Brown v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE

WESTERN DIVISION

(

CHANCE TURNER BROWN IV, (

(

Plaintiff, (

(

vs. ( No. 25-cv-2323 SHL/cgc

(

WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A., (

(

Defendant. (

(

ORDER GRANTING LEAVE TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

On March 24, 2025, plaintiff Chance Turner Brown IV, filed a pro se complaint and a

motion to proceed in forma pauperis. (D.E. # 2 & 4.) This case has been referred to the United

States magistrate judge for management and for all pretrial matters for determination and/or report

and recommendation as appropriate pursuant to Administrative Order 2013-051.

Federal law provides that the “clerk of each district court shall require parties instituting

any such civil action, suit or proceeding in such court, whether by original process, removal or

otherwise, to pay a filing fee of $400,” 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). To ensure access to the courts,

however, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) permits an indigent plaintiff to avoid payment of filing fees by filing

an in forma pauperis affidavit. Under that section, the Court must conduct a satisfactory inquiry

into the plaintiff’s ability to pay the filing fee and prosecute the lawsuit. A plaintiff seeking in

1 The instant case has been referred to the United States Magistrate Judge by Administrative Order pursuant to the

Federal Magistrates Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 631-639. All pretrial matters within the Magistrate Judge’s jurisdiction are

referred pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) for determination, and all other pretrial matters are referred pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B)-(C) for report and recommendation.

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forma pauperis standing must respond fully to the questions on the Court’s in forma pauperis form

and execute the affidavit in compliance with the certification requirements contained in 28 U.S.C.

§ 1746.

In this case, the Plaintiff has submitted a properly completed and executed in forma

pauperis affidavit. The information set forth in the affidavit satisfies Plaintiff’s burden of

demonstrating that he is unable to pay the civil filing fee. Accordingly, the motion to proceed in

forma pauperis is GRANTED. The Clerk shall record the defendant as Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.

Plaintiff’s “Petition for Enforcement of Bill of Exchange and Ex Parte Temporary

Restraining Order” centers around his attempt to present a “bill of exchange” in the amount of

$8,250,000.00 to Wells Fargo Bank for negotiation. In response, Wells Fargo declined to

negotiate the item presented for deposit and closed Plaintiff’s checking account. Plaintiff alleges

claims for breach of contract, negligence, tortious interference, wrongful account closure,

improper characterization of financial instrument and discrimination in violation of federal law.

On March 28, 2025, Plaintiff filed an amended petition for enforcement of negotiable instrument

(D.E. # 10) which appears to rely on sections of the Uniform Commercial Code and 15 U.S.C. §

1691 for relief.

The Court is required to screen in forma pauperis complaints and to dismiss any complaint,

or any portion thereof, if the action:

(i) is frivolous or malicious;

(ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or

(iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.

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28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).

In assessing whether the complaint in this case states a claim on which relief may be

granted, the Court applies the standards under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), as stated

in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-79 (2009), and in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550

U.S. 544, 555-57 (2007). Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010). “Accepting all

well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true, the Court ‘consider[s] the factual allegations in

[the] complaint to determine if they plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief.’“ Williams v.

Curtin, 631 F.3d 380, 383 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681) (alteration in original).

“[P]leadings that . . . are no more than conclusions are not entitled to the assumption of truth.

While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by

factual allegations.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679; see also Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 n.3 (“Rule 8(a)(2)

still requires a ‘showing,’ rather than a blanket assertion, of entitlement to relief. Without some

factual allegation in the complaint, it is hard to see how a claimant could satisfy the requirement of

providing not only ‘fair notice’ of the nature of the claim, but also ‘grounds’ on which the claim

rests.”).

“A complaint can be frivolous either factually or legally. Any complaint that is legally

frivolous would ipso facto fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Hill, 630 F.3d at

470 (citing Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325, 328-29 (1989)).

Whether a complaint is factually frivolous under §§ 1915(b)(1) and

1915(e)(2)(B)(i) is a separate issue from whether it fails to state a claim for relief.

Statutes allowing a complaint to be dismissed as frivolous give “judges not only the

authority to dismiss a claim based on an indisputably meritless legal theory, but

also the unusual power to pierce the veil of the complaint’s factual allegations and

dismiss those claims whose factual contentions are clearly baseless.” Neitzke, 490

U.S. at 327, 109 S. Ct. 1827 (interpreting 28 U.S.C. § 1915). Unlike a dismissal for

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failure to state a claim, where a judge must accept all factual allegations as true,

Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949-50, a judge does not have to accept “fantastic or

delusional” factual allegations as true in prisoner complaints that are reviewed for

frivolousness. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327-28, 109 S. Ct. 1827.

Id. at 471.

