Singh v. Sachem Central School District

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

JAZBIR SINGH, TEZBIR SINGH, an

infant under the age of eighteen, by his

father and natural guardian, AMARJIT

SINGH, and AMARJIT SINGH, MEMORANDUM & ORDER

individually,

Plaintiffs, 20-CV-00146 (ERK) (LKE)

– against –

SACHEM CENTRAL SCHOOL

DISTRICT, PATRICIA TROMBETTA,

COLLEEN FLANAGAN, SUFFOLK

COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENT, ST.

CATHERINE OF SIENA MEDICAL

CENTER, POLICE OFFICER

KIMBERLY DONO, POLICE OFFICER

JAMES TOBIN, POLICE OFFICER

THEODORE LAMONICA, POLICE

OFFICER KRISTOPHER CHARUBIN,

POLICE OFFICER TULIO SERRATA,

DETECTIVE KEITH SINCLAIR,

DETECTIVE DANIEL PAGANO,

DETECTIVE ANTHONY GIGLIOTTI,

and SERGEANT MATTHEW LUNDIN,

Defendants.

KORMAN, J.:

Plaintiffs Amarjit Singh, Tezbir Singh, and Jazbir Sing bring this action under

42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law against Defendants Sachem Central School District,

Patricia Trombetta (“Principal Trombetta”), Colleen1 Flanagan (“Assistant Principal

Flanagan”), Suffolk County Police Department, St. Catherine of Siena Medical

Center (“St. Catherine’s”), Police Officer Kimberly Dono, Police Officer James

Tobin, Police Officer Theodore Lamonica,2 Police Officer Kristopher Charubin,

Police Officer Tulio Serrata, Detective Keith Sinclair, Detective Daniel Pagano,

Detective Anthony Gigliotti, and Sergeant Matthew Lundin. School District

Defendants,3 County Defendants,4 and St. Catherine’s now separately move for

summary judgment on all claims pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56.

For the reasons set forth below, Defendants’ motions are granted as to Plaintiffs’

federal claims and the claims for assault and battery and prima facie tort. I decline

to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ remaining state law claims, and

thus the remaining state law claims are dismissed without prejudice.

1 The record of the case includes references to both “Colleen” and “Coleen”

Flanagan. This order refers to this Defendant as “Colleen” for consistency with the

case caption.

2 The record of the case includes references to Theodore “Lamonica” and

“Lomonaco.” This order refers to this Defendant as “Lamonica” for consistency

with the case caption.

3 Sachem Central School District, Principal Trombetta, and Assistant Principal

Flanagan are collectively referred to as the “School District Defendants.”

4 Suffolk County Police Department, Police Officer Kimberly Dono, Police Officer

James Tobin, Police Officer Theodore Lamonica, Police Officer Kristopher

Charubin, Police Officer Tulio Serrata, Detective Keith Sinclair, Detective Daniel

Pagano, Detective Anthony Gigliotti, and Sergeant Matthew Lundin are collectively

referred to as the “County Defendants.”

I. Background

A. Factual Background5

Jazbir and Tezbir are brothers, and Amarjit is their father.6 ECF No. 77 ¶¶ 15–

16. At the time of the events underlying this suit, Jazbir was sixteen years old and

an eleventh-grade student at Sachem North High School. Id. ¶ 18. Tezbir was

fourteen years old and a ninth-grade student at Sachem North High School. Id. ¶ 17.

On January 7, 2019, Principal Trombetta, principal of Sachem North High

School, was informed that a student at Sachem North High School had received an

image on her cell phone via AirDrop7 that appeared to show two guns on a table with

the caption: “Don’t come to school tomorrow” (the “AirDropped Image”). Id. ¶ 2;

see also ECF No. 75-5. The student had received the image from someone who

5 The facts stated herein are taken from the parties’ summary judgment papers and

attached exhibits and are undisputed except as otherwise noted. As Plaintiffs

correctly note, St. Catherine’s failed to provide citations to specific evidence in the

record to support many of the factual assertions in its Rule 56.1 Statement of

Material Facts, as required by Local Civil Rule 56.1(d). See ECF No. 76-6 at 1.

Nevertheless, “[a] district court has broad discretion to determine whether to

overlook a party’s failure to comply with local court rules.” Holtz v. Rockefeller &

Co., Inc., 258 F.3d 62, 73 (2d Cir. 2001). Because it appears that Plaintiffs were

able to respond to St. Catherine’s Statement of Material Facts and because the Court

was able independently to review the underlying record, I will accept St. Catherine’s

Statement of Material Facts despite its failure to comply with the local rule.

6 For clarity, this order refers to Jazbir Singh, Tezbir Singh, and Amarjit Singh by

their first names.

7 According to the parties, “an ‘AirDrop’ is when a person uses an iPhone to send

photos (or other documents) to others using Bluetooth.” ECF No. 77 ¶ 4.

appeared to have the name “John Marston”8 while she was on her way home from

school on school bus number 12 (“Bus 12”) that afternoon. ECF No. 77 ¶ 2. The

student’s mother, upon learning of the incident from her daughter, called Principal

Trombetta’s office and provided a copy of the AirDropped Image to the school via

email. Id.; ECF No. 78-5. It was later discovered that Tezbir had sent the

AirDropped Image to the student. See ECF No. 77 ¶ 58.

After learning about the AirDropped Image, Principal Trombetta contacted

the Suffolk County Police Department, the District Superintendent, and the Assistant

Superintendent for Student Services. Id. ¶¶ 5, 7; see also ECF No. 78-29 ¶ 4. She

also called the school administrative team, which included Assistant Principal

Flanagan. ECF No. 77 ¶ 6. Assistant Principal Flanagan testified that she was

concerned about a school shooting based on the AirDropped Image, see ECF No.

76-2 at 77 (76:9–12),9 and Principal Trombetta likewise indicated that she was

concerned for the safety of everyone at the school based on the AirDropped Image,

id. at 131 (27:10–15).

In response to Principal Trombetta’s call, Police Officer Dono notified the

Fourth Precinct Crime Section of the incident and went to Sachem North High

8 According to Plaintiffs, “John Marston” is a “fictional character and the protagonist

in the Red Dead video game series.” ECF No. 77 ¶ 2.

9 Citation to ECF pagination followed by internal pagination in parentheses.

School to take a report and statement from the principal. ECF No. 78-29 ¶ 4; see

also ECF No. 78-5. Police Officer Dono also received a roster of students who rode

on Bus 12 and a copy of the AirDropped Image from the school. ECF No. 78-29

¶ 5. Police Officer Dono then briefed Sergeant Lundin and Detective Pagano on the

situation and gave them the evidence, including the copy of the AirDropped Image,

that she had collected at Sachem North High School. Id. ¶ 6. To further investigate

the incident, Detective Pagano attempted to contact the students on the Bus 12 roster.

Id. ¶ 8. He contacted the student whose mother had reported the AirDropped Image

and took the student’s sworn statement. Id. ¶¶ 8–9; see also ECF No. 78-7. The

Suffolk County Police Department did not identify who sent the AirDropped Image

on January 7, 2019. ECF No. 78-29 ¶ 10.

The next morning, on January 8, 2019, Suffolk County police officers,

including Detective Pagano and Police Officers Dono and Lamonica, were on-site

at Sachem North High School. Id. ¶ 11; see also ECF No. 77 ¶ 8. Security guards

employed by Sachem Central School District and Suffolk County police officers

directed all the students to enter through the school’s front doors, where multiple

security guards and police officers were stationed. ECF No. 78-29 ¶¶ 11–12; ECF

No. 77 ¶ 12. When Bus 12 arrived, the school administrators brought the students

on the bus to the school’s “little theater.” ECF No. 77 ¶ 13. Jazbir and Tezbir rode

on Bus 12 and were among this group of students directed to the little theater. Id.

¶ 14. Detective Pagano, and potentially additional security guards, were also in the

little theater. See ECF No. 78-29 ¶ 13; ECF No. 78-21 at 21:18–22:5. Principal

Trombetta told the students in the theater about the AirDropped Image and asked the

students to speak up if they had any information about the image. ECF No. 77 ¶ 19.

None of the students came forward with any information, and Principal Trombetta

directed the students to their first period classes. Id. ¶¶ 20–21.

The school administrative team decided to continue investigating the incident

by speaking with the students from Bus 12 one by one in Principal Trombetta’s

office. Id. ¶ 22. Detective Pagano, and potentially other members of the Suffolk

County Police Department, was also present in Principal Trombetta’s office during

this time. See ECF No. 78-21 at 24:10–18. School District Defendants claim that

they decided to speak first with students from Bus 12 who they believed had prior

disciplinary incidents. ECF No. 75-3 ¶ 22. Accordingly, the administrative team

first spoke to a student (not Jazbir or Tezbir) who had a disciplinary record. Id. ¶ 23.

The school administrators interviewed the student and asked him to show them his

cell phone to confirm that he did not have the AirDropped Image. Id. ¶ 23; ECF No.

76-2 at 25 (24:4–23). After confirming that he did not have the image on his phone,

the student was permitted to leave. ECF No. 77 ¶ 24.

While the team was considering whom to speak with next, Assistant Principal

Flanagan recalled that Jazbir had previously been disciplined for drawing a swastika

on a classroom whiteboard. ECF No. 75-3 ¶ 25. Principal Trombetta and Assistant

Principal Flanagan also testified that the police officers in the room recalled that

Jazbir and Tezbir had been involved in an incident in which a bullet was found on a

school bus.10 Id. ¶ 26; ECF No. 76-2 at 22–23 (21:9–22:18), 134–36 (30:19–32:18);

ECF No. 75-3 ¶ 26. Based on these past incidents, the administrative team decided

to interview the Singh brothers. ECF No. 75-3 ¶¶ 25–26. Plaintiffs acknowledge

that Jazbir had previously been disciplined by the school for drawing what was

perceived to be a swastika on a classroom whiteboard, but they contend that Jazbir

drew this symbol because it is a sign of good luck in India and in his religion,

Hinduism. ECF No. 77 ¶ 25; ECF No. 78-23 at 26:19–20. Plaintiffs also dispute

that Jazbir and Tezbir were involved in an incident with a bullet on a school bus,

asserting that there is no record of this incident having occurred. ECF No. 77 ¶ 26.

Of the Singh brothers, Jazbir was called first to Principal Trombetta’s office.

Id. ¶ 28. He was escorted from his geometry class to the front office, where Principal

Trombetta’s office was located, by a school security guard. See ECF No. 78-20 at

30:19–31:17. Principal Trombetta, Assistant Principal Flanagan, and Detective

Pagano, along with other school administrators and potentially other police officers,

were present. See id. at 32:3–33:3; ECF No. 78-21 at 27:4–16; ECF No. 76-2 at 28–

29 (27:15–28:18), 137 (33:5–11). Principal Trombetta asked Jazbir about the

AirDropped Image and whether he knew anything about the picture, and Jazbir said

10 Detective Pagano and Police Officer Dono did not recall whether an incident

involving the Singh brothers and a bullet found on a school bus was discussed. ECF

No. 78-21 at 35:9–12, 77:15–78:5; ECF No. 78-22 at 18:25–19:12.

that he did not. ECF No. 77 ¶¶ 29–30. Principal Trombetta then asked Jazbir if she

could look at his cell phone, and Jazbir refused. Id. ¶ 31.

The parties present diverging accounts of what happened next. School

District Defendants assert that Assistant Principal Flanagan told Jazbir that, if he did

not give the school administrators permission to search his phone, they would have

to call his father for a meeting. ECF No. 75-3 ¶ 32. Principal Trombetta then asked

Jazbir if he would be more comfortable speaking with Assistant Principal Flanagan,

his assigned assistant principal, alone in a different room. Id. ¶ 33; see also ECF

No. 76-2 at 138 (34:15–18). After Jazbir agreed, he and Assistant Principal Flanagan

moved to a nearby office. ECF No. 75-3 ¶ 34. Assistant Principal Flanagan then

asked Jazbir again if he knew anything about the AirDropped Image and if there was

anything on his phone that he wanted to show her. Id. ¶ 35. In reply, Jazbir

voluntarily unlocked his cell phone, handed the phone to Assistant Principal

Flanagan, and allowed her to scroll through the photos on his phone to confirm that

he did not have the AirDropped Image. Id. ¶¶ 36–38. County Defendants also assert

that Jazbir handed over his phone and provided his phone’s passcode voluntarily.

ECF No. 78-2 ¶ 14. Assistant Principal Flanagan did not find the AirDropped Image

on Jazbir’s phone, but she did find other images and videos that she considered

“disturbing,” including: pictures of people dressed up in KKK outfits; images of

Nazi soldiers with swastikas; an image of a boy at the bottom of a flight of stairs

with a caption suggesting the boy was dead because he was a “faggot”; a picture of

candy on a table next to a gun with words along the lines of “[w]hen I bring these to

school everyone wants to be my friend”; a picture of a student with a Hitler

mustache; a picture of a dead squirrel in the grass; and a video of a person on a

motorcycle pointing a gun at a police car. ECF No. 75-3 ¶¶ 39–40; see also ECF

No. 76-2 at 34 (33:4–22). Assistant Principal Flanagan explained to Jazbir that she

was concerned about the images on his phone and asked him why he had them, but

Jazbir did not respond. ECF No. 75-3 ¶ 43. At her deposition, Assistant Principal

Flanagan testified that she believed Jazbir had a flat affect and poor eye contact

throughout their conversation. ECF No. 76-2 at 78 (77:11–16). She also stated that

Jazbir was not responsive to her questioning and that she was concerned about how

Jazbir was processing information cognitively and emotionally, based on her

training as a licensed social worker. Id. at 48–50 (47:23–49:24).

Plaintiffs, on the other hand, claim that Principal Trombetta told Jazbir that he

would be suspended if he did not show the school administrators his phone. ECF

No. 77 ¶ 32. In response, Jazbir unlocked his phone and showed his Photos

application to Principal Trombetta; one of the Assistant Principals then took the

phone out of his hands. Id. ¶ 35; ECF No. 78-20 at 37:16–38:21.11 Jazbir was then

11 Jazbir testified to this sequence of events in his Rule 50-h hearing. In his pretrial

deposition, however, Jazbir stated that, in response to Principal Trombetta’s

assertion about being suspended, he handed over his phone to the principal. ECF

No. 78-23 at 101:18–20.

sent out of Principal Trombetta’s office into another nearby office, and the school

administrators kept his phone. ECF No. 77 ¶¶ 33–34; ECF No. 78-20 at 38:22–39:5.

Jazbir testified that he was in the separate office without his phone for about an hour

or two. ECF No. 78-20 at 39:6–8. Plaintiffs agree that the school administrators did

not find the AirDropped Image on Jazbir’s phone. ECF No. 77 ¶ 39. They deny,

however, that the school administrators saw the “disturbing” images described by

Assistant Principal Flanagan on Jazbir’s cell phone and claim that the school

administrators only found “a video of a Russian man ordering fifteen cheeseburgers

at a McDonalds with a gun, and a dirty rap video.” Id.

In both Plaintiffs’ and Defendants’ version of events, while Jazbir was in a

separate office, Principal Trombetta called Tezbir to her office to discuss the

AirDropped Image. Id. ¶ 45. Tezbir was escorted from his gym class to her office

by a school security guard. ECF No. 28-19 at 37:22–38:4, 39:18–20. Several other

school administrators were also in the office, along with Detective Pagano and

potentially other police officers, when Tezbir arrived.12 Id. ¶ 47; ECF No. 78-21 at

34:8–17. Principal Trombetta asked Tezbir if he knew anything about the

AirDropped Image, and he initially claimed that he had received the image on the

bus but that other students thought he had sent it. ECF No. 77 ¶¶ 48–49. The

12 Tezbir testified that only school administrators were present in Principal

Trombetta’s office. ECF No. 78-19 at 40:21–41:5.

administrative team asked to see the AirDropped Image on his phone, and he claimed

that he had already deleted it. Id. ¶ 50. He then unlocked his phone and showed

Principal Trombetta the Photos application on his phone. Id. ¶ 51. In doing so,

Tezbir handed his phone to Principal Trombetta. Id. School District Defendants

claim that the administrative team then asked to see the “Recently Deleted” folder

on his Photos application and that, in response, he showed them that his “Recently

Deleted” folder was empty. ECF No. 75-3 ¶ 51. Plaintiffs, however, deny that the

school administrators asked for permission or that Tezbir gave them permission to

view his “Recently Deleted” images folder. ECF No. 77 ¶ 51. The parties agree that

the school administrators did not find the AirDropped Image on Tezbir’s phone. Id.

¶ 52. School District Defendants assert that Principal Trombetta saw a video of

someone shooting a drive-through server on Tezbir’s phone, ECF No. 75-3 ¶ 52, but

Plaintiffs contend that Tezbir did not have this video on his phone, ECF No. 77 ¶ 52.

