White v. Miyares

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA

Richmond Division

MICHELE WHITE, )

Plaintiff,

v. Civil Action No. 3:24-cv-725-HEH

JASON S. MIYARES, et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

(Granting Motion to Dismiss)

THIS MATTER is before the Court on Attorney General Jason S. Miyares and former

Senior Assistant Attorney General Joshua N. Lief’s (collectively, the “Prosecutor

Defendants” or the “Prosecutors”) Motion to Dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) (the “Motion”,

ECF No. 24) filed on December 6, 2024. Although Defendants Investigator Mark P. de

Almeida and Investigator Howard Mulholland are also named defendants in this case, they

do not join the instant Motion. The Prosecutor Defendants and Plaintiff Michele White filed

memoranda in support of their respective positions, and the Court held a hearing on March

18, 2025. For the following reasons, the Court will grant the Motion to Dismiss as to

Defendant Miyares and as to Defendant Lief.

I. BACKGROUND

When considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, such as the one brought by the

Prosecutor Defendants here, a court must assume that the plaintiff's well-pleaded allegations

are true. Vitol, S.A. v. Primerose Shipping Co., 708 F.3d 527, 539 (4th Cir. 2013).

Therefore, the Court recites the pertinent facts as alleged by Plaintiff in her Complaint.

Plaintiff Michele White (“Plaintiff”) was employed as Prince William County’s (the

“County”) General Registrar in 2015 and oversaw the 2020 Presidential and Special

Elections (collectively, the “2020 Election”) in the County. (Compl. {{] 24-26.) Due in part

to COVID-19-related social distancing requirements, the County used a special precinct for

the 2020 Election known as the Central Absentee Precinct (“CAP or CAP Precinct”). (id. at

30.) The CAP Precinct was “overseen by a senior Assistant Registrar, where elections

officers (one from each major political party) opened returned absentee ballots and began the

process of counting them, even before Election Day.” (/d.) At the end of the 2020 Election,

the Prince William County Electoral Board would report the County’s election results to the

Virginia State Electoral Board via an intermediary database and software system called the

Virginia Election and Registration Information System (“VERIS”). (/d. J 9.)

Election Day 2020 occurred on Tuesday, November 3, 2020. (Compl. § 46.) As the

polls closed, elections officers from each precinct in the County collected voting machine

printouts and data, completed “Statement of Results” (“SOR”) forms based on the voting

machine printouts, and signed the completed SOR forms to verify the agreed-upon results.

(Compl. 47.) According to Plaintiff's Complaint, “Following completion of the SOR

forms, elections officers entered the unofficial results in a shared spreadsheet used by Ms.

White [Plaintiff] and her staff to upload the same into VERIS.” (/d. | 49.) Officials at the

CAP Precinct continued to process absentee ballots beyond Election Day because “one of the

new state laws passed prior to the election required returned absentee ballots be counted and

added to official vote counts if they were received by noon on Friday after the 2020

Election.” (Ud. 7 51.)

On November 4, 2020, the “canvassing” process began—which involved election

officials reviewing, confirming, and certifying local election results. According to the

Complaint, the County routinely requires manual changes to its VERIS data due to the

County’s large population and because it spans three (3) different federal congressional

districts. (Compl. f 56-65.) In 2020, election officials made numerous manual changes to

the voting data in VERIS. (Jd. 64.) One such change occurred on November 5 when

Plaintiff “directed Assistant Registrar Sean Mulligan to manually update voting data in

VERIS so that the distribution of total votes across the congressional districts would be

accurate.” (Id. ] 61.) Another occurred on November 7, 2020, when the Assistant Registrar

overseeing the CAP Precinct, Colleen Rummell, and another official made changes to the

data in that precinct. (/d. { 64.)

On November 10, 2020, the County completed its canvassing process. (Compl. { 66.)

The next day, November 11, 2020, the Prince William County Electoral Board approved and

signed the certified record of the results (the “Abstract of Votes”) to the Virginia Department

of Elections (“ELECT”), representing the county’s official certification of its 2020 election

results. (Id. | 66.) On November 12, 2020, ELECT identified some errors in the County’s

data, primarily related to its entry of voter turnout. (/d. | 68.) The County corrected those

errors. (/d. J 69.)

The SBE then certified the statewide results of the 2020 Election on November 18,

2020. (id. § 71.) However, on November 20, 2020, ELECT identified that, in two (2)

precincts in the County, the vote tally had not been entered correctly, resulting in display

errors on an unofficial election night result webpage. (/d. 975.) According to the

Complaint, “After being informed of these errors, Ms. White [Plaintiff] followed ELECT’s

instructions by correcting the errors in VERIS” and by arranging for a corrected Abstract of

Votes to be sent to the County Electoral Board for approval, and then to the State Board of

Elections (“SBE”). (Id. | 76.) The Complaint further states, “On December 7, 2020,

following standard procedure, the State Board of Elections met and recertified the corrected

abstracts from Prince William County, as well as corrected abstracts of at least one other

locality.” (id. 977.) This last correction did not change the outcome of the election as

certified on November 18, 2020. (id. 78.) At the time, neither ELECT nor the SBE

referred these issues to Virginia’s Office of the Attorney General (“OAG”) for investigation.

(Id. 79.)

The following year, Defendant Jason Miyares (“Miyares”) was elected as Attorney

General of Virginia. (Compl. 491.) According to Plaintiff, “Although Defendant Miyares

has acknowledged the outcome of the 2020 presidential election, during his campaign, he

pledged to investigate election fraud and cast doubt on the integrity of the 2020 Election,

including on the debate stage.” (Compl. {J 5, 91-92, 161.) After assuming office, Miyares

hired new officials including Senior Assistant Attorney General Joshua Lief (“Lief”).

(Id. Ff 93-94.). Lief and Miyares, the Prosecutor Defendants, later formed an Election

Integrity Unit (“EIU”) within the OAG. (id. ff] 91, 102.)

In early 2022, Eric Olsen—Plaintiff’s successor as General Registrar for the

County—audited the County’s 2020 Election results and data, finding a number of

discrepancies. (Mem. in Supp. at 1, ECF No. 26; Compl. §{ 109-13, 123-25.) For example,

“according to Mr. Olsen’s audit, there were 2,400 overcounted Trump votes and 1,600

undercounted Biden votes in the CAP Precinct data in VERIS, errors introduced by changes

made to the VERIS data on November 7, 2020.” (id. ¥ 111.)

