Clardy v. Board of Parole

No. 525 June 4, 2025 211

This is a nonprecedential memorandum opinion

pursuant to ORAP 10.30 and may not be cited

except as provided in ORAP 10.30(1).

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE

STATE OF OREGON

SIRGIORGIO SANFORD CLARDY,

Petitioner,

v.

BOARD OF PAROLE AND POST-PRISON

SUPERVISION,

Respondent.

Board of Parole and Post-Prison Supervision

A181462

Submitted on May 15, 2025.

Ernest G. Lannet, Chief Defender, Criminal Appellate

Section, and Shawn Wiley, Deputy Public Defender, Oregon

Public Defense Commission, filed the opening brief for peti-

tioner. Sir Giorgio Sanford Clardy filed the supplemental

brief pro se.

Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, Benjamin

Gutman, Solicitor General, and Jeff J. Payne, Assistant

Attorney General, filed the brief for respondent.

Before Tookey, Presiding Judge, Kamins, Judge, and

Jacquot, Judge.

PER CURIAM

Affirmed.

212 Clardy v. Board of Parole

PER CURIAM

Petitioner is an adult in custody who was sentenced

as a dangerous offender to serve 300 months with a man-

datory minimum of 75 months on multiple felony counts.

Petitioner assigns error to the Board of Parole and Post-

Prison Supervision’s (the board) order denying him release

and deferring parole consideration for two years. He argues

that the board applied improper standards to the deter-

mination of whether he was eligible for release, and that

the board’s determinations are unsupported by substantial

evidence resulting in a final order that lacked substantial

reason. The board argues that it applied the proper stan-

dards to the release determination according to our prior

decisions, and that its factual findings were based upon sub-

stantial evidence in the record. We affirm.

We review a board order “for legal error, substantial

evidence, and substantial reason.” Bell v. Board of Parole, 283

Or App 711, 713, 391 P3d 907, rev den, 361 Or 645 (2017). First,

we address petitioner’s argument that the board applied the

wrong standard. When a person is sentenced as a dangerous

offender, the trial court has made a finding that the person

was suffering from a severe personality disorder that predis-

posed them to commit crimes that seriously endangered the

life or safety of another. We have previously determined, in

a case not materially distinguishable from this one, that the

test the board applied, including whether petitioner still suf-

fered from a mental disorder that predisposed him to com-

mit any crime, is appropriate. Guzek v. Board of Parole, 325

Or App 795, 804, 530 P3d 510, rev den, 371 Or 476 (2023).

Similar to that case, we have considered the record, and

determine that the board’s intermediate determinations that

petitioner lacked remorse for the victims, failed to engage in

mental health treatment, and resisted being supervised as a

sex offender, are amply supported by evidence in the record,

and petitioner’s own statements to the board—quoted in the

board’s letter of deferral—reinforce our determination that

the board considered the appropriate standard in denying

release and deferring the next parole consideration hearing.

We also find the psychologist’s finding that peti-

tioner is currently suffering from antisocial personality

Nonprecedential Memo Op: 341 Or App 211 (2025) 213

disorder to be adequately supported by a preponderance of

evidence in the record, despite problems associated with the

Personality Assessment Inventory test. The board’s duty at

the parole consideration hearing is to determine whether

petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence

that he is no longer dangerous at the time of the parole con-

sideration hearing. Davis v. Board of Parole, 341 Or 442,

448, 144 P3d 931 (2006). Here, the board adequately con-

nected its reasons for denial to evidence in the record, and it

did not err.

Affirmed.