The opinion
[Cite as Brown v. Brown, 2025-Ohio-1998.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
Mervin Brown, :
Plaintiff-Appellee, : No. 24AP-285
(C.P.C. No. 22DR-0880)
v. :
(REGULAR CALENDAR)
Tracey Brown, :
Defendant-Appellant. :
D E C I S I O N
Rendered on June 5, 2025
On brief: Trolinger Law Offices LLC and Christopher L.
Trolinger, for appellant. Argued: Christopher L. Trolinger.
APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas,
Division of Domestic Relations
EDELSTEIN, J.
{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant, Tracey Brown, appeals from a decision and judgment
entry of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, Division of Domestic Relations,
granting a divorce and terminating her marriage to plaintiff-appellee, Mervin Brown.
Appellee did not file a brief in this action. For the following reasons, we reverse.
I. Facts and Procedural History
{¶ 2} The parties were married on November 29, 1985 and had four children.
Three of the children emancipated. One child, M.B., was born on December 30, 1997 with
a chromosomal disorder and was severely disabled from the time of his birth. (Feb. 12,
2024 Tr. at 109-10.) M.B. was not able to walk or talk, could not physically or mentally care
for himself, and required daily care for the duration of his life including a special short gut
diet, a feeding tube, a hospital bed, and a wheelchair. (Feb. 12, 2024 Tr. at 109-13.)
No. 24AP-285 2
{¶ 3} On March 17, 2022, appellee filed a complaint for divorce. Appellant filed an
answer and counterclaim for divorce on April 21, 2022. The trial court issued temporary
orders on October 11, 2022 finding M.B. to be a “Castle child” within the meaning of Castle
v. Castle, 15 Ohio St.3d 279 (1984), and requiring appellee to pay child support to appellant
in the amount of $539.53 per month for M.B.’s care. The trial court ordered the parties to
equally split the cost of M.B.’s medical expenses.
{¶ 4} Appellee filed a motion to modify the temporary orders on October 26, 2022.
The magistrate denied appellee’s motion to modify in a January 13, 2023 magistrate’s
order. Appellee then filed an objection to the magistrate’s order arguing it was contrary to
this court’s decision in Geygan v. Geygan, 2012-Ohio-1965 (10th Dist.), which held a
domestic relations court lacks jurisdiction to enter a child support order for a disabled child
who is older than the age of 18 at the time the divorce decree is issued. In an April 11, 2023
decision and judgment entry, the trial court sustained appellee’s objection and granted the
motion to set aside the magistrate’s order. The trial court determined that, despite other
appellate districts in Ohio consistently finding to the contrary, it was bound by Geygan and
was therefore compelled to conclude it did not have jurisdiction to establish child support
because M.B. had already reached the age of 18 before the divorce proceedings.
{¶ 5} On February 12, 2024, the trial court conducted a final hearing.
Subsequently, on April 2, 2024, the trial court issued a judgment entry and decree of
divorce. The trial court did not order either party to pay spousal support and reiterated its
prior finding from the April 11, 2023 decision and judgment entry that the court did not
have jurisdiction to award child support for M.B. (Decision and Jgmt. Entry at 9, 18-19.)
{¶ 6} Appellant timely appeals. On November 12, 2024, after appellant filed her
merit brief in this appeal, M.B. passed away. (Supplemental Brief at 3.) Appellant then
submitted a supplemental brief addressing the issue of whether M.B.’s death rendered the
appeal moot.
II. Assignments of Error
{¶ 7} Appellant raises the following assignments of error for our review:
[I.] The trial court erred as a matter of law and abused its
discretion in finding that a parent of a disabled child that
attained the age of eighteen while under a legal disability is
No. 24AP-285 3
inel[i]gible to receive child support as the domestic relations
court did not have jurisdiction.
[II.] The trial court erred and violated the equal protection
clause of the United States Constitution’s Fourteenth
Amendment and the Ohio Constitution in finding that parents
of disabled children that divorce prior to the child reaching the
age of eighteen may receive child support beyond the age of
eighteen but parents of disabled children that obtain the age of
eighteen prior to the filing of divorce cannot receive child
support.