In addition to the alleged errors stemming from results in the CAP Precinct, Olsen’s

audit also identified other minor discrepancies for a few other non-CAP split precincts, not

exceeding 51 votes in any one precinct, where the alleged errors marginally favored Biden.

(Id.) None of the alleged discrepancies Olsen discovered were sufficient to change the

outcome for Virginia in the 2020 election for the office of President of the United States.

(Id. 112.) The Complaint states, “The net result of the alleged errors Mr. Olsen identified

was an undercount for the entire county of 1,648 votes for Joseph R. Biden and an overcount

for former [President] Donald J. Trump of 2,327 votes in a state that Biden had already won

by a margin of several hundreds of thousands of votes.” (Jd.)

The Complaint alleges that the Prosecutor Defendants seized upon Olsen’s audit to

investigate and prosecute Plaintiff. (Compl. □ 114.) On April 13, 2022, Lief attended a

closed meeting of the SBE, resulting in the SBE referring the matter of the County’s election

results to the OAG for investigation. (Jd. § 115; Mem. in Opp’n at 5, ECF No. 27.)

Immediately after the SBE meeting, Plaintiff alleges, “an OAG investigation into election

fraud during the 2020 Election in Prince William County was initiated, based solely on Mr.

Olsen’s audit.” (Compl. § 115.)

During the course of the investigation, Lief directed and supervised Investigator Mark

de Almeida (“Investigator de Almeida”) and Investigator Howard Mulholland (“Investigator

Mulholland”) (collectively, the “Investigators” or the “Investigator Defendants”). (Id.

4116.) The Investigators forwarded evidence from witnesses directly to Lief as it was

gathered. (Jd.) The Complaint states the Investigators were “Senior Financial Investigators”

with experience “in Medicaid fraud and other white-collar crimes,” but were not experienced

in “Virginia election law, election administration, or election-related crimes.” (dd. J 106.)

Plaintiff alleges that, during the investigation, the Investigators “knowingly provided

false and misleading information and omitted material information to prosecutors.” (Compl.

120-49.) Defendant Lief then presented an indictment of Plaintiff to a grand jury. (Id.

§ 150.) Plaintiff alleges that this presentation included the Investigators’ false

representations and omitted material information, such as Defendant de Almeida’s testimony.

(Id. 150-51.) The Complaint states that this testimony included, but was not limited to:

(a) Falsely stating that Ms. White directed Sean Mulligan to place errors into

VERIS on November 7, 2020 in order to affect the outcome of the election;

(b) Falsely stating that entries in VERIS are “final election results” and are,

therefore, a “statement” or “entry” within the meaning of Va. Code Ann. § 24.2-

1016;

(c) Falsely stating that Ms. White intentionally prevented the verification of

voting data in VERIS;

(d) Falsely stating that Ms. White instructed election workers not to record the

date on which absentee ballots were returned and misleadingly omitting that

Ms. White utilized an alternative procedure for processing returned absentee

ballots that did not require physical date-stamping;

(e) Falsely stating that Ms. White prevented or caused the delay of reviewing

the voter affirmations appended to returned absentee ballots, preventing

such ballots from being cured and/or counted;

(f) Falsely stating that Ms. White instructed election workers to delete “Voter

Credits” in VERIS in order to obscure her failure to timely process and/or

count returned absentee ballots;

(g) Falsely stating that Ms. White failed to return valid out-of-jurisdiction

ballots to their proper jurisdiction so that they could be processed and counted.

(Compl. J 156.)

On September 7, 2022, Defendants acquired a grand jury indictment against Plaintiff.

(Compl. { 150-57.) Plaintiff was indicted for two felonies and one misdemeanor: “False

material statement or entry required by law (Va. Code Ann. § 24.2-1016),” “Corrupt conduct

as an elected official (Va. Code Ann. § 24.2-1001.B),” and “Willful neglect of duties (Va.

Code Ann. § 24.2-1001.A)”. (Compl. § 151.) The Prosecutor Defendants denied that they

engaged in misconduct, instead stating that they eventually decided to drop the charges

against Plaintiff because a key witness changed his story before trial. (Mem. in Supp. at 1.)

After motions by the OAG, the court dismissed the felony charges on December 1, 2023, and

the misdemeanor charge on or about January 3, 2024. (Compl. {J 173, 177.)

Plaintiff filed her Complaint on October 17, 2024, alleging malicious prosecution

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Investigator Defendants (Count J), the same against the

Prosecutor Defendants (Count II), and alleging malicious prosecution under Virginia law

against all Defendants (Count III). (Compl. □□ 183-214.) Plaintiff seeks civil damages, a

declaration that her rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth amendments were violated, and

attorney’s fees. In this suit, Plaintiff contends Defendants improperly and maliciously

prosecuted her to “justify the existence of the Election Integrity Unit,” and based on a sham

investigation that was motived with “malice, spite, ill-will and wanton disregard” for her

rights. (Compl. J 188.) According to Plaintiff, the EIU was flawed because it lacked a

“reporting structure or approval process for opening and conducting investigations,” (id.

{ 103), because it was inadequately staffed, and because the staff was inadequately trained.

(Id. 6, 103-05, 108, 114-15, 117-19.) The Complaint states EIU did not provide

“guidelines, procedures, training materials, or other similar documents.” (Compl. { 103.)

In their Motion to Dismiss, the Prosecutor Defendants argue that “nearly all of the

alleged actions taken by Defendants Miyares and Lief fall within the scope of absolute

prosecutorial immunity under both federal and state law.” (Mot. at 1.) In addition, the

Motion contends the “remaining allegations cannot support a claim for relief or, in the

alternative, Defendants Miyares and Lief are entitled to qualified immunity for those

remaining allegations.” (/d.)

Il, LEGAL STANDARD

A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) does not ask a court to determine whether a

plaintiff's allegations are true; instead, it simply tests the sufficiency of a complaint.

Republican Party of N.C. v. Martin, 980 F.2d 943, 952 (4th Cir. 1992); Fed. R. Civ. P. 12.

