The opinion
Filed 6/5/25 Steiger v. Alameda Health System CA1/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
SHONETTE STEIGER,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
A169457
v.
ALAMEDA HEALTH SYSTEM, (Alameda County
Super. Ct. No. RG19038883)
Defendant and Appellant.
Alameda Health System (AHS) appeals from an award of attorney fees
to its former employee, Shonette Steiger, who prevailed at trial on claims she
brought under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (Gov. Code,1
§ 12900 et seq. (FEHA)). After a jury trial resulted in a judgment in her
favor, Steiger sought an award of $1,901,997.25 in attorney fees, which
included a multiplier of 1.5. After a hearing, the trial court issued a detailed
and closely reasoned eight-page single-spaced order awarding fees of
$997,106.44. The trial court’s nearly 50 percent reduction from the fees
sought by Steiger’s counsel reflected reductions in hourly rates, reductions in
hours worked, and a reduced multiplier of 1.2. On appeal, AHS argues that
the trial court abused its discretion by not further reducing the hourly rates,
1 Subsequent statutory references are to the Government Code unless
otherwise stated.
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by awarding a multiplier, and by awarding fees for work on the fee request
that was documented in Steiger’s reply papers. We will affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Underlying Litigation
After AHS terminated Steiger’s employment as a nurse in 2018, she
filed suit alleging four causes of action under FEHA: disability
discrimination based on disparate treatment in violation of section 12940,
subdivision (a); failure to engage in the interactive process in violation of
section 12940, subdivision (n); failure to provide reasonable accommodation
in violation of section 12940, subdivision (m); and retaliation in violation of
section 12940, subdivision (h). The case was heard by a jury in a trial
conducted over a three-week period at which 10 witnesses testified and 91
exhibits were admitted into evidence. The jury found for Steiger on two of
her causes of action, found against her on the other two, and awarded her
$355,428.19 in past economic losses and $110,000 in future economic losses,
and no non-economic damages. (See Steiger v. Alameda Health System (June
5, 2025, A168216, A168382) [nonpub. opn.] [affirming the judgment].)
B. Steiger’s Motion for Attorney Fees
On July 5, 2023, Steiger filed a motion for an award of attorney fees
under section 12965.2 She requested a lodestar of $1,216,776.50 for work
performed through June 27, 2023, and a multiplier of 1.5, for a total of
$1,825,164.75. She argued that she was also entitled to recover the fees
incurred in filing the fee motion, and stated that with her reply papers she
would provide a complete accounting of the time spent researching,
preparing, and arguing the fee motion.
2 Steiger sought, and was awarded, costs as well as fees. Costs are not
at issue in this appeal, so we do not discuss them.
2
Steiger’s motion was supported by several declarations, including one
from Steiger who stated that she had tried unsuccessfully to resolve her
dispute with AHS without legal counsel. She consulted with about a dozen
other attorneys before the firm of Siegel, LeWitter Malkani agreed to
represent her on a contingency basis, advancing all costs.
Steiger also filed declarations from her attorneys containing
information about their qualifications, experience, and past fee awards, along
with detailed records of the work they performed in this matter. She also
filed declarations from Bryan Schwartz and Phil Horowitz, two Bay Area
attorneys who represent plaintiffs in employment cases. Schwartz opined
that the hourly rates sought by Steiger’s counsel were “reasonable and
appropriate and well within market range for lawyers with similar
qualifications handling comparable litigation”; Horowitz opined that the
hourly rates were in line with, or lower than, fees charged by trial attorneys
in employment cases with similar levels of skill and experience.
C. AHS’s Opposition
In opposing Steiger’s fee motion, AHS argued that the fee request was
so excessive as to justify denying fees altogether and that if fees were
awarded at all, they should be awarded as a percentage of Steiger’s damages
because “[u]tilizing the lodestar approach in this matter is completely
speculative.” (AHS has not pursued these arguments on appeal.) AHS
argued that if the court used the lodestar approach, Steiger’s requested
hourly rates should be reduced because they were “unreasonable and higher
than the hourly rates of other attorneys in the area.” AHS further argued
that the requested hours were not reasonable and should be denied in their
entirety or significantly reduced, and that no multiplier was warranted.
