Befaithful Coker v. Slyvester Warren, III

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 23-11160

Non-Argument Calendar

____________________

BEFAITHFUL COKER,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

SLYVESTER WARREN, III,

individually,

JUSTICE AND EQUALITY COALITION, INCORPORATED,

collectively,

CITY COUNCIL OF LAKE CITY FLORIDA,

individually and collectively,

JAKE HILL,

individually and in his official capacity,

EUGENE JEFFERSON,

individually and in his official capacity, et al.,

Defendants-Appellees,

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2 Opinion of the Court 23-11160

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Florida

D.C. Docket No. 3:22-cv-00518-MMH-LLL

____________________

Before JORDAN, LAGOA, and ABUDU, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Befaithful Coker, proceeding pro se, appeals the district

court’s dismissal of her civil suit that brought state and federal

claims against numerous defendants.1 Coker v. Warren, 660 F. Supp.

3d 1308 (M.D. Fla. 2023). On appeal, Coker contests several of the

1 We write only for the parties so, as to any issues that we do not mention

explicitly, we affirm without discussion. For reference, Coker’s third amended

complaint brought 11 Counts (Counts I through IX) against the following 24

defendants: (1) Sylvester Warren, III; (2) the Justice and Equality Coalition,

Inc; (3) Audrey Sikes, City Clerk of Lake City, Florida and Deputy Supervisor

of Elections for Columbia County; (4) the City Council of Lake City (“the City

Council”); (5) Christopher Todd Sampson; (6) Jake Hill; (7) Eugene Jefferson;

(8) Stephen Witt; (9) Fred Koberlein, Jr.; (10) Kris Bradshaw Robinson;

(11) Tomi Brown, Columbia County Supervisor of Elections; (12) Stephen

Douglas; (13) Joel Foreman, Attorney for Columbia County Board of County

Commissioners and for Columbia County Supervisor of Elections; (14) the

Columbia County Board of County Commissioners; (15) Ronald Williams;

(16) Northeast Florida Newspaper, LLC; (17) Todd Wilson; (18) the Lake City,

Columbia County Chamber of Commerce; (19) Steve Smith; (20) Glennel

Bowden; (21) Vanessa George; (22) Nathan Gambles, III; (23) David Fina,

Judge of the Third Circuit Court of Florida; and (24) the Florida Secretary of

State, Division of Elections.

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district court’s jurisdictional and substantive rulings, but she fails to

preserve challenges to several other rulings of the district court.

After careful review, we affirm.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

We begin by summarizing the factual allegations of Coker’s

operative complaint. In doing so, we accept, as we must, “the com-

plaint’s allegations as true and construe them in the light most fa-

vorable to” Coker. Wainberg v. Mellichamp, 93 F.4th 1221, 1224 (11th

Cir. 2024).

Coker, a community activist and volunteer in Lake City,

Florida, made several “protected disclosures” and complaints to

government officials and to “state and federal agencies.” These dis-

closures concerned, among other matters, the “misuse of taxpayers

funds, abuses of power and political position, and threatening and

intimidating practices of members of the [Lake City] City Council”

and other defendants. For example, in January 2021, Coker made

a public disclosure to the City Council that councilmember Jake

Hill had committed “gross waste and abuse of duty” by advocating

for a lease negotiation that violated the municipal charter and that

represented a conflict of interest.

In later “public disclosures,” Coker claimed another coun-

cilmember, Fred Koberlein, Jr., had engaged in negotiations with

other defendants “without using established financial policies,”

leading to “a gross waste of funds,” also in violation of the munici-

pal charter. She also claimed that councilmembers Hill and Eugene

Jefferson “abused their office” by encouraging “the Third Circuit

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4 Opinion of the Court 23-11160

Judicial Court not to prosecute” another defendant, Sylvester War-

ren, for pending charges in state court and for encouraging his early

release from federal probation. In June 2021, Coker made a “public

disclosure” to the City Council about “suspected criminal activity

by business owners” who were not in compliance with the munic-

ipal charter, including businesses owned by several defendants.