To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a “complaint must provide ‘sufficient factual matter,

accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Turner v. Thomas,

930 F.3d 640, 644 (4th Cir. 2019) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)).

The facts alleged must be sufficient to “state all elements of [any] claim[s].” Bass v. E.2.

Dupont de Nemours & Co., 324 F.3d 761, 765 (4th Cir. 2003). When considering a Rule

12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a court must accept as true all well-pleaded allegations. Vitol,

S.A., 708 F.3d at 539. However, conclusory allegations enjoy no such deference. Iqbal, 556

USS. at 678. A court “need not accept legal conclusions couched as facts or unwarranted

inferences, unreasonable conclusions, or arguments.” Turner, 930 F.3d at 644 (quoting Wag

More Dogs, LLC v. Cozart, 680 F.3d 359, 365 (4th Cir. 2012)).

At the motion to dismiss stage, a defendant may properly raise the issues of his

immunity from suit and deficiencies in the plaintiffs pleadings as to proximate cause. See

Atkinson v. Godfrey, 100 F.4th 498, 508 (4th Cir. 2024) (reversing a district court’s denial of

a motion to dismiss based on qualified immunity); Nero v. Mosby, 890 F.3d 106, 131 (4th

Cir. 2018) (reversing a district court’s denial of a motion to dismiss based on a prosecutor’s

immunity from suit); Slay’s Restoration, LLC v. Wright Nat’l Flood Ins. Co., 884 F.3d 489,

495 (4th Cir. 2018) (affirming a district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss for lack of

proximate cause).

Ill. ANALYSIS

A. Section 1983 Claims

In her Complaint, Plaintiff advances a count of malicious prosecution under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 for violations of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution.

“What is conventionally referred to as a ‘§ 1983 malicious prosecution’ action is nothing

more than a § 1983 claim arising from a Fourth Amendment violation.” Lambert v.

Williams, 223 F.3d 257, 260 (4th Cir. 2000). To prevail on such a claim, a plaintiff must

ultimately prove that “the defendant (1) caused (2) a seizure of the plaintiff pursuant to legal

process unsupported by probable cause, and (3) criminal proceedings terminated in plaintiff's

favor.” Evans v. Chalmers, 703 F.3d 636, 647 (4th Cir. 2012) (citing Durham v. Horner,

690 F.3d 183, 188 (4th Cir. 2012)).

1. Absolute Immunity Under Federal Law

State prosecutors hold absolute immunity against federal civil liability suits that

challenge the initiation and pursuit of a criminal prosecution. Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509

U.S. 259, 269-70 (1993) (citing Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976)). The justification

for this doctrine has long been recognized. As the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth

Circuit has stated, “The public trust of the prosecutor’s office would suffer if he were

constrained in making every decision by the consequences in terms of his own potential

liability in a suit for damages.” Nero, 890 F.3d at 117 (citing Imbler, 424 U.S. at 424-25.)

“Without immunity from suit, this threat of retaliatory litigation would predispose

prosecutors to bring charges based not on merit but on the social or political capital of

prospective defendants.” Jd. (citing Imbler, 424 U.S. at 438 (White, J., concurring)). The

absolute immunity doctrine “stems from courts’ recognition that ‘any lesser degree of

immunity could impair the judicial process itself.’” Jd. (quoting Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S.

118, 127 (1997)).

This absolute immunity extends to actions “intimately associated with the judicial

phase of the criminal process.” Nero, 890 F.3d at 117-18; Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430-31. The

official claiming immunity bears the burden of showing that such immunity is justified.

See Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 486 (1991). When reviewing whether this standard is met,

courts first “look at the specific act challenged” and then determine what function was served

by that act. Nero, 890 F.3d at 118-20; see Buckley, 509 U.S. at 269, 271; Burns, 500 US. at

486. If a prosecutor’s actions served only an administrative or investigative function, then

absolute immunity may not apply. Van de Kamp v. Goldstein, 555 U.S. 335, 342 (2009).

This is because “[a] prosecutor’s administrative duties and those investigatory functions that

do not relate to an advocate’s preparation for the initiation of a prosecution or for judicial

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proceedings are not entitled to absolute immunity.” Buckley, 509 U.S. at 273 (citing Burns,

500 U.S. at 494-96).

The Supreme Court of the United States has thus held that absolute immunity does

not apply “when a prosecutor gives advice to police during a criminal investigation, when the

prosecutor makes statements to the press, or when a prosecutor acts as a complaining witness

in support of a warrant application.” Van de Kamp, 555 U.S. at 343 (cleaned up) (collecting

cases). Absolute immunity also does not apply “[w]hen a prosecutor performs the

investigative functions normally performed by a detective or police officer . . . . Thus, ifa

prosecutor plans and executes a raid on a suspected weapons cache, he ‘has no greater claim

to complete immunity than activities of police officers allegedly acting under his direction.””

Buckley, 509 U.S. at 274 (quoting Hampton v. Chicago, 484 F.2d 602, 608 (7th Cit. 1973),

cert, denied, 415 U.S. 917 (1974)).

On the other hand, prosecutors are immune when the challenged act is initiating a

prosecution, presenting the state’s case, or preparing for such proceedings. Nero, 890 F.3d at

118-19 (citing Kalina, 522 U.S. at 130.) As the Supreme Court has held, “acts undertaken

by a prosecutor in preparing for the initiation of judicial proceedings or for trial, and which

occur in the course of his role as an advocate for the State, are entitled to the protections of

absolute immunity.” Buckley, 509 U.S. at 273; see Van de Kamp, 555 U.S. at 343;

Ostrzenski v. Seigel, 177 F.3d 245, 250 (4th Cir. 1999). Absolute immunity applies when a

prosecutor is evaluating evidence assembled by the police, Buckley, 509 U.S. at 273,

deciding to seek an arrest warrant, Kalina, 522 U.S. at 130, and preparing and filing charging

documents, Nero, 890 F.3d at 118-19. Even some supervisory roles which might appear to

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be administrative have been held to be protected by absolute immunity. See Van de Kamp,

555 U.S. at 339-49. The Supreme Court has found prosecutors immune for failing properly

to train prosecutors, failing properly to supervise prosecutors, and failing to establish an

information system containing potential impeachment material about informants. Jd.