III. Mootness
{¶ 8} Before we consider the merits of appellant’s assignments of error, we address
the issue of mootness. After appellant filed her notice of appeal and merit brief with this
court but before the matter came for oral argument, appellant notified this court of M.B.’s
November 12, 2024 death. (Supplemental Brief at 3.) In a January 10, 2025 journal entry,
we ordered appellant to submit supplemental briefing “addressing the issue of whether
[M.B.]’s death has rendered this appeal moot.” (Jan. 10, 2025 Journal Entry.) Appellant
filed her supplemental brief on January 29, 2025.
{¶ 9} As a general matter, an appellate court does not decide moot appeals. Parris
v. Chapman, 2021-Ohio-3501, ¶ 16 (10th Dist.), citing Rithy Properties, Inc. v. Cheeseman,
2016-Ohio-1602, ¶ 14 (10th Dist.). “Moot appeals involve no actual genuine live
controversy, the decision of which can definitely affect existing legal relations.” Id., citing
In re L.W., 2006-Ohio-644, ¶ 11 (10th Dist.). Thus, an appeal is rendered moot when, even
if a reviewing court were to rule in favor of the party seeking relief, it is impossible for the
court to grant meaningful relief. Id., citing Dublin v. Friedman, 2017-Ohio-9127, ¶ 21 (10th
Dist.).
{¶ 10} Appellant acknowledges that M.B.’s death represents a cut-off date in any
future claims to child support, but she argues the appeal is not moot because she still seeks
relief in the form of child support backdated from the date of filing her counterclaim for
divorce through the time of M.B.’s death. We agree with appellant that a backdated award
of child support would be meaningful relief and, thus, her appeal is not moot. See, e.g.,
Lichtenstein v. Lichtenstein, 2020-Ohio-5080, ¶ 63 (8th Dist.) (final divorce decree did not
No. 24AP-285 4
render moot wife’s motion to modify temporary support orders because the issue was
whether she was entitled to temporary support from the date of the final divorce hearing
until the court issued the final divorce decree). Accordingly, we address the merits of
appellant’s appeal.
IV. First Assignment of Error–Trial Court’s Jurisdiction
{¶ 11} In her first assignment of error, appellant argues the trial court erred in
concluding it lacked jurisdiction to award child support for M.B.’s care because he was older
than the age of 18 when the parties divorced.
{¶ 12} A trial court has discretion to determine child support obligations, and an
appellate court will not disturb the trial court’s child support determination unless the trial
court has abused its discretion. Pauly v. Pauly, 80 Ohio St.3d 386, 390 (1997). An abuse
of discretion connotes a decision that is unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable.
Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219 (1983); State ex rel. Deblase v. Ohio Ballot
Bd., 2023-Ohio-1823, ¶ 27. Here, however, appellant argues the trial court erred in its
application of R.C. 3119.86 to conclude it lacked jurisdiction to enter a child support order
for a Castle child. The application of a statute presents a question of law that we review de
novo. Zibaie v. Zibaie, 2024-Ohio-1140, ¶ 28 (10th Dist.), citing TBF Fin. L.L.C. v.
Wilkerson, 2019-Ohio-3493, ¶ 11 (10th Dist.); Ramsey v. Ramsey, 2014-Ohio-1921, ¶ 29
(10th Dist.). Additionally, appellate courts review determinations of subject-matter
jurisdiction under a de novo standard. Bruner Holdings, LLC v. Sleeper, 2024-Ohio-2925,
¶ 20 (10th Dist.), citing Pointer v. Smith, 2021-Ohio-2247, ¶ 8 (10th Dist.).
{¶ 13} R.C. 3105.011(A) explicitly confers on the domestic court “full equitable
powers and jurisdiction appropriate to the determination of all domestic relations matters.”
In a divorce proceeding, the domestic relations court “shall allocate the parental rights and
responsibilities for the care of the minor children of the marriage.” R.C. 3109.04(A). Under
R.C. 3109.05(A)(1), “the court may order either or both parents to support or help support
their children.”
{¶ 14} In Castle, 15 Ohio St.3d 279, the Supreme Court of Ohio held “[t]he common-
law duty imposed on parents to support their minor children may be found by a court of
domestic relations having jurisdiction of the matter, to continue beyond the age of majority
No. 24AP-285 5
if the children are unable to support themselves because of mental or physical disabilities
which existed before attaining the age of majority.” Castle at paragraph one of the syllabus.