Another “public disclosure” stated that Koberlein failed to inform

the City Council about an “improperly called” special meeting held

to terminate a city manager and reinstate a terminated and ineligi-

ble Human Resources director, and she claimed the City Council

failed to follow its own hiring policies and practices. One “pro-

tected disclosure” notified various defendants that the City Council

“was placing members of the public” who had been convicted of

felonies “on public-funded boards” despite policies preventing peo-

ple convicted of felonies from serving in those roles. She also in-

formed defendants that members of the community were improp-

erly receiving taxpayer funds, and money was going to organiza-

tions where “convicted sex offenders” sat on the board.

Coker asserted that, in retaliation for her “protected disclo-

sures,” certain defendants defamed her at City Council meetings,

published libelous and defamatory statements about her on social

media, and encouraged threats to be made against her and her chil-

dren. Coker sought “safeguards” from various defendants and law

enforcement but received none.

Coker also alleged that the defendants retaliatorily con-

spired to deny her positions in city and local government. For

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example, she explained that, after Clerk Audry Sikes informed ad-

visory councilmember Bowden of a protected disclosure, Glennel

Bowden “publicize[d] on social media his commitment to use all

efforts to prevent” her from holding public office. Coker applied

to fill a vacancy on the Planning and Zoning Board in March 2020,

but her application was delayed. Then, the City Council denied

her application because she had been appointed, in October 2021,

to fill a vacancy on the City Council. Further, Coker contended

that various defendants blocked her from filling that seat on the

City Council, even though she was selected and eligible. After she

was denied the seat, Coker petitioned for mandamus in the Third

Circuit Judicial Court of Columbia County. Even though she had

been appointed, several defendants presented a resolution to pre-

vent her from being seated. Coker contended that, as a matter of

law, she was a member of the City Council, and the Council had

no authority to bar her from being seated. She asserted that the

actions of each member were inconsistent with the municipal char-

ter and the U.S. and Florida Constitutions.

Coker also alleged that several defendants prevented her

from attending future public meetings by intimidating and threat-

ening her. Even though the City Council had a decorum policy, it

allowed participants to “slander and defame” her at meetings while

those meetings were broadcast live over the internet. Other coun-

cilmembers listened and failed to act as defendants “hurl[ed]

threats” against her and her minor children. Coker identified sev-

eral false and malicious statements that caused her reputational

harm. For example, Coker alleged that councilman Sampson

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“maliciously” made false and reckless reports “that [Coker had]

caused a previous Georgia residence to be burned to relocate to

Florida,” in order to discourage voters from voting for Coker.

Coker’s operative complaint also included challenges to sev-

eral of the City Council’s procedures. First, she asserted that the

Council charged a qualification fee under Section 506 of the munic-

ipal charter, requiring any candidate who seeks to be a coun-

cilmember for District 14 to pay a fee of $1,065.85. Second, she

alleged that the City Council had “a practice of rezoning” that

moved a candidate from a district of incumbents which had “an

effect of reducing the representation of minorities and minority

women from holding public” office.

In Count IX, of particular relevance to our discussion here,

Coker alleged that the defendants had engaged in a conspiracy un-

der 42 U.S.C. § 1985 to prevent her from being seated on the City

Council. As part of this Count, Coker alleged the City Council tried

to secretly appoint Douglas to the vacant seat before Coker’s selec-

tion. Douglas sat on an advisory board of the Columbia County

Board of County Commissioners, which Foreman represented.

Sampson, Koberlein, and Sikes communicated about preventing

Coker from taking the vacant seat and Sikes then spread that com-

munication to Jefferson, Hill, and Witt. The City Council allowed

other defendants’ “public slander” at a November 1st City Council

meeting to be aired online. At the same meeting, the Chamber of

Commerce, represented by Smith, voiced its support for Douglas

to fill the vacant seat. After Coker sought a writ of mandamus to

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be seated on the City Council, the initially assigned judge—Judge

Jackson—entered an Order Nisi in Prohibition but then transferred

the case to Judge Fina who, Coker alleged, had a conflict of interest

in the case which he did not disclose. Judge Fina then failed to en-

force Judge Jackson’s order to seat her in her rightful position on

the City Council. Coker maintained that many defendants submit-

ted fraudulent and intentionally misleading filings in the case to de-

lay a decision and to cause her duress. She also contended that

Judge Fina’s rulings were improper and violated his duties.

