Opinion

Cain v. Ponca City Independent School District I-71

Court
District Court, W.D. Oklahoma
Filed
Jun 4, 2025
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 36.1%

denying summary judgment where the plaintiff was diagnosed with multiple disorders and eventually left the school following years of verbal harassment

How later courts described this case

  • denying summary judgment where the plaintiff was diagnosed with multiple disorders and eventually left the school following years of verbal harassment
  • A plaintiff’s “failure to rebut the arguments raised by” a defendant in his “motion for summary judgment is fatal to his attempt to raise and rebut such arguments on . . . appeal.”
  • first quoting Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167, 182 (2005) and then citing Davis ex rel. LaShonda D. v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 650 (1999)
  • noting the Court has not held that Title IX enables plaintiffs to obtain damages for violating “administrative requirements” like enactment of a grievance procedure

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

CULLY PORTER, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Case No. CIV-21-00612-PRW

)

PONCA CITY INDEPENDENT SCHOOL )

DISTRICT, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

ORDER

Before the Court are the Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. 119) filed by

Defendants Shelley Arrott (misidentified as “Shelly Arrott”), Thad Dilbeck, Bret Smith,

Jared Freeman, Brad Parent (collectively the “School Employees”), and Independent

School District No. 71 of Kay County, Oklahoma, commonly known as Ponca City Public

Schools (the “School District,” and together with the School Employees, the “School

Defendants”); Plaintiff Cully Porter’s Response (Dkt. 126); and the School Defendants’

Reply (Dkt. 129). For the reasons that follow, the Court GRANTS the Motion (Dkt. 119).

Background

This case arises from a hazing incident involving sexual harassment on the Ponca

City High School basketball team. In June 2017, Defendants Kelby Cross and Avery

Revard were seniors and Porter was a freshman on the basketball team. Arrott was the

superintendent; Smith was the Director of Maintenance, Risk Manager, and Title IX

Coordinator; Dilbeck was the Principal of Ponca City High School; Freeman was the

Athletic Director, and Parent was a math teacher and coach.

I. The June 2017 Assault

From June 22–24, 2017, Porter, Cross, Revard, and ten other Ponca City players

attended a basketball camp organized by Oral Roberts University, along with Coach

Parent1 and non-defendants head coach Keenen Curry and coach Brandon Wilson. On

either June 22 or 23, after the team had finished their basketball games for the day, they

went to their hotel to shower before heading to dinner. Porter alleges that after the students

in his room finished showering, one non-defendant student stood lookout while Cross held

Porter down and Revard “pulled [his] pants down and flopped [his] penis on [Porter’s]

forehead.”2 The students apparently refer to this particular form of hazing as “the Flopper.”

About five to ten minutes later, Head Coach Curry came to Porter’s room and instructed

the students to get on the bus. Porter did not tell any adult about the assault at that time.

After the team ate dinner, they returned to the hotel room and began a video game

tournament. Porter alleges that while the team was playing the game, Cross and Revard

repeated the maneuver on another freshman, and attempted to do the same to a third student

who managed to fight them off and run to another room. After this, there were no further

incidents, and no one discussed the assaults for the rest of the trip.

1 Although the record contains conflicting evidence as to whether Coach Parent attended

the camp, the School Defendants do not dispute his presence for the purposes of their

Motion. See Mot. (Dkt. 119), at 9–10.

2 Pl. Dep. (Dkt. 126-1), at 60:16–23.

Initially, no one reported these incidents to the coaches, and Head Coach Curry

testified that he did not know anything was amiss or observe any unusual behavior by the

students. During the trip, Porter texted his mother, Amanda Cain, “I got the flopper, and I

never want it again.”3 Porter’s mother responded that they would discuss the matter when

Porter got home. At the conclusion of the camp, the team returned to Ponca City with no

further incidents or discussion of the incident. Once he got home, Porter told his parents

what happened. His mother then scheduled a meeting with Curry the following Monday,

June 26, 2017.

Before the scheduled meeting, at practice, one of the alleged victims approached

Curry and told him what had happened on the trip. Curry then told Porter that he would be

kicking Cross and Revard off the team. Curry informed Revard the same and immediately

sent him home.4 Curry then reported the allegations to Athletic Director Freeman, who

advised that he would commence an investigation. Freeman contacted Superintendent

Arrott and Principal Dilbeck to inform them of the situation.

After practice, Porter and his mother met with the coaches. Head Coach Curry told

Porter that Cross and Revard’s behavior was unacceptable, and he arranged for Porter and

his mother to meet with Athletic Director Freeman. Porter and his mother met with

Freeman and an officer with the Ponca City Police Department, where Porter described

what happened. Freeman assured them that he would investigate the matter. The officer

3 Id. at 79:18–24.

4 Cross did not attend practice that day for unrelated reasons.

recommended that Freeman file a report with the Jenks Police Department (as the assault

occurred in Jenks), and Freeman did so.

At the next basketball practice, Curry discussed the assaults with the team. He

warned the players that he would not tolerate that sort of behavior and that he would

“happily” kick anyone else who engaged in such practices off the team.5

Athletic Director Freeman, Principal Dilbeck, and the officer investigated the

allegations under the oversight of Superintendent Arrott and Risk Manager Smith. The

investigation involved interviews with the alleged victims, Cross and Revard, the coaches,

and the non-party student witnesses. Cross and Revard admitted their role in the assault.

Freeman kept the parents apprised of the investigation’s status as it progressed. At the

conclusion of the investigation, Freeman and Principal Dilbeck, after consulting with

Superintendent Arrott, permanently banned Cross and Revard from athletics and

suspended them from school for ten days.

Despite Porter’s initial interest in pressing criminal charges against Cross and

Revard, he and his family ultimately declined to do so. Despite that, the School District

Administration attempted to press charges, but the Jenks Police Department declined.