The child in Castle was 13 years old at the time of her parents’ divorce but had the mental
age of a 5-year-old and would never be able to support herself. Id. at 280. When the parents
divorced, the father was ordered to pay child support, but he discontinued support
payments when the child turned 18 and filed a motion to terminate the child support
obligation. Id. The trial court granted the father’s motion because the child was over the
age of 18 and received Social Security disability payments. Id. The court of appeals reversed
the trial court, finding a common-law duty of continued support beyond the age of majority
of developmentally disabled children. Id. The Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals
and held “a domestic relations court has jurisdiction to order a noncustodial parent to
continue to provide support after the age of majority if the child is physically or mentally
disabled to the extent of being incapable of maintaining himself or herself.” Id. at 283.
{¶ 15} After the Supreme Court’s decision in Castle, the General Assembly adopted
R.C. 3119.86, effectively codifying the Castle decision. See Yost v. Yost, 2003-Ohio-3754,
¶ 10 (4th Dist.); Geygan, 2012-Ohio-1965, at ¶ 10. The version of R.C. 3119.86 in effect at
the time of the trial court’s decision below states, in pertinent part:
(A) Notwithstanding section 3109.01 of the Revised Code, both
of the following apply:
(1) The duty of support to a child imposed pursuant to a court
child support order shall continue beyond the child’s
eighteenth birthday only under the following circumstances:
(a) The child is mentally or physically disabled and is incapable
of supporting or maintaining himself or herself.
Former R.C. 3119.86(A)(1)(a) (2024 version). In turn, R.C. 3109.01 defines the “age of
majority,” and states “[a]ll persons of the age of eighteen years or more, who are under no
legal disability, are capable of contracting and are of full age for all purposes.”
{¶ 16} In granting appellee’s motion to set aside the magistrate’s order, the trial
court found that although M.B. qualifies as a Castle child, the trial court nonetheless lacked
jurisdiction to enter a child support order for M.B. under R.C. 3119.86. The trial court
stated it was compelled to follow this court’s precedent in Geygan, which held the domestic
No. 24AP-285 6
relations court lacked jurisdiction to enter a child support order relating to a disabled child
because the disabled child was over the age of 18 at the time of the divorce. Appellant
acknowledges the trial court followed Geygan in rendering its judgment but nonetheless
argues Geygan, and therefore the trial court, erroneously interpreted R.C. 3119.86.
{¶ 17} In Geygan, this court determined both Castle and former R.C.
3119.86(A)(1)(a) involve the domestic relations court exercising continuing jurisdiction to
modify or enforce child support orders for a disabled child where (1) the disabled child was
disabled prior to reaching the age of 18, and (2) the child support order was first issued
prior to the disabled child reaching the age of 18. Geygan at ¶ 11-12. This court reasoned
that because R.C. 3119.86 used the words “continue” and “beyond,” continued support for
a disabled child applies only when the initial support order is entered prior to the child
reaching the age of 18. Geygan at ¶ 17.
{¶ 18} More than a decade has passed since this court issued Geygan, and, until
now, this court has not had the occasion to revisit this jurisdictional question. Having
examined Castle and the version of R.C. 3119.86 in effect at the time of the trial court’s
decision, we believe Geygan was wrongly decided.
{¶ 19} In interpreting a statute, a court’s duty is not to delete or insert words but to
give effect to the words used. State v. E.K., 2024-Ohio-5496, ¶ 12 (10th Dist.), citing State
v. Maxwell, 2002-Ohio-2121, ¶ 10. “Where the language of a statute is plain and
unambiguous and conveys a clear and definite meaning there is no occasion for resorting
to rules of statutory interpretation. An unambiguous statute is to be applied, not
interpreted.” Sears v. Weimer, 143 Ohio St. 312 (1944), paragraph five of the syllabus.
“Only when a definitive meaning proves elusive should rules for construing ambiguous
language be employed. Otherwise, allegations of ambiguity become self-fulfilling.” State
v. Porterfield, 2005-Ohio-3095, ¶ 11. “Ambiguity exists only if the language of the statute
is susceptible of more than one reasonable interpretation.” E.K. at ¶ 12, citing State ex rel.
Toledo Edison Co. v. Clyde, 76 Ohio St.3d 508, 513 (1996).
