district court’s discretion to deny leave to amend particularly broad where 8 plaintiff has previously filed an amended complaint
How later courts described this case
- district court’s discretion to deny leave to amend particularly broad where 8 plaintiff has previously filed an amended complaint
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
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4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
6
7 JOHN FRATUS, Case No. 24-cv-03469 EJD (PR)
8 Plaintiff, ORDER OF PARTIAL DISMISSAL
AND OF SERVICE; TERMINATING
9 v. MOTION AS MOOT; DIRECTING
DEFENDANT TO FILE
10 VACA, DISPOSITIVE MOTION OR
NOTICE REGARDING SUCH
11 Defendant. MOTION; INSTRUCTIONS TO
CLERK
12
(Docket No. 24)
13
14 Plaintiff, a state prisoner, filed the instant pro se civil rights action pursuant to 42
15 U.S.C. § 1983 against prison staff at Salinas Valley State Prison (“SVSP”) where he was
16 previously housed. Dkt. No. 1. The Court dismissed the complaint with leave to amend to
17 correct the deficiencies with respect to a failure to protect claim and allegations against John
18 Doe defendants. Dkt. No. 16. Plaintiff filed an amended complaint. Dkt. No. 22.
19 Recently, Plaintiff filed a motion for clarification, seeking a status of this case. Dkt. No. 24.
20 DISCUSSION
21 A. Standard of Review
22 A federal court must conduct a preliminary screening in any case in which a prisoner
23 seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.
24 See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). In its review, the court must identify any cognizable claims and
25 dismiss any claims that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may
26 be granted or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See
27 id. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). Pro se pleadings must, however, be liberally construed. See
1 To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential
2 elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was
3 violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color
4 of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
5 B. Plaintiff’s Claims
6 Plaintiff claims that on July 12, 2021, he was attacked by another inmate who was
7 unknown to him. Dkt. No. 22 ¶ 17. While Plaintiff was seated in a corner talking on the
8 phone, the inmate began to repeatedly punch Plaintiff in the head and back of the neck. Id.
9 Plaintiff claims that officers immediately responded and began spraying pepper spray
10 directly into his eyes and face, but did not spray the attacker. Id. ¶ 18. The officer who
11 sprayed Plaintiff in the face was Defendant Vaca. Id. ¶ 20. Afterward, while he was
12 escorting Plaintiff to the shower to decontaminate, Defendant Vaca stated: “[T]hat was for
13 the other day when you held the food port hostage and disrespected officers and sergeant
14 that’s what you get. We paid him to assault you because we heard that you like to sue
15 officers. You can’t sue us now we didn’t’ have to lay a finger on you we have inmates that
16 will handle the job for us, etc. etc. etc. [sic].” Id. ¶ 22.1
17 According to Plaintiff, the “other day” was July 10, 2021, when Plaintiff kept his
18 food port open and also caused a trash can to spill down the hall in an effort to gain officers’
19 attention to obtain missing pages from a Rules Violation Report that he had been issued that
20 day. Id. ¶¶ 8-12. Plaintiff also “cussed out” several officers who “disrespected and cussed
21 at Plaintiff first.” Id. ¶ 12. Plaintiff asserts Defendant Vaca’s comment reveals that officers
22 sent an inmate to attack him on their behalf. Id. ¶ 23. Plaintiff also names as defendants
23 “John Doe #1, 2, and 3” who are “correctional officers employed at SVSP.” Id. ¶ 6, 28.
24 Plaintiff asserts that his Eighth Amendment rights were violated due to Defendants’
25 “failure to protect, when they sent an inmate to attack [him] on their behalf” and “allowed
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27 1 The amended complaint is essentially identical to the original complaint except for
1 this inmate to assault and batter Plaintiff.” Id. ¶ 27. Plaintiff also claims that the pepper
2 spray in his face constitutes excessive force. Id. Plaintiff seeks damages, including punitive
3 damages, because Defendants’ acts were “despicable, sadistic, knowing, willful, malicious,
4 and carried out with deliberate indifference and reckless disregard for Plaintiff’s federally
5 protected rights [and] offend[ed] contemporary standards of decency.” Id. ¶¶ 29-31.
6 Plaintiff’s allegation that Defendant Vaca sprayed only him (and not the other
7 inmate) coupled with Defendant’s statements support the inference that the force was
8 intentionally directed at Plaintiff. Furthermore, the reference to the “other day” supports
9 Plaintiff’s allegation that Defendant Vaca acted with malicious and sadistic intent to cause
10 harm for Plaintiff’s past behavior. Accordingly, the allegations are sufficient to state an
11 Eighth Amendment violation against Defendant Vaca for use of excessive force. See
12 Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6 (1992).
13 The allegations are also sufficient to state a failure-to-protect claim because
14 Defendant Vaca’s statement raises the inference that he knew Plaintiff faced a substantial
15 risk of serious harm and disregarded that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate
16 it. See Hearns v. Terhune, 413 F.3d 1036, 1041-42 (9th Cir. 2005).
