Baldwin v. Williams

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA

CHARLESTON DIVISION

TRISTAN BALDWIN,

Plaintiff

v. Case No. 2:24-cv-00538

(Consolidated with Case No.

2:25-cv-00009)

DERRICK WILLIAMS, U.S. MARSHAL,

2 UNIDENTIFIED MARSHALS, and

1 UNIDENTIFIED KANAWHA COUNTY SHERIFF (“JOHN DOES”),

Defendants.

AMENDED PROPOSED FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION

This matter is assigned to the Honorable Joseph R. Goodwin, United States

District Judge, and it is referred to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). Pending before the Court is Defendant Derrick

Williams’ Motion to Dismiss or, in the alternative, Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF

No. 32).

I. RELEVANT FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On September 7, 2023, an arrest warrant for Tristan Monroe Baldwin

(“Plaintiff”) was received by the United States Marshal Service (“USMS”) concerning

violations of Plaintiff’s terms of federal supervised release. (ECF No. 32, Ex. 1; ECF No.

33 at 1). The warrant was assigned to the S/WV CUFFED Task Force (“Task Force”).

(Id.) According to the Declarations of Defendant Deputy United States Marshal Derrick

Williams (“Williams”) and Supervisory Deputy United States Marshal Frederick W.

Lamey, all defendants named herein were working as members of the Task Force at the

time of Plaintiff’s arrest on the warrant on September 18, 2023. (ECF No. 41, Exs. 1 and

2).

This matter is proceeding on Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint. (ECF No. 20). The

Amended Complaint alleges that, on September 18, 2023, while he and his uncle were

unloading materials at a recycling center in or around Charleston/Sissonville, West

Virginia, Plaintiff received a telephone call from his former fiancée’s phone, but it was

an unidentified United States Marshal on the phone, who directed him to turn himself

in for an alleged violation of his terms of supervised release. (Id. at 1). Plaintiff stated

that he was scared and offered to turn himself in at the courthouse, but the Marshal

refused. Plaintiff hung up the phone and asked his uncle to take him to the courthouse

when they were finished unloading their materials. (Id.) Shortly thereafter, Plaintiff

heard someone say, “Put your fucking hands up!” and Plaintiff “froze with [his] hands in

the air.” (Id.) He further claims that he heard undecipherable screaming and was then

“maliciously slammed to the ground and kneed, punched, [and] kicked all in the

temples, face and head area.” (Id.)

Plaintiff claims that he was “not lucid” and drifted in and out of consciousness.

(Id.) Although in the initial complaint, Plaintiff alleged that he “remembers nothing

until he woke up in ICU at General in Charleston[,]” in the Amended Complaint, he

recalls being taken first to the South Central Regional Jail (“SCRJ”) where he was

evaluated by prison medical staff, with photographs being taken and reports being

made. (ECF No. 2-1 at 1; ECF No. 20 at 1). He was then denied entrance into the jail

and was taken to the hospital by ambulance. (ECF No. 20 at 1). Plaintiff further alleges

that, due to injuries suffered from the force used against him during his arrest, he “was

put on life support, put on a ventilator, and in a coma.” (Id.) He claims that he “almost

died” and continues to suffer from Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (“PTSD”), anxiety,

headaches, neck and back pain. (Id.) He seeks monetary relief from each defendant in

both their “official and regular [individual] capacity.” (Id.)

Because Williams was the only defendant specifically identified, he is the only

defendant who has been served with process. On February 18, 2025, Williams filed the

instant Motion to Dismiss or, in the alternative, Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF

No. 32) and Memorandum of Law in support thereof (ECF No. 33). Williams’ motion

asserts that: (1) he is not subject to suit in his official capacity; (2) that Plaintiff’s claim

does not arise under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (3) that Plaintiff’s claim is not actionable under

Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971); and (4) that

Williams is entitled to qualified immunity. (Id.)

On March 4, 2025, the undersigned entered an Order and Notice, pursuant to the

holding in Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1975), notifying Plaintiff of his

right and an obligation to file a response to Defendant’s motion, of the types of evidence

that he must offer to overcome a motion for summary judgment, and setting deadlines

for Plaintiff’s response and Defendant’s reply briefs. (ECF No. 35). On March 20, 2025,

Plaintiff responded and provided his own affidavit, which largely repeats the allegations

contained in his Amended Complaint and does not specifically address the legal

arguments made in Defendant’s motion. (ECF No. 40).