{¶ 20} To discern legislative intent, a court must first consider the statutory
language, “reading words and phrases in context and construing them in accordance with
rules of grammar and common usage.” State ex rel. Choices for South-Western City
Schools v. Anthony, 2005-Ohio-5362, ¶ 40. In concluding R.C. 3119.86 did not apply to a
No. 24AP-285 7
situation involving a disabled child who was disabled prior to reaching the age of 18 but
where no support order had been issued prior to the child reaching age 18, this court stated
in Geygan:
[I]n enacting R.C. 3119.86, the General Assembly considered
the question of child support for adult children with
disabilities. In so doing, legislators chose to incorporate the
words “continue” and “beyond.” The General Assembly, at the
time of enactment or in a subsequent amendment, very easily
could have deleted these words and stated simply that child
support may be imposed for a child who is over the age of 18
and is mentally or physically disabled and incapable of
supporting or maintaining himself or herself. It did not.
For these reasons, we conclude that the domestic relations
court lacked jurisdiction to enter a child support order relating
to John because he was 38 years old at the time of the final
judgment entry.
Geygan, 2012-Ohio-1965, at ¶ 17-18. Upon review, we find that analysis was both contrary
to the tenets of statutory interpretation and internally inconsistent.
{¶ 21} In Geygan, this court fixated on “continue” and “beyond,” isolating the words
from their context and ignoring the plain language of the rest of the statute. Choices for
South-Western City Schools at ¶ 40. To reach the conclusion that the domestic relations
court lacked jurisdiction, this court unnecessarily narrowly construed the phrase “shall
continue beyond” in R.C. 3119.86 as attaching only to the phrase “imposed pursuant to a
court child support order” instead of more broadly attaching to the general phrase “duty of
support.” This exceptionally narrow reading of the statutory text deprives the broader
language of the statute of its ordinary meaning and adds a requirement not found in the
statute–that a child support order for the disabled child must already exist before the child
reaches the age of 18 for the duty to support the disabled child to continue after the child
reaches the age of 18. Hulsmeyer v. Hospice of Southwest Ohio, Inc., 2014-Ohio-5511, ¶ 23
(“court[s] must give effect to the words used, making neither additions nor deletions from
words chosen by the General Assembly”).
{¶ 22} Additionally, this court in Geygan made no effort to give effect to the
definition of age of majority in R.C. 3109.01, which specifically requires the person to be of
age 18 or more and “under no legal disability.” Notably, this court recognized that R.C.
No. 24AP-285 8
3119.86 “effectively codif[ied]” the Supreme Court’s decision in Castle which found a
parent’s obligation to support a disabled child does not cease simply because the child turns
18. Geygan at ¶ 10. Though Geygan attempted to distinguish Castle on the facts, noting
the child in Castle was younger than 18 when the parents divorced, nothing in Castle or the
plain language of R.C. 3119.86 supports the Geygan court’s conclusion that the timing of
the parents’ divorce is the dispositive inquiry for whether the domestic relations court
retains jurisdiction to order child support for the first time for a disabled child over the age
of 18. To the contrary, R.C. 3119.86 plainly applies “[n]otwithstanding” the age of majority
in R.C. 3109.01, and Castle expressly holds “[t]he common-law duty imposed on parents to
support their minor children may be found by a court of domestic relations having
jurisdiction of the matter to continue beyond the age of majority if the children are unable
to support themselves because of mental or physical disabilities which existed before
attaining the age of majority.” Castle, 15 Ohio St.3d at 283. The key inquiry under Castle,
then, is not the timing of the parents’ divorce but the age at which the child’s disability
occurred. The Geygan decision does not explain how its interpretation of R.C. 3119.86 is
consistent with the broader holding in Castle.
