substances in the community.

In July 2019, Mohandessi, for the first time, wrote

in his treatment notes that petitioner’s current psychiatric

disorders “include Adjustment Disorder and Narcissistic

Personality Disorder.” Mohandessi did not include any

4

It is not clear why Mohandessi reported that petitioner had bipolar disorder

in 2018. His testimony at petitioner’s hearing in 2020 was that he had never diag-

nosed petitioner with bipolar disorder and that sometimes old diagnoses “carry

over.”

46 Walters v. PSRB

explanation in his notes as to why he included an adjust-

ment disorder as one of petitioner’s then-current psychiat-

ric disorders. It is not clear if Mohandessi was referencing

Kim’s opinion (that petitioner had an adjustment disorder in

2002), if it was related to petitioner’s more-recent relapses,

or something else.

Shortly after Mohandessi wrote that petitioner’s

then-current disorders included an adjustment disorder,

Jones, a licensed professional counselor at Cascadia who

worked with petitioner, wrote in her treatment notes that

petitioner’s symptoms appeared to qualify him for an adjust-

ment disorder with depressed mood:

“[Petitioner’s] diagnosis has been unclear since his

entry into the Cascadia program. Over the past year, his

symptoms have become more comprehensible and clearer

to diagnose. He has not met criteria for Bipolar Disorder as

he has not been observed to experience a manic episode or a

major depressive episode since his entry into the Cascadia

program. However, he has been observed to experience

hopelessness and sadness after a stressful event that is

out of proportion to the severity or intensity of the stressor.

As a result his diagnosis has been changed from Bipolar

Disorder to Adjustment disorder with depressed mood.”

Jones also wrote that petitioner presented with “symptoms

of depressed mood, low self-worth, feelings of failure, avoli-

tion, anhedonia, disorganization, and impulsive behaviors.”

In August 2020, Cascadia requested jurisdictional

discharge on the basis of petitioner not having a qualifying

diagnosis.

Petitioner’s “five-year” jurisdictional hearing was

held in 2020. ORS 161.336(6).5 Prior to that hearing,

Mohandessi reported to the PSRB that petitioner’s cur-

rent diagnoses include narcissistic personality disorder

and adjustment disorder and that, due to these diagnoses,

petitioner does not meet the criteria for a qualifying mental

5

The PSRB is required to hold a hearing after a person under its jurisdiction

has been on conditional release for five years. ORS 161.336(6). At that hearing, the

PSRB “shall review the person’s status and determine whether the person should

be discharged from the jurisdiction of the board.” Id. Cascadia’s request for juris-

dictional discharge coincided with the time for petitioner’s “five-year” hearing.

Cite as 341 Or App 41 (2025) 47

disorder to maintain current PSRB jurisdiction.6 The PSRB

also received a report from a forensic psychologist, Dr. Orf,

who was retained by petitioner. In that report, Orf concluded

that petitioner met the criteria for diagnoses of narcissistic

personality disorder; other specified personality disorder,

schizotypal traits; and, alcohol use disorder—none of which

are qualifying mental disorders. Cascadia again recom-

mended jurisdictional discharge of petitioner.

At petitioner’s hearing, the PSRB heard testimony

from Mohandessi, Orf, and a member of petitioner’s treat-

ment team at Cascadia. All three testified that petitioner

did not have a qualifying mental disorder. The state opposed

jurisdictional discharge, arguing that petitioner was still

affected by his “historical diagnoses of a mood disorder

of some kind.” The state did not explain, at the hearing,

whether it was referring to petitioner’s historical diagnosis

of bipolar disorder, depressive disorder, or some other mood

disorder.

The PSRB denied petitioner’s request for discharge

on the basis of petitioner having a qualifying mental disor-

der, but it did not explain in its order what mental disorder

the PSRB believed petitioner to have. Petitioner petitioned

for judicial review. In 2022, while the petition was pending,

the PSRB withdrew its order and entered a continuation

of conditional release with a new order on reconsideration

that stated petitioner’s exact qualifying mental disorder—

adjustment disorder with depressed mood—and it is from

that order that petitioner seeks our review.7

II. ANALYSIS

“When a person over whom the [PSRB] exercises

jurisdiction * * * is adversely affected or aggrieved by a final

order of the [PSRB], the person is entitled to judicial review

of the final order.” ORS 161.348(1). “We review agency

6

Mohandessi also reported that, when active, petitioner’s diagnoses do not

make him a danger to others.