On March 24, 2025, in response to Plaintiff’s motions seeking subpoenas for

medical records and other information concerning his arrest, Defendant offered the

Declarations of Defendant Williams and Supervisory Deputy Marshal Frederick W.

Lamey, which confirmed that Plaintiff was arrested by the USMS’s CUFFED Task Force,

of which all defendants were members. (ECF No. 42, Exs. 1 and 2). Thereafter, Plaintiff

filed copies of some of his medical records as evidence of his alleged injuries. (ECF No.

46, Ex. 1). Briefing has concluded and this matter is ripe for resolution.

II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

A. Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6).

Pro se complaints are held to less stringent standards than those drafted by

attorneys, and the court is obliged to liberally construe such complaints. In general, a

pleading must include “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the

pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2); see McCleary-Evans v. Md. Dep’t of

Transp., State Highway Admin., 780 F.3d 582, 585 (4th Cir. 2015) (stating that this

requirement exists “to give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the

grounds upon which it rests” (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555

(2007))). However, to withstand a motion to dismiss made pursuant to Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a complaint must plead enough facts “to state a claim to relief

that is plausible on its face.” Wikimedia Found. v. Nat’l Sec. Agency, 857 F.3d 193, 208

(4th Cir. 2017) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)).

“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that

allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the

misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Stated another way, the factual allegations

in the complaint “must be sufficient ‘to raise a right to relief above the speculative

level.’” Woods v. City of Greensboro, 855 F.3d 639, 647 (4th Cir. 2017) (quoting

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). A complaint that alleges enough facts “to satisfy the

elements of a cause of action created by [the relevant] statute” will survive a motion to

dismiss. Id. at 648 (quoting McCleary-Evans, 780 F.3d at 585).

In evaluating the sufficiency of a complaint, this Court first “identif[ies] pleadings

that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of

truth.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. This Court then “assume[s] the[] veracity” of the

complaint’s “well-pleaded factual allegations” and “determine[s] whether they plausibly

give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Id. Review of the complaint is “a context-specific

task that requires [this Court] to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id.

“[T]o satisfy the plausibility standard, a plaintiff is not required to plead factual

allegations in great detail, but the allegations must contain sufficient factual heft to

allow a court, drawing on judicial experience and common sense, to infer more than the

mere possibility of that which is alleged.” Nanni v. Aberdeen Marketplace, Inc., 878

F.3d 447, 452 (4th Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted). Despite the liberal

construction requirement, the complaint must nonetheless “contain enough facts to

state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Thomas v. Salvation Army S.

Territory, 841 F.3d 632, 637 (4th Cir. 2016).

B. Summary Judgment under Rule 56.

Defendant alternatively moves for summary judgment. In evaluating summary

judgment motions, Rule 56(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides:

A party may move for summary judgment, identifying each claim or

defense — or the part of each claim or defense — on which summary

judgment is sought. The court shall grant summary judgment if the

movant shows there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the

movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The court should state

on the record the reasons for granting or denying the motion.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Material facts are those necessary to establish the elements of a

party’s cause of action. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).

Summary judgment is required when a party fails to make a showing sufficient to

establish an essential element of a claim. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23. The moving party

has the burden of establishing that there is an absence of evidence to support the

nonmoving party’s claim. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986).

Once the moving party demonstrates such a lack of evidence, the non-moving

party must go beyond the pleadings and make a sufficient showing of facts presenting a

genuine issue for trial. Id.; see also Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,

475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986). “A party opposing summary judgment must do more than

just rest upon mere allegations, general denials, or vague statements.” Brown v.

Showboat Altantic City Propoco, LLC, No. 08-5145, 2010 WL 5237855, *2 (D.N.J. Dec.

16, 2010) (citing Saldana v. Kmart Corp., 260 F.3d 228, 232 (3d Cir. 2001). Rather,

“the non-moving party must identify specific facts and affirmative evidence that

contradict those offered by the moving party.” Id. (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256-57).