Afterwards, Porter’s mother contacted the school counselor to rearrange Porter’s schedule

to ensure that he would not be in class with Cross or Revard. As a result, Porter had no

classes with Cross or Revard when the school year began. In fact, he only ever had one

interaction with Revard following the investigation, in a Snapchat group chat.

5 Pl. Dep. (Dkt. 126-1), at 67:19–25.

II. Post-Assault Harassment

The parties agree that Porter suffered additional harassment following the assault,

but they dispute the specifics. According to Porter, he endured verbal, electronic, and

physical harassment throughout the remainder of his high school career, all related to the

assault. Specifically, he testifies that students called him several different names and teased

him regarding the assault as early as the start of the school year in 2017. He says that it

turned physical on “two or three” occasions during his freshman year, when he “was

pushed down a flight of stairs and called a faggot the whole way . . . down.”6 He also

testifies that each time he experienced harassment, he reported it to his counselor, non-

party assistant principal Krystina Muralt.7 He believes that Muralt did nothing in response,

due to the fact that the harassment persisted and, to his knowledge, no one was disciplined.8

The parties do not dispute that in Spring 2019, Porter’s mother reported some verbal

and electronic harassment to Assistant Principal Muralt. Specifically, Porter told his mother

that some of Revard’s friends called him a snitch, and that on other occasions

upperclassmen called him “Avery[ Revard’s] bitch” and “sex doll.”9 Porter’s mother

6 Id. at 227:6–17.

7 Id. at 85:13–88:11, 227:18–229:13.

8 Id. at 85:13–88:11, 178:6–20.

9 Porter-Cain Dep. (Dkt. 126-6), at 94:4–97:2.

reported these incidents to Muralt who was “very . . . [c]oncerned.”10 Porter’s mother did

not know what Muralt did in response.11

Muralt’s testimony generally confirms that Ms. Cain reported the verbal and

electronic harassment, with the first report on February 6, 2019.12 Muralt testified that she

was unaware of any post-assault harassment until that date.13 After Ms. Cain’s report,

Muralt called Porter in to ask about the incidents. Porter said that he did not know the

identities of the perpetrators of the alleged verbal harassment. He did name another student

who posted a harassing social media post. Muralt asked if Porter needed to go home, but

he declined. Muralt told Porter that if he experienced further harassment, he could come

into either her or the counselor’s office to take a break. So that Porter wouldn’t have to

make frequent visits to the office, she advised him to text his mother about any further

incidents, who could then notify Muralt.

Muralt then called Porter’s mother to inform her of the situation. Two days later,

Porter’s mother went to Muralt’s office and identified a student who called Porter “Avery[

Revard’s] bitch.” After this, Muralt and the student resource officer visited the homes of

the two identified students to address the situation.14

10 Id. at 97:3–11.

11 Id.

12 Muralt Dep. (Dkt. 119-13), at 32:18–33:5, 39:13–40:3.

13 Id. at 33:13–15.

14 Id. at 50:24–52:15.

The parties do not dispute that despite the assault and the post-assault harassment,

Porter continued to play on the basketball team all four years of high school, playing in

every varsity game from his sophomore through senior years. He also participated in other

extracurricular activities and successfully graduated from Ponca City High School in the

spring of 2021. He now attends college in North Dakota.

Porter now brings Section 1983 claims against the School Defendants and Title IX

claims against the School District.15 The School Defendants move for summary judgment

as to each claim.

Legal Standard

Summary judgment is proper “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute

as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”16 A

genuine issue exists if “there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury

to return a verdict for that party.”17 Evidence that is “merely colorable” or “not significantly

probative” will not defeat a motion for summary judgment.18 A fact is material if it “might

affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.”19

15 The Court previously dismissed Porter’s state law negligence claims against the School

Employees. See May 6, 2022, Order (Dkt. 31).

16 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).

17 See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986) (citation omitted).

18 Id. at 249–50 (citation omitted).

19 Id. at 248.

The moving party bears the initial burden of showing beyond a reasonable doubt the

absence of a genuine issue of material fact.20 Once the movant has met his initial burden,

the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to “set forth specific facts showing that there is a

genuine issue for trial.”21 Courts may only consider admissible evidence in reviewing

summary judgment, but the evidence need not be submitted “in a form that would be

admissible at trial.”22 Rather, the proponent must show that the evidence is capable of

presentation in an admissible form.23 Courts must view all facts and reasonable inferences

in the light most favorable to the nonmovant.24

Analysis

I. Despite Porter’s failure to comport with the local rules, the Court proceeds on

the Motion as briefed.

As a preliminary matter, the Court notes that Porter failed to comply with the local

rules in his Response. Generally, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) requires a party

asserting that a fact is genuinely disputed to support his assertion by “(A) citing to parts of

materials in the record . . . ; or (B) showing that the materials cited do not establish the

absence or presence of a genuine dispute, . . . .” If a party does not properly address another

party’s fact assertions as required by Rule 56(c), a district court may:

20 Trainor v. Apollo Metal Specialties, Inc., 318 F.3d 976, 979 (10th Cir. 2002) (citation

omitted).

21 Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256.

22 Brown v. Perez, 835 F.3d 1223, 1232 (10th Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks omitted)

(quoting Trevizo v. Adams, 455 F.3d 1155, 1160 (10th Cir. 2006)).

23 Id. (citations omitted).

24 Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255.

(1) give an opportunity to properly support or address the fact; (2) consider

the fact undisputed for purposes of the motion; (3) grant summary judgment

if the motion and supporting materials—including the facts considered

undisputed—show that the movant is entitled to it; or (4) issue any other

appropriate order.25

Additionally, the Local Civil Rules requires parties moving for summary judgment to begin

their brief “with a section stating the material facts to which the movant contends no

genuine dispute exists. . . . in concise, numbered paragraphs.”26 Similarly, opposing parties,

must open their brief in opposition with a “section responding, by correspondingly

numbered paragraph, to the facts that the movant contends are not in dispute and state any

fact that is disputed.”27 Porter did not do so.