Tezbir testified that, at this point, he asked for his phone back and Principal

Trombetta refused to return it to him and that she then kept his phone while he was

brought to a nearby office (separate from the office Jazbir was in) so that Principal

Trombetta could check on Jazbir. ECF No. 78-19 at 42:10–43:7, 45:4–7; see also

ECF No. 77 ¶ 54.

After briefly checking in with Jazbir, Principal Trombetta returned to the

office with Tezbir. ECF No. 77 ¶¶ 54–55. Soon after, Tezbir admitted that he had

created and sent the AirDropped Image. Id. ¶¶ 58–60. Tezbir testified that he sent

the AirDropped Image as a joke. ECF No. 78-19 at 26:13–16. The parties agree

that the guns in the AirDropped Image are in fact air guns but that this was not clear

from the image. ECF No. 77 ¶¶ 62–64. After Tezbir admitted to sending the

AirDropped Image, Principal Trombetta returned to her office and informed the

police officers that Tezbir had sent the image. ECF No. 76-2 at 146 (42:6–11). One

of the school administrators then called Amarjit and asked him to come to the school.

ECF No. 77 ¶ 65.

During this time, Assistant Principal Flanagan returned to Principal

Trombetta’s office to tell her about the photos she saw on Jazbir’s phone and learned

that Tezbir had admitted to sending the AirDropped Image. ECF No. 76-2 at 37–19

(36:18–38:17); see also ECF No. 75-3 ¶ 66. According to Assistant Principal

Flanagan, she and Principal Trombetta then brought Jazbir back to Principal

Trombetta’s office, had Jazbir open his phone, and reviewed his photos. ECF No.

76-2 at 40 (39:8–20). Principal Trombetta testified that she saw the same images on

Jazbir’s phone that Assistant Principal Flanagan reported seeing. Id. at 148–49

(44:22–45:3); see also ECF No. 75-3 ¶ 67. Plaintiffs assert that Principal Trombetta

only saw a video of “a Russian man ordering fifteen cheeseburgers at a McDonalds

with a gun, and a dirty rap video”—the same videos that they assert Assistant

Principal Flanagan saw. ECF No. 77 ¶¶ 66–67.

During the in-school investigation into the AirDropped Image, County

Defendants did not ask any questions of either Jazbir or Tezbir. ECF No. 78-29 ¶ 16.

County Defendants also claim that the police department did not search either

Tezbir’s or Jazbir’s phone during the investigation at the school. Id. ¶¶ 14–15. With

respect to Tezbir, Plaintiffs do not directly dispute this but assert that County

Defendants were present while School District Defendants searched Tezbir’s phone.

ECF No. 78-29 ¶ 15. With respect to Jazbir, Plaintiffs state that they dispute this but

point only to testimony that indicates that police officers were in the room while

School District Defendants looked at Jazbir’s phone, not that the police officers ever

personally looked at Jazbir’s phone. Id. ¶ 14.

When Amarjit arrived at Sachem North High School, the school

administrators showed him the AirDropped Image and told him that Tezbir had sent

it to another student. ECF No. 77 ¶¶ 69–70. Principal Trombetta also showed

Amarjit images on Jazbir’s phone—the content of which is disputed, as discussed

above—and the school administrators expressed their concern about the images. Id.

¶¶ 77–78. Principal Trombetta testified that, in her opinion, Amarjit did not seem

concerned about the images on Jazbir’s phone. ECF No. 76-2 at 204–05 (100:25–

101:8), 221–22 (117:24–118:9).

Amarjit then spoke with Detective Pagano and gave consent for a member of

the Suffolk County Police Department to search his home for weapons. ECF No.

78-29 ¶¶ 19–20. Police Officer Charubin and Amarjit went to the Singh household

for this purpose. Id. ¶ 21. Police Officer Charubin searched the house and did not

find any weapons or other items of concern. Id. ¶ 22. After the search, Amarjit

returned to Sachem North High School and to Principal Trombetta’s office. ECF

No. 77 ¶ 84.

After Amarjit returned to the school, Principal Trombetta and Assistant

Principal Flanagan spoke with Amarjit about sending Jazbir for a psychiatric

evaluation based on the images they found on his cell phone. ECF No. 75-3 ¶¶ 85,

88. County Defendants also participated in this discussion. Id. ¶ 90. School District

Defendants and County Defendants claim that they only recommended that Jazbir

receive an evaluation and that Amarjit consented to the evaluation. Id. ¶ 91; ECF

No. 78-29 ¶ 31. They also claim that Amarjit signed a form titled “Mental Health

Assistance Incident Report,” which was prepared by Detective Pagano, consenting

to the transport of Jazbir for a psychiatric evaluation. ECF No. 75-3 ¶ 93; ECF No.

78-29 ¶ 31; see also ECF No. 75-16. Plaintiffs, on the other hand, assert that Amarjit

insisted that a psychiatric evaluation was not necessary and that any consent that he

did give was not voluntary. ECF No. 77 ¶¶ 92, 94. Amarjit testified that School

District Defendants told him that if Jazbir did not receive a psychiatric evaluation,

he would be suspended for five days and that, in response, he said “okay.” ECF No.

78-17 at 44:19–45:2; see also ECF No. 78-25 at 32:5–9. Plaintiffs do not dispute

that Amarjit signed the mental health transmittal form for Jazbir but assert that it was

not voluntary because Amarjit had insisted that an evaluation was not necessary.13

13 Curiously, while Plaintiffs do not dispute this fact in their response to School

District Defendants’ and St. Catherine’s Statements of Material Facts, see ECF No.

ECF No. 77 ¶ 93. Nevertheless, Plaintiffs do not dispute that School District

Defendants “do not have power to compel a student to get a psychiatric evaluation”

and that they can “only make a recommendation to a parent that a student should get

a psych evaluation.” Id. ¶¶ 86–87. The parties agree that Jazbir was ultimately led

outside, handcuffed behind his back, placed in the back of a police car, and

transported to St. Catherine’s by Police Officer Lamonica. ECF No. 78-29 ¶ 35.

Amarjit followed Jazbir to the hospital. See ECF No. 78-25 at 49:8–21.

Around the same time, County Defendants arrested Tezbir as a juvenile for

the crime of Falsely Reporting an Incident in the Third Degree, based on the

photograph evidence of the AirDropped Image, Tezbir’s own admission to sending

the image, and the statements of Principal Trombetta and the student on Bus 12 who

received the image. ECF No. 78-2 ¶¶ 24, 29. Plaintiffs state that they “contest the

claim that Tezbir Singh was arrested since under New York law, where a charge is

dismissed, the individual is restored to his prearrest status,” but do not appear to

dispute any of the underlying facts. ECF No. 78-29 ¶ 24. To carry out the arrest,

Police Officer Dono handcuffed Tezbir behind his back, placed him in the front of a

marked police vehicle, and transported him to the Fourth Precinct juvenile room,

where he remained from about 11:35 a.m. to 1:00 p.m. Id. ¶¶ 25–26. At the precinct,

77 ¶ 93; ECF No. 76-6 at 63 ¶ 14, they deny that Amarjit signed the form in their

response to County Defendants’ Statement of Material Facts, see ECF No. 78-29

¶ 31.

Tezbir was issued an Appearance Ticket pursuant to Family Court Act S 307.1. Id.

¶ 29; see also ECF No. 78-14. Detective Sinclair, as the supervising officer,

reviewed the arrest paperwork for Tezbir. ECF No. 78-29 ¶ 32. Amarjit later came

to the precinct, where he consented to a police search of both Jazbir’s and Tezbir’s

cell phones. Id. ¶¶ 27, 30; see also ECF No. 78-10; ECF No. 78-12. Detective

Pagano invoiced Tezbir’s cell phone and delivered it to Police Officer Gigliotti in

the computer crimes section, who later downloaded the device’s contents. ECF No.

78-29 ¶¶ 37–38.

Detective Pagano and his supervisors determined that Tezbir should also

receive a psychiatric evaluation based on his dissemination of the AirDropped

Image. ECF No. 77 ¶ 98; ECF No. 78-21 at 51:10–25. Police Officer Dono then

transported Tezbir to St. Catherine’s. ECF No. 78-29 ¶ 34. County Defendants

assert that Amarjit consented to a psychiatric evaluation for Tezbir and his transport

to St. Catherine’s, but Plaintiffs dispute this. ECF No. 78-2 ¶ 33; ECF No. 78-29

¶ 33.

Originally, the Singh brothers were intended to go to Stony Brook University

Hospital, but they were diverted to St. Catherine’s. ECF No. 76-6 at 63 ¶ 15;14 ECF

No. 76-2 at 158 (54:19–55:12). While at Sachem North High School, Amarjit was

told by one of the police officers to follow the police car to the hospital, so he was

14 Citation to ECF pagination followed by internal paragraph number.

able to follow Jazbir to the correct hospital. ECF No. 78-25 at 44:4–10, 49:8–21.

Principal Trombetta recalled that she and Assistant Principal Flanagan also alerted

Amarjit to the change in hospital, see ECF No. 76-2 at 158–59 (54:19–55:6), but

Amarjit did not recall receiving a call from School District Defendants about the

change in hospitals, see ECF No. 78-25 at 49:2–5. School District Defendants

played no role in determining the hospital to which Jazbir and Tezbir were brought.

ECF No. 77 ¶ 95.

Upon arriving at St. Catherine’s, both Singh brothers were met by hospital

employees. ECF No. 78-29 ¶¶ 34–35. Amarjit signed general consent for medical

treatment forms for both his sons, allowing them to be admitted. ECF No. 76-6 at

64 ¶ 19. Amarjit did not convey to St. Catherine’s that he objected to either of his

sons receiving a psychiatric evaluation. Id. He was also informed by the hospital

that St. Catherine’s did not have a children’s psychiatry doctor on staff, although the

parties dispute when he was told this. Id. at 64 ¶ 20.

During their time at St. Catherine’s, the Singh brothers stayed in the same

hospital room, which had two beds and a television. Id. at 64 ¶ 21. Jazbir and Tezbir

each received an EKG and possibly had their blood drawn, but they were otherwise

not touched by hospital staff. Id. at 64 ¶ 22. At no point were they physically

restrained or given any prescription medication. Id. at 64 ¶ 23. They were given

hospital food15 and were able to bring in their own food. Id. at 65 ¶ 26, 77 ¶ 63.

They were also given puzzles and board games for entertainment and were able to

watch the television. Id. at 64 ¶ 21, 76 ¶ 58, 77 ¶ 64. Amarjit visited Jazbir and

Tezbir, along with their mother, Parvinder Kaur, for about eight hours every day

they were at St. Catherine’s. Id. at 77 ¶ 62. John Benedict, who operates a karate

studio and ministry and who is close to the Singh family, was also able to visit, as

was one of Jazbir’s friends. Id. at 69 ¶ 36, 77 ¶ 62.

Jazbir and Tezbir were both evaluated by St. Catherine’s psychiatrists on

January 8, 2019. Jazbir was evaluated by Dr. Maria Benetos, id. at 78 ¶ 68, and

Tezbir was evaluated by Dr. Kausar Shamim, id. at 65 ¶ 27. Dr. Benetos determined

that Jazbir required inpatient psychiatric hospitalization, ECF No. 76 at 93 ¶ 73,16

and Dr. Shamim determined the same for Tezbir, id. at 84 ¶ 29–30.17 Plaintiffs

dispute that these conclusions were “justified,” but they do not appear to dispute that

these were the psychiatrists’ determinations. ECF No. 76-6 at 66–67 ¶¶ 29–30, 80

¶ 73. Dr. Benetos’s and Dr. Shamim’s conclusions were conveyed to Amarjit and

15 Plaintiffs assert that they were not provided lunch by St. Catherine’s on the first

day that they were at the hospital, but Amarjit testified that he brought his sons lunch

and dinner on that day. ECF No. 76-6 at 65 ¶ 26.

16 Citation to ECF pagination followed by internal paragraph number.

17 St. Catherine’s Statement of Material Facts, Plaintiffs’ response, and the parties’

underlying exhibits contain more detailed information about the physicians’

evaluations of Jazbir and Tezbir throughout their stay at St. Catherine’s. These facts

are not necessary to resolve the federal claims and are therefore not included.

Kaur, but they refused to consent to inpatient hospitalization for either of their sons.

Id. at 68 ¶ 33, 80 ¶ 73. The hospital contacted Child Protective Services because of

Amarjit’s and Kaur’s refusal to agree to inpatient psychiatric hospitalization for

Jazbir and/or Tezbir. See ECF No. 76-5 at 117.18

Because St. Catherine’s did not have pediatric psychiatrists on staff, St.

Catherine’s nurses and staff began to search for an institution that had such

psychiatrists that would accept transfer of Jazbir and Tezbir. ECF No. 76-6 at 69

¶ 34. Nineteen other institutions were contacted over the course of their stay at St.

Catherine’s. Id. at 80–81 ¶ 75. Initially, St. Catherine’s could not find a facility that

would accept the transfer because the institutions they contacted either had no beds

available or would not accept the involuntary transfer of a minor over parental

objection. Id. at 70 ¶ 45, 80 ¶ 75. Amarjit was informed on January 8, 2019 that the

hospital was looking for an institution to accept transfer of Jazbir and Tezbir. ECF

No. 78-26 at 206:8–14. He recalled being informed that some of the contacted

institutions did not have available beds and did not recall whether he was told that

some of the institutions would not accept involuntary transfers of minors. Id. at

187:10–19. Jazbir and Tezbir stayed at St. Catherine’s until the hospital was able to

find a facility that would accept them, and they were ultimately transferred to

Sagamore Children’s Psychiatric Center (“Sagamore”) on January 11, 2019. ECF

18 Citation to ECF pagination.

No. 76-6 at 76 ¶ 59, 90 ¶ 101. While at St. Catherine’s, Jazbir and Tezbir were

attended to by the hospital’s nurses and staff and evaluated by the hospital’s

psychiatrists. See ECF No. 76 at 84 ¶ 27, 87–88 ¶¶ 47–48, 89 ¶ 53, 92 ¶ 68, 96 ¶ 86,

96–97 ¶ 88, 97 ¶ 90.

Dr. Shamim and Dr. Benetos spoke with Principal Trombetta and Assistant

Principal Flanagan about Jazbir and Tezbir on January 9, 2019. Id. at 88 ¶ 48, 93–

94 ¶¶ 77–78; ECF No. 76-2 at 279–82 (31:19–34:14). There is no indication in the

record that School District Defendants otherwise communicated with or that County

Defendants ever communicated with St. Catherine’s about the Singhs. See ECF No.

76-6 at 63–64 ¶¶ 16, 18; ECF No. 78-21 at 87:19–88:3; ECF No. 76-2 at 173 (69:10–

12), 211 (107:2–5); ECF No. 78-23 at 94:15–23.

After being transferred to Sagamore, Tezbir was evaluated by Dr. Pius

Ojevwe, who determined that Tezbir required further observation and assessment.

ECF No. 76-6 at 91 ¶¶ 104–05. Tezbir was provisionally diagnosed with unspecified

disruptive impulse control and conduct disorder. ECF No. 76 at 101 ¶ 109. Jazbir,

meanwhile, was evaluated by Dr. Willing and Dr. Theoharas at Sagamore.19 Id. at

102–03 ¶ 117. He was diagnosed with unspecified disruptive impulse control and

conduct disorder, and the Sagamore treatment team recommended to his parents that

they follow up with psychiatric and mental health services for Jazbir. Id. at 103

19 Dr. Willing’s and Dr. Theoharas’s first names are not provided by the parties.

¶ 121. Although Plaintiffs dispute the bases of these opinions, they do not appear to

dispute that Tezbir and Jazbir were treated by these psychiatrists or that they received

these diagnoses. See ECF No. 76-6 at 91 ¶¶ 104–05; 92 ¶ 109; 94–95 ¶¶ 117–18; 96

¶ 121. Tezbir was discharged from Sagamore on January 16, 2019 and Jazbir was

discharged on January 18, 2019. ECF No. 77 ¶¶ 102–03. On at least one occasion,

Amarjit asked Sagamore to release his sons, and the hospital refused to do so. ECF

No. 76-6 at 91 ¶ 104; ECF No. 78-26 at 217:10–218:5.

After their discharge from Sagamore, the Singh brothers saw Debra Terry, a

Licensed Clinical Social Worker, for mental health treatment on several occasions

between February and May 2019. ECF No. 76-6 at 97 ¶¶ 126, 128. Their parents

had sought treatment from Terry at the recommendation of Child Protective

Services. ECF No. 78-26 at 222:5–8. Tezbir stated that he derived no benefit from

the treatment with Terry and that he thought the treatment sessions were boring.

ECF No. 76-6 at 99 ¶ 134. Jazbir likewise did not think that the treatment sessions

were necessary and stated that he only saw Terry because his parents suggested it to

him. Id. ¶ 135.