Following the Council’s initial vote to seat Coker, Northeast

Florida Newspaper, LLC ran an article entitled “City council goes

with Coker.” After the Council chose not to grant Coker the seat,

the newspaper ran an article entitled “No seat for Coker either.”

Coker’s operative complaint also referenced an opinion piece in the

newspaper, written by Todd Wilson, which advised the City Coun-

cil not to seat Coker. Coker asserted that the articles had portrayed

her in a negative and false light to delay her appointment and cause

her embarrassment and humiliation.

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Coker filed her initial complaint in May 2022. Shortly after

that, she filed an amended complaint. The district court struck

Coker’s amended complaint as an impermissible “shotgun plead-

ing.” Coker filed a second, and then third amended complaint—

the operative complaint—that sought damages, injunctive and de-

claratory relief, and a jury trial. All the defendants except for Doug-

las moved to dismiss the third amended complaint. Coker moved

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8 Opinion of the Court 23-11160

for default judgment against Douglas for failure to respond, and

she opposed the motions to dismiss. 2

The district court granted the motions to dismiss in a 46-

page order, for reasons we explain more below. See Coker, 660 F.

Supp. 3d at 1315-36. The court dismissed Counts VII and VIII, as

well as Coker’s claims for declaratory and injunctive relief, without

prejudice for lack of standing. It dismissed the claims for damages

in Counts II, V, VI, IX, and X for failure to state a claim and it dis-

missed the state-law claims in Counts I, III, IV, and XI without prej-

udice, declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over those

Counts. It also denied Coker’s motion for default judgment against

Douglas. Coker timely appealed.

III. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

We resolve jurisdictional issues before we address the merits

of the underlying claims, see Friends of the Everglades v. E.P.A.,

699 F.3d 1280, 1288–89 (11th Cir. 2012), and we review subject-

matter jurisdiction questions de novo, Behr v. Campbell, 8 F.4th 1206,

1209 (11th Cir. 2021). That said, “[w]e review the district court’s

decision not to exercise supplemental jurisdiction for abuse of dis-

cretion.” Parker v. Scrap Metal Processors, Inc., 468 F.3d 733, 738

2 In her filings in opposition to the motions to dismiss, Coker included more

allegations that were not part of her operative complaint. The district court

declined to consider those allegations and did not err in doing so. See Michel v.

NYP Holdings, Inc., 816 F.3d 686, 705 (11th Cir. 2016) (“[A plaintiff] can-

not . . . use h[er] briefing to add new allegations and argue that those new as-

sertions support h[er] cause of action.”).

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(11th Cir. 2006). We review a district court’s dismissal of a com-

plaint for failure to state a claim de novo. Watts v. Joggers Run Prop.

Owners Ass’n, 133 F.4th 1032, 1038–39 (11th Cir. 2025). We also

review questions of law de novo. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Ham-

ilton, 453 F.3d 1331, 1334 (11th Cir. 2006).

Additionally, “[w]e review the denial of a motion for a de-

fault judgment for abuse of discretion.” Mitchell v. Brown & Wil-

liamson Tobacco Corp., 294 F.3d 1309, 1316 (11th Cir. 2002). “De-

fault is to be used sparingly,” as we have a general preference that

cases be heard on the merits. Id. at 1316–17; Wahl v. McIver, 773

F.2d 1169, 1174 (11th Cir. 1985).

In applying these principles, we hold pro se pleadings to a less

stringent standard and liberally construe them. Campbell v. Air Jam.,

Ltd., 760 F.3d 1165, 1168 (11th Cir. 2014). Even so, we will not

“serve as de facto counsel for a party” nor “rewrite an otherwise

deficient pleading in order to sustain an action.” Id. at 1168–69

(quoting GJR Invs., Inc. v. Cnty. of Escambia, 132 F.3d 1359, 1369

(11th Cir. 1998)).

IV. DISCUSSION

Coker appeals the district court’s dismissal of her complaint

for lack of standing, lack of jurisdiction, and failure to state a claim.

