Jones v. Siloam Springs, Arkansas

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

FAYETTEVILLE DIVISION

BLAKE JONES PLAINTIFF

vs. CASE NO. 5:23-CV-05162

SILOAM SPRINGS, ARKANSAS, et al. DEFENDANTS

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiff Blake Jones, proceeding pro se, filed an Amended Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 against Siloam Springs, Arkansas (“City”) and members of the Siloam Springs Police

Department – Chief Allan Gilbert, Officer Derek Spicer, Officer Corley, Sergeant Coody and

Detective Coble, in their individual and official capacities. (ECF No. 8). Jones – who describes

himself as a “champion for the rights of the citizens of Siloam Springs” – alleges multiple violations

by these Defendants of Jones’ rights protected by the First, Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments,

violations of the Arkansas Civil Rights Act, and the torts of abuse of process and malicious

prosecution. Defendants answered on December 19, 2024, (ECF No. 16) and all parties consented

to the jurisdiction of the undersigned. (ECF No. 29). In light of the Defendants’ pending motion

for summary judgment filed on December 16, 2024 (ECF No. 44), this matter was removed from the

Court’s trial docket. (ECF No. 68). For the reasons stated below, Defendants’ Motion for Summary

Judgment will be granted on Jones’ 1983 claims and judgment entered in favor of Defendants;

Plaintiff’s state law claims will be dismissed without prejudice as the Court declines to exercise

supplemental jurisdiction over them pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367.

Standard of Review

Summary judgment is appropriate if, after viewing the facts and all reasonable inferences in

the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,

475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986), the record "shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact

and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). "Once a party

moving for summary judgment has made a sufficient showing, the burden rests with the non-moving

party to set forth specific facts, by affidavit or other evidence, showing that a genuine issue of

material fact exists.” Nat’l Bank of Commerce v. Dow Chemical Co., 165 F.3d 602, 607 (8th Cir.

1999).

The non-moving party "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical

doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586. "They must show there is sufficient

evidence to support a jury verdict in their favor." Nat’l Bank, 165 F.3d at 607 (citing Anderson v.

Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986)). "A case founded on speculation or suspicion is

insufficient to survive a motion for summary judgment." Id. (citing, Metge v. Baehler, 762 F.2d 621,

625 (8th Cir. 1985)). “When opposing parties tell two different stories, one of which is blatantly

contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not adopt that

version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment.” Scott v. Harris, 550

U.S. 372, 380 (2007).

Undisputed Material Facts

In support of their Motion and in compliance with Rule 56.1 of the Local Rules for the

Eastern and Western Districts of Arkansas, Defendants filed a Statement of Undisputed Facts with

(34) supporting exhibits. (ECF No. 46). Under Rule 56, once the moving party meets its burden of

production, the nonmoving party must go beyond the pleadings and show by depositions, affidavits,

or other evidence “specific facts which create a genuine issue for trial.” See Mosley v. City of

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Northwoods, 415 F.3d 908, 910 (8th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted). The opposing

party – here, Jones – may not simply point to allegations made in his complaint but must identify and

provide evidence of “specific facts creating a triable controversy.” Jaurequi v. Carter Mfg. Co., 173

F.3d 1076, 1085 (8th Cir. 1999) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Jones has not satisfied this requirement – he has not filed any objections to Defendants’

Statement, has not pointed out genuinely disputed material facts which preclude judgment and/or

require a trial, and has not presented any Affidavits or other evidence for the Court to consider in

connection with his response to Defendants’ Motion. The Court thus finds that Defendants’

Statement of Undisputed Facts have been admitted. See Local Rule 56.1(c). Nevertheless, not all

of the undisputed facts are relevant to the Court’s determinations; relevant admitted facts are

referenced below.

Section 1983

Section 1983 provides a federal cause of action for the deprivation, under color of law, of a

citizen’s “rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws” of the United

States. To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that the defendant acted

under color of law and that he or she violated a right secured by the Constitution. West v. Atkins, 487

U.S. 42 (1988); Dunham v. Wadley, 195 F.3d 1007, 1009 (8th Cir. 1999). Plaintiff alleges

Defendants were acting under color of law and Defendants do not dispute that their actions were

under color of law. The remaining questions are whether the Defendants violated Jones’

constitutionally protected rights.

