The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
RAYMOND CORDIRO BROWN : CIVIL ACTION
Plaintiff :
:
v. : NO. 24-CV-5187
:
SGT. LADDERMORE :
Defendants :
M E M O R A N D U M
NITZA I. QUIÑONES ALEJANDRO, J. JUNE 5, 2025
Plaintiff Raymond Cordiro Brown, a convicted and sentenced prisoner who is currently
incarcerated at SCI Houtzdale, filed a Complaint against various correctional officers asserting
violations of his constitutional rights arising from an alleged incident of use of excessive force.
(“Compl. (ECF No. 2)). Brown’s contemporaneously filed Motion for Leave to Proceed In Forma
Pauperis was denied because Brown had obtained three prior “strikes” and did not allege an
imminent danger of serious physical injury pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). (See December 9,
2024 Order, ECF No. 4.)
Currently, before the Court is Brown’s Second Motion for Leave to Proceed In Forma
Pauperis. (“Second Motion” (ECF No. 6)). For the following reasons, the Second Motion for
leave to proceed in forma pauperis is denied. Brown is required to pay the full filing fee if he
wishes to continue with the case.1
1 Also pending is Brown’s Motion for Update (ECF No. 5), which seeks information as to the status
of this case. The motion will be denied as moot in light of the instant Memorandum and accompanying
Order.
I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS2
Brown asserts individual and official capacity claims against Sergeant Laddermore,
Lieutenant. Linder, Corrections Officers (“CO”) John Doe 1 and 2, and CO X. Charles based on
events that occurred while Brown was incarcerated at the Curran Fromhold Correctional Facility
(“CFCF”). (Id. at 1.) Brown alleges that on April 18, 2024, he was experiencing a medical and
mental health emergency. (Id. at 2.) Doe 1 did not immediately request medical assistance for
Brown but waited until Laddermore and Linder arrived. Upon their arrival, they ordered Brown
back to his cell and denied him medical attention. (Id.) While Laddermore and Linder were
attempting to force Brown into his cell, Brown commented that they were incompetent. (Id.)
While Brown’s hands were behind his back, Laddermore ordered Doe 1 to spray Brown with
pepper spray because of his comments about Laddermore and Linder. (Id.) Linder did not object
to Laddermore’s order, or otherwise attempt to stop Doe 1, and Doe 1 sprayed Brown with pepper
spray. (Id. at 2-3.)
Brown was then handcuffed, and Doe 2 placed him in a restraint hold that subjected his
left shoulder to extreme pressure. (Id. at 3.) Charles did not stop Doe 2. (Id.) After their arrival
at the medical unit, Doe 2 continued to subject Brown’s shoulder to extreme pressure, causing
pain. (Id.) Brown alleges that he was complying with Doe 2 and not acting aggressively during
this time. (Id.) Based on these facts, Brown asserts Eighth Amendment excessive force and failure
to protect claims, and First Amendment retaliation claims against the Defendants. (Id.) He also
asserts Eighth Amendment claims for deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. (Id.)
He seeks a declaratory judgment and money damages. (Id. at 4.)
2 The factual allegations set forth in this Memorandum are taken from Brown’s Complaint and his
Second Motion. (ECF Nos. 2, 6.) The Court adopts the pagination supplied by the CM/ECF docketing
system. Where appropriate, grammar, spelling, and punctuation errors in Brown’s pleading will be
corrected for clarity.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
The in forma pauperis statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1915, allows indigent litigants to bring an action
in federal court without prepayment of filing fees, ensuring that such persons are not prevented
“from pursuing meaningful litigation” because of their indigence. Abdul-Akbar v. McKelvie, 239
F.3d 307, 312 (3d Cir. 2001) (en banc) (internal quotation marks omitted). But, as Congress has
recognized, people who obtain in forma pauperis status are “not subject to the same economic
disincentives to filing meritless cases that face other civil litigants,” and thus the provision is
susceptible to abuse. Id. (citing 141 Cong. Rec. S7498-01, S7526 (daily ed. May 25, 1995)
(statement of Sen. Kyl)). “[I]n response to the tide of substantively meritless prisoner claims that
have swamped the federal courts,” Congress enacted the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”)
in 1996. Ball v. Famiglio, 726 F.3d 448, 452 (3d Cir. 2013) (quoting Shane v. Fauver, 213 F.3d
113, 117 (3d Cir. 2000)) (internal quotation marks omitted), abrogated in part on other grounds
by Coleman v. Tollefson, 135 S. Ct. 1759, 1763 (2015). The PLRA implemented, inter alia, the
so-called “three strikes rule,” which provides:
In no event shall a prisoner bring a civil action or appeal a judgment in a civil action
or proceeding under this section if the prisoner has, on 3 or more prior occasions,
while incarcerated or detained in any facility, brought an action or appeal in a court
of the United States that was dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious,
or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, unless the prisoner is
under imminent danger of serious physical injury.