3
In support of its opposition, AHS filed a declaration and report from its
retained expert Laura S. Johnson, an attorney licensed in the state of New
York, who is the legal operations manager of Sterling & Sterling, LLC, a firm
that reviews and audits legal bills. Johnson opined that no multiplier was
warranted and that the requested lodestar should be reduced by
approximately $800,000 to reflect her recommended reductions to the
requested hourly rates and the hours worked. AHS also filed a declaration
from an associate attorney at the firm that represented AHS in the trial
court, who recommended additional reductions amounting to about $150,000.
In addition, AHS filed objections to the Schwartz and Horowitz
declarations, arguing that the declarations should be stricken entirely or in
part.
D. Steiger’s Reply
In her reply papers, filed on August 25, 2023, Steiger requested a
lodestar of $76,832.50 for work performed from June 28 to August 24. The
request was supported by a declaration from one of Steiger’s attorneys,
Latika Malkani, and detailed time records supporting the additional fees.
Steiger also submitted objections to the Johnson declaration and the
declaration from the AHS associate.
E. Hearing and Order
The trial court’s tentative ruling was contested by both parties. After a
hearing at which both parties argued extensively, the court took the matter
under submission. The court subsequently issued a detailed written order
liberally citing the applicable law, discussing the evidence and arguments
presented by the parties, and explaining its reasons for granting the motion
in part and denying it in part.
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The court disallowed the time for one of Steiger’s attorneys and reduced
the hourly rates that Steiger had requested for three other attorneys and a
paralegal, which reduced Steiger’s lodestar from $1,216,776.50 to $1,015,941.
The court further reduced the lodestar to $789,263.70 to account for hours it
determined were not reasonably expended. The court then applied a
multiplier of 1.2 to the adjusted lodestar, yielding $947,116.44. The court
awarded $49,990 of the $76,832.50 Steiger had requested in her reply papers
for fees incurred after the filing of the motion, with no multiplier, resulting in
a fee award of $997,106.44, about 52 percent of the total amount Steiger had
requested. This appeal timely followed.
DISCUSSION
A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
FEHA provides that “the court, in its discretion, may award to the
prevailing party . . . reasonable attorney’s fees and costs.” (§ 12965, subd.
(c)(6).) To determine a fee award, the trial court first determines the
“lodestar” amount, calculated as the number of hours reasonably worked
times a reasonable hourly fee. (Greene v. Dillingham Construction, N.A., Inc.
(2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 418, 422 (Greene).) The court has the discretion to
increase or reduce the lodestar “by applying a positive or negative
‘ “multiplier” ’ based on a variety of factors.” (Ibid.)
In a case like this one, where “ ‘the sole issue before us . . . is the
amount of fees awarded, our review is deferential. “ ‘The “experienced trial
judge is the best judge of the value of professional services rendered in his
court, and while his judgment is of course subject to review, it will not be
disturbed unless the appellate court is convinced that it is clearly wrong”—
meaning that it abused its discretion.’ ” (PLCM Group v. Drexler (2000) 22
Cal.4th 1084, 1095, quoting Serrano v. Priest (1977) 20 Cal.3d 25, 49, and
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citing Fed-Mart Corp. v. Pell Enterprises, Inc. (1980) 111 Cal.App.3d 215, 228
[an appellate court will interfere with a determination of reasonable attorney
fees “only where there has been a manifest abuse of discretion”].)’ Indeed,
our colleagues in Division Four have observed that the ‘only proper basis of
reversal of the amount of an attorney fees award is if the amount awarded is
so large or small that it shocks the conscience and suggests that passion and
prejudice influenced the termination.’ (Akins v. Enterprise Rent-A-Car Co.
(2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 1127, 1134.)” (Calvo Fisher & Jacob LLP v. Lujan
(2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 608, 620.) Thus the law that governs here requires
AHS to demonstrate an abuse of discretion. (Ibid.)