Tezbir was suspended from Sachem North High School following the events

of January 8, 2019, pending a Superintendent’s disciplinary hearing. ECF No. 77

¶ 116. On June 7, 2019, he and the district agreed to settle the disciplinary matter.

Id. ¶ 117.

B. Procedural Background

By way of a Complaint dated January 7, 2020, Plaintiffs commenced this

action against Sachem Central School District, Principal Trombetta, Assistant

Principal Flanagan, Suffolk County Police Department, St. Catherine’s, “John Does

1–10,” (unnamed Sachem Central School District employees), and “John Does 11–

15” (unnamed Suffolk County Police Department employees), alleging causes of

action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of the Fourth Amendment and Amarjit’s

constitutionally protected right to parental liberty, as well as claims under state law.

See generally ECF No. 1.

On April 11, 2022, Plaintiffs sought leave to file an amended complaint

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(2), naming as new defendants:

Police Officers Kimberly Dono, James Tobin, Theodore Lamonica, Kristopher

Charubin, and Tulio Serrata; Detectives Keith Sinclair, Daniel Pagano, and Anthony

Gigliotti; and Sergeant Matthew Lundin. See generally ECF No. 45. Plaintiffs

sought to bring causes of action based on alleged violations of the Fourth

Amendment under § 1983 against all the newly added Defendants and to add them

to the constitutional parental liberty claim and state law claims that had previously

been brought against all Defendants. ECF No. 45-1 at 2. Plaintiffs attached to their

motion a Proposed Amended Complaint (the “Amended Complaint”). ECF No.

45-2. Defendant Suffolk County Police Department opposed the motion. See ECF

No. 46. Plaintiffs’ motion was granted “without prejudice to the Suffolk County

Defendants raising any arguments regarding the timeliness of the amendment in their

motion for summary judgment.” ECF Order of April 18, 2022.20

The Amended Complaint asserts fifty-five causes of action for violations of

Jazbir’s and Tezbir’s Fourth Amendment rights and of Amarjit’s constitutionally

protected right to parental liberty under § 1983, and for false arrest, false

20 After Plaintiffs’ motion to amend the complaint was granted, Plaintiffs failed to

file the Proposed Amended Complaint as the Amended Complaint on the docket.

Although it would have been better practice to do so, Defendants were nevertheless

on notice of the Amended Complaint, as evidenced by their summary judgment

filings. See ECF Nos. 78-1 & 78-4 (motion for summary judgement from County

Defendants attaching the Amended Complaint). Moreover, Defendants have not

challenged the adequacy of service of the Amended Complaint. Therefore, the

Amended Complaint will be treated as the operative pleading for this case. Cf. Carr

v. City of Norwich, No. 3:17-CV-0954, 2019 WL 1332770, at *3 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 1,

2019) (ruling on motion for summary judgment despite procedural shortcoming “in

light of the preference and desirability of resolving litigated matters based upon

relative merit, rather than on the basis of a procedural or technical default” and

because the “defendants do not seek summary judgment on the basis of this

shortcoming”), report and recommendation adopted, 2019 WL 1331910 (N.D.N.Y.

Mar. 25, 2019).

Relatedly, Defendants failed to answer or otherwise respond to the Amended

Complaint in accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12, instead filing

motions for summary judgment. Nevertheless, it is proper to rule on Defendants’

motions for summary judgment because there is no indication that Plaintiffs’

opposition to the motions would have been any more comprehensive had answers to

the Amended Complaint been filed, particularly considering the years of discovery

undertaken in this case and the extensive factual record submitted with the motions

for summary judgment. See, e.g., Delphi-Delco Elecs. Sys. v. M.V. Nedlloyd

Europa, 324 F. Supp. 2d 403, 406 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (“[T]he [c]ourt need not

postpone ruling on a motion for summary judgment where the moving defendant has

failed to file an answer if the answer would not clarify the issues raised by the motion

or aid the [c]ourt in determining whether there are any genuine issues of material

fact that would preclude granting summary judgment.”).

imprisonment, assault and battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, abuse

of process, prima facie tort, negligence, medical malpractice, and parental loss of

services of a child under state law. ECF No. 45-2 ¶¶ 123–549. No party moved to

dismiss the Complaint or the Amended Complaint. Following the completion of

discovery, School District Defendants, County Defendants, and St. Catherine’s

moved for summary judgment, seeking dismissal of Plaintiffs’ claims in their

entirety. See generally ECF No. 75; ECF No. 76; ECF No. 78.

II. Standard of Review

A court may grant a motion for summary judgment when “there is no genuine

dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of

law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322–23

(1986). The court may not resolve issues of fact; rather, the court’s task is “carefully

limited to discerning whether there are any genuine issues of material fact to be tried,

not to deciding them.” Gallo v. Prudential Residential Servs., 22 F.3d 1219, 1224

(2d Cir. 1994). An issue is “genuine” if “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury

could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,

477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A material fact is one that would “affect the outcome of

the suit under the governing law.” Id. In other words, “only those facts that must be

decided in order to resolve a claim or defense will prevent summary judgment from

being granted. . . . Immaterial or minor facts will not prevent summary judgment.”

DeFelice ex rel. DeFelice v. Warner, 511 F. Supp. 2d 241, 245 (D. Conn. 2007)

(citing Howard v. Gleason Corp., 901 F.2d 1154, 1159 (2d Cir. 1990)).

When reviewing the evidence on a motion for summary judgment, the court

must “assess the record in the light most favorable to the non-movant and . . . draw

all reasonable inferences in [the non-movant’s] favor.” Del. & Hudson Ry. Co. v.

Consol. Rail Corp., 902 F.2d 174, 177 (2d Cir. 1990). After taking the facts in the

light most favorable to the non-movant, “Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary

judgment . . . against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the

existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will

bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322.

The party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of establishing the

absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Delphi-Delco Elecs. Sys., 324 F. Supp.

2d at 408. This burden is satisfied if the moving party “can point to an absence of

evidence to support an essential element of the nonmoving party’s claim.” Id.

(quoting Goenaga v. March of Dimes Birth Defects Found., 51 F.3d 14, 18 (2d Cir.

1995)). If the moving party satisfies his burden, the non-movant must “offer specific

evidence showing that a genuine issue for trial exists” to defeat the motion for

summary judgment. Id. Conclusory allegations are insufficient, and there must be

more than “some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” See id. (quoting

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986)).

“When no rational jury could find in favor of the nonmoving party because the

evidence to support its case is so slight, there is no genuine issue of material fact and

a grant of summary judgment is proper.” Gallo, 22 F.3d at 1224.

III. Discussion

A. Statute of Limitations

As an initial matter, County Defendants argue that the § 1983 claims asserted

against the individual County Defendants (Police Officers Kimberly Dono, James

Tobin, Theodore Lamonica, Kristopher Charubin, and Tulio Serrata; Detectives

Keith Sinclair, Daniel Pagano, and Anthony Gigliotti; and Sergeant Matthew

Lundin), who were added in the Amended Complaint, must be dismissed because

they are barred by the applicable three-year statute of limitations. ECF No. 78-27 at

19–20. In response, Plaintiffs argue that the claims asserted in the Amended

Complaint were timely because the statute of limitations was tolled by Executive

Order No. 202.8, which was enacted on March 20, 2020 by then-Governor Andrew

Cuomo in response to the COVID-19 pandemic and extended in a series of

subsequently issued executive orders through November 3, 2020. ECF No. 78-30 at

32–35; see also N.Y. Exec. Order No. 202.8; N.Y. Exec. Order No. 202.67. In reply,

County Defendants argue that Plaintiffs cannot rely on the tolling because the statute

of limitations would have expired on January 7, 2022, after the executive orders had

already expired. ECF No. 78-31 at 10.

New York and federal courts that have considered this issue have determined

that Executive Order No. 202.8 and the subsequent executive orders tolled statutes

of limitations for the time that the executive orders were in place, meaning a statute

of limitation’s clock stopped running between March 20, 2020 and November 3,

2020 (a total of 228 days). See McLaughlin v. Snowlift, Inc., 185 N.Y.S.3d 212,

213–14 (N.Y. App. Div. 2023); Doe v. State Univ. of N.Y. Purchase Coll., 617 F.

Supp. 3d 195, 207–08 (S.D.N.Y. 2022); see also Brash v. Richards, 149 N.Y.S.3d

560, 561–63 (N.Y. App. Div. 2021) (finding that the executive orders “constitute a

toll” of filing deadlines applicable to litigation in New York courts). The executive

orders apply to § 1983 cases. See Bonilla v. City of New York, No. 20-CV-1704,

2020 WL 6637214, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 12, 2020). Moreover, the tolling applies

to a statute of limitations that fell after November 3, 2020, when the executive orders

expired. See McLaughlin, 185 N.Y.S.3d at 214.

Here, the statute of limitations for the § 1983 claims would have expired on

January 7, 2022 in normal course. See ECF No. 78-31 at 10. With the tolling, the

statute of limitations was extended by 228 days to August 23, 2022. The claims

asserted in the Amended Complaint, which was attached to the motion to amend the

Complaint that was filed on April 11, 2022 and granted on April 18, 2022, were

timely.21

21 Because the statute of limitations for the § 1983 claims had not expired when

Plaintiffs filed their Amended Complaint, it is unnecessary to address County

Defendants’ arguments about whether the amended pleadings relate back to the

original Complaint. See ECF No. 78-27 at 19–20. Additionally, because I ultimately

dismiss the state law claims without prejudice, I do not address County Defendants’

argument that “any state tort causes of action” are also untimely as to the individual

B. Individual Versus Official Capacity

Plaintiffs do not state explicitly in the Amended Complaint whether they bring

suit against the individual School District Defendants (Principal Trombetta and

Assistant Principal Flanagan) and the individual County Defendants in their

individual or official capacities. In the Second Circuit, when the pleadings do not

specify whether an official is sued personally, in his official capacity, or in both

capacities, courts typically look to “the course of proceedings” to determine “the

nature of the liability sought to be imposed.” Rodriguez v. Phillips, 66 F.3d 470,

482 (2d Cir. 1995). More recently, courts in the Second Circuit have assumed that

a state official is named in his individual capacity when a complaint is silent as to

whether a defendant is named in his individual or official capacity. See Santucci v.

Levine, No. 17-CV-10204, 2021 WL 76337, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 8, 2021); Kravtsov

v. Town of Greenburgh, No. 10-CV-3142, 2012 WL 2719663, at *24 (S.D.N.Y. July

9, 2012).

Here, Plaintiffs state in the Amended Complaint that each of the individual

County Defendants were “acting within his [or her] capacity . . . with Defendant

SUFFOLK COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENT” at the relevant time and include

their professional titles in the case caption, suggesting they may have intended to

County Defendants under Section 217-a of the New York Civil Practice Law. See

id. at 20.

sue the individual County Defendants in their official capacities. See ECF No. 45-2

¶¶ 16–55. Plaintiffs do not include similar language for School District Defendants.

See id. ¶¶ 8–11. On the other hand, Plaintiffs seek punitive damages against all

Defendants. See id. at 85. Punitive damages are generally not available in § 1983

actions unless asserted against defendants in their individual capacities. See

Santucci, 2021 WL 76337, at *9. Moreover, in their summary judgment briefs,

School District Defendants, County Defendants, and Plaintiffs all address whether

the individual Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity—a defense that is only

available to state officials in their individual capacities, see Shabazz v. Coughlin,

852 F.2d 697, 700 (2d Cir. 1988)—suggesting that the parties believe that the

individual Defendants are sued in their individual capacities, see ECF No. 75-1 at

16–17; ECF No. 77-1 at 31–42; ECF No. 78-27 at 13–14; ECF No. 78-30 at 17–29.

Thus, because it appears from the issues raised that Plaintiffs intended to bring suit

against the individual Defendants in their individual capacities, the Amended

Complaint is interpreted in such a manner. See Frank v. Relin, 1 F.3d 1317, 1326

(2d Cir. 1993) (looking beyond the “doctrinal confusion displayed by [plaintiff’s]

memorandum” and focusing on plaintiff’s arguments to determine whether plaintiff

should be given opportunity to pursue official-capacity claim). To the extent that

Plaintiffs intended to bring suit against the individual School District Defendants

and County Defendants in their official capacities, the substance of those claims will

be addressed below in the section on municipal liability for Sachem Central School

District and Suffolk County Police Department because “the real party in interest in

an official-capacity suit is the governmental entity and not the named official . . . .”

Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25 (1991).

C. Federal Causes of Action

1. Section 1983

Section 1983 imposes civil liability upon persons who, acting under color of

state law, deprive an individual of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the

Constitution and laws of the United States. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. “Section 1983

itself creates no substantive rights; it provides only a procedure for redress for the

deprivation of rights established elsewhere.” Sykes v. James, 13 F.3d 515, 519 (2d

Cir. 1993). “To prevail on a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must show

that (1) defendants acted under ‘color of state law’ (2) to deprive him of a right,

privilege, or immunity guaranteed by the Constitution or laws of the United States.”

Kraft v. City of New York, 696 F. Supp. 2d 403, 412 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). As part of

this analysis, a plaintiff must show that a defendant was personally involved in the

alleged constitutional deprivation. See Mislin v. City of Townawada Sch. Dist.,

No. 02-CV-273S, 2007 WL 952048, at *7 (W.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2007).

2. Qualified Immunity

Qualified immunity can be raised by a party as an affirmative defense to

§ 1983 claims. See Johnson v. Newburgh Enlarged Sch. Dist., 239 F.3d 246, 250

(2d Cir. 2001). In this case, the individual School District Defendants and individual

County Defendants raise the defense of qualified immunity in response to at least

some of Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims. See ECF No. 75-1 at 16–17; ECF No. 78-27 at

13–14. A municipality may not raise the defense of qualified immunity for its

actions, even where the individual officers who acted on the municipality’s behalf

may do so. See Vassallo v. Lando, 591 F. Supp. 2d 172, 198 n.21 (E.D.N.Y. 2008).

“The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials ‘from

liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established

statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’”

Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457

U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). Qualified immunity is “an immunity from suit rather than a

mere defense to liability.” Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200 (2001) (quoting

Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985)). The doctrine is intended to balance

“the need to hold public officials accountable when they exercise power

irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from harassment, distraction, and

liability when they perform their duties reasonably.” Pearson, 555 U.S. at 231. As

a result, qualified immunity protects “all but the plainly incompetent or those who

knowingly violate the law.” Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986).

When a defendant invokes qualified immunity to support a motion for

summary judgment, courts typically engage in a two-part inquiry: whether the facts

shown “make out a violation of a constitutional right” and “whether the right at issue

was clearly established at the time of defendant’s alleged misconduct.” Pearson,

555 U.S. at 232, 236 (holding that, although this two-step process is “often

appropriate,” it is not “mandatory”); see also Taravella v. Town of Wolcott, 599 F.3d

129, 133 (2d Cir. 2010). Courts in the Second Circuit find a right to be clearly

established if: “(1) the law is defined with reasonable clarity, (2) the Supreme Court

or the Second Circuit has recognized the right, and (3) ‘a reasonable defendant

[would] have understood from the existing law that [his] conduct was unlawful.’”

Anderson v. Recore, 317 F.3d 194, 197 (2d Cir. 2003) (quoting Young v. County of

Fulton, 160 F.3d 899, 903 (2d Cir. 1998)).

Even if a right is clearly established, a state officer is entitled to qualified

immunity “if it was ‘objectively reasonable’ for him at the time of the challenged

action to believe his acts were lawful,” or, in other words, “if ‘officers of reasonable

competence could disagree’ on the legality of the action at issue in its particular

factual context.” Southerland v. City of New York, 680 F.3d 127, 141 (2d Cir. 2012)

(first quoting Taravella, 599 F.3d at 134; and then quoting Manganiello v. City of

New York, 612 F.3d 149, 165 (2d Cir. 2010)). This inquiry requires consideration

of the specific factual situation that the state actor confronted, particularly in the

Fourth Amendment context. See McKinney v. City of Middletown, 49 F.4th 730,

739 (2d Cir. 2022) (“[O]ur inquiry focuses on the specific ‘factual situation the

officer[s] confront[ed],’ and the defendants will be ‘entitled to qualified immunity

unless existing precedent squarely governs the specific facts at issue.’” (quoting

Kisela v. Hughes, 584 U.S. 100, 104 (2018))); see also Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201

(noting that the “clearly established” inquiry “must be undertaken in light of the

specific context of the case, not as a broad general proposition”).

The Supreme Court has also recognized that, in some “rare” and “obvious”

cases, “the unlawfulness of the officer’s conduct is sufficiently clear even though

existing precedent does not address similar circumstances.” District of Columbia v.

Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 64 (2018) (citing Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 199

(2004)). In these cases, state officers are not entitled to qualified immunity.