7

The PSRB alerts us to the fact that petitioner’s conditional release was

later revoked in February 2022 and, at the time of filing, he resided at the OSH.

That fact has no bearing on the legal issue of whether there was substantial evi-

dence to support the finding that, at the time of his five-year hearing, petitioner

continued to have a qualifying mental disorder.

48 Walters v. PSRB

orders for errors of law, substantial evidence, and substan-

tial reason.” Rinne v. PSRB, 326 Or App 777, 781, 533 P3d

802 (2023), rev den, 371 Or 825 (2024). “Substantial evidence

exists to support a finding of fact when the record, viewed

as a whole, would permit a reasonable person to make that

finding.” ORS 183.482(8)(c). “Substantial reason exists where

the agency has articulated a rational connection between

the facts and the legal conclusion that the agency draws

from them.” Rinne, 326 Or App at 781.

A. PSRB Decision

At petitioner’s jurisdictional hearing, Mohandessi,

petitioner’s treating psychiatrist at Cascadia, testified that,

since a diagnostic clarification assessment by his staff back

in 2018, he did not believe that petitioner had a qualifying

mental disorder. He noted that, especially in “treatment

plan” reports, historical diagnoses are often “carried over”

from previous providers, but that he had “never diagnosed

[petitioner] with any type of bipolar disorder be it specific

or nonspecific,” and any adjustment disorder petitioner once

had was fully resolved:

“DR. MOHANDESSI: Well, previously, though this is not

a current or active diagnosis, at Cascadia we had diagnosed

him with adjustment disorder really due to life stressors

and his life circumstances. At that time, there was con-

siderable stress around his family, housing, but I don’t—I

don’t see those same stressors being present or active at

this time and he does not meet criteria currently for an

adjustment disorder diagnosis.”

(Emphases added.)

The PSRB also heard similar testimony from Orf

that petitioner no longer had a qualifying mental disorder

and that any adjustment disorder had resolved and was not

going to reoccur:

“DR. ORF: There’s a discussion of an adjustment dis-

order previously. I didn’t see the necessary documentation

to support an adjustment disorder diagnoses [sic]. Based on

my review of the more recent record those issues that were

present at the time have—have clearly resolved and adjust-

ment disorder is not a cyclic disorder. It does not recur as

a specific diagnosis for a point in time. It’s a reaction to a

Cite as 341 Or App 41 (2025) 49

stressor. So if it was present in the past an adjustment dis-

order is certainly resolved, at least at the time of my evalu-

ation of [petitioner].”

(Emphases added.)

As the end of the hearing, the PSRB concluded that

petitioner was affected by a qualifying mental disorder

“as demonstrated by the underlying facts shown by the

evidence in the record and the testimony provided at the

hearing (see Exhibits 301, 309, 310, 318, 321, 323, 325, 326,

330, and 331, all of which diagnose [petitioner] with an

Adjustment Disorder).

“* * * * *

“This finding is supported by the evidence of long-

standing mental health diagnoses that began in [petition-

er’s] adolescence and persisted in adulthood for several

years both prior to and subsequent to his instant offense,

as evidenced in Exhibits 6, 7, 9, 11, 12, 13, 26, 33, 55, 86,

103, 115, 116, 120, 122, 129, 133, 195, 197, 240, 249, 257,

281, 290, and 309, all of which contain at least one qualify-

ing mental health diagnosis.”

The PSRB also cited to evidence that petitioner presented

with symptoms of depression at his April 2019 mental health

assessment and to professional opinions found throughout

the record that petitioner was “most likely to experience

increased symptoms, particularly mood-related symptoms,

during significant periods of stress and copes with [those]

symptoms by using alcohol or other substances.” Finally,

the PSRB noted that petitioner’s mental-health-related

symptoms become more severe when petitioner lives inde-

pendently and petitioner had not yet secured independent

housing, despite being approved for independent living

for over two years. The PSRB ultimately found that peti-

tioner continued to be affected by an adjustment order with

depressed mood, a qualifying mental disorder.8

8

The parties appear to agree, as a threshold matter, that adjustment dis-

order with depressed mood is a qualifying mental disorder. A qualifying mental

disorder, by statute, is one that results in a person “lack[ing] substantial capac-

ity either to appreciate the criminality of the[ir] conduct or to conform the[ir]

conduct to the requirements of law.” ORS 161.295(1). In the absence of argument

from the parties, we express no opinion as to whether an adjustment disorder

meets the statutory standard.