28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) (emphasis added). That is, under the PLRA, a prisoner with three prior
“strikes” can proceed in forma pauperis only if he is in imminent danger of serious physical injury.
Courts must consider a pro se prisoner’s allegations of imminent danger “under our liberal
pleading rules, construing all allegations in favor of the complainant.” Gibbs v. Cross, 160 F.3d
962, 966 (3d Cir. 1998).
Pursuant to § 1915(g), a prisoner who on three or more prior occasions while incarcerated
has filed an action or appeal in federal court that was dismissed as frivolous, malicious, or for
failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, must be denied in forma pauperis status
unless he was in imminent danger of serious physical injury at the time that the complaint was
filed. Abdul-Akbar, 239 F.3d at 310-11. A strike under § 1915(g) “will accrue only if the entire
action or appeal is (1) dismissed explicitly because it is ‘frivolous,’ ‘malicious,’ or ‘fails to state a
claim’ or (2) dismissed pursuant to a statutory provision or rule that is limited solely to dismissals
for such reasons, including (but not necessarily limited to) 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1),
1915(e)(2)(B)(i), 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), or Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.”
Byrd v. Shannon, 715 F.3d 117, 126 (3d Cir. 2013). “A strike-call under Section 1915(g) . . .
hinges exclusively on the basis for the dismissal, regardless of the decision’s prejudicial effect.”
Lomax v. Ortiz-Marquez, 140 S. Ct. 1721, 1724-25 (2020), abrogating Millhouse v. Heath, 866
F.3d 152, 161 (3d Cir. 2017).
III. “THREE-STRIKE” ANALYSIS
A. Brown Has Accumulated Three Strikes
The Court concludes that Brown has accumulated at least three strikes for purposes of
§ 1915(g). In Brown v. Buck, No. 14-2866 (E.D. Pa.), by Order dated July 15, 2014, the Court
dismissed Brown’s complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to state a claim
for relief. See July 15, 2014 Order, No. 14-2866, ECF No. 7 (dismissing claims as clearly time-
barred). The Court’s dismissal of Brown’s complaint was affirmed on appeal. See Order, Brown
v. Buck, No. 14-3932 (3d Cir. June 12, 2015). The dismissal of this case in its entirety on
enumerated statutory grounds constitutes a strike under § 1915(g). Lomax, 140 S. Ct. at 1724
(“[A] prisoner accrues a strike for any action dismissed on the ground that it fails to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted.”)
Similarly, in Brown v. Fitzpatrick, No. 15-2217 (E.D. Pa.), by Order dated May 18, 2015,
the Court dismissed Brown’s complaint with prejudice for failure to state a claim for relief pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). See May 18, 2015 Order, No. 15-2217, ECF No. 4 (dismissing
claims based on the defendants’ alleged failure to investigate and prosecute and on absolute
witness immunity grounds). The dismissal of this case in its entirety on enumerated statutory
grounds constitutes a second strike under § 1915(g). See Lomax, 140 S. Ct. at 1724.
In Brown v. Cohen, No. 22-2499, 2022 WL 5250274 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 6, 2022), the Court
dismissed Brown’s Complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
In his Complaint, Brown sought a declaratory judgment, and an injunction vacating his state court
criminal conviction and expunging his record. Id. at *1. The Court concluded that Brown’s
request for vacatur of his conviction and expungement of his record was relief not available
pursuant to § 1983 but was properly pursed in a petition for writ of habeas corpus. Id. at *2.
Moreover, to the extent that Brown sought other relief, the Court determined that because a
favorable outcome on Brown’s claims would necessarily imply the invalidity of his criminal
conviction, any such claims were barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994) (explaining
that “to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other
harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a §
1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal,
expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such
determination, or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus”).
