noting that § 455 was amended in 1974 to, among other things, “omit[] the phrase ‘in his opinion’, in order to eliminate the subjective standard.”
How later courts described this case
- noting that § 455 was amended in 1974 to, among other things, “omit[] the phrase ‘in his opinion’, in order to eliminate the subjective standard.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
WESLEY RICKS (#499599) CIVIL ACTION NO.
VERSUS 23-651-BAJ-SDJ
STATE OF LOUISIANA DEPT. OF
PUBLIC SAFETY AND CORRECTIONS,
ET AL.
ORDER
Before the Court is a “Motion to Recuse,”1 filed by Plaintiff Wesley Ricks (“Plaintiff”),
who is representing himself and who is confined at the Louisiana State Penitentiary in Angola,
Louisiana. Plaintiff requests that the undersigned recuse from this case because Plaintiff is
displeased with some orders issued by the undersigned.2
A motion to recuse is committed to the broad discretion of the targeted judge3 to determine
whether disqualification is appropriate.4 A judge is presumed to be qualified to preside over a
case,5 so a movant seeking disqualification bears the burden of proving that a judge is not qualified
by clear and convincing evidence.6
1 R. Doc. 34.
2 R. Doc. 34, p. 1.
3 United States v. Bremers, 195 F.3d 221, 226 (5th Cir. 1999).
4 See, e.g., United States v. Mizell, 88 F.3d 288, 299 (5th Cir. 1996), citing Matter of Hipp, Inc., 5 F.3d 109, 116 (5th
Cir.1993).
5 In re Wilborn, 401 B.R. 848, 860 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2009), citing In re Betts, 143 B.R. 1016, 1022 (Bankr.
N.D.Ill.1992) (citing Idaho v. Freeman, 478 F.Supp. 33 (D. Idaho 1979)).
6 See Kinnear–Weed Corp. v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 441 F.2d 631, 634 (5th Cir. 1971), superseded by statute,
28 U.S.C. § 455 (1974), as stated in Aronson v. Brown, 14 F.3d 1578, 1582-83 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (noting that § 455 was
amended in 1974 to, among other things, “omit[] the phrase ‘in his opinion’, in order to eliminate the subjective
standard.”).
Two statutes govern recusal motions: 28 U.S.C. § 144 and 28 U.S.C. § 455.7 § 144 states
as follows:
Whenever a party to any proceeding in a district court makes and
files a timely and sufficient affidavit that the judge before whom the
matter is pending has a personal bias or prejudice either against him
or in favor of any adverse party, such judge shall proceed no further
therein, but another judge shall be assigned to hear such proceeding.
The affidavit shall state the facts and the reasons for the belief that
bias or prejudice exists and shall be filed not less than ten days
before the beginning of the term at which the proceeding is to be
heard, or good cause shall be shown for failure to file it within such
time. A party may file only one such affidavit in any case. It shall
be accompanied by a certificate of counsel of record stating that it is
made in good faith.
Some courts have held that a pro se litigant may not obtain disqualification of a judge under § 144
because a pro se litigant cannot meet the plain language of the statute requiring “a certificate of
counsel of record stating that it [the affidavit in support of recusal] is made in good faith.”8 Even
if Plaintiff, who is representing himself, could proceed under § 144, the allegations in his Motion
are not sufficient to establish personal bias or prejudice on the part of the magistrate judge assigned
to this case, as more fully explained below in relation to § 455.
§ 455 reads, in pertinent part, as follows:
(a) Any justice, judge, or magistrate judge of the United States shall
disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might
reasonably be questioned. (b) He shall also disqualify himself in the
following circumstances: (1) Where he has a personal bias or
prejudice concerning a party, or personal knowledge of disputed
evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding. . ..”
7 K & F Holdings, Ltd. v. Rouse’s Enterprises, L.L.C., No. 16-293, 2017 WL 2778345, at *1 (M.D. La. June 27, 2017)
(Dick, C.J.).
8 See, e.g., Gibson v. Gusman, No. 14-2273, 2014 WL 6469507, at *3 (E.D. La. Nov. 17, 2014), citing Robinson v.
Gregory, 929 F.Supp. 334, 337-38 (S.D. Ind. 1996).
While § 455 does not contain the same procedural requirements as § 144, recusal under § 455 is
not warranted here.
In determining whether recusal is appropriate under this statute, the Fifth Circuit has stated
that the recusal standard is an objective one. A party seeking recusal must demonstrate that a
reasonable and objective person, knowing all the facts and circumstances of the case, would harbor
doubts concerning the judge’s impartiality.9 This showing must be based on specific facts so as to
avoid giving a party a “random veto over the assignment of judges.”10 Also, a § 455 claim must
not be so broadly construed that “recusal is mandated upon the merest unsubstantiated suggestion
of personal bias or prejudice.”11
Plaintiff has failed to provide any specific facts that would lead a reasonable and objective
person to question the impartiality or to demonstrate any personal bias under either § 144 or § 455.
The only facts provided by Plaintiff are about Orders issued by the undersigned and involve how
a case of this type typically proceeds through the Court system; disagreements about rulings and
orders issued by this Court are not a basis for recusal.12
After carefully reviewing the matter, there is not sufficient factual support for Plaintiff’s
allegation of any personal bias or prejudice on the part of the undersigned to warrant recusal.
Accordingly,
9 Patterson v. Mobil Oil Corp., 335 F.3d 476, 484 (5th Cir. 2003); United States v. Spears, No. 09-19, 2012 WL
112985, at *2 (M.D. La. Jan. 12, 2012).
10 Capizzo v. State, No. 99-138, 1999 WL 539439, at * 1 (E.D. La. July 22, 1999).
11 Spears, 2012 WL 112985 at * 2.
12 See Mandawala v. Northeast Baptist Hospital, Counts 1, 2, and 11, 16 F.4th 1144, 1156-57 (5th Cir. 2021)
(“[A]dverse rulings, without more, do not warrant disqualification for bias. It is obvious why: If we credited [the
plaintiff’s] theory, every judge would have to recuse, because any ruling in a dispute between parties would supply
prima facie evidence of bias against the loser.”). See also Liteky v. U.S., 510 U.S. 540, 541 (1994) (“First, judicial
rulings alone almost never constitute valid basis for a bias or partiality recusal motion…Second, opinions formed by
the judge on the basis of facts introduced or events occurring during current or prior proceedings are not grounds for
a recusal motion unless they display deep-seated favoritism or antagonism as would make fair judgment impossible.”).
IT IS ORDERED that to the “Motion to Recuse”13 filed by Plaintiff Wesley Ricks is
DENIED.
Signed in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, on June 5, 2025.
S
SCOTT D. JOHNSON
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
13 R. Doc. 34.