She also contends she was entitled to a jury trial and a default

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10 Opinion of the Court 23-11160

judgment as to Douglas. We review the court’s rulings on these

issues in turn below. 3

A. The District Court properly dismissed Counts VII and

VIII and Coker’s requests for Prospective Relief for lack of

Article III Standing

Read liberally, Coker’s brief challenges the district court’s

conclusion that she lacked standing to bring several of her claims.4

“[T]o enjoy standing to sue in a federal court[,]” Coker needed to

make three showings for each claim: “(i) that [s]he ‘suffered an in-

jury in fact that is concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent’;

(ii) that [the defendants] ‘likely caused’ h[er] injury; and (iii) that a

favorable judicial decision can likely redress h[er] injury.” Polelle v.

3 Coker has abandoned challenges to several of the district court’s rulings by

failing to challenge them on appeal. See Irwin v. Hawk, 40 F.3d 347, 347 n.1

(11th Cir. 1994); Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678, 681 (11th

Cir. 2014). First, Coker does not address the district court’s dismissal of Count

II and Count V against the City Council, Hill, Sampson, Witt, Jefferson, Sikes,

and Koberlein. Sapuppo, 739 F.3d at 681. Further, as to Count X and the por-

tion of Count IX brought against Judge Fina, the district court dismissed the

counts on multiple, independent grounds, thus, to reverse, Coker had to “con-

vince us that every stated ground for the judgment against h[er] [wa]s incor-

rect.” Id. at 680. Still, Coker has not challenged the district court’s conclusions

that Judge Fina was immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment and

was entitled to absolute judicial immunity. Accordingly, we affirm the district

court’s dismissal of these portions of her suit.

4 Admittedly, Coker’s brief is not all that clear about this issue, but she is pro-

ceeding pro se, Campbell, 760 F.3d at 1168, and generally, “parties cannot waive

[or forfeit] subject matter jurisdiction.” Scarfo v. Ginsberg, 175 F.3d 957, 960

(11th Cir. 1999). Accordingly, we address the standing issues.

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Fla. Sec’y of State, 131 F.4th 1201, 1208 (11th Cir. 2025) (quoting

TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U.S. 413, 423 (2021)). All three re-

quirements were necessary, and the failure to establish any of them

deprives a federal court of jurisdiction. See id. To be “particular-

ized,” an injury must be “‘individual and personal in nature’” rather

than a mere “generalized grievance[] that anybody could pursue.”

Id. (quoting Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561 (1964)). Coker’s ar-

guments about standing implicate the district court’s dismissal of

Counts VII and VIII of her complaint, as well as her claims for pro-

spective (declaratory and injunctive) relief in each count.

First, as to Count VII, Coker alleged that the City Council,

Sikes, Brown, and the Florida Secretary of State violated the Voting

Rights Act (“VRA”), 52 U.S.C. §§ 10301, 10304, & 10308, by requir-

ing candidates for the City Council to pay a qualifying fee. She

contended that this fee limited the opportunities of minorities to

participate in the political process, and she requested monetary

damages and injunctive relief, presumably against the imposition

of the fee going forward. The district court held that Coker had

not asserted an injury in fact because she did not allege that she was

charged a qualifying fee, who charged her that fee, that she re-

quested a waiver of the fee, or that she planned to run for office

(and incur the fee) in the future. Rather, it concluded that Coker

complained of a generalized harm to all Black female candidates

and that the fee was not alleged to be related to any of the other

facts alleged in the amended complaint. Taking as true Coker’s

contentions in Count VII regarding the unlawfulness of the candi-

date fee—Coker did not allege that she was charged that fee or

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12 Opinion of the Court 23-11160

intended to participate as a candidate subjected to the fee, and she

therefore did not allege an injury “individual and personal in na-

ture.” Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 561. Accordingly, we affirm on this

issue.