3. Fourth Amendment

Plaintiffs assert causes of action under § 1983 for violations of their rights

secured by the Fourth Amendment against the individual School District Defendants

and individual County Defendants for the seizure of Jazbir and Tezbir and the

searches and seizures of their cell phones during the investigation into the

AirDropped Image at Sachem North High School on January 8, 2019. See ECF No.

45-2 ¶¶ 123–60.

The Fourth Amendment provides that “[t]he right of the people to be secure

in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and

seizures, shall not be violated.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. The Fourteenth Amendment

“extends this constitutional guarantee to searches and seizures by state officers,

including public school officials.” Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646,

652 (1995) (citations omitted). Generally, for a governmental search or seizure to

be constitutional under the Fourth Amendment, the government must have a judicial

warrant supported by probable cause to believe that the searched or seized individual

has committed a crime. Id. at 652–53; Bailey v. United States, 568 U.S. 186, 192–

93 (2013). The Supreme Court has recognized a narrow exception to the Fourth

Amendment’s probable cause requirement “when ‘special needs, beyond the normal

need for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause requirement

impracticable.’” Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987) (quoting New Jersey

v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring)).

In New Jersey v. T.L.O., the Supreme Court recognized that such “special

needs” exist in the public-school context and that “the school setting requires some

easing of the restrictions to which searches by public authorities are ordinarily

subject . . . [and] some modification of the level of suspicion of illicit activity needed

to justify a search.” 469 U.S. at 340; see also Vernonia Sch. Dist., 515 U.S. at 653.

The Court reasoned that requiring school officials to obtain a warrant before

searching a student “would unduly interfere with the maintenance of the swift and

informal disciplinary procedures needed in the schools.” T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 340.

The Court also acknowledged that, in the public-school context, the “privacy

interests of schoolchildren” must be balanced against the “substantial need of

teachers and administrators for freedom to maintain order in the schools.” Id. at 341.

Consistent with this reasoning, the Court articulated a two-part inquiry to determine

whether a search of a student by a school official is reasonable—and therefore

permissible—in the public-school setting: the search (1) must be “justified at its

inception” and (2) must be “reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which

justified the interference in the first place.” Id. at 341–42 (quoting Terry v. Ohio,

392 U.S. 1, 20 (1986)). With respect to the first prong, a search is “‘justified at its

inception’ when there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that the search will turn

up evidence that the student has violated or is violating either the law or the rules of

the school.” Id.; see also Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364,

371 (2009) (“The lesser standard for school searches could as readily be described

as a moderate chance of finding evidence of wrongdoing.”). With respect to the

second prong, “[s]uch a search will be permissible in its scope when the measures

adopted are reasonably related to the objectives of the search and not excessively

intrusive in light of the age and sex of the student and the nature of the infraction.”

T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 342.

The Supreme Court in T.L.O. did not address the question of whether the

two-prong analysis applies to seizures of students by public school officials. The

Second Circuit has recognized in dicta, however, that “[c]onstitutional claims based

on searches or seizures by public school officials relating to public school

students . . . call for an analysis under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments that

is different from” the law of “warrant and probable cause.” Tenenbaum v. Williams,

193 F.3d 581, 604, 607 (2d Cir. 1999). Moreover, other circuit courts and lower

courts in the Second Circuit have determined that the T.L.O. reasonableness standard

applies to seizures of students by school officials for the reasons articulated by the

Supreme Court in T.L.O. See Doe ex rel. Doe v. Hawaii Dep’t of Educ., 334 F.3d

906, 909 (9th Cir. 2003); Hassan ex rel. Hassan v. Lubbock Indep. Sch. Dist., 55

F.3d 1075, 1079–80 (5th Cir. 1995); Edwards ex rel. Edwards v. Rees, 883 F.2d 882,

884–85 (10th Cir. 1989); Piechowicz v. Lancaster Cent. Sch. Dist., No.

17-CV-00845V(F), 2022 WL 22782841, at *14 (W.D.N.Y. Jan. 18, 2022), report

and recommendation adopted, 2022 WL 17540648 (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 8, 2022);

Bisignano v. Harrison Cent. Sch. Dist., 113 F. Supp. 2d 591, 596–97 (S.D.N.Y.

2000); see also Wallace ex rel. Wallace v. Batavia Sch. Dist. 101, 68 F.3d 1010,

1014 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding that “a teacher or administrator who seizes a student

does so in violation of the Fourth Amendment only when the restriction of liberty is

unreasonable under the circumstances then existing and apparent”).

The Supreme Court in T.L.O. also did not address whether the reasonableness

standard should apply to school searches “conducted by school officials in

conjunction with or at the behest of law enforcement agencies.” 469 U.S. at 341 n.7.

The Second Circuit has not yet addressed this issue, but other circuit courts have

found that the T.L.O. reasonableness test applies when school officials initiate a

search or seizure and police involvement is minimal and when school officials act

in conjunction with—not at the behest of—law enforcement. See Gray ex rel.

Alexander v. Bostic, 458 F.3d 1295, 1304 (11th Cir. 2006) (applying the

reasonableness standard articulated in T.L.O. to school seizure by law enforcement

officers); Wofford v. Evans, 390 F.3d 318, 326–28 (4th Cir. 2004) (same); Shade v.

City of Farmington, 309 F.3d 1054, 1060–62 (8th Cir. 2002) (same for school search

by law enforcement officers); see also Milligan v. City of Slidell, 226 F.3d 652, 654–

55 (5th Cir. 2000) (considering the reasonableness of a school seizure by police

officers in light of the “lesser expectation of privacy” enjoyed by students in the

school environment without explicitly adopting the T.L.O. test). But see C.B. v. City

of Sonora, 769 F.3d 1005, 1023 (9th Cir. 2014) (declining to decide whether the

T.L.O. reasonableness standard applied to law enforcement’s use of handcuffs on a

student in the school setting). District courts in this circuit have also applied the

T.L.O. standard to determine if searches and seizures conducted by school officials

with the assistance of law enforcement officers were reasonable. See Piechowicz,

2022 WL 22782841, at *3, *14–15; N.U. ex rel. Amar v. E. Islip Union Free Sch.

Dist. (N.U. ex rel. Amar I), No. 16-CV-4540, 2017 WL 10456860, at *2, *10–11

(E.D.N.Y. Sept. 15, 2017); Vassallo, 591 F. Supp. 2d at 193–94; see also Guan N.

v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., No. 11-CV-4299, 2014 WL 1275487, at *21 (S.D.N.Y.

Mar. 24, 2014) (suggesting that the Second Circuit’s decision in Tenenbaum

“arguably supports a broad reading of T.L.O.” and recognizing that “the line

separating school discipline from law enforcement activity subject to the warrant

requirement is difficult to draw”). As one court has articulated, to hold that the

T.L.O. standard should not apply in such cases “would potentially discourage school

administrators from seeking the assistance and expertise of the police in a school’s

effort to address criminal and potentially dangerous situations that may be rapidly

unfolding on school property.” Vassallo, 591 F. Supp. 2d at 194.

Finally, the Supreme Court in T.L.O. did not address whether and under what

circumstances students can be searched in the absence of individualized suspicion

of wrongdoing. In later cases, however, the Court determined that school searches

do not always need to be based on individualized suspicion. In Vernonia School

District 47J v. Acton, the Court upheld a school district’s drug testing policy, which

subjected all student-athletes to mandatory random drug tests. 515 U.S. at 654–65.

In coming to this conclusion, the Court considered that student athletes have a

diminished expectation of privacy, that the drug tests were not particularly invasive,

that the school had an “important” interest in deterring student drug use, and that the

policy “effectively addressed” the problem of drug use at the school. Id. at 654–63.

Subsequently, in Board of Education v. Earls, the Supreme Court held that schools

may conduct random drug tests of any student who participates in competitive

extracurricular activities. 536 U.S. 822, 830–38 (2002). In reaching this conclusion,

the Court considered the nature of the students’ privacy interest, the degree of

invasion into their privacy interest, and the significance of the school’s need for the

drug-testing policy. Id. Lower courts, applying this balancing test, have since

upheld searches of groups of students without individualized suspicion when student

safety was at issue. See, e.g., Thompson v. Carthage Sch. Dist., 87 F.3d 979, 982–

83 (8th Cir. 1996) (finding that a search of all male students in grades six through

twelve was constitutional in part because school officials had grounds to believe that

weapons had been brought to school and because search was minimally invasive);

Brousseau ex rel. Brousseau v. Town of Westerly ex rel. Perri, 11 F. Supp. 2d 177,

180–83 (D.R.I. 1998) (finding that a search of all students in cafeteria at time when

serrated kitchen knife went missing was constitutional in part because of concerns

to student safety and because the search was limited to a pat-down of specific areas).

Plaintiffs argue that the Supreme Court’s decision in Riley v. California, 573

U.S. 373 (2014), should control the analysis of the cell phone searches in this case.

See ECF No. 77-1 at 18–19. In Riley, the Court held that a warrantless search of a

cell phone conducted by the police incident to arrest is unconstitutional absent a

showing of exigent circumstances. 573 U.S. at 402–03. Riley has not been held to

apply to searches of students’ cell phones carried out by public school officials,

however. As the Eleventh Circuit has explained, “Riley held only that the exception

to the warrant requirement for searches incident to arrest does not extend to searches

of information contained in cellphones, and T.L.O. held that ‘[t]he warrant

requirement . . . is unsuited to the school environment.’” Jackson v. McCurry, 762

F. App’x 919, 927 (11th Cir. 2019) (quoting T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 340). Consistent

with this understanding, lower courts have continued to apply the T.L.O. framework

to searches of students’ cell phones conducted by school officials following Riley.

See, e.g., Piechowicz, 2022 WL 17540648, at *7 (“Riley was not a school case, and

[plaintiff] gives no reason why this [c]ourt can or should supplant T.L.O.’s

school-specific inquiry with the constitutional requirements that might apply outside

a school’s walls.”).

a. Individual School District Defendants

In the Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs allege that School District Defendants

violated Jazbir’s and Tezbir’s right to be free from illegal searches and seizures

under the Fourth Amendment. ECF No. 45-2 ¶¶ 123–60. In particular, they argue

that Principal Trombetta illegally seized Tezbir and searched his cell phone and that

Assistant Principal Flanagan illegally seized Jazbir and searched his cell phone while

School District Defendants were investigating the AirDropped Image at Sachem

North High School on January 8, 2019. Id.

School District Defendants move for summary judgment on all the Fourth

Amendment claims. They assert that there were no Fourth Amendment violations

because Jazbir and Tezbir voluntarily consented to be interviewed by the school

officials and to the cell phone searches. ECF No. 75-1 at 11 (citing Schneckloth v.

Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973)). In the alternative, School District

Defendants argue that the searches and seizures of Jazbir and Tezbir and their cell

phones were lawful because, under the circumstances, the school administrators had

reasonable suspicion to interview the Singh brothers and to search their cell phones.

Id. at 12–15. Finally, they argue that Principal Trombetta and Assistant Principal

Flanagan are entitled to qualified immunity because they did not violate any of

Plaintiffs’ clearly established constitutional rights. Id. at 16–17.

In response, Plaintiffs do not appear to contest that the Singh brothers

participated in the in-school interviews voluntarily, but they deny that Jazbir and

Tezbir consented to the searches of their cell phones. ECF No. 77-1 at 16–17.

Although Plaintiffs acknowledge that both Jazbir and Tezbir initially unlocked their

cell phones, they argue that “any claim of voluntariness . . . disappeared” when one

of the school administrators grabbed Jazbir’s phone from his hands and when

Principal Trombetta kept Tezbir’s phone after he asked her to return the phone. Id.

at 17. They also argue that Tezbir never gave Principal Trombetta permission to

look in his “Recently Deleted” folder in his Photos application. Id. Additionally,

Plaintiffs argue that the cell phone searches were illegal under Riley because there

were no exigent circumstances to justify the searches. Id. at 18–19. Moreover,

Plaintiffs argue that the searches were unreasonable under T.L.O. because

Defendants were not genuinely concerned about a school shooting and because “a

gun cannot be concealed on a phone.” Id. at 21–25. With respect to School District

Defendants’ qualified immunity defense, Plaintiffs assert that “the Supreme Court

has held that a warrantless search of a cell phone is per se unreasonable.” Id. at 31–

33. They also argue that, even assuming that the case law surrounding cell phone

searches is not sufficiently clear, Principal Trombetta’s and Assistant Principal

Flanagan’s actions were so “obviously unconstitutional” that no precedent is

necessary to find that they are not entitled to qualified immunity. Id.22

As an initial matter, the parties do not dispute that School District Defendants’

in-school interviews of Jazbir and Tezbir and examinations of their cell phones were

seizures and searches, respectively, within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.

Consequently, I assume without deciding that the complained-of conduct amounted

to seizures and searches governed by the Fourth Amendment.

Turning next to the issue of consent, the parties dispute whether Jazbir and

Tezbir consented to the searches of their cell phones.23 If Jazbir or Tezbir did

voluntarily consent to the search of his cell phone, the Fourth Amendment was not

violated as to that search. See United States v. Garcia, 890 F.2d 355, 360 (11th Cir.

22 Plaintiffs also argue against the application of the doctrine of qualified immunity

more generally, contesting that “[t]he doctrine of modern qualified immunity not

only does not derive from the text of the statute, but is actually antagonistic to the

language of the statute and the congressional intent underlying the statute.”

ECF No. 77-1 at 34. The doctrine of qualified immunity, however, is consistently

applied by the Supreme Court and the Second Circuit and is binding precedent on

this Court. See McKinney, 49 F.4th at 746 (rejecting argument to deny qualified

immunity on public policy grounds because of the “well-settled principles of

qualified immunity”).

23 As noted, Plaintiffs do not appear to dispute that Jazbir and Tezbir consented to

be interviewed as part of the investigation into the AirDropped Image, and therefore

Plaintiffs may have abandoned these claims. See Jackson v. Fed. Exp., 766 F.3d

189, 198 (2d Cir. 2014) (“[I]n the case of a counseled party, a court may, when

appropriate, infer from a party’s partial opposition that relevant claims or defenses

that are not defended have been abandoned.”). Nevertheless, I consider whether the

seizures were legal under the T.L.O. standard and conclude that they were.

1989) (“One of the well-established exceptions to the probable cause and warrant

requirements is a search which is conducted pursuant to voluntary consent.”).

Plaintiffs assert that Jazbir did not consent to the search because he handed his phone

to Assistant Principal Flanagan only after she threatened him with suspension, ECF

No. 77 ¶¶ 32–38, and that Tezbir did not consent to the search because Principal

Flanagan denied his request to return his phone and looked in his “Recently Deleted

Photos” folder, which he did not give her permission to do, id. at ¶¶ 50–51; ECF

No. 78-19 at 45:4–8. Based on these disputed facts, Jazbir and Tezbir may not have

consented to the searches of their cell phones. See Lavin v. Thornton, 959 F. Supp.

181, 190 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (consent may be revoked); Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S.

248, 251 (1991) (scope of a consent search may not exceed the scope of the consent

given, which is defined by “its expressed object”); Garcia, 890 F.2d at 360 (“In order

for consent to a search to be deemed voluntary, it must be the product of an

essentially free and unconstrained choice.”).

Accordingly, I turn to whether the in-school interviews and cell phone

searches were reasonable in the absence of voluntary consent under the standard

articulated in T.L.O. The undisputed facts establish that, as a matter of law, the

in-school interviews and cell phones searches were justified at the inception. On the

day in question, School District Defendants were reasonably investigating what they

perceived to be a serious school shooting threat. The previous day, Principal

Trombetta learned from a parent that her daughter, a student at Sachem North High

School, had received the AirDropped Image, which depicted two firearms and the

words “Don’t come to school tomorrow,” while she was riding home from school

on Bus 12. ECF No. 77 ¶¶ 2–3. School District Defendants were justified in relying

on this information—provided by a student through her parent—to initiate an

investigation into the incident. See C.B. ex rel. Breeding v. Driscoll, 82 F.3d 383,

388 (11th Cir. 1996) (concluding that reasonable grounds for a student search existed

where supported by a classmate’s tip to school administrators); Gallimore v. Henrico

Cnty. Sch. Bd., 38 F. Supp. 3d 721, 725 (E.D. Va. 2014) (finding that a student search

was justified at the inception based on information that school administrators had

received from two parents). Moreover, Assistant Principal Flanagan testified that,

upon learning of the AirDropped Image, she was concerned of a possible school

shooting. See ECF No. 76-2 at 77 (76:9–12). Indeed, it is without dispute that an

image of firearms with the words “Don’t come to school tomorrow” could be

perceived as a threat of a school shooting—Plaintiffs acknowledge that the

AirDropped Image could be seen as threatening. ECF No. 77 ¶¶ 62–64, 73, 75–77.24

24 Despite acknowledging this, Plaintiffs attempt to argue that School District

Defendants and County Defendants did not genuinely believe that there was a threat

to school safety and that they “were searching, not for evidence of a gun, but for

evidence of a photo to cover themselves because the photo was out in the open and

known to the public.” See ECF No. 77-1 at 22; ECF No. 78-30 at 14. This argument

is belied by the record and by common sense. For one, School District Defendants

and County Defendants had no need to “cover themselves” in this situation. More

importantly, the record as a whole shows that School District Defendants and County

Defendants were genuinely concerned about the safety of the school and were

working to identify the student who sent the AirDropped Image to ensure student

Although Tezbir testified that he sent the image as a joke, ECF No. 78-19 at 26:13–

16, School District Defendants did not and could not have known this before

speaking with him during the investigation. Thus, School District Defendants had

reason to investigate the AirDropped Image.

