Ford v. Rickard

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

FRANCIS FORD, : No. 3:24-CV-1557

Petitioner :

: (Judge Munley)

Vv. :

WARDEN FMC ROCHESTER, ' :

Respondent :

MEMORANDUM

Petitioner Francis Ford initiated the above-captioned action by filing a pro

se petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. He asks the

court to order the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) to “recatculate” his projected

prerelease custody date with consideration of both his earned time credits under

the First Step Act (FSA), Pub. L. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194 (2018), and days he

believes he is owed under the Second Chance Act of 2007 (SCA), Pub. L. No.

110-199, 122 Stat. 657 (2008). For the following reasons, the court must dismiss

Ford’s Section 2241 petition.

1 When Ford filed the instant petition, he was incarcerated at FCI Schuylkill and named the

warden of that facility (“Warden Rickard”) as Respondent. (See Doc. 1 at 1). Ford has since

been transferred to FMC Rochester. The court will therefore substitute the appropriate

Respondent in this case. See 28 U.S.C. § 2242; Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 434 (2004)

(noting that, in federal habeas proceedings, proper respondent is “the person who has custody

over [the petitioner] (alteration in original)); Barry v. Bergen Cnty. Probation Dep't, 128 F.3¢

152, 162 (3d Cir. 1997) (citing Braden v. 30th Jud. Cir. Crt. of Ky., 410 U.S. 484, 494-95 (1973)

("The writ of habeas corpus does not act upon the prisoner who seeks relief, but upon the persor

who holds him in what is alleged to be unlawful custedy.”)).

l. BACKGROUND

Ford is currently serving a 63-month sentence imposed in 2023 by the

United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia for Hobbs Act

Robbery and Conspiracy to Commit Hobbs Act Robbery. (Doc. 14-2 at 1] 3;

Doc. 14-3 at 2). His current projected release date, via FSA release, is October

8, 2026. (See Doc. 14-3 at 2).

Ford lodged the instant Section 2241 petition in September 2024. (See

generally Doc. 1). In that petition, Ford broadly requested a “complete review" of

his FSA time credit calculations, but failed to proffer any argument or explanation

as to why the BOP’s FSA calculations were incorrect. (See Doc. 1 at 9: Doc. 9 at

1-2). The court thus ordered Ford to show cause as to why his Section 2241

petition should be granted, giving him 21 days to file an amended petition that

properly set forth his argument or arguments regarding the alleged FSA credit

dispute. (See Doc. 9 at 2).

The day after the court issued its show-cause order, the court received an

amended petition from Ford. (Doc. 10). In that amended petition, Ford asked

the court to order the BOP to “recalculate” his prerelease custody date to include

both FSA time credits and SCA placement days. (See id. at 19). Ford requests

6.3 months (ten percent of his sentence) in SCA days, and 12 months in FSA

credits toward prerelease custody—for a total of 18.3 months’ prerelease

custody—although he does not explain how he arrived at the 12-month FSA

credit calculation. (See id.) Ford also responded to the show cause order. (See

Doc. 11). However, that filing states only that he “was supposed to get 6 months

halfway house” but was only given “75 days,” apparently referring to SCA

conditional placement days recommended by the BOP. (See id. at 1, 4).

Respondent timely responded to Ford’s Section 2241 petition and its

supplements. (See generally Doc. 14). Ford did not file a traverse and the time

for doing so has passed. His Section 2241 petition, therefore, is ripe for

disposition.

ll. DISCUSSION

As best as the court can discern, Ford appears to contend that the BOP

miscalculated his prerelease custody time and he should have been awarded

18.3 months in prerelease custody by combining his SCA days and FSA time

credits. Respondent counters that Ford failed to exhaust his administrative

remedies and that, even if he had properly exhausted his claims, they are

substantively meritless. Respondent is correct on both accounts.

A. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

Although there is no explicit statutory exhaustion requirement for Section

2241 habeas petitions, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit

has consistently held that exhaustion applies to such claims. See Callwood v.

Enos, 230 F.3d 627, 634 (3d Cir. 2000) (citing Schandelmeier v. Cunningham,

819 F.2d 52, 53 (3d Cir. 1986)); Moscato v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 98 F.3d 757,

760 (3d Cir. 1996). Exhaustion allows the relevant agency to develop a factual

record and apply its expertise, conserves judicial resources, and provides

agencies the opportunity to “correct their own errors” thereby fostering

“administrative autonomy.” Moscato, 98 F.3d at 761-62 (citations omitted).

The Bureau of Prisons has a specific internal system through which federal

prisoners can request review of nearly any aspect of their imprisonment. See

generally 28 C.F.R. §§ 542.10-.19. That process begins with an informal request

to staff and progresses to formal review by the warden, appeal with the Regional

Director, and—ultimately—final appeal to the General Counsel. See id. §§

542.13-.15.