Fourth Amendment

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Construing Jones’ Amended Complaint in the light most favorable to him, the Amended

Complaint makes only one plausible claim for violation of the Fourth Amendment – Defendant

Officer Corley’s May 16, 2022, arrest of Jones for breaking and entering and theft of property. The

remainder of Jones’s allegations regarding “stops without probable cause” and officers stopping and

parking in front of his house or questioning him lack sufficient detail for analysis. (ECF No. 8, p.3).

With respect to the May 16, 2022, arrest, the following information was in the possession of

law enforcement and has not been disputed by Jones:

* Officer Royce Corley filed an incident report detailing that on May 12, 2022, at

approximately 4:06 pm, he was dispatched to Amanda Carter’s home to discuss a

report of alleged harassment. ECF No. 46-10, Jones Incident Report 22050097.

* Carter claimed that as she was coming home, her friend Blake Jones was waiting at

the end of the street. Carter claims Jones had attempted to cut her off and was doing

this because she had stopped talking to him. Carter claimed Jones had been

harassing her lately and previously had taken her phone on one occasion. ECF No.

46-10, Jones Incident Report 22050097.

* Officer Corley’s report indicated the following:

I asked Ms. Carter if she had video of the incident where Mr.

Jones took her phone from her, she stated she did. I had Ms.

Carter show me the video from May 3rd, 2022, at

approximately 1621 hours. I observed Ms. Carter in her car

with the window rolled up and Mr. Jones standing by the

driver side door. I observed Ms. Carter telling Mr. Jones to go

away multiple times. I observed Mr. Jones say multiple times

he could not hear Ms. Carter and then motioned with his hand

for Ms. Carter to roll down her window because he could not

hear her. I observed Ms. Carter roll down the window slightly,

just enough to talk to Mr. Jones, and begin telling him to go

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away. I observed Mr. Jones grab the window as she rolled it

down and stated, “Now you listen to me.” I observed Mr.

Jones reach inside the vehicle and grab the phone, rip it out of

Ms. Carters hands and began walking away leaving the

property and into the roadway. I observed Mr. Jones start

running away and get into a vehicle, and then exit the vehicle

and start walking back. I observed Mr. Jones place the phone

back on top of Ms. Carters vehicle and began leaving the

property. I observed Ms. Carter pick her phone up and tell Mr.

Jones to stay off her property and turned the video off. Ms.

Carter stated Mr. Jones placed the phone back on top of the

vehicle when she was going to the neighbor’s house to call

the police. ECF No. 46-10, Jones Incident Report 22050097.

* In the video, Jones can be seen texting something on his phone and holding

a cigarette while Carter repeatedly tells him to get away from her car; Jones

claims he cannot hear; Carter rolls down the window, repeatedly telling Jones

to get away; Jones reaches inside the car and grabs Carter’s phone. ECF No.

46-11, Video of May 3, 2022, Encounter 0:00-0:30.

* Jones takes Carter’s phone and runs away while Carter chases him. Carter

asks for her phone back, and Jones refuses. At that point, Carter asks her

neighbor for her neighbor’s phone to call the police. ECF No. 46-11, Video

of May 3, 2022, Encounter, 0:30-1:00.

* About twenty seconds after Carter decides to call the police, Jones places

Carter’s phone on her car, and she retrieves her phone thirty seconds after

Jones drops it. ECF No. 46-11, Video of May 3, 2022, Encounter, 1:00-

2:12.

* Officer Corley reported that he ascertained the value of Carter’s phone from

the internet and filed for a warrant against Jones for breaking or entering,

Ark. Code. Ann. § 5-39-202, and theft of property, Ark. Code Ann. 5-36-103

on May 12, 2022. Jones was notified that he was barred from Carter’s

address. ECF No. 46-10, Jones Incident Report 22050097. ECF No. 46-

12, Jones Supplement 22050097.

* On May 16, 2022, an arrest warrant was signed by a Circuit Court of Benton

County judge, the Plaintiff was arrested, and his court date was set on June

20, 2022. ECF No. 46-12, Jones Supplement 22050097.

