The opinion
No. 507 June 4, 2025 139
This is a nonprecedential memorandum opinion
pursuant to ORAP 10.30 and may not be cited
except as provided in ORAP 10.30(1).
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE
STATE OF OREGON
KENDALL LEIGH VEDDER,
Petitioner,
v.
BOARD OF PAROLE AND POST-PRISON
SUPERVISION,
Respondent.
Board of Parole and Post-Prison Supervision
A183013
Submitted May 15, 2025.
Ernest G. Lannet, Chief Defender, Criminal Appellate
Section, and Stacy M. Du Clos, Deputy Public Defender,
Oregon Public Defense Commission, filed the brief for
petitioner.
Dan Rayfield, Attorney General, Benjamin Gutman,
Solicitor General, and Patricia G. Rincon, Assistant Attorney
General, filed the brief for respondent.
Before Tookey, Presiding Judge, Kamins, Judge, and
Jacquot, Judge.
KAMINS, J.
Affirmed.
140 Vedder v. Board of Parole
KAMINS, J.
Petitioner seeks judicial review from a final order
of the Board of Parole and Post-Prison Supervision (board)
denying him release after holding a juvenile hearing. In its
order, the board concluded petitioner had not demonstrated
maturity and rehabilitation, ORS 144.397(7), and deferred
petitioner’s release. In a single assignment of error, peti-
tioner argues that the board’s order lacked substantial rea-
son and that several findings lacked substantial evidence.
See ORS 144.335 (providing that ORS 183.482(8) governs
review of board orders); ORS 183.482(8)(c) (providing for
substantial evidence review). We affirm.
In 2003, petitioner was convicted of attempted rape
of his 15-year-old sister and the rape and attempted murder
of his neighbor and sentenced to nearly 30 years in prison.
Petitioner was 17 years old at the time he committed those
crimes. In 2021, Governor Kate Brown commuted petition-
er’s sentence by granting him a juvenile hearing under ORS
144.397. Under ORS 144.397, persons convicted of crimes
committed when they were juveniles may petition the board
for early release after 15 years of imprisonment by demon-
strating “maturity and rehabilitation.” After holding peti-
tioner’s hearing, the board found that petitioner had not
demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation and deferred his
next juvenile hearing for five years.
On appeal, petitioner focuses his arguments on two
of the board’s findings he believes are not supported by sub-
stantial evidence. “Substantial evidence exists to support a
finding of fact when the record, viewed as a whole, would
permit a reasonable person to make that finding of fact.”
ORS 183.482(8)(c).
First, petitioner argues that the record lacks sub-
stantial evidence to support the board’s “concern” that
petitioner might not seek mental health treatment in the
community based on his refusal to seek treatment while
incarcerated under the first factor listed in OAR 255-033-
0030(5). That factor permits the board to consider “the per-
son’s involvement in correctional treatment, medical care,
educational, vocational, or other training in the institution
Nonprecedential Memo Op: 341 Or App 139 (2025) 141
which will substantially enhance the person’s capacity to
lead a law-abiding life when released.” OAR 255-033-0030(5)
(a). Petitioner does not dispute that, in 2020 and 2021, he
experienced symptoms of depression and did not seek men-
tal health treatment nor does he dispute that he had previ-
ously stopped taking his mental health medication without
consulting a provider. He argues, however, that the evidence
in the record demonstrated that he was able to successfully
manage his symptoms himself, through exercise and daily
routines, and points to his lack of disciplinary infractions
and lack of a formal diagnosis as proof of his ability to live a
law-abiding life.
Assuming that the board’s “concern” is, in fact, a
factual finding, we disagree with petitioner that there was
a lack of substantial evidence to support it. The evidence
in the record showed that, at the time of his crimes, peti-
tioner was feeling isolated, lonely, and depressed. Petitioner
committed his crimes, in part, as a result of those feelings.
A reasonable person could conclude that petitioner’s ability
and motivation to seek professional help would “substan-
tially enhance” his capacity to lead a law-abiding life when
released, OAR 255-033-0030(5)(a), notwithstanding that
petitioner, at times, successfully self-managed his symp-
toms in a controlled prison environment.
Next, petitioner challenges the board’s finding
that he failed to engage in appropriate self-study. See ORS
144.397(5)(e) (the board shall consider “[t]he person’s * * *
use of self-study for self-improvement”); OAR 255-033-
0030(3)(e) (same). Petitioner does not dispute that, despite
having committed violent sexual offenses, he only began a
workbook specific to sexual offending less than two months
before his hearing. However, petitioner argues that he was
only recommended that workbook recently and it had over-
lap with other workbooks he had completed. Petitioner also
notes that he began working through the book shortly after
it was recommended to him.
Although it appears from the record that petitioner
has made some progress in this area—a fact that is notable
given the limited nature of sex-offender-specific treatment
in Oregon’s prisons—we disagree that the board’s finding
142 Vedder v. Board of Parole
lacked substantial evidence. Rather, it was reasonable for
the board to expect petitioner to engage in relevant self-mo-
tivated study earlier than a few months before his hearing.
And, given that petitioner had successfully engaged in other
types of programming earlier in his incarceration, it was
reasonable for the board to conclude that petitioner had the
ability and means to procure the self-study materials spe-
cific to building healthy sexual relationships and habits ear-
lier, but he failed to do so.
In addition to concluding that these specific find-
ings are supported by substantial evidence, we note that
the board’s ultimate conclusion—that petitioner failed to
demonstrate maturity and rehabilitation—was supported
by multiple other factual findings which themselves were
supported by substantial evidence in the record.
Affirmed.