The opinion
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
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No. 24-2364
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Nathan Rinne
Plaintiff - Appellee
v.
Camden County; Camden County Commission
Defendants
Greg Hasty, In His Personal Capacity
Defendant - Appellant
Donald Buell Williams, Jr., In His Personal Capacity
Defendant
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No. 24-2365
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Nathan Rinne
Plaintiff - Appellee
v.
Camden County; Camden County Commission
Defendants - Appellants
Greg Hasty, In His Personal Capacity
Defendant
Donald Buell Williams, Jr., In His Personal Capacity
Defendant - Appellant
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Appeal from United States District Court
for the Western District of Missouri - Jefferson City
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Submitted: April 14, 2025
Filed: June 9, 2025
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Before SMITH, SHEPHERD, and KOBES, Circuit Judges.
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SHEPHERD, Circuit Judge.
Nathan Rinne sued Camden County and two of its commissioners, Greg Hasty
and Donald Williams, Jr., for violating his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights
after Hasty and Williams voted to ban Rinne from all County property for one year.
Defendants moved for, in relevant part, summary judgment on the defenses of
qualified and legislative immunity and on the merits of the issue of punitive
damages, and the district court1 denied the motions in full. Defendants now appeal.
We have jurisdiction to review the denial of legislative immunity under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1292 but lack jurisdiction to consider Defendants’ qualified immunity defense and
the issue of punitive damages. We affirm the denial of legislative immunity and
dismiss the remainder of the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
1
The Honorable M. Douglas Harpool, United States District Judge for the
Western District of Missouri.
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I.
“The ‘first and fundamental question’ in an appeal from a denial of qualified
immunity is that of jurisdiction.” Thompson v. Murray, 800 F.3d 979, 982 (8th Cir.
2015) (citation omitted). “In conducting an interlocutory review on an order denying
qualified immunity, our jurisdiction is limited to the purely legal question of whether
the conduct that the district court found was adequately supported in the record
violated a clearly established federal right.” Taylor v. St. Louis Cmty. Coll., 2 F.4th
1124, 1126-27 (8th Cir. 2021). Thus, this Court “cannot review whether a factual
dispute is genuine,” or “which facts a party may, or may not, be able to prove at
trial,” “if at the heart of the argument is a dispute of fact.” Id. at 1127 (citations
omitted). Here, the Commissioners argue that Rinne’s conduct “went
beyond . . . expressing his opinions,” and that, because other county employees “felt
threatened and harassed” by Rinne, the ban was justified. There are factual disputes
as to these issues, and “[i]n order for us to reach [the Commissioners’] ‘legal
argument’ that [they] . . . did not violate clearly established law, we would have to
exceed our jurisdiction . . . and resolve genuine factual disputes against [Rinne].”
See id. “This we cannot do.” Id.; see also Riggs v. Gibbs, 923 F.3d 518, 524 (8th
Cir. 2019) (dismissing appeal of denial of qualified immunity because material
disputes of fact were at the heart of the officers’ appeal).
Likewise, we lack jurisdiction to consider the denial of summary judgment on
the issue of punitive damages as to the Commissioners. “A denial of summary
judgment is not a final order and is not appealable.” Reich v. ConAgra, Inc., 987
F.2d 1357, 1362 n.6 (8th Cir. 1993) (citation omitted). The Commissioners argue
that this Court may exercise pendent jurisdiction over the punitive damages claim
because it is “‘inextricably intertwined’ with the appealable decision” of qualified
immunity. See Kincade v. City of Blue Springs, 64 F.3d 389, 394 (8th Cir. 1995)
(citation omitted). But, because we lack jurisdiction to consider the qualified
immunity question, there cannot be pendent jurisdiction over the punitive damages
claim. We therefore dismiss the appeal pertaining to the Commissioners’ claims of
qualified immunity and the issue of punitive damages.
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II.
Finally, the Commissioners appeal the denial of summary judgment on the
issue of absolute legislative immunity.2 “[W]e have limited authority under the
collateral order doctrine to review the denial of a motion for summary judgment to
the extent the motion is based on the right to absolute . . . immunity . . . .” Leapheart
v. Williamson, 705 F.3d 310, 313 (8th Cir. 2013) (alterations in original) (citation
omitted). Further, “[w]e review a district court’s decision regarding legislative
immunity de novo.” Id. The Commissioners argue that the district court erred
because their decision to ban Rinne from all County property was inherently
legislative, not administrative, entitling them to absolute immunity.
“[L]ocal legislators are . . . absolutely immune from suit under § 1983 for their
legislative activities.” Bogan v. Scott-Harris, 523 U.S. 44, 49 (1998). “Whether an
act is legislative turns on the nature of the act, rather than on the motive or intent of
the official performing it.” Id. at 54. At bottom, whether an action is, “in law and
fact, an exercise of legislative power depends not on [its] form but upon ‘whether
[it] contain[s] matter which is properly to be regarded as legislative in its character
and effect.’” INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 952 (1983) (citation omitted). The Tenth
Circuit has considered facts similar to this case, analyzing whether a board of county
commissioners was immune from suit for voting to ban an individual “from all future
Commission meetings” and prohibiting him “from speaking at or participating in
meetings.” Kamplain v. Curry Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 159 F.3d 1248, 1252 (10th
Cir. 1998). The court determined that this vote and ban “were administrative acts”
2
To the extent the County challenges the denial of legislative immunity, it is
well settled that municipalities “do not enjoy immunity from suit—either absolute
or qualified—under § 1983.” Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty. Narcotics Intel. &
Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 166 (1993). Because the County argued below,
and the district court agreed, that it was a municipality, the County may not now,
“because [its] interests have changed, assume a contrary position.” See New
Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 749 (2001) (citation omitted). The County is
judicially estopped from arguing it is not a municipality and is therefore ineligible
for absolute immunity.
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insufficient to confer immunity because the commissioners vote “did not concern
the enactment or promulgation of public policy.” Id. Rather, the “decisions to ban
[the p]laintiff were simply efforts to monitor and discipline his presence and conduct
at future Commission meetings.” Id. (emphasis added).
Here, the district court properly relied on the sound reasoning of Kamplain
and found that, as a matter of law, the Commissioners were not entitled to legislative
immunity. Viewed in the light most favorable to Rinne as the nonmovant on
summary judgment, see K.C. v. Mayo, 983 F.3d 365, 368 (8th Cir. 2020), the record
shows that the Commissioners voted to ban Rinne from county property for a year,
an act that is administrative, not legislative, in nature. See Kamplain, 159 F.3d at
1252. Accordingly, the district court did not err in denying summary judgment to
Hasty and Williams based on legislative immunity.
III.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the denial of legislative immunity, and
the rest of this appeal is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
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