The undersigned notes that Defendants’ Statement of Undisputed Facts includes a substantial amount

of pre-arrest and post-arrest contact between Jones and the Carters (including efforts by Jones to

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have one or both of them arrested during June 2022); pre-arrest and post-arrest contact between

Jones and the Siloam Springs Police Department; and allegations by Jones suggestive that he and

Mrs. Carter had a lengthy, complicated and messy relationship. Regardless, the Court finds most

of these facts immaterial to whether Jones’s arrest on May 16, 2022, violated the Fourth

Amendment.

Here, a warrant for Jones’ arrest was issued by Benton County Circuit Court Judge Schrantz.

(ECF No. 46-12). Arrest pursuant to a warrant is the preferred method for a Fourth Amendment

seizure. Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 212 (1981). The determination of probable cause

by an independent magistrate is given great deference by reviewing courts. Illinois v. Gates, 462

U.S. 213, 236 (1983). Thus, the issuance of an arrest warrant establishes probable cause for Jones’

arrest. See, e.g., Wood v. Wooten, 986 F.3d 1079 (8th Cir. 2021).

Jones offers argument but no evidence that Officer Corley made deliberate falsehoods or

acted in a reckless disregard for the truth when submitting the “Facts Constituting Probable Cause”

to Judge Schrantz to obtain the arrest warrant for Jones. (ECF No. 46-12); Howe v. Gilpin, 65 F.4th

975, 979 (8th Cir. 2023) (no facts in the record support a deliberate falsehood was the basis for the

warrant affidavit). Jones contends Officer Corley should have included additional historical context

regarding the relationship between Jones and the Carters when seeking the warrant on May 12;

however, there is no indication Officer Corley knew the full extent of the relationship between Jones

and the Carters until perhaps May 22, or even as late as May 26, 2022. (ECF No. 46, ¶¶ 21-29). “In

a warrant affidavit, the government need only show facts sufficient to support a finding of probable

cause.” United States v. Ozar, 50 F.3d 1440, 1445 (8th Cir. 1995) (quotation omitted); see United

States v. Knutson, 967 F.3d 754, 760 (8th Cir. 2020); Murray v. Lene, 595 F.3d 868, 872 (8th Cir.

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2010). A law enforcement officer does not “violate a clearly established constitutional right by

omitting information from a warrant application that he does not actually know, even if the reason

is his own reckless investigation.” Hartman v. Bowles, 39 F.4th 544, 545 (8th Cir. 2022).

The information known to Officer Corley was presented to Judge Schrantz who, upon review,

authorized the arrest warrant. (ECF No. 46-12). The party attacking a warrant affidavit “must show

that the omitted material would be clearly critical to the finding of probable cause.” United States

v. Jacobs, 986 F.2d 1231, 1235 (8th Cir. 1993) (quotation omitted). Jones has failed to point out

what Officer Corley knew at the time he presented the warrant to Judge Schrantz but omitted from

the application that would have caused Judge Schrantz to decline issuance of the arrest warrant. The

Court finds Officer Corley did not violate the Fourth Amendment.

First Amendment

A deferential reading of Jones’ Amended Complaint supports that he is making three (3)

distinct allegations that his First Amendment rights were violated: (1) Jones says he was arrested on

May 16, 2022, due to a retaliatory animus on the part of the City resulting from Jones’ adversarial

prior relationship with the Siloam Springs Police Department; (2) Jones says his freedom of religion

was impeded when the Siloam Springs Police Department prevented him (on an unknown date) from

walking past the Carters’ house en route to church; and (3) Jones says his rights were violated when

Chief Gilbert barred Jones from a Siloam Springs City Council meeting on August 3, 2021.

“The First Amendment prohibits laws ‘abridging the freedom of speech.’” Houston Cmty.