Accordingly, summary judgment will generally be granted unless a reasonable jury

could render a verdict for the non-moving party on the evidence presented. Anderson,

477 U.S. at 247-48.

A court must not resolve disputed facts or weigh the evidence and may not make

determinations of credibility. Russell v. Microdyne Corp., 65 F .3d 1229, 1239 (4th Cir.

1995); Sosebee v. Murphy, 797 F.2d 179, 182 (4th Cir. 1986). Rather, the party opposing

the motion is entitled to have his or her version of the facts accepted as true and to have

all internal conflicts resolved in his or her favor. Charbonnages de France v. Smith, 597

F.2d 406, 414 (4th Cir. 1979). Inferences that are “drawn from the underlying facts . . .

must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion.” United

States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962). However, the party opposing the

motion may not rely upon mere allegations or denials of the pleadings, but must set

forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Sprenkle v. Hartford

Life Ins. Co., 84 F. Supp.2d 751 (N.D.W. Va. 2000).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Williams is not subject to suit in his official capacity.

Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint alleges a use of excessive force by the defendants

during his arrest, which arises under the Fourth Amendment to the United States

Constitution. To the extent Plaintiff raises a claim against Defendant Williams in his

official capacity, Williams asserts that this Court is without subject matter jurisdiction

because the United States has not waived its sovereign immunity for money damages

claims brought under the federal constitution. (ECF No. 33 at 4).

As noted by Williams’ motion, “[a]ny claims against an individual USMS

employee in their official capacity are tantamount to an action against the United States

itself.” See Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609, 620 (1963). (Id.) Moreover, absent a waiver

of sovereign immunity, the United States cannot be sued for money damages. United

States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 399 (1976); United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584,

586 (1941). As further noted by Williams’ motion, Congress has not waived such

immunity with respect to claims under the United States Constitution. F.D.I.C. v.

Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 485-86 (1994). Plaintiff has not sufficiently opposed this

argument; thus, it is undisputed. Consequently, the undersigned proposes that the

presiding District Judge FIND that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over any

claim against Williams in his official capacity and such claim must be dismissed.

B. Plaintiff’s claim does not arise under § 1983.

Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint also alleges that he is bringing a claim under 42

U.S.C. § 1983. To state a claim for relief under § 1983, however, Plaintiff must establish:

(1) that “some person has deprived him of a federal right” and (2) that “the person who

has deprived him of that right acted under color of state . . . law.” Curbelo v.

Pendergraph, 124 F. App’x 162, 162 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S.

635, 640 (1980)). (ECF No. 33 at 4).

Although the Amended Complaint summarily cites to § 1983, Plaintiff has not

claimed that Williams acted under the color of state law; nor can he, as Williams was a

federal law enforcement officer acting under color of federal law, and, thus, he is not

subject to suit under § 1983. See Dowe v. Total Action Against Poverty in Roanoke

Valley, 145 F.3d 653, 658 (4th Cir. 1998) (§ 1983 “does not apply to federal actors”).

(Id. at 4-5). This assertion is, likewise, undisputed by Plaintiff. Therefore, the

undersigned proposes that the presiding District Judge FIND that Plaintiff’s § 1983

claim must also be dismissed.

C. Plaintiff’s claim is not actionable under Bivens.

While Congress created liability under § 1983 for alleged violations of federal

constitutional or statutory law by state actors, it has never enacted an equivalent

provision for liability of federal actors. However, in 1971, the Supreme Court created an

implied cause of action for money damages under the Fourth Amendment in Bivens v.

Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), where the plaintiff alleged

that federal narcotics agents manacled him, threatened his family, engaged in a

warrantless search, and arrested him without a warrant. Although not discussed in any

detail, the Bivens opinion also characterized the complaint therein to include an

allegation that “unreasonable force was employed in making the arrest.” Id. at 389.