As we have stated, courts describe rulings that constitute an abuse of
discretion as “ ‘exceed[ing] the bounds of reason’ ” or as “arbitrary, capricious,
patently absurd, or even whimsical.” (Artus v. Gramercy Towers
Condominium Assn. (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 1043, 1051.) “[O]ur Supreme
Court said that ‘A ruling that constitutes an abuse of discretion has been
described as one that is “so irrational or arbitrary that no reasonable person
could agree with it.” ’ ” (Ibid., quoting Sargon Enterprises, Inc. v. University
of Southern California (2012) 55 Cal.4th 747, 773.)
B. Challenge to Hourly Rates
1. Additional Background
Steiger requested hourly rates as follows: $975 for attorney Siegel (a
partner with over 40 years of experience in labor and employment matters),
$850 for attorney Malkani (a partner with more than 26 years of experience
as an employment litigator), $675 for attorney Weber (an associate with
almost 20 years of experience litigating employment cases), and $250 for
paralegal Ledezma. Attorney Malkani declared that these represent the
firm’s 2023 customary hourly rates for employment litigation, which apply to
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the firm’s individual clients who are charged on an hourly basis. Malkani
declared that the firm was “regularly . . . successful in fee petitions and
negotiated fee agreements seeking our then-existing regular hourly rates.”
As evidence that the rates were “well within the range of rates charged by
and awarded to comparable attorneys for comparable work,” Steiger referred
to the Schwartz and Horowitz declarations and provided evidence that the
rates sought were consistent with or less than rates listed on the so-called
“Laffey Matrix,” which has served as the basis for attorney fee awards upheld
by California courts. (See Syers Properties III, Inc. v. Rankin (2014) 226
Cal.App.4th 691, 702 [affirming fee award based on adjusted Laffey Matrix]
(Syers).)
AHS argued that the requested rates should be reduced to those
recommended by its expert, Johnson: $600 for partners (i.e., Siegel and
Malkani), $400 for associates (i.e., Weber), and $150 for paralegal services
(i.e., Ledezma). Johnson opined that the rates sought by Steiger were
“unreasonable in comparison to the rates billed by other attorneys
performing similar labor and employment work in similar-sized firms in the
San Francisco area.” Johnson reported that her recommended rates were
“based on data from the Wolters Kluwer Real Rate Report for Employment
and Labor within the San Francisco area.”
The trial court found that Steiger’s attorneys and paralegal Ledezma
were well-qualified and experienced; that they achieved a good result for
Steiger; and that they “deserve a reasonable hourly rate.” The court also
found that the hourly rates Steiger sought were unreasonably high. The trial
court reduced the requested hourly rates to $750 for Siegel and Malkani,
$550 for Weber, and $150 for Ledezma, explaining that it based the
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reductions on its “familiarity with prevailing rates for legal work in the San
Francisco Bay Area market.”
The court wrote that it had considered the evidentiary submissions
submitted by both parties, but found them unhelpful. The court overruled
AHS’s objections to the Schwartz and Horowitz declarations, but noted that
opinions expressed in the declarations were based on Schwartz’s and
Horowitz’s subjective impressions of Steiger’s attorneys rather than review of
the attorney’s time entries or work product, or the trial transcript. The court
also overruled Steiger’s objections to the Johnson declaration. The court
found that Johnson was “clearly qualified to give expert opinions on
attorney’s fees,” concluding that AHS’s failure to “secure the services of a
California-based expert familiar with the local market” went to the weight,
rather than the admissibility, of Johnson’s opinion. The court also noted that
Johnson had presented data drawn from the Wolters Kluwer 2022 Real Rate
Report “without any context,” and that she had not attached the report to her
affidavit, which she should have done.
2. Analysis
AHS contends that because Steiger presented “no reliable authority or
evidence” to support the hourly rates she requested, the trial court abused its
discretion by awarding higher rates than AHS’s expert, Johnson, determined
were reasonable. This argument is meritless.