Second, in Count VIII, Coker alleged that the City Council

violated the VRA, 52 U.S.C. §§ 10301, 10304, and 10308, by rezon-

ing District 13 to reduce the voting power of minorities. She again

sought monetary damages and injunctive relief. The district court

held Coker did not assert an injury in fact because she failed to al-

lege that she was injured by the rezoning in 2013, either as a candi-

date or as a voter in that district. As with her allegations in

Count VII, Coker did not allege that she intended to participate as

a candidate or a voter affected by the 2013 rezoning and, therefore,

she also did not allege an injury “individual and personal in nature”

for Count VIII. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 561. Thus, we affirm on this

issue as well.

Finally, in each of her other counts—Counts I through VII

and IX through XI—Coker sought injunctive and declaratory relief

in addition to monetary relief. The district court held Coker’s com-

plaint alleged harms that were “entirely in the past,” and therefore

insufficient to show standing for prospective relief. When a plain-

tiff seeks declaratory or injunctive relief, she must show “a real and

immediate threat of a future harm.” Elend v. Basham, 471 F.3d 1199,

1207 (11th Cir. 2006); see also Food & Drug. Admin. v. All. for Hippo-

cratic Med., 602 U.S. 367, 381 (2024) (“And when a plaintiff seeks

prospective relief such as an injunction, the plaintiff must establish

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a sufficient likelihood of future injury.”). “[I]t follows that ‘[p]ast

exposure to illegal conduct does not in itself show a present case or

controversy regarding injunctive relief . . . if unaccompanied by

any continuing, present adverse effects.’” Elend, 471 F.3d at 1207

(quoting City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 102 (1983)).

Here, Coker’s amended complaint only addressed past

events and there were no allegations that she would be exposed to

the same illegal conduct again. Coker did not allege that she in-

tends to seek a seat on the City Council in the future or attend a

City Council meeting. Nor did she allege that she will be forced to

pay, as relevant to her VRA claims, any fees going forward or that

she would be a voter or candidate impacted by the current voting

maps. As the district court explained, the amended complaint does

not contain “facts showing that she is likely to have another en-

counter with any Defendant under the same or similar circum-

stances that gave rise to her past injuries.” Coker, 660 F. Supp. 3d

at 1326.

In sum, the district court did not err in dismissing, without

prejudice, Coker’s claims for prospective relief and her claims un-

der the Voting Rights Act. These portions of Coker’s operative

complaint did not establish that she had an “injury in fact” as op-

posed to “only a general legal, moral, ideological, or policy objec-

tion to” the defendants alleged actions. All. for Hippocratic Med., 602

U.S. at 381. Because Coker’s operative complaint did not establish

that she had standing in these respects, the court lacked jurisdiction

over them and properly dismissed them without prejudice. See

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Dupree v. Owens, 92 F.4th 999, 1007 (11th Cir. 2024) (“[T]he jurisdic-

tional nature of the dismissal requires it to be entered without prej-

udice.”).

B. The District Court did not abuse its discretion in declin-

ing to exercise Supplemental Jurisdiction over Coker’s

state law claims in Counts I, III, IV, and XI

The district court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdic-

tion over Coker’s state-law claims to serve judicial economy. It

explained that these aspects of Coker’s suit presented “uniquely

state[-]law claims that [were] best addressed by the state courts”

and it noted that, although the case had been pending for some

time, it remained in the motion to dismiss stage and the court had

not issued any dispositive rulings as to the state-law claims. On

appeal, Coker contends the district court should not have dismissed

these claims because they were connected to her federal claims,

and she makes arguments about the merits of these claims which

the district court did not reach.

“[T]he abuse of discretion standard allows ‘a range of choice

for the district court, so long as that choice does not constitute a

clear error of judgment.’” Rasbury v. IRS (In re Rasbury), 24 F.3d

159, 168 (11th Cir. 1994) (quoting United States v. Kelly, 888 F.2d 732,

745 (11th Cir. 1989)); see Crosby v. Paulk, 187 F.3d 1339, 1359 (11th

Cir. 1999) (“In making” a supplemental jurisdiction “determina-

tion, [a] judge should ‘take into account concerns of comity, judi-

cial economy, convenience, fairness, and the like.’” (quoting Roche

v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 81 F.3d 249, 257 (1st Cir. 1996))).

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The relevant factors here weighed against exercising supplemental

jurisdiction, as the district court had dismissed all the claims over

which it had jurisdiction.5 Accordingly, the district court weighed

appropriate factors and reached an appropriate conclusion, so we

affirm. Parker, 468 F.3d at 738.