“Pro se complaints are to be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted

by lawyers, and should therefore be liberally construed.” Williams, 631 F.3d at 383 (internal

quotation marks omitted). Pro se litigants, however, are not exempt from the requirements of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989); see also

Brown v. Matauszak, 415 F. App’x 608, 613 (6th Cir. 2011) (“[A] court cannot create a claim

which [a plaintiff] has not spelled out in his pleading”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Payne

v. Secretary of Treas., 73 F. App’x 836, 837 (6th Cir. 2003) (affirming sua sponte dismissal of

complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) and stating, “[n]either this court nor the district court

is required to create Payne’s claim for her”); cf. Pliler v. Ford, 542 U.S. 225, 231 (2004) (“District

judges have no obligation to act as counsel or paralegal to pro se litigants.”); Young Bok Song v.

Gipson, 423 F. App’x 506, 510 (6th Cir. 2011) (“[W]e decline to affirmatively require courts to

ferret out the strongest cause of action on behalf of pro se litigants. Not only would that duty be

overly burdensome, it would transform the courts from neutral arbiters of disputes into advocates

for a particular party. While courts are properly charged with protecting the rights of all who come

before it, that responsibility does not encompass advising litigants as to what legal theories they

should pursue.”), cert. denied, 565 U.S. 966 (2011).

It is recommended that there is no subject matter jurisdiction for Plaintiff’s claims of

breach of contract, negligence and tortious interference. Jurisdiction for these torts claims would

depend on diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. However, the amount in controversy

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must exceed $75,000. For the amount claimed by Plaintiff in the complaint to control for

jurisdiction purposes the Sixth Circuit requires that the claim be made in good faith. Kovacs v.

Chesley, 406 F.3d 393, 395 (6th Cir. 2005)

It is further recommended that Plaintiff fails to state a claim under the 12 U.S.C. § 1818 and

15 U.S.C. § 1691. Title 12 Section 1818 of the United States Code concerns the termination of

status as an insured depository institution. Nothing in this statute provides a private right of

action. Further, while Plaintiff alleges discrimination in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1691 he does

not allege membership in a protected class and does not allege facts supporting his conclusory

statements that he was subjected to discrimination. Regarding the claims under the UCC, “the

UCC itself, is not the law of any state, nor is it federal law.” Yoo v. East Ohio Gas Co.,

1:25-cv-548, 2025 WL 885683, *2 (N.D. Ohio March 21, 2025) (case dismissed for lack of

subject-matter jurisdiction where plaintiff sought to pay outstanding gas bill with “Bill of

Exchange” and claimed monetary damages $10,132,646.20))

Plaintiff, like many pro se litigants pursuing claims based on attempts to negotiate a “Bill

of Exchange”, is proffering an “underlying legal theory [that] is utterly frivolous, patently

ludicrous, and a waste of this Court’s time and resources.” Kennebrew v. PNC Bank, 1:25-cv-13,

2025 WL 801169, *4 (E.D. Tenn. March 13, 2025) (remanding case to state court where plaintiff

sought to discharge $67,034.86 car loan with a “Bill of Exchange”) Therefore, it is recommended

that Plaintiff’s complaint be dismissed without prejudice as to his state law claims for lack of

subject matter jurisdiction and with prejudice as to his federal question claims for failure to state a

claim.

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The Court must also consider whether Brown should be allowed to appeal this decision in

forma pauperis, should he seek to do so. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

requires that all district courts in the circuit determine, in all cases where the appellant seeks to

proceed in forma pauperis, whether the appeal would be frivolous. Twenty-eight U.S.C. §

1915(a)(3) provides that “[a]n appeal may not be taken in forma pauperis if the trial court certifies

in writing that it is not taken in good faith.”

The good faith standard is an objective one. Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438,

445 (1962). The test under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) for whether an appeal is taken in good faith is

whether the litigant seeks appellate review of any issue that is not frivolous. Id. It would be

inconsistent for a district court to determine that a complaint should be dismissed prior to service

on the defendant, but has sufficient merit to support an appeal in forma pauperis. See Williams v.

Kullman, 722 F.2d 1048, 1050 n.1 (2d Cir. 1983). The same considerations that lead the Court to

recommend dismissal of this case for failure to state a claim also compel the conclusion that an

appeal would not be taken in good faith. It is therefore RECOMMENDED that the Court

CERTIFY, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that any appeal in this matter by Plaintiff would not

be taken in good faith and Plaintiff may not proceed on appeal in forma pauperis.

Signed this 9th day of May 2025.

s/ Charmiane G. Claxton

CHARMIANE G. CLAXTON

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

ANY OBJECTIONS OR EXCEPTIONS TO THIS REPORT MUST BE FILED WITHIN

FOURTEEN (14) DAYS AFTER BEING SERVED WITH A COPY OF THE REPORT. 28

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). FAILURE TO FILE SAID OBJECTIONS OR EXCEPTIONS

WITHIN FOURTEEN (14) DAYS MAY CONSTITUTE A WAIVER AND/OR

FORFEITURE OF THE OPPORTUNITY TO RAISE OBJECTIONS, EXCEPTIONS,

AND ANY FURTHER APPEAL.

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