Here, Plaintiff concedes that the Prosecutor Defendants are protected by absolute

immunity for at least some of the conduct alleged in her Complaint, such as initiating charges

and presenting evidence to the grand jury.' Plaintiff contends, however, that absolute

immunity does not apply to the Prosecutors’ actions that occurred before and during their

investigation of Plaintiff. (Mem. in Opp’n at 7-8.) These include their acts of creating the

EIU, directing its staff, and investigating Plaintiff. (/d.)

Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that the investigation and indictment against her were

set in motion by the Prosecutor Defendants’ actions of establishing the EIU “without any

safeguards,” “identifying investigative targets despite the absence of evidence of a crime,”

and “taking steps by and through that Unit [the EIU] to generate evidence of election fraud.”

(Mem. in Opp’n at 9.) Supporting these conclusions, Plaintiff contends, are the alleged facts

that the EIU was structured “without clear procedures, training, or guidelines,” and that its

staff “lacked relevant experience in election law or administration or standard safeguards.”

(Id.) The Prosecutors wrongly identified Plaintiff as an investigation target, she argues,

Specifically, Plaintiff “does not dispute that the act of initiating charges after reviewing the

evidence produced during the formal investigation is protected by absolute immunity.” (Mem. in

Opp’n at 2). And Plaintiff states that she “does not rest her claim on the actual presentation of

fabricated evidence to the grand jury.” (Jd. at 26.) Furthermore, the parties appear to agree that the

Prosecutor Defendants are protected by absolute immunity as to any prosecutorial actions that

occurred after the grand jury indictment in this case. (/d. at 2, n.1 (“Likewise, Plaintiff does not

contest that acts occurring after an indictment are generally protected by absolute immunity.”).)

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because Olsen’s audit revealed only minor election result discrepancies in the County where

she was the Registrar. (/d. at 9-10.) In addition, Plaintiff states that the Prosecutor

Defendants “used Olsen’s audit as a pretext to secure a referral for a formal investigation”

from the SBE. (/d.) Other conduct not protected by absolute immunity, Plaintiff argues,

includes her allegations that Lief directed, supervised, and received evidence from the

Investigators, and that while Lief was supervising the Investigators they “provided false and

misleading information and omitted material information to prosecutors.” (Compl. ff 115-

16, 120.)

The Court finds that the Prosecutor Defendants are absolutely immune for much of

the actions alleged in the Complaint. Indeed, under Supreme Court and Fourth Circuit

precedent, the Prosecutors are absolutely immune for acts “intimately associated with the

judicial phase of the criminal process,” which covers a great deal of the conduct alleged. See

Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430-31; Nero, 890 F.3d at 117-18. Thus, the Prosecutors are absolutely

immune for preparing for and initiating charges, and for their prosecutorial acts that occurred

afterwards. Also protected by this immunity are the Prosecutor Defendants’ decisions

regarding training and supervising subordinate prosecutors, and the creation of, or lack of,

specific evidence management systems within the EIU. See Van de Kamp, 555 U.S. at 339-

49. Collectively, these acts by the Prosecutors “fall squarely under the umbrella of absolute

immunity.” See Nero, 890 F.3d at 118-19; Van de Kamp, 555 U.S. at 339-43.

However, not all of the acts alleged within Plaintiffs § 1983 claim are barred by

absolute immunity. Indeed, the Prosecutor Defendants concede that the immunity does not

cover the actions they took before investigating Plaintiff. (Reply at 2-3, ECF No. 28.) In

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addition, the Court finds that this immunity does not apply to Lief’s acts in supervising the

investigation of Plaintiff before Lief determined that he had probable cause. See Buckley,

509 U.S. at 274 (quoting Hampton, 484 F.2d at 608).

The Court is aware that Plaintiff made additional allegations, but those are

conclusory, and the Court cannot assume they are true. The Complaint, building on

Plaintiff's theory that the investigation against her was a sham, alleged in a section titled,

“Count II — 42 U.S.C. § 1983” that “Defendant Lief directly participated in, and directed, the

unlawful actions of the Defendant Investigators.” (Compl. { 197.) The Complaint then

further alleged, “Defendants Miyares and Lief knew about, facilitated, approved, condoned

and/or ratified the unlawful actions of the Defendant Investigators.” (Jd. { 198.) The Court

searched Plaintiff’s Complaint and her brief for one or more specific facts supporting these

conclusions, but it has found none. Under these circumstances, precedent from the Fourth

Circuit and the Supreme Court establish that these allegations cannot be assumed to be

true. See Igbal, 556 U.S. at 680-81; Nero, 890 F.3d at 120, n.4. In Ashcroft v. Iqbal, the

Supreme Court rejected conclusory allegations that claimed the parties: (1) “knew of,

condoned, and willfully and maliciously agreed to subject [him]” to harsh conditions of

confinement “as a matter of policy, solely on account of [his] religion, race, and/or national

origin and for no legitimate penological interest”; (2) that “Ashcroft was the principal

architect of this invidious policy;” and (3) that “Mueller was instrumental in adopting and

executing it.” Jqbal, 556 U.S. at 680-81. The Supreme Court held, “These bare assertions,

much like the pleading of conspiracy in Twombly, amount to nothing more than a ‘formulaic

14

recitation of the elements’ of a constitutional discrimination claim.” Jd. (quoting Bell Ail.

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).

Similarly, in Nero, the Fourth Circuit stated:

The Officers claimed that the State’s Attorney’s Office “manipulated evidence

to facilitate [the] indictments,” J.A. 176, that “Mosby created false facts and

omitted material facts,” J.A. 179, and that she “conduct[ed] a bogus and sham

investigation,” J.A. 179. But, absent specific supporting facts, these conclusory

allegations are “not entitled to be assumed true.”

Nero, 890 F.3d at 120, n.4 (quoting Jgbal, 556 U.S. at 681). Even more so than the

allegations of misconduct in Jgbal and Nero, Plaintiff's vague, conclusory allegations that

Defendants Lief and Miyares were involved in, or were aware of, unlawful conduct are

insufficient to overcome a motion to dismiss. Furthermore, these conclusory allegations run

counter to the Complaint’s repeated, specific facts that the Investigators lied to prosecutors

about what evidence they discovered. (Compl. { 120, 127, 138, 140-41, 143-44, 149.) For

all these reasons, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to make any well-pleaded or factual

allegation that the Prosecutor Defendants directed, condoned, or even knew about the

Investigators’ alleged misconduct.