C. Coker Failed to State a Claim for Conspiracy in Count IX

Coker contends the district court erred in holding she failed

to state a Section 1985 claim for civil conspiracy in Count IX. Sec-

tion 1985 has three subsections—titled: “(1) Preventing officer

from performing duties[,]” 42 U.S.C. § 1985(1), “(2) Obstructing

justice; intimidating party, witness, or juror[,]” id. § 1985(2), and

“(3) Depriving persons of rights or privileges[,]” id. § 1985(3)—each

prohibiting conspiracies to interfere with civil rights. The district

court determined that Coker’s complaint failed to specify which

subsection of Section 1985 she intended to invoke and that, in any

event, her complaint failed to state a claim under any of the three

subsections. We agree, and we discuss each section in turn.

Section 1985(1) applies to “conspiracies that interfere with

the performance of official duties by federal officers.” Morast v.

Lance, 807 F.2d 926, 929 (11th Cir. 1987), overruled in part on other

grounds by Haddle v. Garrison, 525 U.S. 121, 123–24 (1998); see also

Kush v. Rutledge, 460 U.S. 719, 724 (1983); 42 U.S.C. § 1985(1). The

district court concluded that Coker’s complaint did not state a

5 Moreover, as we explain, we affirm the district court’s resolution of Coker’s

federal claims, further supporting its supplemental jurisdiction ruling.

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16 Opinion of the Court 23-11160

claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(1) for interference with a federal of-

fice because her complaint only discussed local office, not federal

office. See Morast, 807 F.2d at 929.

“Section 1985(2) applies only if the conspiracy attempted to

prevent [a] witness from attending or testifying in federal court.”

Id. at 930 (citing Kimble v. D.J. McDuffy, Inc., 648 F.2d 340, 348 (5th

Cir. 1981) (en banc), overruled in part on other grounds by Kush, 460

U.S. at 723). 6 Coker’s allegations did not present such a circum-

stance, and thus she did not state a claim under § 1985(2) either. Id.

To state a claim under § 1985(3), a plaintiff must allege:

(1) a conspiracy, (2) for the purpose of depriving, ei-

ther directly or indirectly, any person or class of per-

sons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal

privileges and immunities under the laws; and (3) an

act in furtherance of the conspiracy, (4) whereby a

person is either injured in his person or property or

deprived of any right or privilege of a citizen of the

United States.

Childree v. UAP/GA AG CHEM, Inc., 92 F.3d 1140, 1146–47 (11th Cir.

1996) (citing Lucero v. Operation Rescue, 954 F.2d 624, 627 (11th Cir.

1992)). “In the context of section 1985 conspiracy claims, ‘conclu-

sory, vague, and general allegations of conspiracy may justify

6 All Fifth Circuit decisions issued by the close of business on September 30,

1981, are binding precedent in this Court. Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d

1206, 1207 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc). Kimble was issued in June 1981, so it is

binding in this Circuit.

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dismissal of a complaint.’” Wainberg, 93 F.4th at 1224 (quoting

Kearson v. S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 763 F.2d 405, 407 (11th Cir. 1985)).

A claim under § 1985(3) also requires “some racial, or perhaps oth-

erwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus behind the

conspirators’ action.” Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102 (1971).

“That animus standard requires that the defendant proceeded on

his course of conduct ‘because of, not merely in spite of, its adverse

effects upon an identifiable group.’” Dean v. Warren, 12 F.4th 1248,

1255 (11th Cir. 2021) (quoting Bray v. Alexandria Women’s Health

Clinic, 506 U.S. 263, 272 (1993)).

