ALLEN v. SCI ROCKVIEW

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

PITTSBURGH DIVISION

AMIR R. ALLEN, )

)

) Civil Action No. 2:25-cv-00734-CBB

Plaintiff, )

) Christopher B. Brown

vs. ) United States Magistrate Judge

)

SCI ROCKVIEW, MRS. BOBBI JO )

)

SALAMON, SUPERINTENDENT;

)

PENNSYLVANIA DEPT OF )

CORRECTIONS, PENNSYLVANIA )

PRISON SOCIETY, )

)

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Christopher B. Brown, United States Magistrate Judge

Plaintiff, Amir R. Allen, is a state prisoner currently incarcerated at SCI-

Rockview. ECF No. 1. See also DOC Inmate locator https://inmatelocator.cor.

pa.gov. Plaintiff has submitted a prisoner civil rights complaint which has been

lodged at ECF No. 1. The Complaint was not accompanied by either the required

filing fee or a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A, the Court has screened the Complaint prior to docketing or service.

The gist of the allegations of the Complaint concern Plaintiff’s conditions of

confinement while incarcerated at SCI-Rockview. He is attempting to state a claim

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for “physical harm, harassment, assault, physical torture.”1

1 The determination of whether this case is subject to preservice dismissal for failure to state a

claim is left to the transferee Court.

He states “[w]hile at SCI Rockview I have been literally tortured and abused

consistently for approx. 31 months – this pattern of abuse has been cloaked under

the guise of therapy or perhaps a security issue.” ECF No. 1, ¶ II(D). Specifically,

he claims,

I’ve been placed in a hot cell or “stress box” for more than

two years under supervision and certain torture. I have

been gassed and harmed with gas in an attempt to

achieve a neutral hijacking. In cells in my grievances

(mostly cell 1041 C/3 Rockview). I have been inundated

with gas causing severe pain, stress, stiffness, and

discrimination.

Id., Statement of Claim, ¶ IV (quoted verbatim).

The issue of proper venue may be raised sua sponte by a court. See

Stjernholm v. Peterson, 83 F.3d 347, 349 (10th Cir. 1996); Garcia v. Pugh, 948 F.

Supp. 20, 23 n.5 (E.D. Pa. 1996). The venue statute applicable to Plaintiff’s

constitutional claims is 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), which provides that a civil action may

be brought in:

(1) a judicial district in which any defendant resides, if all

defendants are residents of the State in which the district

is located;

(2) a judicial district in which a substantial part of the

events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a

substantial part of property that is the subject of the

action is situated; or

(3) if there is no district in which an action may otherwise

be brought as provided in this section, any judicial district

in which any defendant is subject to the court’s personal

jurisdiction with respect to such action.

28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). The Court finds that venue is improper in this Court.

First, the Complaint reflects Defendant Salamon is the Superintendent at

SCI-Rockview, Defendant Department of Corrections is located in Mechanisburg,

PA; and Defendant Pennsylvania Prison Society is located in Philadelphia, PA.

None of these defendants are located or reside in the Western District of

Pennsylvania (“Western District”). Venue is also improper under the second

requirement since a “substantial part” of the events giving rise to Plaintiff’s claims

occurred at SCI-Rockview, which is located within the territorial boundaries of the

United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania. In fact, none

of the complained conduct giving rise to Plaintiff’s claims occurred in the Western

District. Venue is also inappropriate under the third requirement because the

Defendants cannot be found in the Western District. In sum, this district is an

improper venue under § 1391(b) for the claims brought in this lawsuit.

Because this Court lacks personal jurisdiction over the Defendants, the

question remains whether the Court should dismiss this action pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1406(a) or exercise its discretion to transfer to an appropriate District

Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1631. See Gehling v. St. George's Sch. of Med., Ltd.,

773 F.2d 539, 544 (3d Cir. 1985) (stating that a district court lacking personal

jurisdiction can transfer a case to a district in which the case could have originally

been brought); see also Danziger & De Llano, LLP v. Morgan Verkamp LLC, 948

F.3d 124, 132 (3d Cir. 2020) (“[A] district court that lacks personal jurisdiction must

at least consider a transfer.”).

Section 1406(a) provides:

The district court of a district in which is filed a case

laying venue in the wrong division or district shall

dismiss, or if it be in the interest of justice, transfer such

case to any district or division in which it could have been

brought.

28 U.S.C. § 1406(a). On the other hand, Section 1631 provides, in pertinent part:

Whenever a civil action is filed in a court . . . and that

court finds that there is a want of jurisdiction, the court

shall, if it is in the interest of justice, transfer such action

or appeal to any other such court in which the action or

appeal could have been brought at the time it was filed . .

. and the action . . . shall proceed as if it has been filed in .

. . the court to which it is transferred on the date upon

which it was actually filed in . . . the court from which it is

transferred.

28 U.S.C. § 1631. The Court has broad discretion to transfer the matter to an

appropriate forum. See Danziger & De Llano, 948 F.3d at 132 (citing Jumara v.

State Farm Ins. Co., 55 F.3d 873, 883 (3d Cir. 1995)).

“In most cases of improper venue, the courts conclude that it is in the interest

of justice to transfer to a proper forum rather than to dismiss the litigation.” 14D

Wright & Miller § 3827 at 540 (4th Ed. 2013); see also Holiday v. Bally’s Park Place,

Inc., No. 06-4588, 2007 WL 2600877, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 10, 2007) (“Generally,

transfer to the proper forum is preferable to outright dismissal because it prevents

repetitive motion practice and unnecessary costs.”). This case is no different.

Transfer in this case will save the time and expense associated with initiating a

new lawsuit. See Decker v. Dyson, 165 F. App’x 951, 954 n.3 (3d Cir. 2006) (district

court may sua sponte transfer under § 1406(a)).

The Court has determined the interests of justice are better served if this

case is transferred to the Middle District of Pennsylvania. An appropriate Order

transferring this case follows.2

DATED this 5th day of June, 2025.

BY THE COURT:

s/Christopher B. Brown

Christopher B. Brown

United States Magistrate Judge

cc: AMIR R. ALLEN

GX4384

SCI ROCKVIEW

Box A

1 Rockview Place

Bellefonte, PA 16823

(via U.S. First Class Mail)

2 An Order to transfer venue “involves a non-dispositive pretrial matter which a magistrate

judge may determine pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A).” Beemac, Inc. v. Glass Am., LLC, No. 23-

1329, 2024 WL 4367027, at *1 n.1 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 1, 2024) (citing Berg v. Aetna Freight Lines, No. 07-

1393, 2008 WL 2779294 (W.D. Pa. July 15, 2008) (collecting cases)). “This is true ‘because it can only

result in the transfer of a case to another federal district, not in a decision on the merits or even a

determination of federal jurisdiction.’” Id. (citing Berg, at *1) (internal citation omitted). Therefore,

the decision to transfer rests within the jurisdiction of a United States Magistrate Judge under 28

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A), subject to appeal to the district court for an abuse of that discretion.” Id. (citing

Franklin v. GMAC, No. 13-0046, 2013 WL 140042 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 10, 2013)).