With respect to the cell phone searches, specifically, School District

Defendants had reasonable grounds to believe that the students’ cell phones would

contain information about the AirDropped Image because the image appeared to be

sent from an iPhone using Bluetooth. Plaintiffs argue that the cell phone searches

were not reasonable because “a gun cannot be concealed on a phone.” ECF No. 77-1

at 25. This argument is unpersuasive, however, because School District Defendants

did not need to be looking for a gun for the searches to be proper. School District

Defendants were searching the students’ cell phones for information about the

AirDropped Image—a fact that Plaintiffs acknowledge. See id. Because such

information would assist School District Defendants in identifying the student who

made the perceived school shooting threat, it was appropriate for School District

Defendants to search students’ cell phones for the AirDropped Image. Cf. Sabbah

safety. Plaintiffs, in attempting to argue to the contrary, point almost exclusively to

actions that Defendants did not take while investigating the AirDropped Image, such

as patting down the Bus 12 students and searching their backpacks while they were

gathered in the little theater. ECF No. 77-1 at 21–23; ECF No. 78-30 at 12–15. But

School District Defendants’ and County Defendants’ decision not to take such

actions does not establish that they were not genuinely concerned about the threat to

school safety.

v. Springfield Sch. Dist., No. 19-CV-5564, 2021 WL 2138792, at *6 (E.D. Pa. May

26, 2021) (recognizing that, while the discovery of a “to kill list” in a classroom

“was not the same as a student having a weapon at school,” this does not “hamstring

the school from taking appropriate steps to investigate the list”).

Additionally, because iPhones must be near one another to send and receive

an image via AirDrop, see ECF No. 78-19 at 18:25–19:18, it was reasonable for

School District Defendants to focus their investigation on the students who rode on

Bus 12. Although School District Defendants did not have reason to suspect that

Jazbir or Tezbir sent the AirDropped Image specifically, they did not need

individualized suspicion to search the students who rode on Bus 12. Although

students generally have a reduced expectation of privacy while in school compared

to the public at large, see Earls, 536 U.S. at 830–31, Plaintiffs likely maintained

some expectation of privacy in their cell phones as personal items brought to school,

see T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 339. Nevertheless, Plaintiffs’ privacy interest was

outweighed by School District Defendants’ immediate and compelling interest in

maintaining the safety and security of the school and its students. See Milligan, 226

F.3d at 655 (recognizing that a school has a “compelling” and “immedia[te]” interest

in protecting students and deterring “possibly violent misconduct” that was “due to

happen that day”). School District Defendants were investigating what they believed

to be a threat of violence against the school, which they had an important interest in

preventing. Courts have upheld searches without individualized suspicion when

faced with similar concerns over school safety. See Thompson, 87 F.3d at 982–83;

Milligan, 226 F.3d at 655–56; Stockton v. City of Freeport, 147 F. Supp. 2d 642,

646–47 (S.D. Tex. 2001); Brousseau, 11 F. Supp. 2d at 180–83. Indeed, in light of

the all-too-frequent and devastating school shootings that our country has

experienced in recent years, the Ninth Circuit has observed that “[w]e are

hard-pressed to imagine a more important, time-sensitive matter than preventing the

unspeakable tragedy of a school shooting.” Bernal v. Sacramento Cnty. Sheriff’s

Dep’t, 73 F.4th 678, 689 (9th Cir. 2023). Thus, because the school’s interest in

maintaining safety outweighed the right of students to be free from in-school

interviews and cell phone searches, School District Defendants were permitted to

search and seize the students who rode on Bus 12 without individualized suspicion

and the interviews of Jazbir and Tezbir and searches of their cell phones were

justified at the inception.25 See K.G. ex rel. Doe v. Bd. of Educ., No. 5:18-CV-0555,

2022 WL 19692050, at *15 (E.D. Ky. Jan. 19, 2022) (“Courts have held that a search

25 As discussed above, School District Defendants assert that they chose to interview

Jazbir and Tezbir before other students on Bus 12 because the Singhs had

disciplinary records. See ECF No. 75-3 ¶¶ 22, 25–26. Plaintiffs dispute that Tezbir

had a disciplinary record, and although they acknowledge that Jazbir had previously

been disciplined at school for drawing what appeared to be a swastika in a classroom,

they argue that Jazbir had drawn a symbol of good luck in his country. Id. ¶¶ 25–

25. While it would have been proper for School District Defendants to consider a

student’s disciplinary record in deciding which students to interview, see Phaneuf v.

Fraikin, 448 F.3d 591, 599 (2d Cir. 2006), as explained, they had grounds to

interview any of the students on Bus 12, and therefore the disputed facts surrounding

Jazbir’s and Tezbir’s prior disciplinary records are not material.

of a student’s cellphone is justified at its inception when there is a threat to student

safety.”).

Turning to the second prong of the T.L.O. standard, it must next be determined

whether the in-school interviews and cell phone searches were reasonable in scope.

Beginning with the in-school interviews, the undisputed facts establish that the

interviews of Jazbir and Tezbir were reasonable in scope. On the day in question,

Jazbir and Tezbir were each individually summoned to the front office, where

Principal Trombetta’s office was located, and then questioned about their knowledge

of the AirDropped Image. The interviews were focused on identifying information

about the AirDropped Image, and Jazbir and Tezbir were held in the front office only

long enough for the school administrators to interview them and to contact their

father and await his arrival. See Shuman ex rel. Shertzer v. Penn Manor Sch. Dist.,

422 F.3d 141, 149 (3d Cir. 2005) (detaining a student to permit school officials to

investigate another student’s report of serious sexual misconduct and to determine

an appropriate punishment was reasonable). Moreover, there is no evidence that any

of the school administrators or police officers present raised their voices during the

interviews, or that either of the Singh brothers asked to leave the interviews, became

emotionally upset during the interviews, or asked to call their parents. See Mislin,

2007 WL 952048, at *11 (considering such factors in determining whether an

in-school interview was reasonable in scope). These undisputed facts establish that

the in-school interviews were reasonable in scope.

As to the cell phones searches, however, genuine issues of material fact

remain concerning the reasonableness of the scope of the searches. Beginning with

Jazbir, the parties dispute whether Jazbir was present when his phone was searched.

Jazbir claims that one of the assistant principals took his phone out of his hands and

that the administrative team then held his phone for about an hour or two while he

was in a separate room. ECF No. 77 ¶¶ 32–35; ECF No. 78-20 at 37:16–38:21,

39:6–8. School District Defendants claim that Assistant Principal Flanagan searched

Jazbir’s phone after he handed it to her and while he was present. ECF No. 75-3

¶¶ 35–38. Additionally, although the parties disagree about what images were

found, the parties agree that Assistant Principal Flanagan and Principal Trombetta

looked at images on Jazbir’s phone that were clearly not the AirDropped Image. See

id. ¶¶ 39–40, 66–67; ECF No. 77 ¶¶ 39, 66–67. If Plaintiffs’ version of the facts is

adopted, a reasonable jury could find that the school administrators acted in an

overly intrusive manner when they took Jazbir’s cell phone out of his hands, sent

him into a separate room, and held his phone for an hour or two. Cf. N.U. ex rel.

Amar v. E. Islip Union Free Sch. Dist. (N.U. ex rel. Amar II), No. 16-CV-4540, 2020

WL 7024309, at *9 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 30, 2020) (finding that the search of the phone

and wallet of a student who made a bomb threat against his school was reasonable

in part because the search lasted only a minute-and-a-half and did not involve items

“physically removed from [the student’s] person”). Additionally, a reasonable jury

might find that the school administrators acted unreasonably in scrolling through

Jazbir’s photos that were clearly not the AirDropped Image. Cf. K.G. ex rel. Doe,

2022 WL 19692050, at *16 (finding that school administrators’ search of a student’s

cell phone was reasonable in scope in part because “[w]hen they did not find

anything [in the student’s text messages related to the conduct about which they were

concerned], they stopped”).

Turning to Tezbir, Plaintiffs claim that Principal Trombetta had Tezbir’s cell

phone in her possession outside of Tezbir’s presence for an extended period of time.

ECF No. 78-19 at 42:10–43:7, 45:4–7. School District Defendants, on the other

hand, state that Tezbir handed Principal Trombetta his cell phone and gave her

permission to search his phone. ECF No. 75-3 ¶¶ 50–51. Drawing all inferences in

favor of Plaintiffs, a reasonable jury could find that it was unreasonable to take

Tezbir’s cell phone into another room for an extended period of time, when Tezbir

did not know whether and how his phone was being searched. Cf. N.U. ex rel. Amar

II, 2020 WL 7024309, at *9.

Nevertheless, the individual School District Defendants—Principal

Trombetta and Assistant Principal Flanagan—are shielded by qualified immunity

and therefore cannot be liable for the searches of the Singh brothers’ cell phones.

See Safford, 557 U.S. at 377–79 (finding that a strip search of a student was not

reasonable but that the school officers involved in the search were entitled to

qualified immunity); see also Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 643–44 (1987)

(rejecting the argument that officials alleged to have violated the Fourth Amendment

cannot be protected by qualified immunity). On the facts of this case, it is not clearly

established, and it was not clearly established at the time of the searches at issue,

that Jazbir and Tezbir had a right to be free from cell phone searches conducted by

public school administrators who were investigating a perceived school

shooting threat.

Plaintiffs argue that the individual School District Defendants are not entitled

to qualified immunity because the Supreme Court has held that cell phone searches

are “per se unreasonable,” ECF No. 77-1 at 31–33, but this assertion is incorrect. In

Riley, the Supreme Court held that law enforcement may not conduct a warrantless

search of a defendant’s cell phone incident to arrest absent exigent circumstances.

573 U.S. at 385, 402–03. The instant case, which involves the search of students’

cell phones by school officials in the public-school setting during the investigation

into a perceived school shooting threat, is not governed by Riley. See McKinney, 49

F.4th at 739 (“Qualified immunity requires consideration of the ‘specific factual

situation’ that the state actors confronted.”). Plaintiffs have not identified any

decision by the Supreme Court or Second Circuit addressing the constitutionality of

the search of a student’s cell phone in the public-school setting, nor has this Court

identified any such case. Indeed, to the contrary, searches of students’ cell phones

by school administrators investigating threatening and inappropriate student conduct

have been upheld by district courts in this circuit on several occasions. See

Piechowicz, 2022 WL 17540648, at *7; N.U. ex rel. Amar II, 2020 WL 7024309, at

*9. Thus, because there is no precedent that establishes a student’s right to be free

from cell phone searches in the public-school context, particularly during an

investigation into a perceived threat of violence against the school, Principal

Trombetta and Assistant Principal Flanagan did not violate a clearly established

constitutional right of which a reasonable school official would have known when

they searched Jazbir’s and Tezbir’s cell phones.

Plaintiffs also argue that the school officials’ conduct was “so ‘obviously’

illegal that no ‘body of relevant case law’ is necessary” to determine that it ran afoul

of the Constitution. ECF No. 77-1 at 32 (quoting Brosseau, 543 U.S. at 199).

Plaintiffs’ argument fails because there is no basis to conclude that the searches at

issue were so egregious or “outrageous” that a reasonable school official would

know that the searches violated the law even though court decisions have not

addressed the issue. See Safford, 557 U.S. at 377–78 (“[O]utrageous conduct

obviously will be unconstitutional.”). While investigating a perceived school

shooting threat that appeared to be sent from a cell phone, School District

Defendants searched the cell phones of two students who were on the bus where the

threat was sent. There is simply nothing about School District Defendants’ searches

of Jazbir’s and Tezbir’s cell phones that was “so obviously at the very core of what

the Fourth Amendment prohibits that the unlawfulness of the conduct was readily

apparent to [them] notwithstanding the lack of [fact-specific] case law.” Gray ex

rel. Alexander, 458 F.3d at 1307 (quoting Lee v. Ferraro, 284 F.3d 1188, 1199 (11th

Cir. 2002)). Indeed, cases in which obvious constitutional violations have been

found involved conduct that is significantly more egregious than the conduct at issue

here. See, e.g., Taylor v. Riojas, 592 U.S. 7, 8–9 (2020) (denying qualified immunity

to an officer who confined an inmate in a cell “covered, nearly floor to ceiling in

massive amounts of feces” because “any reasonable officer should have realized that

[the] conditions of confinement offended the Constitution” (internal quotation marks

omitted)); Evans v. Stephens, 407 F.3d 1272, 1283 (11th Cir. 2005) (concluding that

the constitutional violation was “obvious” where an officer conducted body cavity

searches in a “degrading and forceful manner”). The fact that School District

Defendants may have taken Jazbir’s and Tezbir’s cell phones out of their presence

for an extended period does not make their conduct so egregious that no reasonable

school official would think they were acting lawfully. Likewise, it was not so

“obviously illegal” for Principal Trombetta and Assistant Principal Flanagan to look

at images on Jazbir’s phone that were not the AirDropped Image that qualified

immunity does not apply. Accordingly, Principal Trombetta and Assistant Principal

Flanagan are entitled to qualified immunity, and their motion for summary judgment

is granted as to the Fourth Amendment claims (the first, second, third, and fourth

causes of action).

b. Individual County Defendants

In the Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs allege that County Defendants violated

Jazbir’s and Tezbir’s right to be free from illegal searches and seizures under the

Fourth Amendment based on the same in-school interviews and cell phone searches

as School District Defendants. ECF No. 45-2 ¶¶ 175–444. In particular, Plaintiffs

assert thirty-six causes of action alleging that each individual County Defendant

illegally seized Jazbir, illegally seized Tezbir, and illegally searched each of their

cell phones.26 Id. Plaintiffs concede that there is not sufficient evidence in the record

to sustain these claims against Defendants Tobin, Charubin, Serrata, Sinclair,

Lundin, and Gigliotti. ECF No. 78-30 at 35–36. Plaintiffs also concede that there

is not enough evidence in the record to sustain all but one claim—for the seizure of

Jazbir—brought against Defendant Lamonica. Id. at 36–37. County Defendants’

motion for summary judgment is therefore granted with respect to the eleventh

through fifteenth, seventeenth through thirtieth, and thirty-fifth through forty-second

causes of action. Plaintiffs’ remaining claims allege that Police Officer Lamonica

illegally seized Jazbir and that Police Officer Dono and Detective Pagano each

illegally seized Jazbir and Tezbir and illegally searched their cell phones.27

26 County Defendants argue that these “cut and paste claims” should be dismissed

because Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 “permits and at times requires the

dismissal of a complaint where its length and complexity obscures the function as a

notice pleading.” ECF No. 78-27 at 23. Because Plaintiffs agreed to dismiss the

claims for which there was no evidentiary basis, it is not necessary to consider

dismissal of these claims on these grounds.

27 I do not interpret Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint to assert causes of action based

on the Fourth Amendment against County Defendants for the arrest of Tezbir or the

hospitalization of Jazbir and/or Tezbir at St. Catherine’s. Rather, Plaintiffs appear

to assert that the hospitalization of Jazbir and Tezbir at St. Catherine’s amounted to

false arrest/false imprisonment under state law. See ECF No. 78-30 at 12–17. To

County Defendants move for summary judgment on the remaining Fourth

Amendment claims, arguing that the undisputed facts demonstrate that Jazbir and

Tezbir consented to be interviewed and to the searches of their cell phones. See ECF

No. 78-27 at 8–9. They also assert that the interviews and cell phone searches were

carried out only by School District Defendants, not County Defendants, and that the

Fourth Amendment claims against County Defendants are therefore meritless. Id.

at 8–9. Moreover, they argue that the search and seizure of Tezbir’s cell phone was

constitutional because they had probable cause to arrest him and because “[s]eizure

of everyday objects in plain view is justified where the officers have probable cause

to believe that the objects contain or constitute evidence.” Id. at 9 (quoting United

Sates v. Babilonia, 854 F.3d 163, 180 (2d Cir. 2017)).