Since Bivens, the Supreme Court has extended such liability only twice: (1) an

implied cause of action under the Fifth Amendment for sex discrimination by a United

States Congressman in Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979); and (2) an implied cause

of action under the Eighth Amendment for a federal prisoner’s claim of inadequate

medical care in Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980). Post-Carlson, the Supreme Court

“came to appreciate more fully the tension between this practice and the Constitution’s

separation of legislative and judicial power[,]” Hernandez v. Mesa, 589 U.S. 93, 99

(2020), and has “declined 11 times to imply a similar cause of action for other

constitutional violations.” See Egbert v. Boule, 596 U.S. 482, 484 (2022). Thus, “the

Court has made clear that expanding the Bivens remedy is now a ‘disfavored’ judicial

activity” and has affirmatively stated that, if “called to decide Bivens today, [it] would

decline to discover any implied causes of action in the Constitution.” Id. at 7, quoting

Ziglar v. Abbasi, 582 U.S. 120, 135 (2017) and Egbert, 596 U.S. at 491, 502.

Consequently, the Court has “consistently refused to extend Bivens to any new context

or new category of defendants.” Correctional Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 68

(2001). In fact, another member of this Court has aptly described Bivens as “zombie

precedent.” Wickline v. Cumberledge, No. 2:23-cv-00799, 2024 WL 4340045, at *7

(S.D.W. Va. Sept. 27, 2024) (Johnson, J.).

Courts faced with a potential Bivens claim must now engage in a “highly

restrictive” two-step inquiry to determine whether the case presents “a new Bivens

context” and, if so, whether there are “special factors” that counsel against extending

such liability. Egbert, 596 U.S. at 492-93; Mays v. Smith, 70 F.4th 198, 202 (4th Cir.

2023); see also Earle v. Shreves, 990 F.3d 774, 778 (4th Cir. 2021) (“[T]he analytical

framework established by the Ziglar Court places significant obstacles in the path to

recognition of an implied cause of action [under Bivens].”). Essentially, the Court must

determine “whether there is any reason to think that Congress might be better equipped

to create a damages remedy.” 596 U.S. at 492. The Supreme Court has cautioned that

“[i]f there is even a single ‘reason to pause before applying Bivens in a new context,’ a

court may not recognize a Bivens remedy.” Id. (quoting Hernandez, supra, 589 U.S. at

102). (ECF No. 33 at 5).

Williams’ motion argues that this case “presents a new Bivens context,” because,

unlike Bivens, which involved a warrantless search and arrest by narcotics agents,

Plaintiff was arrested by task force officers with a different federal agency, the USMS,

pursuant to a validly obtained warrant, executed in a public place. Thus, Williams

asserts that Plaintiff’s case plainly involves “a new category of defendants.” (ECF No. 33

at 6-12). In support of this assertion, Williams notes that “[t]he four courts of appeals to

consider the issue have agreed that cases involving the execution of arrest warrants by a

Marshals Service task force arise in a new context and there are special factors

counseling hesitation in this context.” See Robinson v. Sauls, et al., No. 23-10719, 2024

WL 2821127 (11th Cir. June 4, 2024); Logsdon v. USMS, 91 F.4th 1352, 1358 (10th Cir.

2024); Lewis v. Bartosh, 22-3060-pr, 2023 WL 8613873, at *2 (2d Cir. Dec. 13, 2023);

Cain v. Rinehart, No. 22-1893, 2023 WL 6439438, at *4 (6th Cir. July 25, 2023). (ECF

No. 33 at 6-7).

While it appears that the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

has not yet directly answered this question, Williams’ motion further notes that several

judges of this United States District Court, including the presiding District Judge, have

previously found that a use of force during the execution of an arrest warrant by a USMS

task force is a new context under Bivens and that there are special factors that counsel

against extending such liability here. See Lester v. Sizemore, No. 5:24-cv-00054, 2024

WL 4491643, at *5 (S.D.W. Va. Oct. 15, 2024) (Volk, C.J.) (finding that Plaintiff’s claims

“would require scrutiny of a new category of defendants – appointed members of a

USMS joint task force”); Wickline, supra, 2024 WL 4340045, at *5 (Johnson, J.)

(finding that temporarily deputized United States Marshals are “beyond Bivens’

ambit”); Manriquez v. Kanawha Cty. Sheriff's Dep’t, No. 2:22-cv-00406, 2024 WL

3898108, at *6 (S.D.W. Va. Aug. 21, 2024) (Goodwin, J.) (finding USMS task force

presented “a new category of defendants” under Bivens). (ECF No. 33 at 7 n.4).

