Opinion

Slinkard v. Independent School District No. 1 of Tulsa County

Court
District Court, N.D. Oklahoma
Filed
Jun 6, 2025
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 36.2%

The opinion

Gnited States District Court

for the s2Qorthern District of Oklahoma

Case No. 23-cv-354-JDR-JFJ

MEGAN SLINKARD; JON SLINKARD,

Plaintiffs,

versus

INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT No. 1 OF TULSA CounTY, also

known as TULSA PUBLIC SCHOOLS; ALPHA BENSON, Interim

Principal, in his official and personal capacity, DEBORAH GIST,

Superintendent, in her official and personal capactty,

Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

The Court denied the Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment and

granted Defendants Alpha Benson and Deborah Gist’s motion to dismiss.

Dkt. 44. Plaintiffs Megan and Jon Slinkard seek reconsideration of that opin-

ion and order regarding (1) the facial constitutionality of Okla. Stat. tit. 21, §

1376 and Tulsa Public School Board Policy 1301, and (2) the dismissal of

claims against Alpha Benson based on qualified immunity. Dkt. 52. The

Slinkards’ arguments do not persuade the Court to reconsider its decisions,

and the Court denies their motion.

The Slinkards’ motion to reconsider the Court’s opinion and order

does not meet the requirements of Rule 59(e). Under Rule 59(e), a party may

ask for reconsideration if the court’s judgment “misapprehended the facts, a

party’s position, or the controlling law.” Barber ex. rel. Barber v. Colo. Dep’t of

Revenue, 562 F.3d 1222, 1228 (10th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and

citation omitted). “Grounds warranting a motion to reconsider include (1) an

No. 23-cv-354

intervening change in the controlling law, (2) new evidence previously una-

vailable, and (3) the need to correct clear error or prevent manifest injustice.”

Servants of Paraclete v. Does, 204 F.3d 1005, 1012 (10th Cir. 2000) (citation

omitted). Reconsideration is “ ‘not available to allow a party merely to reargue

an issue previously addressed by the court when the reargument merely ad-

vances new arguments or supporting facts which were available for presenta-

tion at the time of the original argument.’” FDIC v. United Pac. Ins. Co., 152

F.3d 1266, 1272 (10th Cir.1998) (quoting Cashner ». Freedom Stores, Inc., 98

F.3d 572, 577 (10th Cir.1996)). ““A Rule 59(e) motion to reconsider is designed

to permit relief in extraordinary circumstances and not to offer a second bite

at the proverbial apple.” Syntroleum Corp. v. Fletcher Int'l Ltd., No. 08-cv-

384-JHP-FHM, 2009 WL 761322, at *1 (N.D. Okla. Mar. 19, 2009) (internal

quotation marks and citation omitted). And the Slinkards’ motion is just that:

an attempt to reargue the matters already addressed in the Court’s opinion

and order.

The Court finds that the Slinkards have not met the heavy burden re-

quired by Rule 59(e). Nearly all of the motion is devoted to re-arguing matters

previously raised and rejected by the Court’s opinion and order. The Court

has no obligation to consider those arguments when ruling on a Rule 59(e)

motion, see Servants of Paraclete, 204 F.3d at 1009, and the Court will not do

so here. Because the Slinkards failed to meet the requirements of Rule 59, the

Court denies the motion.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Slinkards’ motion to

reconsider [Dkt. 52] is denied.

DATED this 6th day of June 2025.

1 val Rony —

ant. ce

United States District Judge

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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