{¶ 23} Other appellate districts that have considered the same question both before
and after this court’s decision in Geygan have reached the opposite conclusion. See Abbas
v. Abbas, 128 Ohio App.3d 513 (7th Dist. 1998) (domestic court had jurisdiction to award
child support for disabled child who was 25 years old at the time of the parents’ divorce);
Wiczynski v. Wiczynski, 2006-Ohio-867, ¶ 23 (6th Dist.) (domestic court had jurisdiction
to award child support for adult disabled child who was older than 18 at the time of the
parents’ divorce); In re Edgell, 2010-Ohio-6435, ¶ 38 (11th Dist.) (following Wiczynski,
Castle, and Abbas for “the strong public policy of this state requiring parents to be
financially responsible for their children who suffer from disabilities prior to reaching the
chronological age of majority”), discretionary appeal not allowed by Edgell v. Edgell, 2011-
Ohio-2055; Donohoo v. Donohoo, 2012-Ohio-4105, ¶ 17 (12th Dist.) (disagreeing with
Geygan and holding nothing in R.C. 3119.86 prohibits a domestic relations court from
ordering child support in the first instance for a disabled child after the child turns 18); In
re Palcisco, 2012-Ohio-6134, ¶ 22 (11th Dist.) (declining to follow Geygan and rejecting the
argument that a support order must exist before the disabled child turns 18 in order for
No. 24AP-285 9
support to be continued beyond the child’s reaching the age of 18), discretionary appeal
not allowed by Palcisco v. Palcisco, 2013-Ohio-1857; C.S. v. R.S., 2021-Ohio-3581, ¶ 29
(5th Dist.) (declining to follow Geygan).
{¶ 24} We also note that after appellant filed her brief but before oral argument in
this matter, the General Assembly amended R.C. 3119.86 to make it explicit that a domestic
relations court has jurisdiction to enter child support orders for a disabled child even when
the disabled child is older than 18 at the time of the parents’ divorce. The current version
of R.C. 3119.86(A)(1) provides “[t]he duty of support to a child imposed pursuant to a court
child support order shall continue beyond the child’s eighteenth birthday . . . [u]nder an
order issued or modified pursuant to section 3109.20 or 3119.11 of the Revised Code for a
child who is mentally or physically disabled and is incapable of supporting or maintaining
oneself.” (Emphasis added.) R.C. 3109.20(B) provides: “Notwithstanding section 3109.01
of the Revised Code, a court may issue, pursuant to a proceeding for divorce, dissolution,
legal separation, or annulment, an order of support for the care and maintenance of the
parties’ child who is a person with a disability, regardless of whether the child has reached
the age of majority.” (Emphasis added.) Further, R.C. 3119.11 provides: “Notwithstanding
section 3109.01 of the Revised Code, when issuing or modifying a court child support order,
a court may provide for the care and maintenance of a child who is a person with a disability
and the subject of the order, to be issued or continue after the date the child reaches the age
of majority. This section applies regardless of whether the child is younger or older than
the age of majority when the court issues or modifies the order.” (Emphasis added.)
Though these amendments were not effective until March 20, 2025 and therefore not
applicable to the trial court proceedings in this case, they provide further support for our
conclusion that the intent of former R.C. 3119.86 was to confer jurisdiction on the domestic
relations court to enter child support orders for disabled children whose disability occurred
before they attained the age of 18 even when the parents’ divorce does not occur until after
the children have reached 18 years of age.
{¶ 25} Based on our interpretation of Castle and the statutory text of former R.C.
3119.86, we conclude Geygan was wrongly decided. We do not read former R.C. 3119.86
as applying only when the parents’ divorce occurs before the disabled child reaches the age
of 18. Instead, former R.C. 3119.86 is properly understood as extending the duty to support
No. 24AP-285 10
a disabled child beyond the age of 18, and a child support order is the mechanism by which
the domestic relations court implements that duty of support even where the parents do
not divorce until after the disabled child has attained the age of 18. Thus, the domestic
relations court had jurisdiction to enter a child support order for M.B. This conclusion
aligns with the other appellate districts that have considered the matter and the
understanding of the General Assembly as reflected in the recent amendments to R.C.
3119.86.
{¶ 26} We recognize this conclusion directly contradicts this court’s previous
holding in Geygan. “The doctrine of stare decisis forms ‘the bedrock of the American
judicial system.’ ” T&R Properties v. Wimberly, 2020-Ohio-4279, ¶ 43 (10th Dist.), quoting
Westfield Ins. Co. v. Galatis, 2003-Ohio-5849, ¶ 1. Under the doctrine of stare decisis,
“courts follow controlling precedent, thereby ‘creating stability and predictability in our
legal system.’ ” In re Holycross, 2007-Ohio-1, ¶ 22, quoting Galatis at ¶ 1. Though we are
mindful of the vital role of stare decisis, we will not continue to perpetuate incorrect
statements of law. State v. Enyart, 2023-Ohio-3373, ¶ 22 (10th Dist.), quoting Cardon v.