Exhaustion is the rule in most cases, and faijure to exhaust will generally

preclude federal habeas review. See Moscato, 98 F.3d at 761. Only in rare

circumstances is exhaustion of administrative remedies not required. For

example, exhaustion is unnecessary if the issue presented is one that consists

purely of statutory construction. See Vasquez v. Strada, 684 F.3d 431, 433-34

(3d Cir. 2012) (citing Bradshaw v. Carlson, 682 F.2d 1050, 1052 (3d Cir. 1981)).

Exhaustion is likewise not required when it would be futile. Rose v. Lundy, 455

U.S. 509, 516 n.7 (1982): see Cottillion v. United Refining Co., 781 F.3d 47, 54

(3d Cir. 2015) (affirming, in ERISA context, futility exception to exhaustion

requirement). “In order to invoke the futility exception to exhaustion, a party must

‘provide a clear and positive showing’ of futility before the District Court.” Wilson

v. MVM, Inc., 475 F.3d 166, 175 (3d Cir. 2007) (quoting D'Amico v. CBS Corp.,

297 F.3d 287, 293 (3d Cir. 2002)).

The record plainly reflects that Ford did not exhaust his administrative

remedies with respect to any prerelease custody claim. To date, Ford has filed

only one administrative remedy while in BOP custody. (See Doc. 14-2 at 3 □□ 8).

That remedy, number 1206348-F1, concerned the Inmate Financial

Responsibility Program (IFRP) and was denied by the warden in August 2024.

(See Doc. 14-4 at 2). Ford did not appeal this denial! to the Regional Director or

the General Counsel (sometimes referred to as “Central Office”). (See id.; see

also Doc. 14-2 at 3 J 8).

Proper exhaustion requires an inmate to complete each step of their

facility’s grievance process and to do so properly so that the agency decides the

issue on the merits. See Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 90 (2006) (explaining

that proper administrative exhaustion “means using all steps that the agency

holds out, and doing so properly (so that the agency addresses the issues on the

merits)” (citation omitted)). Ford plainly failed to file a relevant administrative

remedy regarding prerelease custody calculations, and his failure to do so

precludes this court from ruling on the merits of his Section 2241 petition. See

Moscato v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 98 F.3d 757, 762 (3d Cir. 1996); Ryan v.

United States, 415 F. App’x 345, 347 (3d Cir. 2011) (nonprecedential) (“As

[Petitioner] readily acknowledges that he failed to exhaust available

administrative grievance processes, the District Court was correct to dismiss his

petition.” (citing Moscato, 98 F.3d at 760)).

B. Merits of Prerelease Custody Claim

Even if Ford had exhausted his prerelease custody challenge, it is likely

meritless. Ford is not entitled to any particular amount of prerelease custody

time under the Second Chance Act, and his assertion of being owed 12 months

of FSA credits toward prerelease custody is simply incorrect.

First, as to Ford’s claim that he should be given 6.3 months of SCA

conditional placement days (ten percent of his 63-month sentence) rather than

the 75 days the BOP recommended, that claim is a nonstarter. The law is well

settled that the award of prerelease custody days under the SCA is statutorily

committed to the exclusive discretion of the BOP, and thus an inmate has no

right or entitlement to a certain amount of SCA prerelease custody. See Woodall

v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 432 F.3d 235, 251 (3d Cir. 2005) (explaining, with

reference to the SCA, “that the BOP may assign a prisoner to [prerelease

custody] does not mean that it must”). All that is required is a good-faith,

individualized review of an inmate’s potential transfer to prerelease custody,

which review must consider the statutory factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b).

See id.; Brown v. Warden Fairton FCI, 617 F. App’x 117, 119 (3d Cir. 2015)

(nonprecedential). Ford received this individualized determination, (see Doc. 11

at 4), and thus he is not entitled to any further relief with respect to the Second

Chance Act portion of his habeas claim. See Brown, 617 F. App’x at 119.

Next, Ford claims—without any support or explanation—that he is entitled

to 12 months of FSA credits toward prerelease custody. Ford is mistaken. Per

the latest FSA Time Credit Assessment on record, (See Doc. 14-5), Ford has

accrued 240 days of FSA credits. (See id. at 1). The BOP has chosen to apply

these credits toward early release rather than toward time in prerelease custody,

resulting in Ford’s release date being advanced by 240 days. (See id.; Doc. 14-3

at 2). Whether to apply FSA credits toward early release or toward early

placement in prerelease custody is statutorily committed to the BOP'’s discretion.

See 18 U.S.C. § 3632(d)(4)(C) (“The Director of the Bureau of Prisons shall

transfer eligible prisoners, as determined under section 3624(g), into prerelease

custody or supervised release.”). The FSA component of Ford’s claim is

therefore both fatally undeveloped and meritless.

In sum, because Ford failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, the

court must dismiss his Section 2241 petition. See Moscato, 98 F.3d at 762;

Ryan, 415 F. App’x at 347. Even if Ford had properly exhausted his claims,

those claims appear to lack any basis in law or fact.

Ill. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the court will dismiss Ford’s petition for a writ of

habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. An appropriate Order follows.

Date: b| hs. BY TE Vio ()

/ JUDGE JULIA K. MUNLE*

| United States 7