In opposition, Plaintiffs assert that County Defendants were working jointly

with School District Defendants to investigate the AirDropped Image on January 8,

2019 and, in so doing, contributed to the illegal seizures and searches of Jazbir and

Tezbir and their cell phones. ECF No. 78-30 at 12–16. Moreover, Plaintiffs argue

the extent that Plaintiffs do assert that these actions violated the Fourth Amendment,

their claims are considered abandoned because Plaintiffs failed to respond to County

Defendants’ argument that the Fourth Amendment claims should be dismissed

because “the facts are largely undisputed and incontrovertibly establish a basis for

probable cause of Tezbir Singh’s arrest, and the transport of Jazbir Singh and Tezbir

Singh to Saint Catherine of Sienna Medica Center . . . for psychiatric evaluation.”

ECF No. 78-27 at 8. See, e.g., Bryant v. Steele, 462 F. Supp. 3d 249, 270 (E.D.N.Y.

2020) (“A party abandons a claim in the context of a summary judgment motion

when she does not respond to arguments concerning that claim.”).

that the searches of the Singh brothers’ cell phones should be governed by the

Supreme Court’s decision in Riley. Id. at 12–13. Plaintiffs assert that, under Riley,

County Defendants illegally searched Jazbir’s and Tezbir’s cell phones because they

did not have a warrant and there were not exigent circumstances because “[t]he

defendants never, for a moment believed there was the potential for an active

shooting.” Id. at 12–15. Plaintiffs also assert that County Defendants’ argument

that Tezbir’s cell phone could be seized and searched because it was in plain view is

inconsistent with Riley. Id. at 16.

As an initial matter, the record is unclear as to which County Defendants were

present for the interviews of Jazbir and Tezbir and the searches of their cell phones.

See ECF No. 78-19 at 40:21–41:5 (Tezbir recalled only school administrators being

present for his interview); ECF No. 78-20 at 32:3–33:3 (Jazbir recalled a number of

police officers were present for his interview but not who specifically); ECF No.

78-21 at 27:4–14, 34:9–17 (Detective Pagano recalled being present for the

interviews of Jazbir and Tezbir); ECF No. 78-22 at 17:25–18:7 (Police Officer Dono

did not recall which interviews she was present for). As discussed, to succeed on a

§ 1983 claim, a plaintiff must show that a defendant was personally involved in the

alleged constitutional deprivation. See Mislin, 2007 WL 952048, at *7. Drawing all

inferences in favor of Plaintiffs, I will therefore assume that Detective Pagano and

Police Officer Dono were present for the interviews of Jazbir and Tezbir and for the

searches of both their cell phones and that Police Officer Lamonica was present for

the interview of Jazbir.

As described above, courts have applied the T.L.O. standard to determine

whether a search or seizure carried out by a school official with assistance from law

enforcement was reasonable, particularly where law enforcement’s role was minor.

See Piechowicz, 2022 WL 22782841, at *3, *14–15; N.U. ex rel. Amar I, 2017 WL

10456860, at *2, *10–11; Vassallo, 591 F. Supp. 2d at 193–94. Here, the record

shows that County Defendants’ role in the in-school interviews and cell phone

searches was minimal. School District Defendants called County Defendants for

assistance with the investigation into the AirDropped Image, and School District

Defendants led the in-school interviews. See ECF No. 78-29 ¶¶ 3, 16. Indeed,

Plaintiffs acknowledge that County Defendants did not question Jazbir and Tezbir

on January 8, 2019. Id. ¶ 16. Moreover, there is no evidence in the record that

County Defendants ever conducted a search of either Jazbir’s or Tezbir’s phone at

Sachem North High School. See ECF No. 78-21 at 36:11–19, 58:8–19. At most,

the record shows that County Defendants were present for the in-school interviews

and cell phone searches and may have incidentally seen content on the Singh

brothers’ cell phones. See ECF No. 78-29 ¶¶ 15–16; ECF No. 76-2 at 148 (44:14–

17). Plaintiffs attempt to create an issue of fact by pointing to Detective Pagano’s

testimony that he took Tezbir’s cell phone after Amarjit permitted the police

department to do so. ECF No. 78-29 ¶ 16 (citing ECF No. 78-21 at 46–47). This

testimony, however, does not create a genuine issue of fact as to whether County

Defendants participated in the searches of the cell phones at Sachem North High

School, and Plaintiffs do not appear to challenge the legality of County Defendants’

seizure of the cell phones after Amarjit permitted the police department to take the

phones. Thus, because the County Defendants played a minor role in the

investigation, the T.L.O. standard applies in this case. Accordingly, the conclusion

that the in-school interviews did not violate the Fourth Amendment but that the

scope of cell phone searches may have been unlawful applies to County Defendants

as well as School District Defendants.

It is somewhat unclear from County Defendants’ summary judgment brief

whether the individual County Defendants raise qualified immunity as a defense to

the Fourth Amendment claims. Plaintiffs argue that County Defendants only assert

the defense of qualified immunity for the false arrest/false imprisonment claims,

ECF No. 78-30 at 17, and it is true that County Defendants included their qualified

immunity discussion in a subsection of their argument on those claims, see ECF No.

78-27 at 13–14. Nevertheless, County Defendants indicate that they are entitled to

qualified immunity for their “conduct investigating an extremely serious threat of

school violence with guns at a local high school,” which includes their conduct

during the cell phone searches. Id. at 14. Moreover, several of their arguments about

qualified immunity on the false arrest/false imprisonment claims—and Plaintiffs’

response to those arguments—are applicable to the Fourth Amendment claims as

well. Specifically, County Defendants argue that their conduct throughout the

investigation was not objectively unreasonable and did not violate clearly

established law given that they were investigating a threat of school violence. Id.

at 13–14. Plaintiffs, in response, argue that Detective Pagano knew that it was illegal

for him to participate in the cell phone searches and that he is therefore not entitled

to qualified immunity. ECF No. 78-30 at 18. They also argue that County

Defendants’ actions throughout the investigation were so “obviously illegal that ‘no

body of relevant case law’ is necessary” to establish that the conduct was illegal. Id.

at 19 (citing Haugen, 543 U.S. at 199).28 Accordingly, I will consider these

arguments and whether the individual County Defendants are entitled to qualified

immunity on the Fourth Amendment cell phone search claims. Cf. Simon v. Susice,

No. 19-CV-132, 2021 WL 4295771, at *4 (N.D.N.Y. June 14, 2021) (addressing

qualified immunity sua sponte in considering a summary judgment motion), report

and recommendation adopted, 2021 WL 4288509 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 21, 2021).

The individual County Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity with

respect to the cell phone searches. As discussed, neither the Supreme Court nor the

Second Circuit has determined whether the T.L.O. reasonableness standard applies

28 As with their opposition to School District Defendants’ motion for summary

judgment, Plaintiffs also argue against the application of the doctrine of qualified

immunity more generally. ECF No. 78-30 at 20–29. As discussed above, the

doctrine of qualified immunity is well-settled law and will be applied in this case.

to school searches carried out by law enforcement officers or school officials with

the assistance of law enforcement officers, but there is precedent from other courts

of appeals indicating that such a standard would apply. See Gray ex rel. Alexander,

458 F.3d at 1304; Wofford, 390 F.3d at 326–28; Shade, 309 F.3d at 1060–62; see

also Milligan, 226 F.3d at 654–55. A reasonable officer therefore could have

believed that he could lawfully participate in a search of a student’s cell phone that

was carried out by school officials. Indeed, as noted, cell phone searches carried out

by school officials in the presence of police officers have been upheld on numerous

occasions in this circuit. Piechowicz, 2022 WL 22782841, at *14–15; N.U. ex rel.

Amar II, 2020 WL 7024309, at *9. Even if the individual County Defendants

participated more directly in the cell phone searches, they would still be entitled to

qualified immunity because the case law is unclear as to whether police officers may

conduct warrantless searches of students’ cell phones in the public-school setting

when investigating a threat of school violence, and thus a reasonable officer could

have reasonably believed it was lawful to do so. Finally, as discussed in the context

of School District Defendants, there is no case law establishing that students have

an absolute right to be free from cell phone searches in the public-school context

more generally.

As with School District Defendants, Plaintiffs argue that County Defendants’

conduct was so “obviously illegal that ‘no body of relevant case law’ is necessary”

to determine that the conduct was unlawful. ECF No. 78-30 at 19 (quoting Haugen,

543 U.S. at 199). This argument again fails because there is nothing about County

Defendants’ role in the cell phone searches that was so egregious or “outrageous”

that a reasonable police officer would know that he was acting unlawfully by being

present when School District Defendants searched Jazbir’s and Tezbir’s cell phones.

See Safford, 557 U.S. at 377–78. County Defendants were assisting with an

investigation into a perceived school shooting threat apparently made over a cell

phone and, during the course of the investigation, the cell phones of two students

who were on the bus where the threat was sent were searched. Even if County

Defendants participated in the cell phone searches more directly, this is not the type

of conduct to which the “obviously unconstitutional” doctrine applies. See, e.g.,

Taylor, 592 U.S. at 8–9; Evans, 407 F.3d at 1283.

Finally, Plaintiffs’ argument that Detective Pagano knew that it was illegal for

him to participate in the cell phone searches is unsupported by the record. In

attempting to make this argument, Plaintiffs state: “Detective Pagano’s vigorous

insistence that he never viewed the contents of the phone, when juxtaposed with the

assertions of the school officials that he did, in fact, review the images, show clearly

that Detective Pagano[] knew the illegality of the actions.” ECF No. 78-30 at 18.

This circular argument is without merit because the school officials did not state that

Detective Pagano searched either Jazbir’s or Tezbir’s cell phone; at most, they stated

that he was present when the school administrators searched the cell phones. See

ECF No. 76-2 at 148 (44:14–17). In any event, even if they had stated that Detective

Pagano searched the cell phones, Detective Pagano’s testimony that he had not done

so would not “show clearly that [he] knew the illegality of [his] actions.” ECF No.

78-30 at 18. Accordingly, Detective Pagano, Police Officer Dono, and Police

Officer Lamonica are entitled to qualified immunity, and their motion for summary

judgment is granted as to the Fourth Amendment claims (the seventh through tenth,

sixteenth, and thirty-first through thirty-fourth causes of action).

4. Fourteenth Amendment

Amarjit brings a cause of action against all Defendants based on a violation

of his “Constitutional Right of Parental Liberty,” alleging that Defendants infringed

on this right by removing Jazbir and Tezbir from their parents’ custody without

probable cause and without any reasonable justification. ECF No. 45-2 ¶¶ 545–49.

Although the Amended Complaint does not specify that this claim is brought under

the Fourteenth Amendment, the Supreme Court has recognized that the “liberty

interest” of parents “in the care, custody, and control of their children” is protected

by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Troxel v. Granville, 530

U.S. 57, 65–67 (2000). Consequently, I interpret this claim to be asserting a

violation of Amarjit’s substantive due process rights secured by the Fourteenth

Amendment.29

29 I interpret the Amended Complaint to assert only a substantive due process claim

and not a procedural due process claim. Amarjit does not appear to allege that

Defendants failed to follow required procedures before he was deprived of his

parental rights, such as that he was deprived of the custody of his sons without being

“Government actions that restrict a parent’s contact with his child implicate

fundamental rights.” Graham v. City of New York, 869 F. Supp. 2d 337, 349

(E.D.N.Y. 2012). “Choices about marriage, family life, and the upbringing of

children are among associational rights the Court has ranked as ‘of basic importance

in our society,’ rights sheltered by the Fourteenth Amendment against the State’s

unwarranted usurpation, disregard, or disrespect.” M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102,

116 (1996) (citation omitted) (quoting Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 376

(1971)). Accordingly, the Supreme Court has recognized that the Fourteenth

Amendment protects “the fundamental right of parents to make decisions concerning

the care, custody, and control of their children.” Troxel, 530 U.S. at 66. The Second

Circuit has also articulated that “family members have, in general terms, a

substantive right under the Due Process Clause to remain together without the

coercive interference of the awesome power of the state.” Anthony v. City of New

York, 339 F.3d 129, 142 (2d Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks and citation

omitted).

afforded the opportunity to be heard “at a meaningful time and in a meaningful

manner,” which is the foundation of a procedural due process claim. See Mathews

v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332–33 (1976) (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S.

545, 552 (1965)). Rather, Amarjit appears to argue that Defendants interfered with

his right to parental liberty in an arbitrary or conscience-shocking way by causing

Jazbir and Tezbir to be hospitalized, which is more consistent with a substantive due

process argument.

Substantive due process, in general, guards “against the government’s

‘exercise of power without any reasonable justification in the service of a legitimate

governmental objective.’” Tenenbaum, 193 F.3d at 600 (quoting County of

Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 846 (1998)). To establish that a specific state

action violated a substantive due process right, a plaintiff must show that the state

action was “so shocking, arbitrary, and egregious that the Due Process Clause would

not countenance it even were it accompanied by full procedural protection.” Id. “It

is not enough that the government act be ‘incorrect or ill-advised’; it must be

‘conscience-shocking.’” Cox v. Warwick Valley Cent. Sch. Dist., 654 F.3d 267, 275

(2d Cir. 2011) (quoting Kaluczky v. City of White Plains, 57 F.3d 202, 211 (2d Cir.

1995)). “Only the most egregious official conduct can be said to be arbitrary in the

constitutional sense and therefore unconstitutional.” Id. (quoting Tenenbaum, 193

F.3d at 600). “To rise to a conscience-shocking level, the misconduct alleged in a

substantive due process claim must be either conduct intended to injure in some way

that is unjustified by any governmental interest or is inflicted with deliberate

indifference in a manner that was shocking under the circumstances.” Swanhart v.

Jackson, No. 20-CV-6819, 2023 WL 4534638, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. July 13, 2023)

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Miner v. N.Y. State Dep’t

of Health, No. 02-CV-3180, 2004 WL 1152491, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. May 24, 2004)

(finding the lack of deliberate indifference fatal to the familial association claim of

an inmate whose wife filed for divorce after receiving an inaccurate letter notifying

her that her husband was HIV positive).

A parent bringing a substantive due process claim based on the deprivation of

the custody or care of a child must establish that there was actual loss of custody of

a child. See Cox, 654 F.3d at 275–76 (“Where there is no actual loss of custody, no

substantive due process claim can lie”); see also Oglesby v. Eikszta, 499 F. App’x

57, 60–61 (2d Cir. 2012) (affirming dismissal of substantive due process claim based

on right of intimate association because “plaintiffs admit[ted] they never lost custody

of any of their children”); Phillips v. County of Orange, 894 F. Supp. 2d 345, 380

(S.D.N.Y. 2012) (finding that plaintiffs failed to state a claim for deprivation of

substantive due process because they never lost custody of their child). Moreover,

“[a]bsent truly extraordinary circumstances, a brief deprivation of custody is

insufficient to state a substantive due process custody claim.” Cox, 654 F.3d at 275.

“Such temporary deprivations do ‘not result in the parents’ wholesale relinquishment

of their right to rear their children,’ so they are not constitutionally outrageous or

conscience-shocking.” Id. (quoting Nicholson v. Scoppetta, 344 F.3d 154, 172 (2d

Cir. 2003)).

Additionally, the Second Circuit has held that “a claim under the Due Process

Clause for infringement of the right to familial associations requires the allegation

that state action was specifically intended to interfere with the family relationship.”

Gorman v. Rensselaer County, 910 F.3d 40, 48 (2d Cir. 2018); see also Calicchio v.

Sachem Cent. Sch. Dist., No. 14-CV-5958, 2020 WL 264959, at *12–13 (E.D.N.Y.

Jan. 17, 2020) (denying summary judgment to defendants on parental liberty claim

where plaintiff testified that he was forced to work for school district without his

parents’ permission and ordered not to tell his parents). Accordingly, “[w]here the

defendants were motivated by other legitimate interests—rather than an intent to

deprive the plaintiff of her rights to associate with her family members—such a

claim cannot survive.” Albert v. City of New York, No. 17-CV-3957, 2019 WL

3804654, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 13, 2019).

a. Individual School District Defendants

In the Amended Complaint, Amarjit alleges that all Defendants violated his

“constitutionally protected right of parental liberty” by “removing [Jazbir and

Tezbir] from their parents’ custody without probable cause and without any

reasonable justification.” ECF No. 45-2 ¶¶ 545–49.

School District Defendants move for summary judgment on Amarjit’s

constitutional parental liberty claim, arguing that they “did not separate the Singhs.”

ECF No. 75-1 at 18. In particular, they assert that they “did not cause the Singh boys

to be hospitalized and did not have the power to determine whether, and for how

long, the Singhs stayed in hospital care.” Id.