Thus, the Court now turns to reviewing whether the Prosecutor Defendants may be

liable for those acts which fall outside the territory of absolute immunity, including creating

the EIU, setting its framework and policies, and Lief’s serving as supervisor of the

investigation of Plaintiff.

2. Prosecutor Defendants’ Other Defenses

For those actions not protected by federal absolute immunity, the Prosecutor

Defendants argue that Plaintiffs § 1983 claim fails because (1) she has not met the standard

15

for a supervisory liability claim, (2) she has failed to plead that the Prosecutor Defendants

were the proximate cause for her seizure, and, in any case, (3) her claim is barred by

qualified immunity. (Mem. in Supp. at 10.) The Court reviews each argument in turn.

a. Supervisory Liability

Plaintiff's claims regarding the EIU’s alleged lack of sufficient policies, reporting

structure, approval processes, guidelines, procedures, instruction materials, staffing, training,

and oversight are the province of a supervisory liability claim under § 1983. See, e.g.,

Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 61 (2011) (failure to train); Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs of

Bryan Cnty. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 400 (1997) (hiring and training decisions); Danser v.

Stansberry, 772 F.3d 340, 350 (4th Cir. 2014) (presence or lack of policy); Shaw, 13 F.3d at

797 (failure to train, supervise, and discipline); Slakan v. Porter, 737 F.2d 368, 371 (4th

Cir. 1984) (failure to enact regulations). Plaintiff, however, opposes this construction of her

case. (Mem. in Opp’n at 2, “Ms. White does not seek to hold Lief and Miyares accountable

simply as supervisors (i.e., their failures to act or intervene)”.) She clarified in her brief that

her claim is not based on supervisory liability but instead rests on the theory that the

Prosecutor Defendants “themselves caused Ms. White’s seizure.” (Jd. 10-11 (“Unlike in

cases involving mere supervisory liability, see Mot. 8-9, the Complaint alleges Miyares and

Lief actively set in motion the unlawful investigation that foreseeably resulted in Ms.

White’s indictment.”).) Parties are responsible for advancing their own case, and the Court

will not interrupt Plaintiff from choosing to waive this avenue of relief. 2

2 In any case, Plaintiff's Complaint fails to state a claim for supervisory liability. Plaintiff has not

pled a pattern of wrongful conduct that occurred before her alleged constitutional violations. See

Danser, 772 F.3d at 350. Moreover, Plaintiff has not shown that the Prosecutor Defendants were

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b. Proximate Cause

The first element of a malicious prosecution claim under §1983 requires a plaintiff to

prove that the defendant was the but-for and proximate cause of her unlawful seizure. Evans,

703 F.3d at 647. “Accordingly, subsequent acts of independent decision-makers (¢.g.,

prosecutors, grand juries, and judges) may constitute intervening superseding causes that

break the causal chain between a defendant-officer’s misconduct and a plaintiff's unlawful

seizure.” Id. The Fourth Circuit has stated that an intermediary’s independent decision to

prosecute insulates an officer from a malicious prosecution claim “unless the officer [1]

concealed or misrepresented facts or [2] brought such undue pressure to bear on the

intermediary that the intermediary’s independent judgment was overborne.” Jd. at 648

(quoting Snider v. Lee, 584 F.3d 193, 206 (4th Cir. 2009) (Stamp, J., concurring)). For

example, although a grand jury indictment usually establishes the existence of probable

cause and thus insulates the arresting officers, “a grand jury’s decision to indict will not

shield a police officer who deliberately supplied misleading information [or failed to supply

relevant information] that influenced the decision.” Trail v. Cressell, No. 20-2219, 2021 WL

4957607, at *2 (4th Cir. Oct. 26, 2021) (alteration in original) (quoting Massey v. Ojaniit,

759 F.3d 343, 356-57 (4th Cir. 2014)).

aware of the alleged misconduct upon which Plaintiff bases her claim for a constitutional injury. See

Johnson v. Robinette, 105 F.4th 99, 123 (4th Cir. 2024) (requiring knowledge of misconduct to

establish supervisory liability). The facts alleged in the Complaint do not show that the Prosecutor

Defendants knew evidence was fabricated or omitted before Plaintiff was charged. See supra Part

III.A.1. As previously discussed, the Complaint continuously alleges that the Investigator

Defendants lied to prosecutors about what evidence was gathered during the investigation and about

the weight of the evidence that they did bring forward. (Compl. { 120, 127, 138, 140-41, 143-44,

149.) Overall, the Complaint fails to show a causal link between the Prosecutor Defendants and the

alleged fabrication and omission of evidence by the Investigators, let alone a pattern of such

behavior, or that the one seizure pled here is otherwise sufficient to apply supervisory liability.

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Even though Plaintiff forgoes a supervisory liability claim here, it is possible for a

plaintiff to obtain recovery on a theory of “effective causation.” See Amisi v. Brooks, 93

F.4th 659, 670 (4th Cir. 2024), “Section 1983 creates liability not just for a state actor who

directly deprives a plaintiff of her rights, but one who ‘causes’ such a deprivation.” Jd.

(emphasis in original). For example, the Supreme Court has recognized that an officer who

submits a warrant affidavit without reasonable grounds for probable cause can be liable

under § 1983, even if he does not personally make the unlawful arrest. Malley v. Briggs, 475

U.S. 335, 337 (1986). The requisite causal connection for this theory can be established

when actors “set[ ] in motion a series of acts by others which the actors know or reasonably

should know would cause others to inflict the constitutional injury.” Amisi, 93 F.4th at 670.

Thus, the question here is whether the Prosecutor Defendants reasonably knew that their

actions would cause others to unlawfully seize Plaintiff.

Plaintiff argues that the manner in which the Prosector Defendants created and

managed the EIU proximately caused unlawful actions that resulted in Plaintiff being

indicted and seized without probable cause. (See Compl. 194-205.) In Plaintiff's view, it

was natural and foreseeable for the Investigators to fabricate incriminating evidence and

conceal exculpatory evidence due to how the Prosecutors structured the EIU, due to the

unit’s lack of adequate staff, training, and policies, and due to the fact that Lief was the

attorney supervisor for Plaintiffs investigation. (Mem. in Opp’n at 12-13 (citing Compl.