Id. at *3. The dismissal of this case in its entirety constitutes a third strike under § 1915(g). See
Garrett v. Murphy, 17 F.4th 419, 427 (3d Cir. 2021) (“We now join the Fifth, Tenth, and D.C.
Circuits in holding that the dismissal of an action for failure to meet Heck’s favorable-termination
requirement counts as a PLRA strike for failure to state a claim. We do so for a simple reason:
Any other rule is incompatible with Heck.”). See also Brown v. Fowler, No. 23-1649, 2025 WL
1017760, at *3-*4 (W.D. Pa. April 4, 2025) (revoking in forma pauperis status because Brown
was determined to be a three-striker, noting that Brown did not challenge the assertion that he was
a three-striker, and citing cases).
B. Brown Does Not Allege Imminent Danger
Because Brown has accumulated three strikes, he can no longer proceed in forma pauperis
in any federal court unless he can show that he is in imminent danger of serious physical injury
related to the claims alleged in his Complaint. The “imminent danger” exception to the three-
strikes rule serves as a “safety valve” to ensure that a prisoner is not subject to serious injury due
to his inability to pay a filing fee. Ball, 726 F.3d at 467. It “creates a narrow opening for a
particular type of claim; it does not give prisoners . . . a license to swamp the court with claims
whenever they successfully state a claim of imminent danger.” Brown v. Lyons, 977 F. Supp. 2d
475, 481-82 (E.D. Pa. 2013) (citing Pettus v. Morgenthau, 554 F.3d 293, 297 (2d Cir. 2009)).
“Imminent dangers are those dangers which are about to occur at any moment or are impending.”
Abdul-Akbar, 239 F.3d at 315 (internal quotation marks omitted). Past dangers are not imminent
dangers. See Ball, 726 F.3d at 467. Vague, general, or conclusory allegations are likewise
insufficient to establish that a plaintiff is in imminent danger. Id. Finally, “there must be a nexus
between the imminent danger a three-strikes prisoner alleges to obtain IFP status, and the legal
claims asserted in his complaint.” Pettus, 554 F.3d at 297; see also Ball v. Hummel, 577 F. App’x
96, 98 n.1 (3d Cir. 2014) (per curiam). In other words, the claimed imminent danger must relate
to the legal claims the prisoner pursues. Id.; see also Brown v. U.S. Dist. Ct., E. Dist., No. 13-
7229, 2014 WL 1225878, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 25, 2014) (“In short, § 1915(g) requires two things:
the allegation of imminent danger and a claim for relief that if granted will preclude the danger
from becoming a reality.”). Brown’s allegations do not meet the imminent danger standard of
Section 1915(g). In his Second Motion, Brown alleges in conclusory fashion that he “is in
imminent danger of serious physical harm and at the time of this filing of this complaint Plaintiff
was and is in imminent danger of irreparable injury to his person.” (ECF No. 6, at 3.) However,
Brown does not describe the nature of the imminent harm he faces and does not in any way relate
the hypothetical harm to the claims raised in his Complaint. See Abdul-Akbar, 239 F.3d at 315;
Pettus, 554 F.3d at 297. The Complaint describes only an isolated event of excessive force and,
the Court notes, Brown is no longer incarcerated in the facility where the excessive force is alleged
to have occurred. Even liberally construed, Browns’ conclusory allegation does not describe how
the relief sought in his Complaint (a declaration that his rights have been violated and an award of
money damages), if granted, would preclude any alleged danger from becoming a reality. For
these reasons, the Court finds that the imminent danger exception does not apply.
IV. CONCLUSION
Because Brown is a “three-striker” who is prohibited from proceeding in forma pauperis
unless he is in imminent danger of serious physical injury at the time of filing his Complaint, and
since he was not in imminent danger when he submitted this Complaint, the Court will deny
Brown’s Second Motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). Should Brown seek to pursue his claims,
he must pay the full filing fee in advance. An appropriate Order follows, which grants Brown an
opportunity to pay the fees in the event he seeks to proceed with this case.3
NITZA I. QUIÑONES ALEJANDRO, J.
3 If Clark pays the filing fee, since he is a prisoner, the case is still subject to statutory screening
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.