Under LCvR56.1(e), “[a]ll material facts set forth in the statement of material facts

of the movant may be deemed admitted for the purpose of summary judgment unless

specifically controverted by the nonmovant using the procedures set forth in this rule.” The

Tenth Circuit has upheld this approach, noting that district courts are under no obligation

“to conduct a fishing expedition” to make up for a deficient response.28 On a motion for

summary judgment, it is the responding party’s burden “to ensure that the factual dispute

25 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e).

26 LCvR56.1(b).

27 LCvR56.1(c) (emphasis in original).

28 Coleman v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Kan., Inc., 287 Fed. Appx. 631, 635 (10th Cir.

2008); see also Glossip v. Chandler, No. CIV-14-0665-F, 2021 WL 1240695, at *1 (W.D.

Okla. Apr. 2, 2021).

is portrayed with particularity, without depending on the trial court to conduct its own

search of the record.”29

Porter has not sufficiently identified which of the School Defendants’ facts are in

dispute. Thus, it would be appropriate to deem the School Defendants’ facts admitted, but

the Court declines to punish Porter for the derelictions of his counsel. And striking the

deficient response and ordering Porter to file a new response that complies with the local

rules would essentially be granting Plaintiff a tenth extension in a case that has been

pending for four years. Porter at least generally cites to the record, and the School

Defendants, in Reply, adequately parsed the facts Porter attempts to dispute in his

Response.

II. Porter’s Title IX Claims

Porter brings Title IX claims against the School District for discrimination and

retaliation. Title IX provides that “[n]o person in the United States shall, on the basis of

sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to

discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial

assistance . . . .”30 Courts generally assess Title IX claims similarly to Title VII claims.31

29 Coleman, 287 Fed. Appx. at 635 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

30 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a).

31 Gossett v. Okla. ex rel. Bd. of Regents for Langston Univ., 245 F.3d 1172, 1176 (10th

Cir. 2001); Doe v. Univ. of Denver, 1 F.4th 822, at 829 n.5 (10th Cir. 2021).

A. The Court grants the Motion as to the Title IX discrimination claims.

A funding recipient’s “‘deliberate indifference to one student’s sexual harassment

of another constitute[s] intentional discrimination on the basis of sex’ prohibited by Title

IX.”32 Because a school district is only liable for its own misconduct, a plaintiff must show

that “the district (1) had actual knowledge of, and (2) was deliberately indifferent to (3)

harassment so severe, pervasive and objectively offensive that it (4) deprived the victim of

access to the educational benefits or opportunities provided by the school.”33

The School District argues that it is entitled to summary judgment based on the first

and second elements. The School Defendants did not address the third or fourth elements

in their Motion, but Porter addressed them in Response, and in Reply, the School

Defendants argue that there is no genuine issue of material fact exists as to those elements

as well. Courts generally do not consider issues raised for the first time in a reply brief, but

they “make an exception when the new issue argued in the reply brief is offered in response

to an argument raised in the plaintiff’s brief.”34 Once Porter contended that the record

shows that the post-assault harassment was so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive,

that he was effectively denied equal access to the school’s resources and opportunities, the

32 Farmer v. Kansas State Univ., 918 F.3d 1094, 1098 (10th Cir. 2019) (first quoting

Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167, 182 (2005) and then citing Davis ex

rel. LaShonda D. v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 650 (1999)).

33 Murrell v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, Denver, 186 F.3d 1238, 1246 (10th Cir. 1999) (citing Davis,

526 U.S. at 642–45). See Farmer, 918 F.3d at 1098 (first citing Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep.

Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 291 (1998) and then citing Davis, 526 U.S. at 640–43).

34 In re Gold Res. Corp. Sec. Litig., 776 F.3d 1103, 1119 (10th Cir. 2015) (cleaned up and

citation omitted).

School Defendants “were free to amplify their argument in reply” by contending that there

is no genuine issue of material fact as to those elements either.35

Porter divides his claim, arguing that the School District was deliberately indifferent

to (1) conduct preceding the assault and (2) harassment following it. Both are actionable

Title IX theories.36 As such, the Court will address them separately.

1. The School District lacked actual knowledge of a substantial risk of

abuse prior to the Assault.

The School Defendants argue that there is no evidence that any School District

employees knew of “the Flopper” prior to the assault. Regarding actual knowledge, a

plaintiff must establish that a school district had “actual knowledge of a substantial risk of

abuse[.]”37 This standard does not require a school district to “receive[] a clearly credible

report of sexual abuse from the plaintiff-student” to be put on notice.38 Instead, prior reports

involving other students may suffice to establish actual notice so long as the plaintiff shows

that the school district “had ‘actual knowledge of a substantial risk of abuse to students

35 Otten v. BNSF Ry. Co., No. 22-8025, 2023 WL 1948626, at *5 (10th Cir. Feb. 13, 2023)

36 Doe v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, Denver, Colo., 970 F.3d 1300, 1311 (10th Cir. 2020); Jackson,

544 U.S. at 173–74 (“Retaliation against a person because that person complained of sex

discrimination is another form of intentional sex discrimination encompassed by Title IX’s

private cause of action.”); See also Ross, 180 F. Supp. 3d at 965 (“A court can find a Title

IX violation when a [school] exhibits deliberate indifference before an attack that makes a

student more vulnerable to the attack itself, or when a [school] exhibits deliberate

indifference after an attack that causes a student to endure additional harassment.” (quoting

Ross v. Corp. of Mercer Univ., 506 F.Supp.2d 1325, 1346 (M.D.Ga.2007)).