6, 103-07, 114~19, 195).) By these actions, Plaintiff contends, the Prosecutor Defendants

caused her to be seized without probable cause. (/d.)

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Plaintiff's theory is fatally attenuated. Proximate cause “require[s] consideration of

the ‘foreseeability or the scope of the risk created by the predicate conduct’” and a

“conclu[sion] that there was ‘some direct relation between the injury asserted and the

injurious conduct alleged.’” Cnty. of Los Angeles v. Mendez, 581 U.S. 420, 431 (2017)

(citation omitted). Applying this standard, courts require a close connection between the

defendant’s act and the constitutional injury—even under an “effective causation” theory.

See Amisi, 93 F.4th at 670. For example, in Amisi, the Fourth Circuit found that the

pleadings showed that a corrections officer, Townsend, effectively caused an unlawful

seizure when he signaled a second corrections officer to take an inmate into a locker room

where Townsend knew that officer usually performed strip searches. Jd. Similarly, in

Riddick v. Barber, the Fourth Circuit held that a detainee established causation when he

“allege[d] specifically that he was ‘placed into 4-point restraints indefinitely’ at the

‘directive’ of both” a Virginia state department commissioner and the director of the hospital

where the plaintiff was confined. 109 F.4th 639, 650 (4th Cir. 2024). Plaintiff has made no

sufficient allegation that either Lief or Miyares directed the Investigators to conceal or omit

evidence. Likewise, she has alleged no other particular act that shows they acted unlawfully

or directed others to do so. Thus, she has failed to show that the Prosecutors “set[ ] in

motion a series of acts by others which the actors know or reasonably should know would

cause others to inflict the constitutional injury.” See Amisi, 93 F.4th at 670.

Although Plaintiff specifically alleged that the EIU’s policies and training were

inadequate, such a theory of causation essentially boils down to a municipal-liability-type

claim, even though Plaintiff brings this claim against the Defendants in their individual

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capacities. (Compl. {J 15-16.) When a plaintiff challenges a general policy or similarly

broad government action that is “itself legal” by alleging that it ultimately resulted in a

constitutional violation, the Supreme Court has explained that there exist “a series of events”

that attenuate causation. Bryan Cnty., 520 U.S. at 405. Thus, where a plaintiff alleges that

the cause of her constitutional deprivation is a policy, a training program, or a lack of either,

the Supreme Court has required that the plaintiff show both that a “pattern of constitutional

violations” put the § 1983 defendants on notice of the deficiency, and that the defendants

failed to address that deficiency. See id. at 407-08 (“Because the decision necessarily

governs a single case, there can be no notice to the municipal decisionmaker, based on

previous violations of federally protected rights, that his approach is inadequate.”) Plaintiff

has pled one seizure here, not a pattern of unlawful seizures or other misconduct. In sum,

Plaintiff has failed to plead sufficient facts for the Court to find that the lawful actions by the

Prosecutor Defendants before and during Plaintiff's investigation directly or proximately

caused her to be seized without probable cause.

Furthermore, Plaintiff's theory of the case runs headlong into a glaring, superseding

cause: the alleged unlawful acts by the Investigators. According to the Complaint,

Investigators reported that Assistant General Registrar Sean Mulligan would testify that

Plaintiff directed him to make changes to VERIS data for the CAP Precinct on

November 7—a day corresponding to one of the discrepancies identified by Olsen’s audit.

(Compl. ff 33, 64, 111.) The Complaint alleges this report was false, and that Mulligan

never made such a statement. (/d. 122-23.) Plaintiff further asserts that during their

investigation, the Investigator Defendants “had evidence that exonerated Ms. White

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[Plaintiff]” but “did not provide this information to prosecutors when presenting the

conclusions of their investigation.” (/d. □□ 33-34.) Moreover, Plaintiff makes these

allegations the linchpin facts in her Complaint, stating that “[t]he malicious prosecution of

Ms. White resulted directly from the misconduct of Defendant Investigators de Almeida and

Investigator Mulholland, who knowingly provided false and misleading information and

omitted material information to prosecutors” which later resulted in a grand jury indictment.

(Compl. J 120 (emphasis added).)

These alleged acts of fabricating and concealing evidence are the type of intentional,

unlawful acts that “break the causal chain” for an unlawful seizure claim. See Evans, 703

F.3d at 647. Plaintiff argues that the causal chain is not broken here, however, because the

Prosecutor Defendants “pressured” the Investigators “to deliver results,” and thus it was

foreseeable that they would violate the law. (Mem. in Opp’n at 12.) The Complaint shows

that the Prosecutors were eager to investigate claims of election fraud in the Commonwealth.

(Compl. 4 56, 92-93, 97, 114, 160-163.) In addition, it is a fair inference that the

Investigators were under pressure to find whatever evidence of election misconduct existed

and to compile it in preparation for potential criminal charges. (See id.) But Plaintiff asks

the Court to conclude that by creating what she alleges was a high-pressure environment, the

Prosecutors should have known their investigators would engage in immoral and unlawful

conduct that would taint their investigations. Without any prior sign of such behavior by the

Investigators, this inferential leap is much too far. Many government agencies expect results,

build a high-pressure environment, and report directly to an elected official. That is not

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enough to make it reasonable and foreseeable to presume that the officials working there are

breaking the law.

This result is unchanged by Plaintiff pleading that Lief was hands-on with the

Investigators, and that Lief was more involved in the investigation than other prosecutors.

(See Compl. ff 115-16.) The Court does not find it reasonable or appropriate to conclude

that a prosecutor’s increased involvement in an investigation means that he should suspect

that officers under his supervision would engage in misconduct—let alone begin fabricating

evidence. The Fourth Circuit has previously rejected the idea that prosecutors should face

greater liability for participating in an investigation, and instead has found that, on occasion,

it is their duty to do so. See Nero, 890 F.3d at 120 (finding that a § 1983 claim against a

prosecutor for “conducting an investigation is not actionable[.]”).

Consequently, the factual allegations in the Complaint fail to show that the Prosecutor

Defendants were the proximate cause of Plaintiff's claimed injury.

c. Qualified Immunity

Qualified immunity protects government officials from civil liability. Nero, 890 F.3d

at 120; see Burns, 500 U.S. at 492-96 (affording qualified immunity to prosecutors for

actions taken outside the judicial phase of criminal proceedings). Unlike absolute immunity,

the question for qualified immunity is not what function a prosecutor served when he acted,

but rather, whether the prosecutor’s actions clearly violated constitutional law. As the

Supreme Court has stated, “Unless the plaintiffs allegations state a claim of violation of

clearly established law, a defendant pleading qualified immunity is entitled to dismissal

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before the commencement of discovery.” Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 306 (1996)

(quoting Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985)).