Northwest Airlines, Inc., 1990 Ohio App. LEXIS 1349, *4 (6th Dist. Apr. 6, 1990), citing
Mead v. McGraw, 19 Ohio St. 55, 62 (1869) (“ ‘[i]f a statement of law is incorrect, a court
should not forbear to correct the error on the principal of stare decisis, but should right the
wrong at the earliest opportunity’ ”). “ ‘It does no violence to the legal doctrine of stare
decisis to right that which is clearly wrong. It serves no valid public purpose to allow
incorrect opinions to remain in the body of our law.’ ” Galatis at ¶ 60, quoting State ex rel.
Bd. of Cty. Commrs. of Lake Cty. v. Zupancic, 62 Ohio St.3d 297, 300 (1991). We cannot,
in good conscience, continue to adhere–or issue precedent that binds trial courts to
adhere–to Geygan in determining whether a domestic relations court has jurisdiction to
enter a child support order for a disabled child whose disability occurred before turning 18
but who has reached 18 when the parties file for divorce. Accordingly, we overrule this
court’s decision in Geygan and hold the trial court did have jurisdiction to enter a child
support order for the care of M.B., a disabled child whose disability occurred before he
turned 18 but who was older than 18 at the time of the parties’ divorce.
{¶ 27} When the trial court issued its April 11, 2023 decision and judgment entry
and its subsequent April 2, 2024 decree of divorce, it reasonably relied on Geygan as the
No. 24AP-285 11
controlling precedent to conclude it lacked jurisdiction to enter a child support order for
M.B. Because this decision overrules Geygan, we must reverse the judgment of the trial
court and remand the matter to determine the question of support for M.B from the time
of appellant’s counterclaim of divorce until the time of M.B.’s death. We therefore sustain
appellant’s first assignment of error.
V. Second Assignment of Error–Equal Protection
{¶ 28} In her second assignment of error, appellant argues the trial court deprived
her of equal protection of the laws when it concluded it could not award her child support
for M.B.’s care. Having determined the trial court has jurisdiction to award child support
for M.B. under former R.C. 3119.86, requiring reversal of the trial court’s decision and
remand to that court for further proceedings, we need not address the additional question
of whether the trial court’s decision deprives appellant of equal protection. Therefore,
appellant’s second assignment of error is moot, and we decline to address it. Darr v.
Livingston, 2017-Ohio-841, ¶ 13 (10th Dist.), citing State ex rel. Ford v. Ruehlman, 2016-
Ohio-3529, ¶ 55 (“[a]n issue becomes moot when it presents only a hypothetical or
academic question, and a judicial resolution of the issue would have no practical
significance”); State v. Gideon, 2020-Ohio-5635, ¶ 26 (“an assignment of error is moot
when an appellant presents issues that are no longer live as a result of some other decision
rendered by the appellate court”).
VI. Disposition
{¶ 29} Based on the foregoing reasons, the trial court erred in concluding it lacked
jurisdiction to enter a support order for M.B., a disabled child whose disability occurred
before he turned 18 but who was older than 18 at the time of the parties’ divorce. Having
sustained appellant’s first assignment of error, rendering moot appellant’s second
assignment of error, we reverse the judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common
Pleas, Division of Domestic Relations, and remand the matter to that court for further
proceedings consistent with this decision.
Judgment reversed;
cause remanded.
BEATTY BLUNT, J., concurs.
No. 24AP-285 12
JAMISON, P.J., dissents.
JAMISON, P.J., dissenting.
{¶ 30} Because I do not agree that this court wrongly decided Geygan v. Geygan,
2012-Ohio-1965 (10th Dist.), I respectfully dissent.
{¶ 31} As the majority decision states, the General Assembly codified Castle v.