50 Walters v. PSRB

Turning to the evidence supporting the PSRB’s

decision, the PSRB order offered a lengthy list of exhibits,

identified only by number and without further explanation.

We endeavor to group that lengthy list into several catego-

ries. The first group (exhibits 240, 257, 281, 290, 301, 309,

310, 318, 321, 323, 325, 326, 330 and 331) are all notes from

petitioner’s time at Cascadia. Those exhibits reflect that the

Cascadia treatment team diagnosed him with an adjustment

disorder and also reported that petitioner had previously

been diagnosed with bipolar disorder (although that diag-

nosis was no longer “current”). All but three of the exhibits

diagnosing petitioner with adjustment disorder are from

petitioner’s treating psychiatrist, Mohandessi. The remain-

ing Cascadia exhibits consist of a mental health assessment

and treatment plan by Jones, a counselor, which were based

on Mohandessi’s diagnosis of adjustment disorder (exhibits

309 and 310), and a letter from a social worker at Cascadia,

informing the PSRB of petitioner’s intent to request a juris-

dictional discharge based on that exhibit (exhibit 326).

The next group of exhibits (exhibits 6, 7, 9, 11, 12,

13, 26, 33, 55, 86, 103, 115, 116, 120, 122, 129, 133, 195,

197, 240, 249, 257, 281, 290, and 309) all contain diagno-

ses of bipolar disorder. The bulk of those exhibits are from

petitioner’s initial treatment, upon entering PSRB jurisdic-

tion, at OSH from 2010-2014. The exhibits not from peti-

tioner’s initial admission to OSH include behavioral health

evaluations by Clackamas County in 2014 in preparation

for petitioner’s conditional release (exhibits 103, 120). Those

evaluations rely on the diagnoses of bipolar contained in the

OSH progress reports. That group of exhibits also contains

diagnostic reports in 2015 and 2016 continuing petitioner’s

diagnosis of bipolar (exhibits 129 and 195).

The next category of exhibits is one that, the PSRB

contends, reflect that petitioner “continues to suffer from

signs and symptoms of depression” and a lack of coping skills

causing petitioner to relapse with drugs and marijuana

(exhibits 7, 8, 12, 18, 19, 26, 72, 195, 249, 296, 302, 303,

309, 310, 312, 322, and 326). Those exhibits are treatment

plans, progress reports, and other reports, that reference

Cite as 341 Or App 41 (2025) 51

symptoms of depression and poor coping skills.9 For exam-

ple, in exhibit 322, petitioner’s case manager, Harris, wrote:

“Client is struggling with motivation and symptoms of

depression related to family issues, recent issue (urinating

in public) which resulting in him [sic] being excluded from

all public libraries, and barriers towards finding housing

in the community.”

B. Substantial Evidence

We conclude that the PSRB’s finding—that peti-

tioner has a qualifying mental disorder of an adjustment

disorder with depressed mood10 —is not supported by sub-

stantial evidence for several reasons. First, all of the exhib-

its that the PSRB cited to in its order attribute that diagno-

sis to petitioner’s treatment team at Cascadia. At the time

of the hearing, however, that same treatment team unani-

mously testified that petitioner no longer had a qualifying

mental disorder. In fact, in contrast to the PSRB’s order,

there was no testimony at the hearing that petitioner had

an adjustment disorder at all.

In addition, petitioner’s treatment team at Cascadia

appears to have based its impressions entirely from

Mohandessi’s diagnosis. Although Mohandessi did, in

mid-2019, diagnose petitioner with adjustment order with

depressed mood, by December 2019, Mohandessi opined

that petitioner’s adjustment disorder was “in partial remis-

sion with no medical intervention,” and at the hearing,

Mohandessi testified that petitioner’s adjustment disorder

had resolved. That timeline appears consistent with Orf’s

testimony that an adjustment disorder is not a “cyclic disor-

der” and does not “reoccur as a specific diagnosis;” instead,

it is a “reaction to a stressor.”11

9

Some of these exhibits contain diagnoses of adjustment disorder and bipo-

lar disorder; however, it appears that the PSRB is citing them here solely for the

exhibits’ mention of specific psychiatric symptoms that the PSRB finds significant.

For example, exhibit 249 is cited both as a reference to petitioner’s historic bipolar

disorder, as well as a reference to petitioner’s symptoms and lack of coping skills.