The qualified-immunity inquiry asks whether “the facts alleged show the officer’s

conduct violated a constitutional right” and, if so, “whether the right was clearly

established.” Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200-01 (2001), If the answer to either question

is “no,” then qualified immunity applies and the official is immune from suit. See Pearson v.

Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236-42 (2009). If the law did not put the officer on notice that his

conduct would be clearly unlawful, then finding that the officer is protected by qualified

immunity is appropriate. See Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202 (citing Malley, 475 U.S. at 341

(stating that qualified immunity “provides ample protection to all but the plainly incompetent

or those who knowingly violate the law”)). To state it differently, “[a] Government official’s

conduct violates clearly established law when, at the time of the challenged conduct, ‘[t]he

contours of [a] right [are] sufficiently clear’ that every ‘reasonable official would [have

understood] that what he is doing violates that right.” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731,

741 (2011) (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987)).

Even where a constitutional right is clearly established as a general matter, the Court

must determine whether it is specific enough that a reasonable official committing the

defendant’s actions “would have understood that what he or she is doing violates that right.”

Atkinson, 100 F.4th at 505 (quoting Adams v. Ferguson, 884 F.3d 219, 226 (4th Cir. 2018)).

“[C]ourts must not ‘define clearly established law at a high level of generality, since doing so

avoids the crucial question whether the official acted reasonably in the particular

circumstances that he or she faced.”” D.C. v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 63-64 (2018) (quoting

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Plumhoff v. Rickard, 572 U.S. 765, 779 (2014)). Thus, for Plaintiffs right to be clearly

established here, there must be caselaw or other similar authority not just about the general

principle that a prosecutor violates the Fourth Amendment by prosecuting a citizen without

probable cause; but instead, “the law must establish that conduct similar to [the Prosecutor

Defendants’ is unconstitutional.” Atkinson, 100 F.4th at 505.

The Prosecutor Defendants argue that qualified immunity protects them from

Plaintiff's claims here because their actions were lawful—and thus, clearly not

unconstitutional. (Mem. in Supp. at 10.) They state, “It is plainly lawful to create a new

investigative unit consistent with the Attorney General’s statutory duties, see Va. Code

§ 24.2-104(A), (B), staff it as necessary, see Bryan Cnty., 520 U.S. at 405, and train the same

staff.” (Id.; see also Nero, 890 F.3d at 12 (stating that prosecutors enjoy qualified immunity

for beginning an investigation before they have probable cause).) “At most,” they contend,

Plaintiff “has alleged that Attorney General Miyares and Lief poorly executed these tasks,

but that is not unconstitutional or a violation of clearly established law.” (Jd.)

In response, Plaintiff argues that the Prosecutor Defendants have not established

qualified immunity for all their actions. (Mem. in Opp’n at 19-20.) She recites that the right

to be free from an arrest effected without probable cause is clearly established. (/d. at 20

(citing Merchant v. Bauer, 677 F.3d 656, 662 (4th Cir. 2012)).)? Here, Plaintiff argues that

the manner and the context in which the Prosecutors created and directed the EIU unlawfully

set in motion her criminal prosecution. (Jd. at 20-21.) While Plaintiff's brief is not exactly

3 The Court likewise assumes arguendo that the right to not be deprived of one’s liberty by

fabrication of evidence is clearly established. See Willis v. Blevins, 957 F. Supp. 2d 690, 703 (E.D.

Va. 2013); Mem. in Opp’n at 20.

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clear, she appears to argue that the Prosecutor’s actions here rendered qualified immunity

inapplicable because, she alleges, the EIU was created with political motives and subsequent

evidence fabrication occurred within that Unit. (/d. at 21 (“Plaintiff does not seek to attach

civil liability to the mere fact the Attorney Defendants created the Unit but rather to the

broader course of unlawful conduct underlying the shambolic and politicized nature of the

Unit’s creation, which proximately caused Plaintiff's indictment.”).)

Here, the flaw underlying Plaintiffs theory of the case emerges once again. She does

all except make a well-pleaded allegation that either Prosecutor Defendant fabricated or hid

evidence, directed others to do so, or discovered that evidence was fabricated or hidden

before charging Plaintiff with a crime. See supra Part III.A.1. Thus, throughout her

Complaint, her brief, and oral argument, she consistently relies upon a hypothesis that—

although the Prosecutors had the lawful authority to create the EIU and to investigate alleged

election fraud—it was both the high-pressure manner in which they did so and their

motivations that make their actions unconstitutional. For this theory, Plaintiff cites no clear

authority. As the Fourth Circuit has stated, for qualified immunity to not attach “the law

must establish that conduct similar to [the Prosecutor Defendants’] is unconstitutional.” See

Atkinson, 100 F.4th at 505; al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 741. That standard is not met here. Instead,

a review of Plaintiff's well-pleaded facts shows that qualified immunity applies.

Consequently, the Court finds that qualified immunity bars Plaintiff's claims against

the Prosecutor Defendants.

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B. Plaintiff's State Law Claims

In Count III of her Complaint, Plaintiff contends that Defendants maliciously caused

her to be arrested and indicted without probable cause in violation of her “rights under state

law.” (Compl. ff 206-14.) Ina Virginia tort action for malicious prosecution, the plaintiff

has the burden of proving four (4) essential elements: “that the prosecution was (1)

malicious, (2) instituted by or with the cooperation of the defendant, (3) without probable

cause, and (4) terminated in a manner not unfavorable to the plaintiff.” Reilly v. Shepherd,

643 S.E.2d 216, 218 (Va. 2007).

The Prosecutor Defendants argue that Count III should be dismissed on grounds of

state absolute immunity—in the form of both sovereign immunity and prosecutorial

immunity. (Mem. in Supp. at 15-19.) In opposition, Plaintiff argues that the elements of a

state law malicious prosecution claim are met here, that the Prosecutors are not protected by

prosecutorial immunity for their actions of creating the EIU and investigating Plaintiff, and

that sovereign immunity does not protect them from the intentional misconduct alleged here.