Coll. Sys. v. Wilson, – U.S. –, 142 S. Ct. 1253, 1259 (2022) (quoting U.S. Const. amend. I). Thus,

“as ‘a general matter,’” the First Amendment “prohibits government officials from subjecting

individuals to ‘retaliatory actions’ after the fact for having engaged in protected speech.” Id. (quoting

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Nieves v. Bartlett, – U.S. –, 139 S. Ct. 1715, 1722 (2019)). “To prevail on [a] retaliation claim, the

plaintiffs must show that ‘they engaged in protected [First Amendment] activity.’” Molina v. City

of St. Louis, 59 F.4th 334, 338 (8th Cir. 2023) (alteration in original) (quoting Quraishi v. St. Charles

Cnty., 986 F.3d 831, 837 (8th Cir. 2021)). “If they can make that showing, then the focus shifts to

whether the officers ‘took [an] adverse action ... that would chill a person of ordinary firmness from

continuing in the [protected] activity.’” Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Hoyland v. McMenomy,

869 F.3d 644, 655 (8th Cir. 2017)). This is an objective test: “[t]he question is not whether the

plaintiff [him]self was deterred, though how plaintiff acted might be evidence of what a reasonable

person would have done.” Garcia v. City of Trenton, 348 F.3d 726, 729 (8th Cir. 2003). Finally, the

plaintiff must prove officers “would not have taken the adverse action but for harboring ‘retaliatory

animus’ against the plaintiff[s] because of [the] exercise of [their] First Amendment rights.” Mitchell

v. Kirchmeier, 28 F.4th 888, 896 (8th Cir. 2022) (quoting Nieves, 139 S. Ct. at 1722). It is not

enough to show that an official acted with a retaliatory motive and that the plaintiff was injured –

the motive must cause the injury. Nieves v. Bartlett, 587 U.S. 391, 398-99 (2019). “Generally, more

than a temporal connection is required to present a genuine factual issue on retaliation.” See Tyler

v. Univ. of Ark. Bd. of Trs., 628 F.3d 980, 986 (8th Cir. 2011) (cleaned up).

(1) With respect to his May 16, 2022, arrest, the Court first notes that Jones has not

shown that he was engaged in a constitutionally protected activity when he reached into Carter’s car

and took her phone, much less an activity protected by the First Amendment. The genesis of Jones’

arrest is that Carter summoned law enforcement to investigate her allegations concerning Jones’

allegedly improper conduct that occurred on her property. Thus, Jones must establish some other

constitutionally protected conduct for which Jones was retaliated against in violation of the First

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Amendment – and this he has not done. Despite Jones’ assertions, there is no evidence in the record

– or any reasonable inference that can be drawn therefrom – that officers “singled out” Jones for

arrest or that the arresting officer was personally aware of any of Jones’ past interactions with the

Siloam Springs Police Department and then decided to “single out” Jones for arrest. See Aldridge

v. City of St. Louis, Missouri, 75 F.4th 895, 900 (8th Cir. 2023). Moreover, Jones was arrested

pursuant to a warrant, and the fact that Judge Schrantz reviewed Officer Corley’s application for

warrant and issued a warrant for Jones’ arrest undermines Jones’ argument that Officer Corley

arrested him due to a forbidden motive. Galarnyk v. Fraser, 687 F.3d 1070, 1076 (8th Cir. 2012).

Additionally, it does not appear that any exception under Nieves is applicable. Jones argues that

Officer Corley arrested Jones because of Jones’ prior FOIA requests, but Jones provides no evidence

to support any temporal relationship between the FOIA requests (many of which were made

following Jones’ arrest) and Officer Corley’s decision to seek a warrant. Jones contends other

misdeeds by the Siloam Springs Police Department influenced their prosecution of Jones but Jones

fails to present any evidence of a temporal relationship or explain how the May 16, 2022, arrest is

retaliation for Jones’ prior First Amendment activity. Importantly, the prior litigation which Jones

references in his pleadings, and which was resolved in this Court, was a civil rights action against

the Benton County Sheriff’s Office and Corporal Blaine, and not the City of Siloam Springs or its

officers. See Jones v. Benton County Sheriff, et al., Civil No 5:22-05030.