10

Although the PSRB referenced the historical diagnosis of bipolar disorder,

that does not appear to be the basis for its decision. The most recent diagnosis of

bipolar occurred in 2016, and it had been specifically ruled out by 2018.

11

That timeline is also consistent with the description of an adjustment dis-

order contained in Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders § 2,

Diagnostic Criteria & Codes, “Trauma and Stressor-Related Disorders” (5th ed

52 Walters v. PSRB

Moreover, all the evidence supporting the PSRB’s

determination that petitioner suffers from adjustment dis-

order consists of historical records authored by Mohandessi

or based on his diagnosis, yet the PSRB still discred-

ited Mohandessi’s testimony that petitioner did not have

adjustment disorder. We are mindful that the PSRB need

not defer to a treatment provider in finding that petitioner

remains affected by a qualifying mental disorder, provided

that its findings are supported by substantial evidence and

substantial reason. See Einstein v. PSRB, 330 Or 121, 128,

128 n 4, 998 P2d 654 (2000) (the PSRB is “not required to

accept” the testimony of a petitioner’s treating psychologist

“without considering the rest of the record”). But the PSRB’s

decision to discredit the testimony of a medical professional

must be made “in light of the other evidence in the record.”

Id. at 128 n 4. Here, there was no evidence in the record that

petitioner had a current diagnosis of a qualifying mental

disorder; rather, the PSRB relied on a historical diagnosis

from the very doctor it discredited.12

The PSRB’s reliance on old exhibits of a historical,

resolved diagnosis further calls its conclusion into question.

The PSRB cited to copious exhibits—exhibits 6, 7, 9, 11, 12,

13, 26, 33, 55, 86, 103, 115, 116, 120, 122, 129, 133, 195,

197, 240, 249, 257, 281, 290, and 309—that all contained

historical mental health diagnoses other than adjustment

disorder, mainly of bipolar disorder, to support its finding

that petitioner has an adjustment disorder. But there was

no evidence in the record that a historical diagnosis of bipo-

lar disorder is linked to a current diagnosis of adjustment

disorder. No witness testified to that connection, and no

exhibit contained any indication that petitioner’s historical

2013) (an adjustment disorder, “[b]y definition * * * lasts no longer than 6 months

after the stressor or its consequences have ceased.”).

12

The PSRB order explained its decision to disregard the testimony from

Mohandessi by asserting that Mohandessi’s opinion that petitioner does not have

a qualifying mental health diagnosis “is fairly recent and appears to overlook

or at least be inconsistent with recent record written by other members of [peti-

tioner’s] treatment team.” However, as discussed above, the cited exhibits from

Cascadia not authored by Mohandessi did not contain independent diagnoses.

The PSRB further cited exhibit 301 as evidence that Mohandessi had diagnosed

petitioner with bipolar as recently as 2019. However, Mohandessi testified that

he never held that opinion and explained that exhibit 301 reflected a “carry-over”

diagnosis.

Cite as 341 Or App 41 (2025) 53

diagnosis somehow predisposed him to the current diag-

nosis. If anything, the only evidence to connect petitioner’s

prior and current diagnoses demonstrated that symptoms

of a narcissistic personality disorder (not an adjustment dis-

order with depressed mood) could be confused with bipolar

disorder.13

In short, petitioner’s treatment team and indepen-

dent evaluators all consistently averred that petitioner no

longer had a qualifying mental disorder. The PSRB’s order

relied on historical, resolved diagnoses and thus was not

supported by substantial evidence.14

Reversed and remanded for proceedings consistent

with this opinion.

13

The PSRB also noted in its order that evidence of certain symptoms—

specifically, of depression and relapses in response to stressors—would allow a

reasonable person to conclude that petitioner has an adjustment disorder with

depressed mood, whether active or in remission. While the PSRB cited to numer-

ous exhibits related to petitioner’s symptoms, those exhibits do not support that

petitioner continues to have a qualifying diagnosis.

14

As mentioned, our disposition obviates the need to address the PSRB’s

finding that, due to a qualifying mental disorder, petitioner is a danger to oth-

ers. However, we note that there was ample evidence in the record pertaining

to petitioner’s dangerousness, including the violent event that brought him into

PSRB jurisdiction, as well as a general lack of insight into his responsibility for

violence. While Mohandessi testified that petitioner lacks a qualifying diagnosis,

he also testified that petitioner does present a danger to others.