(Mem. in Opp’n at 27-30.)

For state law claims, Virginia’s absolute immunity applies to certain state officers

who are sued in their official or individual capacities for acts they performed as part of their

government role. See Messina v. Burden, 321 8.E.2d 657, 661 (Va. 1984); Perry v. Virginia,

No. 117CV546AJTIJFA, 2017 WL 6759618, at *4 (E.D. Va. Nov. 9, 2017) (finding that a

judge is entitled to absolute immunity in both his individual and official capacities). This has

been made clear in the context of the judicial immunity doctrine. Harlow v. Clatterbuck, 339

S.E.2d 181, 184 (Va. 1986) (“It is clear that judges enjoy absolute immunity from civil

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liability, even when they act maliciously or corruptly or in excess of their jurisdiction.

Judges can be held liable only when they act in ‘clear absence of all jurisdiction.””)

The Supreme Court of Virginia has held that a form of absolute immunity applies not

only to judges, but to other high level government officials: “Governors, judges, members of

state and local legislative bodies, and other high level governmental officials have generally

been accorded absolute immunity.” Messina, 321 S.E.2d at 661. Included in the list of “high

level government officials” are officers from the Governor down through, at least, the

Executive Secretary of the Water Control Board. All. to Save the Mattaponi v.

Commonwealth, Dep’t of Env’t Quality ex rel. State Water Control Bd., 621 S.E.2d 78, 96

(Va. 2005) (“We also hold that the Board’s Executive Secretary is immune from suit.”). The

Court finds that the Supreme Court of Virginia would consider its Attorney General—an

officer elected on a statewide basis in the same manner as the Governor—a high level

government official entitled to absolute immunity from suit. See Messina, 321 S.E.2d at 661;

Va. Const. art. V, § 15 (“An Attorney General shall be elected by the qualified voters of the

Commonwealth at the same time and for the same term as the Governor.”).

A form of absolute immunity also applies to front-line prosecutors. Andrews v. Ring,

585 S.E.2d 780, 784-85 (Va. 2003) (“The common-law immunity of a prosecutor is based

upon the same considerations that underlie the common-law immunities of judges and grand

jurors acting within the scope of their duties.” (quoting Jmbler, 424 US. at 422-23).)

Virginia’s Supreme Court has clearly stated, “In each case where a prosecutor is involved in

the charging process, under Virginia law, that action is intimately connected with the

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prosecutor’s role in judicial proceedings and the prosecutor is entitled to absolute immunity

from suit for such actions.” Andrews, 585 S.E.2d at 785.

Notably, this immunity covers an essential element of Plaintiff's Virginia malicious

prosecution claim: that Lief was the one who initiated the criminal prosecution against her.

See Reilly, 643 S.E.2d at 218; Donohoe Const. Co. v. Mount Vernon Assocs., 369 §.E.2d

857, 862 (Va. 1988) (clarifying that malicious prosecution lies for the initiation of criminal

charges, whereas a different tort, abuse of process, applies to actions that occur after criminal

charges are issued.). That is, unlike her § 1983 claim under the Fourth Amendment,

Plaintiff's state law claim does not rest on whether she was unlawfully seized, but whether

the Prosecutor Defendants may be held liable for initiating charges. For that action, Virginia

law grants the Prosecutor Defendants absolute immunity. See Andrews, 585 S.E.2d at 784—

85. Plaintiff has not identified authority that allows her to make an end run around this state

immunity, which courts have recognized is broader than prosecutorial immunity based on

federal law. See King v. Darden, No. 3:17-cv-742, 2018 WL 3651590, at *6 (E.D. Va. Aug.

1, 2018) (“Virginia law provides even broader prosecutorial immunity” than federal

prosecutorial immunity (citing Andrews, 585 S.E.2d at 785)). Furthermore, the immunity

serves a good and critical role by “ensuring that the prosecutor is not deterred from doing his

duty by fear of retaliatory lawsuits from those he had accused whose charges were later

dismissed or who were acquitted.” See Viers v. Baker, 841 S.E.2d 857, 862 (Va. 2020)

(acknowledging that “the underlying policy justifications for judicial immunity also applied

to prosecutors”). The Court has found no authority authorizing the Court to effectively strip

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a prosecutor of this protection by ignoring his act of presenting the charges to a grand jury,

and, instead, reviewing only his conduct that occurred before he initiated these charges.

Consequently, the Court finds that both Prosecutor Defendants are absolutely immune

from a Virginia malicious prosecution claim for the conduct alleged in the Complaint.

IV. CONCLUSION

In sum, the Prosecutor Defendants, like all prosecutors, are absolutely immune for

initiating criminal charges against Plaintiff and pursuing that criminal prosecution.

Likewise, they are shielded by qualified immunity for creating the EIU, setting its framework

and policies, and beginning and supervising the investigation of Plaintiff as these actions

were not unlawful and did not amount to clear violations of her constitutional rights. Her

state law claims, as the Court explained, are barred by absolute immunity under state law

stemming from sovereign immunity and the immunity of prosecutors. Furthermore, her

Complaint fails to allege facts the Court can rely upon to find proximate cause. Of course,

Plaintiff has raised serious allegations that the Investigators fabricated incriminating

evidence, that they concealed or misrepresented exculpatory evidence, that they lied to

prosecutors about the evidence, and that these actions resulted in an arrest without probable

cause. The Investigators whom Plaintiff alleges engaged in this behavior remain named

defendants in this case. However, her allegations do not license her to render the chain of

command within a prosecutor’s office liable for civil damages without facts showing a

sufficient connection to such inappropriate conduct. Thus, she has failed to state a claim for

malicious prosecution under both § 1983 and state law against Attorney General Miyares and

former Senior Assistant Attorney General Lief.

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For all these reasons, the Court will grant the Motion to Dismiss as to both Defendant

Miyares and Defendant Lief. Because the Prosecutor Defendants are immune from suit

based on Plaintiff's pleaded facts and because those immunities are sufficient to grant the

Motion to Dismiss in full, the matter against them will be dismissed with prejudice.

An appropriate Order will accompany this Memorandum Opinion.

Henry E. Hudson

Senior United States District Judge

Date: June A 2025

Richmond, Virginia

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