(2) With respect to the alleged infringement of Jones’ religious freedom, a charitable

reading suggests that Jones alleges a protective order obtained by Carter prompted “threats” from

the Siloam Springs Police Department that Jones would be “imprisoned” if “he went to church or

walked in his neighborhood,” as Jones and Carter attended the same church and lived in the same

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neighborhood. (ECF No. 8, pp. 16-17). Jones’ cross-motion for summary judgment – construed

as a response to Defendant’s motion – references the City’s alleged interpretation that the protective

order restricted Jones from attending church but neither Jones’ Amended Complaint or response

provides any additional details and Jones has not proffered an Affidavit for the Court’s

consideration. (ECF No. 54, pp. 6-7). Jones does not say and the Court cannot infer which Siloam

Springs police officer might have discouraged Jones from attending church.

The only similar allegation is entirely unrelated to the exercise of religion: According to

Officer Corley, Carter called the Siloam Springs Police Department on May 26, 2022, to report Jones

was campaigning on or near their property. With respect to this incident, the undisputed evidence

is that Officer Corley responded and advised Jones the protective order precluded Jones from going

onto the Carters’ property or making contact with Carter but did not preclude Jones from

campaigning away from the Carters’ property. (ECF No. 46, ¶ 23). Apparently, no mention was

made of church/religious exercise as this incident arose in the context of campaigning.

The undersigned finds no evidence in the summary judgment record that anyone in the

Siloam Springs Police Department advised Jones he could not attend church, and/or walk by the

Carters’ property en route to church. Even if Jones was told he could not attend church with Carter,

Defendants says dismissal is proper, arguing that a person of ordinary firmness would not have been

chilled from exercising their First Amendment rights, see Scheffler v. Molin, 743 F.2d 619, 621 (8th

Cir. 2014). While Defendants may be legally correct, the Court finds constitutional analysis is not

required where Jones’ allegation (i.e., that his religious freedoms were violated) is entirely

unsupported by any evidence before the Court. As noted above, a party opposing summary judgment

must “cit[e] particular materials in the record” or show that the “materials cited do not establish the

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... absence of a genuine dispute.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). “A mere ‘scintilla of evidence’ is

insufficient to defeat summary judgment, and if a nonmoving party who has the burden of persuasion

at trial does not present sufficient evidence as to any element of the cause of action, then summary

judgment is appropriate.” Wagner v. Campbell, 779 F.3d 761, 766 (8th Cir. 2015), quoting Brunsting

v. Lutsen Mountains Corp., 601 F.3d 813, 820 (8th Cir. 2010). Here, the Court has nothing more

than Jones’ non-specific allegation that his religious freedom was trampled and this is entirely

insufficient to establish a constitutional violation.

(3) With respect to Jones’ claim that he was barred by Chief Gilbert from a Siloam

Springs City Council meeting on August 3, 2021, the undersigned finds this Court has held that city

council meeting are public forums. See Schnekloth v. Deakins, 2022 WL 105038, at *5 (W.D.Ark.

April 7, 2022). Despite this, the record includes no evidence that Chief Gilbert actually barred Jones

from this particular (August 3rd) or any other city council meeting. Defendants argue that, even had

Chief Gilbert barred Jones from this meeting, an ordinary person would not be chilled from

exercising his First Amendment rights and in fact, Jones was not chilled as it is undisputed Jones

attended the August 17, 2021, City Council meeting, was recognized and spoke about his complaints

(including his complaints regarding Chief Gilbert) and was then thanked for his remarks by the City

Council. (ECF No. 46, ¶ 12, including YouTube link to meeting footage).

“The First Amendment guarantees wide freedom in matters of adult public discourse,”

Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682-83 (1986), and criticism of public officials

and the administration of governmental policies “lies at the heart of speech protected by the First

Amendment.” Williams v. City of Carl Junction, 480 F.3d 871, 874 (8th Cir. 2007). Retaliation by

a government actor in response to such an exercise of First Amendment rights forms a basis for §

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1983 liability. Pendleton v. St. Louis County, 178 F.3d 1007, 1011 (8th Cir.1999). Nevertheless,

“[t]he ordinary-firmness test ... is designed to weed out trivial matters from those deserving the time

of the courts as real and substantial violations of the First Amendment.” Garcia v. City of Trenton,