37 Escue v. N. OK Coll., 450 F.3d 1146, 1154 (10th Cir. 2006) (emphasis supplied by Escue)

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

38 Id.

based on prior complaints by other students.’”39 But prior reports that are “too dissimilar,

too infrequent, [or] too distant in time . . . [do not] provide the school with actual

knowledge[.]”40 Courts are to “analyze the information reported to relevant officials in their

totality, . . . draw[ing] all reasonable inferences favorably to the nonmovant.”41

All of the deposed employees have denied knowing what “the Flopper” was prior

to the report of the assault.42 Porter claims that Principal Dilbeck “stated that he believes

that some investigation regarding ‘The Flopper’ was done in the past, but he is unsure

whether it was fully investigated or whether a determination was reached as to those

incidents.”43 The part of Dilbeck’s deposition on which Porter relies, however, only pertain

to the investigation of the assault itself, not earlier incidents.44 In fact, Dilbeck testified that

39 Ross v. Univ. of Tulsa, 180 F. Supp. 3d 951 (N.D. Okla. 2016), aff’d, 859 F.3d 1280

(10th Cir. 2017) (quoting Escue, 450 F.3d at 1153–54. The Court notes that district courts

are split as to “whether notice of prior complaints [of sexual harassment] as opposed to

notice of the current harassment for which redress is sought triggers liability under Title

IX.” Rost ex rel. K.C. v. Steamboat Springs RE-2 Sch. Dist., 511 F.3d 1114, 1119 (10th

Cir. 2008). And the Tenth Circuit has not yet resolved the issue. See Forth v. Laramie Cnty.

Sch. Dist. No. 1, 85 F.4th 1044, 1057 (10th Cir. 2023). But because the School District

does not deny that notice can theoretically consist of prior reports of sexual harassment

(see Reply (Dkt. 129), at 8), the Court need not weigh in on the issue.

40 Escue, 450 F.3d at 1153–54.

41 Forth, 85 F.4th at 1055 (citation omitted).

42 Arrott Dep. (Dkt. 126-12), at 20:21 (“I didn’t know what the flopper was.”); Curry Dep.

(Dkt. 126-2), at 28:13–14 (“I had no clue what the flopper was until my athletic director

told me.”); Wilson Dep. (Dkt. 126-4), at 60:14–17; Dilbeck Dep. (Dkt. 126-7), at 92:9–

93:1; Bradley Parent’s Tr. (Dkt. 119-2), at 36:15–37:9; Smith Dep. (Dkt. 126-15), at

179:20–22; Muralt Dep. (Dkt. 126-13), at 90:6–12.

43 Resp. (Dkt. 126), at 14.

44 Dilbeck Dep. (Dkt. 126-7), at 24:19–25:12, 30:5–23, 45:15–46:17.

he was unaware of any other incident where a student alleged that they were sexually

assaulted by another student or subjected to hazing in sports.45

Next, Porter cites to Cross’s “Proposed Statement” that “coaches were absolutely

aware of the hazing. The flopper had been the move for at least 4 years, and which

happened to me multiple times. [sic].”46 Notwithstanding that Porter utterly fails to explain

how this unsworn “Proposed Statement” would be admissible (and Defendants argue it

isn’t), Cross’s sworn deposition testimony is quite different, where he testified that “[t]he

school was not absolutely aware of [naked horseplay], no. I think the school may have been

aware that there was horseplay that went on. But I don’t think that they thought it to be any

more extreme than normal horseplay.”47 Moreover, Cross also said that he was only aware

of one pre-assault “Flopper” incident—one in which he was the victim and no adult had

knowledge.48

Porter also construes a note documenting the consequences imposed on Revard and

Cross for the assault as referring to an incident in 2016.49 But the note relates to the June

45 Id. at 92:9–93:1.

46 “Kelby Cross Proposed Statement” (Dkt. 126-11).

47 Cross Dep. (Dkt. 126-3), at 30:2–19.

48 Id. at 32:4–33:10, 19:18–21:18 (“I wouldn’t say [that the flopper happened to me] in the

presence of coaches either because they were at the front of the bus and it was dark and we

were at the back of the bus. [sic]”).

49 Discipline Docs. (Dkt. 126-10).

2017 assault.50 And in any event, the note does not show that any employee of the School

District knew of a substantial risk of abuse prior to the assault.

This leaves only Porter’s speculation that Coaches Wilson and Parent knew of “the

Flopper.” On the bus, Revard purportedly asked Wilson if he “wanted” “the Flopper”.51

Porter testifies that he witnessed the exchange and that Wilson responded by grinning and

Parent, who apparently was in earshot, responded by “laughing really hard.”52 Viewing this

in the light most favorable to Porter, there could be a fact issue as to whether Wilson and

Parent knew what “the Flopper” was. But the actual notice standard requires more than

awareness of the nature of the act. It requires that Wilson or Parent (or any other employee

of the School District) knew of a “substantial risk of abuse” to a student.53 As such, Porter

has not shown a genuine issue of material fact as to whether any of the School Defendants

had actual knowledge of a substantial risk of abuse to students based on prior complaints.54

Summary judgment on Porter’s “pre-assault” deliberate indifference claim is therefore

appropriate.

50 See Dilbeck Dep. (Dkt. 126-7), at 53:21–54:9; Arrott Dep. (Dkt. 126-12), at 50:19–51:2;

Pl. Dep. (Dkt. 119-3), at 109:2–16.

51 Wilson’s Dep. (Dkt. 126-4), at 60:1–64:8; Ponca City Police Report (Dkt. 126-5), at 5.

52 Pl. Dep. (Dkt. 126-1), at 121:10–122:11.

53 Escue, 450 F.3d at 1154 (emphasis in original).

54 To the extent that Porter relies on the unreported instances of hazing detailing in the facts

section of his brief, the Court notes that, even ignoring their lack of evidentiary support

and construing them in the light most favorable to Porter, they are either “too dissimilar”

to the conduct at issue here or too infrequent to provide the school with actual knowledge

of a substantial risk of abuse. Id. at 1153–54.

2. Regarding the post-assault harassment, genuine issues of material

fact exist as to actual knowledge and deliberate indifference, but

Porter has not shown that he suffered severe and pervasive

harassment that deprived him of educational opportunities.