Like these decisions, Williams’ motion highlights the “‘distinct’ legal mandate”

and specialized police work of USMS joint task forces, which require the participation of

state and local officers. (Id. at 7). His motion states:

By statute, the Marshals Service’s ability to apprehend violent fugitives

depends on the participation of state and local officers to staff its task

forces. Allowing Bivens claims against task force members would “[c]hill[]

participation in joint task forces,” Logsdon, 91 F.4th at 1358, and

“negatively affect” their work, Cain, 2023 WL 6439438, at *4.

Additionally, “adequate alternative remedies” are available. Robinson,

2024 WL 2821127, at *7; see also Logsdon, 91 F.4th at 1359; Cain, 2023

WL 6439438, at *4.

(Id. at 7). Williams’ motion details the creation of USMS task forces to pursue fugitives

and execute federal, state, and local arrest warrants, and the power to federally deputize

officers from other jurisdictions to perform such important governmental functions

which, he claims, distinguishes such task forces from other types of police work. (Id. at

9-11, 15-17). Furthermore, the fact that Congress has never created a damages remedy

in its codification of such task forces, as well as the potential to dissuade participation of

other officers if such liability were created, are special factors that counsel against

implying such a remedy under Bivens. (Id. at 10-11).

Williams’ motion further asserts:

Courts “do not evaluate a potential Bivens cause of action ‘at the level of

“the Fourth Amendment” or even at the level of ‘the unreasonable-

searches-and-seizures clause.’” [Hicks v. Ferreyra, (Hicks II)], 64 F.4th

[156] at 167 [4th Cir. 2023)] (quoting Annappareddy v. Pascale, 996 F.3d

120, 135 (4th Cir. 2021)). Egbert, like Bivens, involved Fourth

Amendment excessive-force claims, but the Court reasoned that even

“parallel circumstances” were not enough to justify a Bivens claim.

Egbert, 596 U.S. at 501 (quotation marks omitted); see also Mays, 70

F.4th at 204-05; Annappareddy, 996 F.3d at 135-36. As the Fourth

Circuit explained, Bivens involved “a claim grounded on the right to be

free from warrantless searches and seizures.” Hicks II, 64 F.4th at 167

(emphasis in original). In the Court’s view, the “issue in Bivens was

whether a plaintiff was entitled to seek damages in a civil action after

federal narcotics officers conducted a warrantless search of his apartment,

arrested him for alleged narcotics violations, and later subjected him to a

visual strip search.” Id. at 165. The Court has “distinguished that context

from the context of searches authorized by a warrant.” Id. at 167;

Annappareddy, 996 F.3d at 135-37.

(Id. at 11). Thus, the fact that Bivens and the instant case both involve the alleged use of

excessive force does not justify an extension of Bivens liability here. The duty to create

such liability “unquestionably lies with Congress.” Wickline, 2024 WL 4340045, at *7.

Williams further argues that Plaintiff’s Bivens claim fails because Plaintiff has

available alternative remedies. (Id. at 13-15). In Egbert, the Supreme Court held that

Bivens should not be extended to those contexts where a plaintiff has alternate remedies

available to him. 596 U.S. at 493 (“Finally, our cases hold that a court may not fashion a

Bivens remedy if Congress already has provided, or has authorized the Executive to

provide, ‘an alternative remedial structure.’”), citing Ziglar, 582 U.S. at 136-37; see also

Bulger v. Hurwitz, 62 F.4th 127, 140 (4th Cir. 2023), quoting Dyer v. Smith, 56 F.4th

271, 279 (4th Cir. 2022) (“An alternative remedy weighs against recognizing a new

Bivens claim even if it is less effective than the damages that would be available under

Bivens and is not expressly identified by Congress as an alternative remedy.”). (Id. at

13-14).