348 F.3d 726, 728 (8th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted).

“The ‘ordinary-firmness’ test is an ‘objective one, not subjective.’” Santiago v. Blair, 707

F.3d 984, 992 (8th Cir. 2013) (quoting Garcia, 348 F.3d at 729). The question is not whether the

person himself was deterred, but “[w]hat would a person of ‘ordinary firmness’ have done in reaction

to the [adverse action]?” Gonzalez v. Bendt, 971 F.3d 742, 745 (8th Cir. 2020) (alteration in

original). A defendant making harassing, derogatory, and humiliating comments is “insufficient to

deter a person of ordinary firmness from continuing to speak out.” Naucke v. City of Park Hills, 284

F.3d 923, 928 (8th Cir. 2002). However, a state actor using “the punitive machinery of government”

to inflict “concrete consequences” is sufficient to chill a person of ordinary firmness from continuing

their conduct. Garcia, 348 F.3d at 729. Prohibitions from entering government property imposed

because of speaking to government officials are “concrete consequence[s]” which are objectively

chilling. Rinne v. Camden Cnty., 65 F.4th 378, 383-84 (8th Cir. 2023). Nevertheless, to be

retaliation, Chief Gilbert must have been motivated by Jones’ protected speech. To prove motivation,

Jones must prove that a protected act is the “but-for” cause of the state's retaliatory action. Nieves

v. Bartlett, 587 U.S. 391(2019). Causation is usually a question of fact, unless “the question is ‘so

free from doubt as to justify taking it from the jury.’” Ricketts v. City of Columbia, Mo., 36 F.3d 775,

779 (8th Cir. 1994) (quoting Trudeau v. Wyrick, 713 F.2d 1360, 1366–67 (8th Cir. 1983)); see also

Naucke v. City of Park Hills, 284 F.3d 923 (8th Cir. 2002).

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Here, while Jones’ allegation is concerning, Jones falls short of establishing a prima facie

case of First Amendment relatiation in connection with the August 3, 2021, City Council meeting.

Jones’ Amended Complaint was not verified and Jones has presented no Affidavit or other evidence

to this Court to create a jury question on whether Chief Gilbert actually barred Jones from entering

the meeting and if Jones was barred, Chief Gilbert’s retaliatory motivation for the alleged First

Amendment violation. Understandably, without being (or having) a lawyer, Jones was disadvantaged

in his presentation but the Court cannot overlook the complete failure of proof. Moreover, the

evidence is undisputed that Jones was not only present at the August 17, 2021, City Council meeting,

but he was undeterred and empowered to complain about the Chief of Police as was his First

Amendment right.

For reasons set forth above, the Court finds that Plaintiff has not established any First

Amendment violations by any defendant.

Qualified Immunity

The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials from liability for civil

damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights

of which a reasonable person would have known. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818

(1982). Qualified immunity balances two important interests, the need to hold public officials

accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from harassment,

distraction, and liability when they perform their duties reasonably. The protection of qualified

immunity applies regardless of whether the government official's error is “a mistake of law, a

mistake of fact, or a mistake based on mixed questions of law and fact.” See Groh v. Ramirez, 540

U.S. 551, 567 (2004) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (quoting Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 507 (1978)

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(for the proposition qualified immunity covers “mere mistakes in judgment, whether the mistake is

one of fact or one of law”)).

Having found no constitutional violation, the undersigned need not delve further into issue

of qualified immunity. Where no constitutional violation exists, Defendants are entitled to qualified

immunity. See, e.g., Krout v. Goemmer, 583 F.3d 557, 564 (8th Cir. 2009) (unless the facts having

make out a violation of a constitutional right the Defendant is entitled to qualified immunity).

City of Siloam Springs

“[U]nder § 1983, local governments are responsible only for ‘their own illegal acts.’”

Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 60 (2011) (quoting Pembaur v. Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 479

(1986)). “They are not vicariously liable under § 1983 for their employees’ actions.” Id. Courts in

the Eighth Circuit have “consistently recognized a general rule that, in order for municipal liability

to attach, individual liability first must be found on an underlying substantive claim.” Moore v. City

of Desloge, 647 F.3d 841, 849 (8th Cir. 2011) (quoting McCoy v. City of Monticello, 411 F.3d 920,

922 (8th Cir. 2005)). Therefore, because there is no evidence to support Jones’ Fourth Amendment

or First Amendment retaliation claims, summary judgment in favor of the City of Siloam Springs

is proper.