The School Defendants claim that there is no evidence of further incidents of sexual

harassment after the June 2017 assault. That, however, is unsupported by the record. As

discussed in greater detail above, Porter testified that he endured harassment throughout

his high school career, reporting each occasion to Assistant Principal Muralt.55 For her part,

Muralt said that she is unaware of any harassment or bullying that occurred between the

assault and the reports she received in 2019.56 Thus, a genuine issue of material fact exists

as to whether the School District had actual knowledge of a substantial risk of post-assault

harassment.

But to show deliberate indifference to that substantial risk, a plaintiff must

demonstrate that the school’s “response to the harassment or lack thereof is clearly

unreasonable in light of the known circumstances.”57 This is a “high standard” that does

not require schools to purge all “actionable peer harassment” or to “engage in particular

disciplinary action. Indeed, courts should refrain from second-guessing the disciplinary

decisions made by school administrators.”58 But a “minimalist response is not within the

55 Pl. Dep. (Dkt. 126-1), at 84:13–88:8, 178:6–20, 227:12–228:23.

56 Muralt Dep. (Dkt. 126-13), at 33:6–12.

57 Doe v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, Denver, Colo., 970 F.3d at 1313 (internal quotation marks

omitted) (quoting Davis, 526 U.S. at 646–47).

58 Id. 1313 (quoting the same) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

contemplation of a reasonable response[.]”59 Porter has shown a genuine issue of material

fact as to whether the School District adequately responded to his reports of post-assault

harassment.

A plaintiff must also, however, establish that the harassment at issue “is so severe,

pervasive, and objectively offensive, and that so undermines and detracts from the

victim[’s] educational experience, that the victim-student[ is] effectively denied equal

access to an institution’s resources and opportunities.”60

Whether gender-oriented conduct rises to the level of actionable

“harassment” thus depends on a constellation of surrounding circumstances,

expectations, and relationships, including, but not limited to, the ages of the

harasser and the victim and the number of individuals involved. Courts,

moreover, must bear in mind that schools are unlike the adult workplace and

that children may regularly interact in a manner that would be unacceptable

among adults. Indeed, at least early on, students are still learning how to

interact appropriately with their peers. It is thus understandable that, in the

school setting, students often engage in insults, banter, teasing, shoving,

pushing, and gender-specific conduct that is upsetting to the students

subjected to it. Damages are not available for simple acts of teasing and

name-calling among school children, however, even where these comments

target differences in gender. Rather, in the context of student-on-student

harassment, damages are available only where the behavior is so severe,

pervasive, and objectively offensive that it denies its victims the equal access

to education that Title IX is designed to protect.61

“Matters of degree—such as severity and pervasiveness—are often best left to the jury[,]”

as the “severity and pervasiveness evaluation. . . is quintessentially a question of fact[.]”62

59 Escue, 450 F.3d, at 1155 (quoting Vance v. Spencer County Pub. Sch. Dist., 231 F.3d

253, 260 (6th Cir. 2000)).

60 Davis, 526 U.S. at 651.

61 Id. at 651–52 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

62 Doe v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, Denver, Colo., 970 F.3d at 1312.

Most of the post-assault harassment that Porter alleges amounts to teasing and

name-calling, for which Title IX damages are not available.63 Porter also says that he was

pushed down the stairs and called a “faggot” on two or three occasions in his freshman

year.64 The Court is unconvinced that a reasonable juror would conclude that this conduct

(although disturbing), taken in the aggregate and construed in the light most favorable to

Porter, can be said to be severe and pervasive.65 But even assuming that it was, Porter has

not shown that he was “effectively denied equal access” to the School District’s resources

and opportunities.

Indicators of deprivation of educational opportunities include a decline in grades

and changes in demeanor or classroom participation.66 Additionally, the Tenth Circuit “has

held that changes in class attendance, transfers out of classes, and changes in schools are

harms that constitute deprivations of educational benefits.”67 The record reflects no such

deprivations. Rather, it shows that Porter enjoyed a successful high school career, playing

63 Davis, 526 U.S. at 652. (“It is not enough to show . . . that a student has been teased or

called offensive names.”).

64 Pl. Dep. (Dkt. 126-1), at 10:7–13:17, 56:5–57:6, 137:1–25.

65 See, e.g., Brodsky ex rel. S.B. v. Trumbull Bd. of Educ., No. CIV. 3:06CV1947PCD,

2009 WL 230708 (D. Conn. Jan. 30, 2009) (granting summary judgment and finding that

where the victim “was subjected to name-calling and insults, had a straw thrown at her,

had a pencil stuck under her butt, had her butt slapped . . . , and on one occasion, had her

breasts and/or buttocks touched without [her] consent” was “collectively are not so severe,

pervasive, and objectively offensive that they could reasonably be said to deprive S.B. of

access to the educational opportunities or benefits provided by the school”).

66 Hawkins v. Sarasota Cnty. Sch. Bd., 322 F.3d 1279, 1289 (11th Cir. 2003).

67 Doe v. Oologah-Talala Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 4 of Rogers Cnty., No. 21-CV-240-JDR-

SH, 2024 WL 3972978, at *9 (N.D. Okla. Aug. 28, 2024) (collecting cases).

in every varsity game from his sophomore year through his senior year; graduated from the

School District, where he participated in other extracurricular activities; and went on to

attend college.68 Porter alleges that as a result of the harassment, he “endured suicidal

thoughts, lost friendships, and lost the ability to serve in the U.S. Air Force.”69 But Porter

makes no effort to show how these had any impact whatsoever on his educational

opportunities.70

68 Cully Porter’s Tr. (Dkt. 119-3), at 2, 3, 7–8, 60.

69 Resp. (Dkt. 126), at 25.

70 This holding is consistent with the caselaw. Compare Dimas v. Pecos Indep. Sch. Dist.

Bd. of Educ., No. 121CV00978KWRJFR, 2023 WL 2573345, at *6 (D.N.M. Mar. 20,

2023) (granting summary judgment where, after one instance of gender-based harassment,

the plaintiff completed her season as a member of the high school basketball team, played

on the softball team, and graduated high school), aff’d, No. 23-2064, 2024 WL 1881076

(10th Cir. Apr. 30, 2024), with C.T. v. Liberal Sch. Dist., 562 F. Supp. 2d 1324, 1335–36

(D. Kan. 2008) (denying summary judgment where the record showed that the plaintiff was

assaulted, received death threats, and called names “every day he went to school for the

remainder of the school year,” causing him to transfer to another school that did not offer

the same athletic programs), and Theno v. Tonganoxie Unified Sch. Dist No. 464, 377 F.