In response, Amarjit argues that School District Defendants “set forth

bold-faced [sic] lies, and made numerous misrepresentations to the hospital

personnel in order to have Jazbir Singh and Tezbir Singh held for psychiatric

examinations” over his express objection. ECF No. 77-1 at 45. In so arguing,

Amarjit points to statements included in the Singh brothers’ medical records from

St. Catherine’s and claims that the statements were provided by School District

Defendants and are false. With respect to Jazbir, Amarjit asserts that School District

Defendants falsely informed St. Catherine’s that there were “serious concerns about

the patient’s mood and recent behavior,” that it “appeared Jazbir did not want to

disclose any information and raised suspicion he was somehow involved,” that he

had disturbing videos on his phone, that Jazbir “has been emotionally disconnected

and flat for some time,” that Jazbir’s grades had dropped considerably, and that

Jazbir was involved in disseminating the AirDropped Image with Tezbir. Id. at 27–

29. With respect to Tezbir, Amarjit asserts that School District Defendants

incorrectly told St. Catherine’s that Tezbir had a prior disciplinary incident involving

a Nazi sticker, that Tezbir’s grades had dropped, that he had been watching violent

videos sent by his friends, that Amarjit was teaching Tezbir how to use a “bb” gun,

and that Tezbir had been collecting threatening images on his phone for a month.

Id. at 30–31.

As an initial matter, Amarjit did not lose parental custody of Jazbir and/or

Tezbir at any time during their stay at St. Catherine’s or Sagamore. Although Child

Protective Services was called while the Singhs were at St. Catherine’s, there is no

evidence that any steps were ever taken to deprive Amarjit of custody. Indeed,

Amarjit was able to visit his sons every day while they were at St. Catherine’s and

Sagamore. ECF No. 76-6 at 77 ¶ 62. Thus, because Amarjit did not lose actual

custody of his sons, “no substantive due process claim can lie.” See Cox, 654 F.3d

at 276; cf. Joyner ex rel. Lowry v. Dumpson, 712 F.2d 770, 777–78 (2d Cir. 1983)

(finding that a temporary transfer of custody pursuant to New York’s foster care

statute was insufficient to establish a due process violation in part because it did not

“result in parents’ wholesale relinquishment of their right to rear their children”);

Stollman v. Williams, No. 20-CV-8937, 2023 WL 6294156, at *15–16 (S.D.N.Y.

Sept. 27, 2023) (finding that a temporary separation of child from father for a

weekend until a Child Safety Conference could be heard did not give rise to a

substantive due process violation).

Moreover, no reasonable jury could find that School District Defendants’

actions were outrageous or “conscience-shocking.” Cox, 654 F.3d at 275. Notably,

Plaintiffs acknowledge that School District Defendants “do not have the power to

compel a student to get a psychiatric evaluation” and that School District Defendants

“can only make a recommendation to a parent that a student should get a psych

evaluation.” ECF No. 77 ¶¶ 86–87. Consistent with this authority, School District

Defendants recommended that Tezbir receive a psychiatric evaluation after he

admitted to sending the AirDropped Image, which was perceived to be a school

shooting threat. This recommendation was not outrageous or conscience-shocking.

Cf. Myslow v. New Milford Sch. Dist., No. 3:03-CV-496, 2006 WL 473735, at *13–

14 (D. Conn. Feb. 28, 2006) (concluding that defendants, including school district,

school board, and individual teachers, administrators, and school staff, did not

violate plaintiff’s right to bodily integrity protected by Fourteenth Amendment by

encouraging parents to medicate student for ADHD).

As to Jazbir, although the parties dispute what images the school

administrators found on his phone, Plaintiffs acknowledge that School District

Defendants found at least a video of “a Russian man ordering fifteen cheeseburgers

at a McDonalds with a gun” and “a dirty rap video.” ECF No. 77 ¶ 39. Assistant

Principal Flanagan also believed Jazbir had a “flat affect,” and she was concerned

about Jazbir’s lack of responsiveness to her questioning. ECF No. 76-2 at 48–50

(47:23–49:24), 78 (77:11–16). She was also concerned about how Jazbir was

processing information cognitively and emotionally, based on her training as a

licensed social worker. Id. at 48–50 (47:23–49:24). Additionally, Principal

Trombetta believed that Amarjit was not concerned about Jazbir possessing

inappropriate images on his phone. Id. at 204–05 (100:25–101:8), 221–22 (117:24–

118:9). Based on these concerns and perceptions, the school administrators did not

act in a conscience-shocking way when they recommended that Jazbir receive a

psychiatric examination. Even assuming School District Defendants told Amarjit

that Jazbir would be suspended for several days if he did not receive a psychiatric

evaluation, this still does not rise to the level of egregious behavior required to find

a constitutional violation considering the concerns that School District Defendants

had about Jazbir’s mental well-being. Cf. MC v. Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist., No.

11-CV-1835, 2012 WL 3020087, at *5–6 (S.D.N.Y. July 24, 2012) (concluding that

defendants, including school district, school board, and teachers, did not violate the

Fourteenth Amendment by “taking a student who was not, and had never been,

suicidal and sending him to hospital, where a psychiatric record was taken” (internal

quotation marks and citation omitted)).

To the extent that the information provided by School District Defendants to

St. Catherine’s was false or misleading,30 there is no evidence that the information

was provided with “the type of malice needed to shock the conscience.” See Cox,

654 F.3d at 276 (finding that there was no violation of substantive due process even

if school official had provided “exaggerated and misleading” information to Child

Family Services, resulting in temporary removal of child). Indeed, several of the

statements pointed to by Amarjit as “falsehoods” are merely Principal Trombetta’s

and Assistant Principal Flanagan’s perceptions of and subjective opinions about

Jazbir’s and Tezbir’s moods and behaviors. Other “falsehoods” appear to be facts

that were true as to one brother but misattributed to the other. Cf. Phillips, 894 F.

Supp. 2d at 381 (finding that negligence in handling of child abuse investigation did

not “shock the conscience”).

30 I make no finding regarding whether the statements attributed to School District

Defendants in St. Catherine’s medical records would be admissible at trial as an

exception to the rule against hearsay. See Fed. R. Evid. 802.

Moreover, to the extent that Amarjit argues that School District Defendants

improperly pressured St. Catherine’s to hold the Singh brothers in a manner that

violated the Fourteenth Amendment, there is no evidence in the record that supports

this argument. Amarjit attempts to establish that School District Defendants

compelled St. Catherine’s to hold the Singh brothers by pointing to his own

testimony and Jazbir’s testimony that they were told by hospital staff that the school

had pressured the hospital to keep Jazbir and Tezbir. See ECF No. 77 ¶ 89; ECF No.

78-17 at 68:23–69:12, 79:6–19; ECF No. 78-24 at 109:1–112:10. These statements

are manifestly hearsay, however, and Amarjit cannot rely on them to oppose School

District Defendants’ motion for summary judgment without showing that admissible

evidence will be available at trial. See Burlington Coat Factory Warehouse Corp.

v. Esprit De Corp., 769 F.2d 919, 924 (2d Cir. 1985).

In any event, the record is devoid of any evidence that School District

Defendants specifically intended to interfere with the Singh’s familial relationships

when they recommended that Jazbir and Tezbir receive psychiatric evaluations. See

Gorman, 910 F.3d at 48. Rather, the evidence in the record establishes that School

District Defendants were concerned about the safety of the school and its students,

as well as the well-being of the Singh brothers, when they recommended that Tezbir

and Jazbir receive psychiatric examinations. See ECF No. 76-2 at 46–48 (45:22–

47:16), 75–76 (74:15–75:14), 184 (80:9–19). Accordingly, School District

Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on Amarjit’s parental liberty claim

(the fifty-fifth cause of action).

b. Individual County Defendants

County Defendants also move for summary judgment on Amarjit’s claim for

deprivation of parental liberty. County Defendants argue that the Suffolk County

Police Department has no control over St. Catherine’s and that the County

Defendants were not involved in St. Catherine’s decisions about how to treat the

Singh brothers. ECF No. 78-27 at 17–18. They also argue that Amarjit consented

to the psychiatric evaluation of Jazbir and Tezbir and that Tezbir was properly

transported to St. Catherine’s because he admitted to making a threat of school

violence. Id. at 17.

In response, Amarjit argues that County Defendants deprived him of his

parental rights by collaborating with the School District Defendants in committing

unlawful actions to have the Singh brothers held for examination over his objection.

ECF No. 78-30 at 30–31. Amarjit also disputes that Tezbir was properly transported

because he made a threat of school violence, arguing that County Defendants’ and

School District Defendants’ behavior indicates that they “never treated this as a

credible threat because it never was.” Id. at 30.

County Defendants did not deprive Amarjit of his right to parental liberty

protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. As established above, Amarjit did not lose

custody of his sons and so his Fourteenth Amendment claim cannot be sustained.

See Cox, 654 F.3d at 276. Even assuming that Amarjit did lose custody, County

Defendants did not act in any way that would “shock the conscience.” Construing

the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, Amarjit did not consent to

psychiatric evaluations for Jazbir and Tezbir. See ECF No. 78-29 ¶¶ 31–33.

Nevertheless, County Defendants did not shock the conscience when they

determined that the Singh brothers should receive psychiatric examinations and

subsequently transported them to St. Catherine’s. County Defendants had

participated in an investigation into a perceived school shooting threat, and during

the course of this investigation, Tezbir admitted to sending the threatening image.

Consequently, it was not outrageous in any sense for County Defendants to decide

that Tezbir should receive a psychiatric evaluation.

As to Jazbir, as discussed above, while the parties disagree about what images

were found on Jazbir’s phone, Plaintiffs acknowledge that School District

Defendants found at least “a Russian man ordering fifteen cheeseburgers at a

McDonalds with a gun” and “a dirty rap video.” ECF No. 77 ¶ 39. The school

administrators also expressed concern about Jazbir’s affect, unresponsiveness, and

cognitive and emotional processing and about Amarjit’s lack of concern about the

images on Jazbir’s phone. ECF No. 76-2 at 48–50 (47:23–49:24), 78 (77:11–16),

204–05 (100:25–101:8), 221–22 (117:24–118:9). Based on the information

available to them at the time, it was not “conscience shocking” for County

Defendants to decide that Jazbir should likewise receive a psychiatric evaluation.

To the extent that Amarjit argues that County Defendants’ behavior was outrageous

because they did not believe there was a credible school shooting threat, this

argument is belied by the record, which shows that County Defendants diligently

responded to and investigated School District Defendants’ report of the AirDropped

Image. See ECF No. 78-21 at 53:4–9 (testimony from Detective Pagano that he

determined the AirDropped Image was “a credible threat”).

There is also no indication in the record that County Defendants determined

that Jazbir and Tezbir should receive psychiatric evaluations to interfere with the

Singh family relations. Rather, the testimony from County Defendants indicates that

they brought Jazbir and Tezbir in for evaluations because they believed that the

Singh brothers posed a threat to themselves and/or to others and were concerned

about their well-being. See ECF No. 78-28 at 52:23–53:9, 55:6–18, 58:8–59:6.

Indeed, County Defendants told Amarjit that he should follow the police car that was

transporting Jazbir to St. Catherine’s, which is inconsistent with the notion that they

were transporting Jazbir to the hospital to interfere with Amarjit’s and Jazbir’s

relationship. Cf. Anthony, 339 F.3d at 143 (finding that police officers’

transportation of plaintiff’s half-sister to hospital for psychiatric evaluation was not

“shocking, arbitrary, and egregious” in part because police officers had attempted to

contact plaintiff before the transportation). County Defendants also did not in any

way interfere with Amarjit’s ability to visit his sons when they were at the hospital.

See Lara-Grimaldi v. County of Putnam, No. 17-CV-622, 2019 WL 3499543, at *4

(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 1, 2019) (dismissing familial-association claim because plaintiff

failed to establish that police officers “specifically intended to interfere with the

family relationship” where defendant police officers were stationed in the hospital

room of plaintiff’s family member but did not obstruct plaintiff from

“communicating or otherwise interacting with” her family member). Because there

is no evidence that County Defendants intended to interfere with Amarjit’s

relationships with his children, they are entitled to summary judgment on the

parental liberty claim (the fifty-fifth cause of action).

c. St. Catherine’s

St. Catherine’s31 also moves for summary judgment on Amarjit’s deprivation

of parental liberty claim. St. Catherine’s argues that it is entitled to summary

judgment on this claim because: Amarjit consented to the evaluation of Jazbir;

Tezbir was evaluated because of his Class A misdemeanor; Amarjit signed consent

forms for both sons to receive treatment at St. Catherine’s; and both Amarjit and his

wife had complete access to their sons while they were at St. Catherine’s. ECF No.

31 In its reply brief in support of its motion for summary judgment, St. Catherine’s

argues that its motion for summary judgment should be granted on the § 1983 claim

because it is not a state actor and was not “acting under color of state law.” See ECF

No. 76-7 at 42–43. St. Catherine’s failed to raise this argument earlier, however,

and it is well-settled that new arguments may not be raised in reply briefs. See Knipe

v. Skinner, 999 F.2d 708, 711 (2d Cir. 1993) (“Arguments may not be made for the

first time in a reply brief.”). Accordingly, I do not consider this argument and

assume for the purposes of this motion that St. Catherine’s is a state actor.

76 at 185–86. St. Catherine’s also argues that Jazbir and Tezbir were only held at

the hospital for several days because their parents refused to consent to a transfer to

another facility, which made it harder for St. Catherine’s to locate a facility that

would accept a transfer of the Singhs. Id.

In response, Amarjit argues that St. Catherine’s interfered with his right to

parental liberty by refusing to discharge Jazbir and Tezbir after Amarjit had told the

hospital that he would “ensure his sons received the appropriate evaluations upon

discharge.” ECF No. 76-6 at 57. Amarjit disputes that Jazbir and Tezbir were held

for several days only because he and his wife would not consent to a transfer to a

facility with a pediatric psychiatrist, arguing that he was cooperative up until the

time that he was told that Jazbir and Tezbir were going to be admitted to an inpatient

psychiatric facility and that he told the physicians at St. Catherine’s that he would

ensure his sons received evaluations if they were discharged. Id.

St. Catherine’s did not violate Amarjit’s right to parental liberty. As

discussed, Amarjit did not lose custody of his sons during their time at St.

Catherine’s. See Cox, 654 F.3d at 276. Indeed, while they were at St. Catherine’s,

Amarjit was able to visit his sons every day for multiple hours. ECF No. 76-6 at 77

¶ 62; see also Anthony, 339 F.3d at 143 (citing the fact that “hospital staff

accommodated [plaintiff’s] interest in staying with [her half-sister at the hospital]”

in determining that there was no substantive due process violation). Thus, Amarjit’s

Fourteenth Amendment claim cannot be sustained.

Moreover, St. Catherine’s conduct was not outrageous or conscience

shocking. Upon Jazbir’s and Tezbir’s arrival at the hospital, St. Catherine’s

psychiatrists conducted independent evaluations of the Singh brothers and

determined that they required further treatment at a facility with a child psychiatrist.

ECF No. 76-6 at 65 ¶ 27, 66 ¶ 29, 78 ¶ 68, 80 ¶ 73. There is no evidence that this

decision was based on anything other than the psychiatrists’ concerns about Jazbir’s

and Tezbir’s mental well-being and the safety of others in their community. See

ECF No. 76-2 at 310–11 (62:9–63:19); ECF No. 76-3 at 176 (27:914), 179–81

(30:10–32:3). Moreover, the hospital’s conduct did not demonstrate “deliberate

indifference” towards Amarjit’s parental rights “in a manner that was shocking

under the circumstances.” Swanhart, 2023 WL 4534638, at *11. The physicians at

St. Catherine’s informed Amarjit about their evaluations of his sons and their

conclusions that Jazbir and Tezbir required further evaluation, and Amarjit was

asked to consent to the inpatient evaluation of his sons, which he chose not to do.

ECF No. 76-6 at 68 ¶ 33, 80 ¶ 73. He was thereafter informed of St. Catherine’s

efforts to find a hospital that could accept the Singh brothers and to relocate them to

another hospital. ECF No. 78-26 at 206:8–14.

In any event, there is no evidence in the record that indicates that St.

Catherine’s acted with the intent to interfere with the Singh family relationships.

Rather, as noted, the hospital permitted Amarjit to visit his sons every day and

informed him of the physicians’ medical determinations that Jazbir and Tezbir

required further examination, which is inconsistent with the notion that St.

Catherine’s acted with the intent to interfere with Amarjit’s relationship with his

sons. See ECF No. 76-6 at 77 ¶ 62; ECF No. 78-26 at 206:8–14; see also Anthony,

339 F.3d at 143. Accordingly, St. Catherine’s is entitled to summary judgment on

the parental liberty claim (the fifty-fifth cause of action).

5. Municipal Liability

Plaintiffs assert causes of action against Sachem Central School District and

Suffolk County Police Department for their role in the alleged constitutional

violations suffered by Plaintiffs based on theories of municipal liability.

A municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior

theory. In Monell v. Department of Social Services of City of New York, the Supreme

Court held that “it is when execution of a government’s policy or custom, whether

made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to

represent official policy, inflicts the injury that the government as an entity is

responsible under § 1983.” 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). Thus, “[a] municipality will

not be held liable under Section 1983 unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the

allegedly unconstitutional action of an individual law enforcement official was taken

pursuant to a policy or custom ‘officially adopted and promulgated by that

[municipality’s] officers.’” Abreu v. City of New York, No. 04-CV-1721, 2006 WL

401651, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 22, 2006) (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 690). In the

Second Circuit, the elements of a Monell claim are: “(1) a municipal policy or

custom that (2) causes the plaintiff to be subjected to (3) the deprivation of a

constitutional right.” Agosto v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 982 F.3d 86, 97 (2d Cir.

2020). The “policy or custom” requirement may be satisfied under one or more of

the following theories:

(1) the existence of a formal policy which is officially endorsed by the

municipality; (2) actions taken or decisions made by municipal officials

with final decision making authority, which caused the alleged

violation of plaintiff’s civil rights; (3) a practice so persistent and

widespread that it constitutes a custom of which constructive

knowledge can be implied on the part of policymaking officials; or (4) a

failure by policy makers to properly train or supervise their

subordinates, amounting to deliberate indifference to the rights of those

who come in contact with municipal employees.

Calicchio v. Sachem Cent. Sch. Dist., 185 F. Supp. 3d 303, 311 (E.D.N.Y. 2016).

Under the final decision-maker theory, a municipality may be held liable for

the decisions or acts of a single official if that official is a decision-maker who

“possesses final authority to establish municipal policy with respect to the action

ordered.” Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 481 (1986). To have final

policy-making authority, the official in question must, with respect to the conduct

challenged, “be responsible under state law for making policy in that area of the

municipality’s business or must have the power to make official policy on a

particular issue or must possess final authority to establish municipal policy with

respect to the action ordered.” Wang v. Bethlehem Cent. Sch. Dist., No.

21-CV-1023, 2022 WL 3154142, at *9 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 8, 2022) (cleaned up).

Under the failure-to-train theory, a municipality may be liable if the plaintiff

shows that his “constitutional injury was the result of a failure to train or supervise

that amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of those with whom the

municipality’s employees interact.” Gordon v. Niagara Wheatfield Cent. Sch. Dist.,

No. 22-CV-172, 2023 WL 6520216, at *14 (W.D.N.Y. Aug. 22, 2023). However,

“[a] municipality’s culpability for a deprivation of rights is at its most tenuous where

a claim turns on a failure to train.” Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 61 (2011).

“[A] municipality’s failure to train its employees in a relevant respect must amount

to ‘deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom the [untrained

employees] come into contact.’” Id. (quoting City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S.

378, 388 (1989)). “Deliberate indifference is a ‘stringent standard of fault,’ which

requires ‘proof that a municipal actor disregarded a known or obvious consequence’

of the particular failure in training.” Selvaggio v. Patterson, 93 F. Supp. 3d 54, 77

(E.D.N.Y. 2015) (quoting Connick, 563 U.S. at 61). In order to succeed on this

theory of liability, plaintiffs must also show “a specific deficiency in the

[municipality’s] training program and establish that that deficiency is ‘closely

related to the ultimate injury’ such that it ‘actually caused’ the constitutional

deprivation.” Amnesty Am. v. Town of W. Hartford, 361 F.3d 113, 129 (2d Cir. 2004)

(quoting City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 391).

a. Sachem Central School District

Plaintiffs allege that Defendant Sachem Central School District is liable under

multiple theories of Monell liability. In the Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs allege

that Defendant Sachem Central School District “had a custom and/or policy of

seizing cellular telephones from students,” which authorized the seizure and search

of students’ cell phones “even in the absence of criminal activity or probable cause,”

and that this custom and/or policy caused Jazbir’s and Tezbir’s cell phones to be

searched. ECF No. 45-2 ¶¶ 161–67. In their opposition to Sachem Central School

District’s motion for summary judgment, Plaintiffs argue in particular that Principal

Trombetta and Assistant Principal Flanagan were policymakers within the meaning

of Monell and that the alleged constitutional violations occurred “in this context.”

ECF No. 77-1 at 43–44. Plaintiffs also allege that Sachem Central School District

failed to train its staff “with respect to the Fourth Amendment rights of students in

general, and more particularly when it came to protected information in cellular

telephones,” and that this failure to train amounted to deliberate indifference to the

rights of students and resulted in the searches of Jazbir’s and Tezbir’s cell phones.

ECF No. 45-2 ¶¶ 168–74.

School District Defendants move for summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ Monell

claims. They argue that there can be no Monell liability because there was no

constitutional violation. ECF No. 75-1 at 18. In the alternative, School District

Defendants argue that, even if there had been a constitutional violation, the school

district is not liable because “there is no unconstitutional policy, practice, custom, or

act of a final decisionmaker that caused Plaintiffs to suffer such a violation.” Id. In

response, Plaintiffs argue that Principal Trombetta and Assistant Principal Flanagan

are policy makers under New York law and, as such, the municipality should be held

liable for their actions. ECF No. 77-1 at 42–44. Plaintiffs point to several

regulations which they claim establish that Principal Trombetta and Assistant

Principal Flanagan had policymaking powers within the meaning of Monell. Id. at

43–44. In reply, however, School District Defendants assert that none of the cited

rules establish that Principal Trombetta or Assistant Principal Flanagan were final

decisionmakers or policymakers. ECF No. 79 at 13.

Sachem Central School District cannot be held liable under Monell because

there is no evidence that indicates that the school district had any policy and/or

custom that caused Jazbir and/or Tezbir to be subjected to the potentially

unconstitutional cell phone searches. With respect to the final-decision-maker

theory of liability, Sachem Central School District cannot be held liable for the

searches of Jazbir’s and Tezbir’s cell phones because Principal Trombetta and

Assistant Principal Flanagan, who carried out the searches, did not have “final

policymaking authority in the particular area of the municipality’s business related

to the actions.” Wang, 2022 WL 3154142, at *9. New York state law clearly grants

policymaking authority over school order and discipline to the Board of Education.

At the time of the conduct at issue, New York law provided that the “board of

education of every union free school district shall have power, and it shall be its

duty: . . . To establish such rules and regulations concerning the order and discipline

of the schools.” N.Y. Educ. Law § 1709(2) (McKinney 2011); see also Baeringer

v. Plainview-Old Bethpage Cent. Sch. Dist., No. 23-CV-03557, 2024 WL 3161814,

at *5 (E.D.N.Y. June 25, 2024) (“New York law grants the Board of Education, not

the principal, the power ‘[t]o establish such rules and regulations [as shall seem

proper] concerning the order and discipline of the schools.’” (quoting Wang, 2022

WL 3154142, at *11)). The seizure and search of students and their cell phones

following a perceived school shooting threat would fall within “the order and

discipline of the schools.” See Wang, 2022 WL 3154142, at *11 (“The authority

granted under § 1709 [to the Board of Education] includes authority to enact policies

to discipline students for misbehavior or acts that endanger the morals or welfare of

others, even where such behavior occurs off campus.”). Thus, because the Board of

Education has final policymaking authority with respect to the conduct at issue, it

cannot be that Principal Trombetta and/or Assistant Principal Flanagan, who are

overseen by the Board of Education, have such authority. The statutes that Plaintiffs

cite do not alter this analysis because they are irrelevant to the conduct at issue,

governing areas such as the performance reviews of classroom teachers, teacher

certification, and curricula. See ECF No. 79 at 13.

With respect to the failure-to-train theory of liability, Plaintiffs’ allegation that

the municipality “failed to train its personnel with respect to the Fourth Amendment

rights of students in general, and more particularly when it came to protected

information in cellular telephones” is entirely conclusory. ECF No. 45-2 ¶¶ 168–

74. The record is devoid of any facts about what training the school district did or

did not provide with respect to cell phone searches, and there are no facts in the

record that would allow a jury to infer that a lack of training caused any injuries to

Plaintiffs. There is also no indication that any failure to train that did occur

amounted to deliberate indifference, which requires “proof that a municipal actor

disregarded a known or obvious consequence’ of the particular failure in training.”

See Selvaggio, 93 F. Supp. 3d at 77 (granting summary judgment to defendants when

there was “no evidence to support [p]laintiff’s failure-to-train claim with respect to

her alleged false arrest” in the “entire record”).

To the extent that Amarjit asserts a Monell claim against Sachem Central

School District in alleging that all Defendants violated his constitutional right to

parental liberty, no Monell claim can lie against the school district pursuant to § 1983

because there was no underlying constitutional violation committed by the

individual School District defendants. See, e.g., DeFabio v. E. Hampton Union Free

Sch. Dist., 658 F. Supp. 2d 461, 498 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) (“[A]s the [c]ourt finds as a

matter of law on summary judgment that no constitutional violation was committed

against plaintiff by the individual defendants . . . no Monell claim can lie against the

District or School Board pursuant to § 1983.”). In any event, even if such a claim

could lie, summary judgment would also be warranted in favor of Sachem Central

School District because Plaintiffs have failed to proffer any evidence of a policy,

custom, or failure to train that led to the alleged deprivation of parental liberty.

Accordingly, Sachem Central School District is entitled to summary judgment on

Plaintiffs’ Monell claims (the fifth, sixth, and fifty-fifth causes of action).

b. Suffolk County Police Department

With respect to Suffolk County Police Department, Plaintiffs allege that the

police department has a policy of “accepting at face value anything deemed a ‘threat’

by school officials” and “defer[ring] to school officials where anything by them is

deemed to be a ‘threat,’” and that this policy “shows deliberate indifference to the

rights of the students” and “led directly to the arrest, detention, and commitment” of

Jazbir and Tezbir. ECF No. 45-2 ¶¶ 445–53.

As an initial matter, County Defendants argue that the Suffolk County Police

Department must be dismissed from this suit because it is not a suable entity. ECF

No. 78-27 at 24. Plaintiffs do not offer any arguments to the contrary. See ECF No.

78-30 at 36. Indeed, it is well-settled that “[u]nder New York law, departments that

are merely administrative arms of a municipality do not have a legal identity separate

and apart from the municipality and, therefore, cannot sue or be sued.” Davis v.

Lynbrook Police Dep’t, 224 F. Supp. 2d 463, 477 (E.D.N.Y. 2002); see also Paulette

v. Suffolk Cnty. 5th Precinct Police Dep’t, No. 22-CV-2913, 2022 WL 2803360, at

*3 (E.D.N.Y. July 18, 2022) (dismissing claims against Suffolk County Police

Department because department was a non-suable entity). Accordingly, Suffolk

County Police Department cannot be maintained as a party to this suit.

Plaintiffs request that they be given “leave to amend the caption and the

pleadings to reflect the name of the proper entity in this matter, and have the

summons and complaint read ‘County of Suffolk s/h/a Suffolk County Police

Department.’” ECF No. 78-30 at 36. To do so would be futile, however, because

the record shows that there is no basis for imposing liability against Suffolk

County—the record is entirely devoid of any evidence that would support a finding

of liability against Suffolk County under Monell.

In their summary judgment brief, County Defendants argue that “plaintiff can

produce no evidence of a County policy, custom or procedure that lead [sic] to or

was the proximate cause of the alleged constitutional violation.” ECF No. 78-27 at

18. Plaintiffs, in response, point to a single statement made by Detective Pagano in

his deposition, claiming that he “expressly noted that in conducting the searches in

this matter he was following the policies of the Suffolk County Police Department.”

ECF No. 78-30 at 31–32 (citing ECF No. 78-21 at 40–42). But Detective Pagano

only stated that he was following Suffolk County Police Department policy when he

asked Amarjit if he could search the Singh residence. See ECF No. 78-21 at 42 (“It’s

just our policy when there is a school incident or a school threat involving a weapon

that we ask the residents of the individuals to search their home.”). Given that the

search of the Singh residence is not at issue in the alleged constitutional violation,

this statement does not support liability under Monell against Suffolk County.

Additionally, Plaintiffs submitted with their opposition to County

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment a section of the Suffolk County Police

Department Rules and Procedures titled “Patrol Operations—Police Response to

Incidents Involving the Mentally Disturbed.” See ECF No. 78-28 at 5. Plaintiffs

concede, however, that County Defendants “failed to comply with the policies and

procedures set forth by the Suffolk County Police Department,” including the

provided section, ECF No. 78-29 ¶ 44, so there cannot be Monell liability premised

on County Defendants’ compliance with this policy. As discussed, in order for a

municipality to be held liable, Plaintiffs are responsible for showing that the

allegedly illegal action was taken “pursuant to” municipal policy. DeFabio, 658 F.

Supp. 2d at 497. If the individual County Defendants “failed to comply with the

policies and procedures” when they committed the alleged illegal actions, they were

not acting “pursuant to” Suffolk County policy. See Ricciuti v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth.,

941 F.2d 119, 122 (2d Cir. 1991) (“In order to establish the liability of [a

municipality and its supervisory officials] in an action under § 1983 for

unconstitutional acts by [a lower-echelon employee], a plaintiff must show that the

violation of his constitutional rights resulted from a municipal custom or policy.”

(emphasis added)). Moreover, the record is entirely devoid of any evidence that the

individual County Defendants’ alleged failure to comply with the policy in this case

was due to Suffolk County’s failure to train its employees.

As with Sachem Central School District, there is also no basis to assert a

Monell claim against Suffolk County based on Amarjit’s parental liberty claim

pursuant to § 1983 because there was no underlying constitutional violation. See,

e.g., DeFabio, 658 F. Supp. 2d at 498. Moreover, even if there had been a

constitutional deprivation, there is no evidence in the record that would establish that

a Suffolk County policy, custom, or failure to train led to the violation of Amarjit’s

parental liberty.

Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ Monell claims against Defendant Suffolk County

Police Department are dismissed and, to the extent Plaintiffs’ request is a motion for

leave to amend the complaint to add Suffolk County as a defendant, the motion is

denied as futile. See Milanese v. Rust-Oleum Corp., 244 F.3d 104, 110–11 (2d Cir.

2001) (noting that courts at the summary judgment stage determine whether a

proposed amendment would be futile under the summary judgment standard).

IV. State Law Causes of Action

Plaintiffs assert state law claims against all Defendants for false arrest, false

imprisonment, assault and battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, abuse

of process, prima facie tort, and negligence and claims against St. Catherine’s for

medical malpractice.32 ECF No. 45-2 ¶¶ 454–539. Amarjit also asserts a claim for

parental loss of services against all Defendants under state law. Id. ¶¶ 540–44.

Plaintiffs do not oppose Defendants’ motions for summary judgment as to the prima

facie tort and assault and battery claims. See ECF No. 77-1 at 47–48; ECF No. 76-6

at 57; ECF No. 78-30 at 29–30. Accordingly, Defendants are entitled to summary

judgment on those claims (the forty-sixth and forty-ninth causes of action).

When a district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original

jurisdiction, it may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over remaining

state law claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). “While dismissal of the state law

claims is not mandatory, when ‘all federal-law claims are eliminated before trial, the

balance of factors to be considered under the pendent jurisdiction doctrine—judicial

economy, convenience, fairness, and comity—will point towards declining to

exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims.’” DeFelice ex rel.

DeFelice, 511 F. Supp. 2d at 247 (citation omitted) (quoting Carnegie-Mellon Univ.

v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 n.7 (1988)); see also United Mine Workers v. Gibbs,

32 Although Plaintiffs do not specify the law under which they bring these claims in

in the enumerated causes of action in the Amended Complaint, they clearly state in

the first paragraph of the Amended Complaint that these claims are “pendent state

claims.” See ECF No. 45-2 at 2; see also ECF No. 45-3 at 2 (describing that

Plaintiffs brought negligence claims and “other tort claims under State law”). Thus,

although several of these causes of action could have been brought under § 1983, I

interpret these claims to be brought under state law. See Hammond v. Long, 727 F.

Supp. 3d 85, 90 n.1 (D. Conn. 2024) (considering the substance of plaintiff’s

complaint to determine if cause of action was brought under § 1983 or state law).

383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966) (“Certainly, if the federal claims are dismissed before

trial . . . the state claims should be dismissed as well.”); Birch v. Pioneer Credit

Recovery, Inc., No. 06-CV-6497F, 2007 WL 1703914, at *5 (W.D.N.Y. June 8,

2007) (“In the interest of comity, the Second Circuit instructs that ‘absent

exceptional circumstances,’ where federal claims can be disposed of pursuant to

Rule 12(b)(6) or summary judgment grounds, courts should ‘abstain from exercising

pendent jurisdiction.’” (quoting Walker v. Time Life Films, Inc., 784 F.2d 44, 53 (2d

Cir. 1986))). Having disposed of all federal claims falling within this Court’s

original jurisdiction, I decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the

remaining state law claims. The state law claims are therefore dismissed without

prejudice to their refiling in state court.

V. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, School District Defendants’ motion for summary

judgment, ECF No. 75, is granted as to the federal claims and the claims for assault

and battery and prima facie tort. St. Catherine’s motion for summary judgment, ECF

No. 76, is granted as to the federal

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