Additionally, Jones has failed to allege the existence of any City of Siloam Springs policy

or custom that caused his alleged constitutional violations. Veneklase v. City of Fargo, 248 F.3d 738,

748 (8th Cir. 2001). Jones has also failed to allege a basis for municipal liability as a result of a

custom or practice of unconstitutional conduct. Mettler v. Whitledge, 165 F.3d 1197, 1204 (8th Cir.

1999). The official capacity claims must be dismissed.

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Brady Violations

Jones devotes considerable portions of his pleadings complaining about evidence which was

either suppressed or manipulated in some manner by the Siloam Springs Police Department, all in

violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).

Under Brady, “the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused ...

violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of

the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.” 373 U.S. at 87. Brady requires the disclosure of

“impeachment evidence as well as exculpatory evidence.” Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 280

(1999). Even inadvertent failure to disclose may violate this duty, which does not require a criminal

defendant's request. See United States v. Bruce, 984 F.3d 884, 894 (9th Cir. 2021). Disclosures

“must be made at a time when [the] disclosure would be of value to the accused.” United States v.

Aichele, 941 F.2d 761, 764 (9th Cir. 1991) (quoting United States v. Gordon, 844 F.2d 1397, 1403

(9th Cir. 1988)). A Brady violation has three elements: “The evidence at issue must be favorable

to the accused, either because it is exculpatory, or because it is impeaching; that evidence must have

been suppressed by the State, either willfully or inadvertently; and prejudice must have ensued.”

Strickler, 527 U.S. at 281–82, 119 S.Ct. 1936. Thus, to proceed with a Brady claim, Jones would

have to illustrate prejudice by showing that “there is a reasonable probability that the result of the

[criminal] proceeding would have been different if the suppressed documents had been disclosed”

to Jones. United States v. Pendleton, 832 F.3d 934, 940 (8th Cir. 2016) (cleaned up).

Jones’ difficulty here is that there was no judicial proceeding that could have been affected

by any withheld or manipulated evidence. Arrested on May 16, 2022, it is undisputed that both of

the criminal charges against Jones were nolle prossed on September 15, 2023. (ECF No. 46, ¶ 70).

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Without a judicial proceeding, Jones cannot show Brady prejudice and thus his Brady claim fails.

See Parker v. County of Riverside, 78 F.4th 1109, 1113 (9th Cir. 2023). The Defendants are entitled

to qualified immunity as to any alleged Brady violations.

State Law Claims

Jones has alleged various other state law violations in his Amended Complaint; however, the

Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction (28 U.S.C. § 1367) over them and will dismiss

them without prejudice.

“A district court's decision whether to exercise [supplemental] jurisdiction after dismissing

every claim over which it had original jurisdiction is purely discretionary.” Carlsbad Tech., Inc. v.

HIF Bio, Inc., 556 U.S. 635, 639 (2009). Since the decision to exercise supplemental jurisdiction

over the remaining state law claims is discretionary rather than jurisdictional, the decision is

reviewed for abuse of discretion. Crest Const. II, Inc. v. Doe, 660 F.3d 346, 359 (8th Cir. 2011).

District courts should consider such factors as “the circumstances of the particular case, the nature

of the state law claims, the character of the governing state law, and the relationship between the

state and federal claims ....” City of Chicago v. Int'l Coll. of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 173 (1997).

“[I]n the usual case in which all federal-law claims are eliminated before trial, the balance of factors

to be considered under the pendent jurisdiction doctrine ... will point toward declining to exercise

jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims.” Wilson v. Miller, 821 F.3d 963, 971 (8th Cir. 2016)

(quoting Johnson v. City of Shorewood, 360 F.3d 810, 819 (8th Cir. 2004)).

A Judgment will be contemporaneously entered.

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IT IS SO ORDERED this 4" day of June 2025.

CHRIS COMSTOCK

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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