Supp. 2d 952 (D. Kan. 2005) (denying summary judgment where the plaintiff was

diagnosed with multiple disorders and eventually left the school following years of verbal

harassment).

Likewise, for a Title IX plaintiff to survive a motion to dismiss, he must allege deprivation

of an educational benefit. Compare Murrell, 186 F.3d at 1248 (finding that the plaintiff

stated a claim where she alleged she suffered repeated instances of battery and assault that

resulted in her being hospitalized and homebound), with Trentadue v. Redmon, 619 F.3d

648, 653–54 (7th Cir. 2010) (affirming dismissal where students taunted her, put gum in

her hair, and made threats against her, causing her to lose “nearly all of her friends,” seek

counselling, and suffer recurring nightmares because her “grades did not suffer, she was

not extensively absent from school, she graduated with a class rank of 27 out of 500, and

thereafter enrolled in college”), and Roe v. Penn. State Univ., No. CV 18-2142, 2019 WL

652527, at *8 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 15, 2019) (dismissing complaint that failed to “detail a single

instance about how she was deprived of access to [the university’s educational benefits or

opportunities, such as dropping classes (or elongating her enrollment at [the university]),

Porter compares this case to Doe v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, Denver, Colorado, where the

Tenth Circuit found that the plaintiff had stated a claim for deliberate indifference where

she alleged that she was repeatedly verbally harassed, blackmailed with nude photographs,

told to commit suicide, and threatened with physical violence.71 Importantly, however, she

also alleged that this harassment “became so intolerable that [she] could not attend classes

at the school. She worked at home, coming to school only to perform assignments before

her regular classes began and after classes had ended.”72 She also avoided eating lunch in

the cafeteria, and opted to use the back doors of the school instead of the main entrance.73

Again, Porter has not shown that the harassment he endured altered his access to the

school’s resources and opportunities. Accordingly, summary judgment is warranted as to

Porter’s “post-assault” deliberate indifference claim.

B. The Court grants the Motion as to Porter’s Title IX retaliation claims.

Title IX “prohibits retaliation against individuals because they have complained of

sex discrimination.”74 The School Defendants next move for summary judgment on

Porter’s retaliation claims, arguing that he cannot show that the school took any adverse

action against him. Porter maintains that his retaliation claim survives because the School

withdrawing from [the university], stopping her employment as a [student] auxiliary officer

or otherwise changing her educational activities.”).

71 970 F.3d at 1311–12.

72 Id. at 1312–1313.

73 Id. at 1312.

74 Hiatt v. Colorado Seminary, 858 F.3d 1307, 1315 (10th Cir. 2017) (citing Jackson, 544

U.S. at 183).

District failed to (1) “comport with Title IX and school policies and procedures in

addressing the initial assault” and (2) “address and seek to eliminate peer retaliatory sexual

harassment for, at the very least, two years after [Porter’s] report of abuse[.]”75

1. Porter has not shown that the School District retaliated against him

in its investigation of the assault.

Courts are generally to evaluate Title IX retaliation claims under the McDonnell

Douglas burden-shifting framework.76 Under this framework, the plaintiff must first

establish a prima facie case for retaliation by showing that the defendant took adverse

action against the plaintiff based on the plaintiff’s protected activity.77 This generally

requires a plaintiff to show that “1) he or she engaged in protected activity; 2) defendant

had knowledge of the protected activity; 3) materially adverse school-related action was

taken against plaintiff; and 4) there was a causal connection between the protected activity

and the adverse action.”78 An action is “materially adverse” if it “might have dissuaded a

reasonable person from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.”79

Porter argues that the School Defendants’ investigations “were replete with

procedural deficiencies.”80 Porter’s only citation to the record in support of this allegation

is the fact that Dilbeck erroneously told Porter’s mother that the assault was not a Title IX

75 Resp. (Dkt. 126), at 27.

76 Hiatt, 858 F.3d at 1315 n.8.

77 Id. at 1316.

78 Doe 1 v. Mount Saint Mary High Sch. Corp. of the State of Okla., No. CIV-22-992-R,

2025 WL 490011, at *15 (W.D. Okla. Feb. 13, 2025)

79 Douglass v. Garden City Cmty. Coll., 649 F. Supp. 3d 1152, 1167 (D. Kan. 2023)

80 Resp. (Dkt. 126), at 28.

situation.81 Porter presents no evidence that the School District’s investigation was adverse

or retaliatory. To the contrary, the record reflects that the School District investigated his

report and punished the perpetrators. Porter has therefore not met his prima facie burden

as to this claim, and summary judgment is appropriate.

2. Porter has not shown that the School District was deliberately

indifferent to student-on-student retaliatory harassment.

Contrary to the School Defendants’ assertions, Title IX recipients can be liable for

deliberate indifference to student-on-student retaliatory harassment.82 The parties urge the

Court to apply the same McDonell Douglas analysis to Porter’s student-on-student

retaliatory harassment claim. However, in Doe v. School District Number 1, Denver,

Colorado, the Tenth Circuit held that retaliatory harassment for reporting misconduct is by

its very nature an act of discrimination.83 It proceeded to analyze the plaintiff’s retaliatory

harassment claim under the same deliberate indifference framework described above.84 The

Court therefore does the same.85 For the same reasons discussed above, Porter’s retaliatory

harassment claim fails—he has not demonstrated harassment that was so severe, pervasive,

and objectively offensive that it deprived him of educational resources or opportunities

provided by the school. Accordingly, summary judgment is appropriate as to this claim.