Castle, 15 Ohio St.3d 279 (1984), when it enacted R.C. 3119.86(A)(1). In Castle, the
Supreme Court of Ohio recognized that a domestic relations court with jurisdiction could
find that a parent’s common-law duty to support a minor child extended beyond the age of
majority if the minor child was unable to support themselves because of mental and
physical disabilities. Id. at paragraph one of the syllabus. By age of majority, the Supreme
Court meant “the age of eighteen.” Id. at 282. The two children at issue in Castle were
under 18 when their parents divorced, and the domestic relations courts issued child
support orders providing for their care and maintenance. Thus, the specific question at
issue in Castle was whether the domestic relations courts could continue to enforce the
child support orders entered when the disabled children were minors after those children
reached the age of majority. Given the question before it, the court reached a limited
holding:
The domestic relations court retains jurisdiction over parties in
a divorce, dissolution or separation proceeding to continue or
modify support payments for a mentally or physically disabled
child, who was so disabled before he or she attained the
statutory age of majority, as if the child were still an infant.
Id. at paragraph two of the syllabus.
{¶ 32} Based on Castle, the General Assembly enacted a statute focused on the
continuance of child support:
(A) Notwithstanding section 3109.01 of the Revised Code, . . . :
(1) The duty of support to a child imposed pursuant to a court
child support order shall continue beyond the child’s
eighteenth birthday only under the following circumstances:
(a) The child is mentally or physically disabled and is incapable
of supporting or maintaining himself or herself.
No. 24AP-285 13
Former R.C. 3119.86(A)(1)(a). In Geygan, we interpreted former R.C. 3119.86(A) to give
effect to the General Assembly’s use of the words “continue” and “beyond.” Geygan at ¶ 17.
Thus, despite the language of R.C. 3109.01—which would normally cut off child support
when the child turned 18—former R.C. 3119.86(A) mandated that the duty to pay a child
support order “continue[d] beyond the child’s eighteenth birthday” if the child satisfied the
criteria of R.C. 3119.86(A)(1). For a child support order to continue beyond the child’s
eighteenth birthday, it necessarily had to exist prior to that birthday. Consequently, former
R.C. 3119.86(A)(1) only gave further life to child support orders issued for the support of a
minor child.
{¶ 33} Contrary to the majority decision’s analysis, in Geygan, we did not attach the
phrase “shall continue beyond” only to the phrase “imposed pursuant to a court child
support order.” Rather, we construed the word “duty” to be modified by all the phrases that
follow: “of support,” “to a child,” and “imposed pursuant to a court child support order.” It
is that particular duty—“[t]he duty of support to a child imposed pursuant to a child support
order”—that must continue beyond the child’s eighteenth birthday for a disabled minor. In
short, we interpreted former R.C. 3119.86(A)(1) to address the same problem Castle
addressed: the continued enforcement of child support orders issued for disabled minors
who, subsequent to a divorce, grow into disabled adults.
{¶ 34} The majority decision expands the language in former R.C. 3119.86(A)(1) to
address a new problem: whether the domestic relations court may impose child support
orders on parents for the care and maintenance of children who are mentally or physically
disabled and cannot care for themselves, but are adults when their parents divorce.
Meanwhile, the General Assembly has enacted new legislation to solve this problem. That
legislation specifies that a domestic relations court may issue a child support order for a
“child who is a person with a disability” regardless of whether the child has reached “the
age of majority.” R.C. 3109.20; 3119.11. Tellingly, the General Assembly, while modifying
R.C. 3119.86(A)(1) to include reference to R.C. 3109.20 and 3119.11, has maintained R.C.
3119.86(A)(1) as solely a statute requiring the continuation of previously issued child
support orders.
{¶ 35} Quite simply, the democratic process has worked: the policy-making body of
our government has resolved a policy issue previously unaddressed by statute. This court
No. 24AP-285 14
should not be reversing 13-year-old precedent at this late stage. Accordingly, I would
overrule the first assignment of error.
{¶ 36} Overruling the first assignment of error would require consideration of the
second assignment of error. Appellant did not raise her equal-protection argument in the
trial court. An appellate court will not consider any error that a party could have brought
to the trial court’s attention, but did not. My Friend’s Place in Unity v. Dept. of Mental
Health & Addiction Servs., 2024-Ohio-3257, ¶ 25 (10th Dist.); Olentangy Commons
Owner, L.L.C. v. Fawley, 2023-Ohio-4039, ¶ 46 (10th Dist.). I thus would conclude that
appellant forfeited her constitutional argument for purposes of appeal. Accordingly, I
would overrule appellant’s second assignment of error.
{¶ 37} In conclusion, I respectfully dissent from the majority’s decision. I would
overrule both assignments of error and affirm the trial court’s judgment.
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