Williams asserts that alternative remedies exist under the USMS’s statutory and

regulatory grievance processes and the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”). He cites to

several cases holding that the USMS internal grievance procedure and the Department

of Justice’s Office of Inspector General (OIG) investigation process are adequate

alternative procedures that preclude application of Bivens to cases such as this. See

Cain, 2023 WL 6439438, at *4; David v. Dotson, No. 20-13123, 2021 WL 5353099, *2

(11th Cir. Nov. 17, 2021). (ECF No. 33 at 13-15). He also points to an alternative tort

remedy under 31 U.S.C. § 3724, permitting settlements by the Attorney General of

claims for personal injury, death, or property damage caused by investigative or law

enforcement officers employed by the Department of Justice for “not more than

$50,000.” (Id. at 15). As previously noted by another member of this Court, the

Supreme Court has recognized that such alternative remedies foreclose extension of

Bivens liability “even where the remedial scheme is less effective than a Bivens remedy

would be—or is downright lousy.” Wickline, 2024 WL 4340045, at *6 (citing Bulger, 62

F.4th at 140).

The undersigned proposes that the presiding District Judge FIND that the facts

of this case undisputedly present a new context involving a new category of defendants

against whom Plaintiff had or has alternative available remedies. Accordingly, the

presiding District Judge should FIND that Plaintiff’s alleged Fourth Amendment claim

against Defendant Williams constitutes an improper extension of Bivens liability

requiring dismissal of such claim as a matter of law.1

1 Because there is no plausible Bivens or other federal constitutional claim, the undersigned believes it is

unnecessary to address Williams’ qualified immunity argument raised in his motion.

D. Plaintiff’s claims against the other defendants likewise fail.

As demonstrated in the undisputed Declarations of Defendant Williams and

Supervisory Deputy United States Marshal Frederick W. Lamey, the other three

defendants, though unidentified by Plaintiff, were acting as members of the USMS

federal task force as well. Consequently, the same legal analysis applies to the claims

against them. First, to the extent that those defendants were acting in their official

capacity as federal law enforcement officers at the time of Plaintiff’s arrest, sovereign

immunity bars any claim against them in their official capacity. Furthermore, § 1983

does not apply to any of those officers – even the alleged Kanawha County Deputy

Sheriff, who was specially deputized as a member of the Task Force at that time. In that

role, these defendants were acting under color of federal, not state, law. Consequently, §

1983 is inapplicable. Finally, as members of the USMS Task Force, who are alleged to

have used excessive force while executing a federal arrest warrant, for the same reasons

as set forth in the analysis of Plaintiff’s Bivens claim against Williams, the undersigned

proposes that the presiding District Judge FIND that Plaintiff’s alleged Fourth

Amendment claims against the unidentified defendants constitute an improper

extension of Bivens liability requiring dismissal of such claims as a matter of law.

IV. RECOMMENDATION

For the reasons stated herein, it is respectfully RECOMMENDED that the

presiding District Judge GRANT Defendant Williams’ Motion to Dismiss or, in the

alternative, Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 32) and DISMISS the claims

against all Defendants, and this civil action, with prejudice.

The plaintiff is notified that this Amended Proposed Findings and

Recommendation is hereby FILED, and a copy will be submitted to the Honorable

Joseph R. Goodwin, United States District Judge. Pursuant to the provisions of Title 28,

United States Code, Section 636(b)(1)(B), and Rules 6(d) and 72(b), Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure, the plaintiff shall have fourteen days (filing of objections) and three

days (mailing) from the date of filing this Proposed Findings and Recommendation

within which to file with the Clerk of this Court, specific written objections, identifying

the portions of the Proposed Findings and Recommendation to which objection is made,

and the basis of such objection. Extension of this time period may be granted by the

presiding District Judge for good cause shown.

Failure to file written objections as set forth above shall constitute a waiver of de

novo review by the District Court and a waiver of appellate review by the Circuit Court

of Appeals. Snyder v. Ridenour, 889 F.2d 1363 (4th Cir. 1989); Thomas v. Arn, 474

U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v.

Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984). Copies of such objections shall be provided to

Judge Goodwin.

The Clerk is directed to file this Amended Proposed Findings and

Recommendation in both above-referenced civil actions and to mail a copy of the same

to Plaintiff and to transmit a copy to counsel of record.

May 7, 2025 / VN ro ZS

LO Dwane L. Tinsley

~.. United States Magistrate Judge

15