81 Porter-Cain Dep. (Dkt. 126-6), at 157:15–16; Dilbeck Dep. (Dkt. 126-7), at 23:5–24:10.

82 See Doe v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, Denver, Colo., 970 F.3d at 1311.

83 Doe v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, Denver, Colo., 970 F.3d at 1310–11.

84 Id. at 1308–15.

85 See C.H. v. Howard, No. CV 21-574 GBW/JHR, 2023 WL 7279329, at *9 (D.N.M. Nov.

3, 2023) (The same elements apply to both “claims for student-on-student sexual

harassment and student-on-student retaliation for reporting sexual harassment.”).

Courts may grant summary judgment on grounds not formally raised in a summary

judgment motion, “so long as the losing party was on notice that [he] had to come forward

with all of [his] evidence.”86 A court commits reversible error on this basis if the losing

party is prejudiced by this action.87 “A party is procedurally prejudiced if it is surprised by

the district court’s action and that surprise results in the party’s failure to support evidence

in support of its position.”88 Here, because Porter fully briefed the deliberate indifference

issue, he is not prejudiced by the Court’s application of Doe v. School District Number 1,

Denver, Colorado.

III. Summary judgment on the claims against the School Employees is warranted.

The School Defendants next seek summary judgment on Porter’s equal protection

claims against the School Employees individually. They raise the defense of qualified

immunity. When the defense of qualified immunity is invoked, the plaintiff must

demonstrate “(1) that the defendant’s actions violated a federal constitutional or statutory

right, and, if so (2) that the right was clearly established at the time of the defendant’s

unlawful conduct.”89 If the plaintiff fails to satisfy either prong, the defendant is entitled to

qualified immunity.90 But “[i]f the plaintiff indeed demonstrates that the [defendant]

violated a clearly established constitutional or statutory right, then the burden shifts back

86 Kannady v. City of Kiowa, 590 F.3d 1161, 1170 (10th Cir. 2010).

87 Id.

88 Id. (citation omitted).

89 Cillo v. City of Greenwood Vill., 739 F.3d 451, 460 (10th Cir. 2013).

90 See Olsen v. Layton Hills Mall, 312 F.3d 1304, 1312 (10th Cir. 2002).

to the defendant, who must prove that ‘no genuine issues of material fact’ exist and that

the defendant ‘is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’”91

Under Section 1983, a person acting under color of state law is liable for depriving

another of constitutional rights.92 The Fourteenth Amendment provides that “[n]o state

shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” A

school employee may be held liable for a denial of equal protection under Section 1983

“upon a showing of deliberate indifference to known sexual harassment.”93 Because

Section 1983 liability requires a “deliberate,” and not merely negligent, deprivation, a

school employee is liable for student-on-student harassment only where he “participates or

consciously acquiesces” in the sexual harassment.94 A plaintiff may show acquiescence by

demonstrating that a school employee refused to reasonably respond to the sexual

harassment.95

In his Response, Porter argues that the School Employees are liable for deliberate

indifference as to (1) pre-assault hazing incidents; (2) their post-assault investigation; and

(3) the post-assault harassment. First, as previously explained, the record shows that the

only School Employee who may have heard of “the Flopper” prior to the assault is Coach

91 Id. (quoting Gross v. Pirtle, 245 F.3d 1151, 1156 (10th Cir. 2001)).

92 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

93 Murrell, 186 F.3d at 1250.

94 Id. (emphasis supplied by Murrell) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

95 Id. (footnote omitted).

Parent.96 But Porter points to no evidence that Parent participated or consciously

acquiesced in the assault. Accordingly, Porter has not shown that the School Employees

had the requisite knowledge to be liable under Section 1983 for pre-assault deliberate

indifference.

Second, as to the investigation, Porter argues that the School Employees were

deliberately indifferent because they (1) did not conduct a proper Title IX investigation;

(2) improperly categorized the assault as hazing rather than sexual assault; and (3) failed

to inform Porter or the other victims of their rights throughout the process.97 But Porter

makes no argument and cites to no authority that shows that these responses were clearly

unreasonable. The record shows that the School Employees promptly and thoroughly

investigated the allegations against Cross and Revard, punished them, and reported the

assault to law enforcement. Indeed, a school “district’s failure to comply with its

regulations does not establish the requisite deliberate indifference” under Title IX.98 And

96 Coach Wilson is not a defendant in this case.

97 Resp. (Dkt. 126) at 35–36.

98 Whitley v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 10 of Dewey Cnty., Okla., No. CIV-18-331-SLP, 2019

WL 7667329, at *8 (W.D. Okla. Apr. 22, 2019); Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist.,

524 U.S. 274, 292 (1998) (noting the Court has not held that Title IX enables plaintiffs to

obtain damages for violating “administrative requirements” like enactment of a grievance

procedure).

to enforce Title IX’s regulatory protections through Section 1983, Porter must still point to

a right secured by Title IX.99

Third, as to the post-assault harassment, Porter identifies no School Employee with

actual knowledge of the post-assault harassment. He only testified that non-party Assistant

Principal Muralt knew of the post-assault harassment. “Personal liability under § 1983 must

be based on personal involvement in the alleged constitutional violation.”100 Nowhere does

Porter allege that any of the School Employees were involved in any way with the post-

assault harassment. Accordingly, Porter has not shown that the School Employees actions

violated Porter’s equal protection rights, and they are entitled to qualified immunity for his

claims against them.

IV. Summary Judgment is appropriate as to the Monell claims.

Finally, the School Defendants seek summary judgment as to Porter’s Monell

claims. The Amended Complaint appears to allege claims based on two alternate theories:

violations of Porter’s rights to (1) substantive due process and (2) equal protection.101 In

his response, Porter only addresses the latter.102 Accordingly, Porter has abandoned his

substantive due process Monell claim.103

99 Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 283–85 (2002).