Contrary to AHS’s assertion, Steiger supported her requested rates
with “reliable evidence,” including the declaration of her attorney Malkani,
who testified how the firm’s rates were set and that the firm had recovered
its then-existing hourly rates in other cases. Steiger also provided evidence
from other Bay Area employment counsel regarding prevailing and
recoverable rates, as well as evidence comparing the rates sought with those
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on the Laffey Matrix. All this evidence was considered by the trial court.3
The fact that the trial court found Steiger’s evidentiary submissions
unhelpful does not mean they were not reliable. We note that the trial court
found AHS’s evidentiary submissions unhelpful, too.
Further, AHS cites no authority to support its claim that the trial court
abused its discretion by “insert[ing] itself as a fact witness” and awarding
higher rates than AHS’s expert Johnson determined were reasonable.4 It is
well-established that the trial court determines the reasonable hourly rate
“ ‘based on the rates prevalent in the community where the court is located,’ ”
and that the trial court judge “is in the best position to value the services
rendered by the attorneys in his or her courtroom.” (Syers, supra, 226
Cal.App.4th at p. 700, 702.) AHS cites no authority to suggest that the trial
court abused its discretion in determining based on its “familiarity with
3 Buried in AHS’s argument concerning hourly rates is the statement
that the trial court overruled its objections to the Schwartz and Horowitz
declarations “in clear error.” This issue has been forfeited by AHS’s failure to
identify it in a heading or subheading of its brief and develop the argument.
(See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(B) [briefs must “[s]tate each point
under a separate heading or subheading summarizing the point, and support
each point by argument and, if possible, by citation of authority”];
Tsakopoulos Investments, LLC v. County of Sacramento (2023) 95
Cal.App.5th 280, 310 [“ ‘[f]ailure to provide proper headings forfeits issues
that may be discussed in the brief but are not clearly identified by a
heading’ ”].) In any event, AHS fails to show prejudice from the trial court’s
overruling its objections, particularly in light of the trial court’s statement
that it found the declarations unhelpful. (See Century Surety Co. v. Polisso
(2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 922, 963 [appellant must affirmatively show how
error constitutes a miscarriage of justice].)
4 AHS claims that Johnson’s opinion on reasonable rates was
“unopposed,” but this is not accurate. Steiger’s counsel objected to Johnson’s
determination of purportedly reasonable hourly rates that were lower than
their own rates.
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prevailing rates for legal work in the San Francisco Bay Area market” that
the reasonable hourly rate for Steiger’s attorneys was neither the rate
requested by Steiger nor the rate recommended by AHS’s expert.
AHS contends that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to
“appropriately consider” Johnson’s declaration. That is plainly incorrect; the
trial court explained that it considered Johnson’s declaration, but found it
unhelpful. The trial court did not exclude Johnson’s testimony: to the
contrary, it overruled Steiger’s objections to the Johnson declaration, while
noting issues that affected the weight it would give to Johnson’s testimony,
including her lack of familiarity with the local market, her failure to provide
the Wolters Kluwer report on which she relied in determining reasonable
rates, and her presentation of data from that report “without any context.”5
In short, AHS fails to show that the trial court abused its discretion in
determining reasonable hourly rates for Steiger’s counsel.
C. Challenge to Multiplier
The trial court may award a multiplier to account for the fact that
because of “the contingent and deferred nature of the fee award in a civil
rights” case, including a case brought under FEHA, “the fair market value of
legal services provided on that basis is greater than the equivalent
noncontingent hourly rate.” (Horsford v. Board of Trustees of California
State University (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 359, 395 (Horsford).) Other factors
the court may consider in determining whether to apply a multiplier and the
amount of any multiplier include “the quality of the representation, the
5 For this reason, the cases cited by AHS to support its claim are
irrelevant: ABM Industries Overtime Cases (2017) 19 Cal.App.5th 277, 292-
293, and Garrett v. Howmedica Osteonics Corp. (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 173,
187, stand for the proposition that a trial court’s ruling on the admissibility of
expert testimony is reviewed for abuse of discretion.
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novelty and difficulty of the issues presented, [and] the results obtained.”
(Greene, supra, 101 Cal.App.4th at pp. 426-427.)