Here, the district court properly concluded Coker had “not

alleged sufficient facts demonstrating a meeting of the minds be-

tween the alleged conspirators,” as necessary for a complaint under

Section 1985(3). Coker, 660 F. Supp. 3d at 1329. Coker’s complaint

presented vague and general allegations of misconduct by many

different actors, and there were no facts alleged that tied each indi-

vidual defendant’s alleged misconduct to any overarching conspir-

acy. Kearson, 763 F.2d at 407. For example, Coker alleged the

Newspaper defendants—Northeast Florida Newspaper, LLC and

Wilson—published a story on the Lake City government and an

opinion piece that advocated for the Council to delay filling the va-

cancy. She did not allege they were instructed by or agreed with

anyone else to publish these articles. Instead, Coker’s complaint

contended that the articles “interfere[d] with [her] right to hold

public office” and that the Lake City Reporter “had no right” to

publish them. Robinson, one of the other defendants, is hardly

mentioned in the amended complaint, and those mentions did not

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18 Opinion of the Court 23-11160

identify any agreement between him and any of the other defend-

ants. See id. 7

Further, many of Coker’s other allegations are conclusory,

and “we need not accept legal conclusions, even when they are

‘couched as . . . factual allegation[s].’” Wainberg, 93 F.4th at 1224

(quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). For instance, at

the beginning of Count IX, Coker, quoting Section 1985(3), alleged

that all defendants “prevented her from performing duties . . . con-

spired to prevent, by force intimidation, or threat, . . . any person

from accepting or holding any office, trust, or place of confidence

under the United States, or from discharging any duties thereof.”

These allegations were also insufficient to state a claim. Iqbal, 556

U.S. at 678 (“[A] formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of

action will not do.” (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,

555 (2007))).

Notwithstanding these problems, Coker also failed to ade-

quately plead that the defendants acted with “invidious discrimina-

tory intent.” Coker, 660 F. Supp. 3d at 1329. Specifically, the por-

tion of Coker’s complaint related to Count IX did not explain what

the motivation for the defendants’ alleged conspiracy was, and the

defendants were not alleged to have been engaged in the conspir-

acy because of any class-based animus rather than personal animus

7 We describe these defendants as examples only, and we conclude that the

allegations against the other parties fail for the same reasons.

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23-11160 Opinion of the Court 19

against Coker as an individual. Dean, 12 F.4th at 1255; Griffin,

403 U.S. at 102.

For these reasons, Coker’s operative complaint failed to

state a claim under any subsection of Section 1985, and we affirm

the district court’s dismissal of Count IX for that reason.

D. The District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying

Coker’s request for a Default Judgment

Next, Coker contends the district court erred in denying her

request for a default judgment against Douglas. Coker’s only claim

against Douglas was Count IX. The district court concluded that

Douglas was “similarly situated to” the other defendants with re-

gard to that Count and reasoned that it would be “appropriate” to

dismiss Count IX against Douglas as well even though he had not

appeared.

“Default is to be used sparingly,” Mitchell, 294 F.3d at 1316,

and our caselaw provides that “[a] District Court may properly on

its own motion dismiss an action as to defendants who have not

moved to dismiss where such defendants are in a position similar

to that of moving defendants or where claims against such defend-

ants are integrally related,” Loman Dev. Co. v. Daytona Hotel & Motel

Suppliers, Inc., 817 F.2d 1533, 1537 (11th Cir. 1987) (quoting Silver-

ton v. Dep’t of the Treasury, 644 F.2d 1341, 1345 (9th Cir. 1981)). In

other words, our precedent allows for the exact sort of dismissal

that occurred here. Id. Moreover, the district court did not err in

concluding that Count IX failed to state a claim, as discussed above.

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20 Opinion of the Court 23-11160

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s denial of her request for

a default judgment.

E. The District Court did not err in denying Coker a Jury Trial

Finally, Coker argues that she was entitled to a jury trial. See

U.S. CONST. amend. VII. Yet, “there is no need to go forward with

a jury trial when the pertinent facts are obvious and indisputable

from the record; the only remaining truly debatable matters are le-

gal questions that a court is competent to address.” Garvie v. City

of Fort Walton Beach, 366 F.3d 1186, 1190 (11th Cir. 2004). As we

have explained, the district court properly dismissed Coker’s

claims—either for lack of standing, on supplemental jurisdiction

grounds, or for failure to state a claim—so it did not err in denying

Coker a jury trial. Id.

V. CONCLUSION

For these reasons, we discern no reversible error by the dis-

trict court. We therefore affirm.

AFFIRMED