100 Brown v. Montoya, 662 F.3d 1152, 1163 (10th Cir. 2011).

101 See Am. Compl. (Dkt. 21), at 18–20.

102 Resp. (Dkt. 126), at 34–39.

103 See Coffey v. Healthtrust, Inc., 955 F.2d 1388, 1393 (10th Cir. 1992) (A plaintiff’s

“failure to rebut the arguments raised by” a defendant in his “motion for summary

judgment is fatal to his attempt to raise and rebut such arguments on . . . appeal.”).

Turning to the equal protection Monell claim, local government entities such as the

School District are “persons” subject to suit under Section 1983.104 Principals of municipal

liability apply to school districts.105 To establish municipal liability, a plaintiff must show

both (1) a harm to the plaintiff caused by a constitutional violation, and (2) liability of the

municipality for that violation.106 For the reasons discussed above, Porter’s Monell claim

regarding the assault fails at the outset, as no reasonable juror could conclude that the

school acted with deliberate indifference to known harassment.

Establishing municipal liability for the violation requires a plaintiff to “demonstrate

that a state employee’s discriminatory actions are representative of an official policy or

custom of the municipal institution, or are taken by an official with final policy making

authority.”107 Absent an official policy, the plaintiff must show that the discriminatory

practice is “so permanent and well settled as to constitute a ‘custom or usage’ with the

force of law.”108 There can be no municipal liability of a government entity “for an injury

inflicted solely by its employees or agents.”109

104 Sauers v. Salt Lake Cnty., 1 F.3d 1122, 1129 (10th Cir. 1993) (citing Monell v. N.Y. City

Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978)).

105 Murrell, 186 F.3d at 1249; Brammer-Hoelter v. Twin Peaks Charter Acad., 602 F.3d

1175, 1188 (10th Cir. 2010).

106 Collins v. City of Harker Heights, Tex., 503 U.S. 115, 120 (1992) (citations omitted).

107 Murrell, 186 F.3d at 1249 (citing Randle v. City of Aurora, 69 F.3d 441, 446–50 (10th

Cir. 1995)).

108 Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); Brammer-Hoelter, 602 F.3d at 1189.

109 Monell, 436 U.S. at 694.

To prevail on his Monell equal protection claim, Porter must show a policy or

custom of deliberate indifference to sexual harassment.110 Porter relies solely on a “failure

to train” theory. Failure to adequately train or supervise employees can constitute an

official policy, “so long as that failure results from deliberate indifference to the injuries

that may be caused.”111 “A municipality’s culpability for a deprivation of rights is at its

most tenuous where a claim turns on a failure to train.”112 It is not enough to show general

deficiencies in a training program. Rather, a plaintiff must “identify a specific deficiency

in the . . . training program closely related to his ultimate injury.”113

In order to “satisfy the stringent deliberate indifference standard, ‘a pattern of

similar constitutional violations by untrained employees is ‘ordinarily necessary[.]’”114

Without notice of a particular deficiency in a course of training, “decisionmakers can

hardly be said to have deliberately chosen a training program that will cause violations of

constitutional rights.”115 In the absence of a “pre-existing pattern of violations,” failure to

train claims only survive “in a narrow range of circumstances, however rare, in which the

110 Murrell, 186 F.3d at 1249.

111 Lucas v. Turn Key Health Clinics, LLC, 58 F.4th 1127, 1145 (10th Cir. 2023) (quoting

Crowson v. Wash. Cnty. Utah, 983 F.3d 1166, 1184 (10th Cir. 2020)).

112 Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 61 (2011).

113 Lopez v. LeMaster, 172 F.3d 756, 760 (10th Cir. 1999).

114 Waller v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 932 F.3d 1277, 1285 (10th Cir. 2019).

115 Id. (quoting Connick, 563 U.S. at 62).

unconstitutional consequences of a failure to train are highly predictable and patently

obvious.”116

Here, the record does not support a pattern of similar constitutional violations by

untrained employees, nor does it reflect the kind of “highly predictable and patently

obvious” consequences required to establish deliberate indifference in a failure-to-train

claim. To the contrary, the undisputed evidence shows that each School District Employee

responded promptly upon learning of the assault. The only countervailing evidence is

Porter’s testimony that Muralt failed to act on his reports of post-assault harassment. But,

viewing this in the light most favorable to Porter, a lone employee’s failure to act—even if

proven—does not demonstrate a pattern of constitutional violations, nor does it meet the

narrow exception for obvious consequences.

V. The Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining

state-law claims.

The only remaining claims are Porter’s state-law claims against Revard and Cross.

As the Amended Complaint does not invoke diversity jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1367

governs the Court’s jurisdiction over the remaining claims. When a court has resolved all

federal claims, it “may, and usually should, decline to exercise jurisdiction over any

remaining state claim.”117 Courts are to consider the balance of the factors of judicial

economy, convenience, fairness, and comity.118 Here, “notions of fairness and comity

116 Id. (quoting Connick, 563 U.S. at 63–64) (cleaned up).

117 Koch v. City of Del City, 660 F.3d 1228, 1248 (10th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted).

118 Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 n.7 (1988).

would suggest that a case now composed of claims based entirely on state law should be

tried in a state court.”'!? Moreover, although the court has devoted substantial judicial

resources to the federal claims, little has been spent on the remaining claims. And although

convenience may cut against dismissal, “the balance of factors” predominately support

dismissal. The Court therefore declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the

remaining claims.

Conclusion

Accordingly, the Court GRANTS the Motion (Dkt. 119), DISMISSES the

remaining state-law claims WITHOUT PREJUDICE to Porter’s right to seek appropriate

relief in state court, and DENIES the remaining pending motions as moot.

IT IS SO ORDERED this 4th day of June 2025.

we

ames ——

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

"1° Power Equip. Maint., Inc. v. AIRCO Power Servs., Inc., 953 F. Supp. 2d 1290, 1298

(S.D. Ga. 2013).

30

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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