Here, plaintiff requested a multiplier of 1.5. The trial court clearly
explained how it exercised its discretion to award a multiplier of 1.2 as
follows: “On the one hand, Plaintiff’s counsel litigated this hotly-contested
case for four years on a pure contingent fee basis with no guarantee of
success, uncovered evidence of animus and motive in discovery, prevailed at
trial on two causes of action, and obtained for Plaintiff an award of economic
damages in the sum of $465,000. On the other hand, Plaintiff did not prevail
on two other causes of action and received zero noneconomic damages. In
light of this result, the Court finds that a reasonable multiplier is 1.2.”
In light of the trial court’s careful explication of how it chose the
multiplier, AHS’s arguments that the trial court abused its discretion fall
flat. AHS points out that Steiger achieved only “limited results.” True—and
that is something the trial court considered in reducing the requested
multiplier. AHS cites no authority suggesting that the award of a multiplier
is an abuse of discretion when a plaintiff achieves only partial success. AHS
emphasizes that Steiger did not show that she is entitled to a multiplier for
“exceptional representation,” but that is a straw argument: the trial court
did not award the multiplier on that basis. Finally, AHS contends that the
trial court abused its discretion by awarding a multiplier to account for
contingent risk because the hourly rate awarded by the court already
compensated for that risk. (See Horsford, supra, 132 Cal.App.4th at p. 395
[contingency adjustment may be made through lodestar calculation or
application of multiplier, but not both].) We disregard this unsupported
assertion. (Air Couriers International v. Employment Development Dept.
(2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 923, 928 [arguments must be supported by
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appropriate references to the record; we may disregard unsupported factual
assertions]; Duarte v. Chino Community Hospital (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 849,
856 [failure to provide adequate citations to the record forfeits claim of
error].) Moreover, “ ‘we presume that the trial court considered all
appropriate factors in selecting a multiplier and applying it to the lodestar
figure.’ ” (Taylor v. Nabors Drilling USA, LP (2014) 222 Cal.App.4th 1228,
1249 [affirming fee award where trial court neither specified the multiplier it
applied nor the factors it considered in selecting a multiplier].) There is
nothing here that suggests any abuse of discretion by the trial court.
D. Challenge to Fees Requested in Reply Papers
The attorney fees recoverable under a statutory attorney fee provision
“ordinarily include compensation for all hours reasonably spent, including
those necessary to establish and defend the fee claim.” (Serrano v. Unruh
(1982) 32 Cal.3d 621, 639 [addressing fees under Code Civ. Proc., § 1021.5].)
A party seeking to recover fees incurred after an initial fee motion is filed
may file a supplemental declaration before the hearing on the fee motion, as
Steiger did here, or may file a separate fee motion. (Doppes v. Bentley
Motors, Inc. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 967, 1002.)
Relying on cases holding that new legal issues cannot be raised for the
first time in a reply brief because of the unfairness to the other party, AHS
contends that the trial court abused its discretion by awarding Steiger’s
attorneys $49,990 in fees purportedly “first requested on reply” for work that
was performed by counsel after the fee motion was filed. (Capitalization
omitted.) Those cases have no application here: Steiger’s request for fees in
her reply papers raised no new legal issue, and there was no unfairness
because AHS was informed in Steiger’s moving papers that she sought fees
for researching, preparing and arguing the fee motion, with further
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documentation to be provided with her reply papers. In any event, AHS has
forfeited its claim of error by failing to raise the issue in the trial court, which
it had the opportunity to do at the hearing on Steiger’s fee motion. (Newton
v. Clemons (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 1, 11 [as a general matter “ ‘issues raised
for the first time on appeal which were not litigated in the trial court are
waived’ ”].) Although AHS addressed other issues concerning Steiger’s reply
papers at the hearing, AHS never argued that any fees should be denied on
the ground that they were requested for the first time in the reply papers.
We will not consider that argument now.
DISPOSITION
The challenged order is affirmed in its entirety. Respondent shall
recover her costs on appeal.
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_________________________
Miller, J.
WE CONCUR:
_________________________
Richman, Acting P. J.
_________________________
Desautels, J.
A169457, Steiger v. Alameda Health System
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