17 With regard to Doe defendants, although the use of “John Doe” to identify a
18 defendant is not favored in the Ninth Circuit, see Gillespie v. Civiletti, 629 F.2d 637, 642
19 (9th Cir. 1980); Wiltsie v. Cal. Dep’t of Corrections, 406 F.2d 515, 518 (9th Cir. 1968),
20 situations may arise where the identity of alleged defendants cannot be known prior to the
21 filing of a complaint. In such circumstances, the plaintiff should be given an opportunity
22 through discovery to identify the unknown defendants, unless it is clear that discovery
23 would not uncover their identities or that the complaint should be dismissed on other
24 grounds. See Gillespie, 629 F.2d at 642; Velasquez v. Senko, 643 F. Supp. 1172, 1180
25 (N.D. Cal. 1986). Plaintiff was already advised that the allegations were insufficient to
26 establish any claim against “John Doe #1, 2, and 3” because the complaint does not describe
27 the specific actions of each John Doe defendant. Dkt. No. 6 at 3. The allegations with
1 original in that the pleadings generally refer to the actions of “officers” with the exception
2 of Defendant Vaca. See generally Dkt. Nos. 1, 22. Accordingly, the amended complaint
3 again fails to state any cognizable claim against John Doe defendants. Plaintiff was already
4 afforded one opportunity to amend his claims against John Doe defendants, and the Court
5 finds no good cause to grant him another opportunity where the amended complaint fails to
6 correct the deficiencies from the original. Wagh v. Metris Direct, Inc., 363 F.3d 821, 830
7 (9th Cir. 2003) (district court’s discretion to deny leave to amend particularly broad where
8 plaintiff has previously filed an amended complaint); Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258,
9 1261 (9th Cir. 1992). Accordingly, the claims against John Doe defendants must be
10 dismissed for failure to state a claim.
11 CONCLUSION
12 For the foregoing reasons, the Court orders as follows:
13 1. The claims against John Doe defendants are DISMISSED for failure to state a
14 claim. This action shall proceed on the excessive force and failure to protect claims against
15 Defendant Vaca.
16 2. Defendant Correctional Officer Vaca shall be served at SVSP.
17 Service on the listed defendant(s) shall proceed under the California Department of
18 Corrections and Rehabilitation’s (CDCR) e-service program for civil rights cases from
19 prisoners in CDCR custody. In accordance with the program, the clerk is directed to serve
20 on CDCR via email the following documents: the operative complaint and any attachments
21 thereto, (Dkt. No. 22), this order of service, a CDCR Report of E-Service Waiver form. The
22 clerk also shall serve a copy of this order on the plaintiff.
23 No later than 40 days after service of this order via email on CDCR, CDCR shall
24 provide the court a completed CDCR Report of E-Service Waiver advising the court which
25 defendant(s) listed in this order will be waiving service of process without the need for
26 service by the United States Marshal Service (USMS) and which defendant(s) decline to
27 waive service or could not be reached. CDCR also shall provide a copy of the CDCR
1 days, shall file with the court a waiver of service of process for the defendant(s) who are
2 waiving service.
3 Upon receipt of the CDCR Report of E-Service Waiver, the clerk shall prepare for
4 each defendant who has not waived service according to the CDCR Report of E-Service
5 Waiver a USM-205 Form. The clerk shall provide to the USMS the completed USM-205
6 forms and copies of this order, the summons and the operative complaint for service upon
7 each defendant who has not waived service. The clerk also shall provide to the USMS a
8 copy of the CDCR Report of E-Service Waiver.
9 3. No later than ninety-one (91) days from the date this order is filed,
10 Defendants shall file a motion for summary judgment or other dispositive motion with
11 respect to the claims in the complaint found to be cognizable above.
12 a. Any motion for summary judgment shall be supported by adequate
13 factual documentation and shall conform in all respects to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of
14 Civil Procedure. Defendants are advised that summary judgment cannot be granted, nor
15 qualified immunity found, if material facts are in dispute. If any Defendant is of the opinion
16 that this case cannot be resolved by summary judgment, he shall so inform the Court prior
17 to the date the summary judgment motion is due.
18 b. In the event Defendants file a motion for summary judgment, the
19 Ninth Circuit has held that Plaintiff must be concurrently provided the appropriate
20 warnings under Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952, 963 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc). See
21 Woods v. Carey, 684 F.3d 934, 940 (9th Cir. 2012).
22 4. Plaintiff’s opposition to the dispositive motion shall be filed with the Court
23 and served on Defendants no later than twenty-eight (28) days from the date Defendants’
24 motion is filed.
25 Plaintiff is also advised to read Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and
26 Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986) (holding party opposing summary judgment
27 must come forward with evidence showing triable issues of material fact on every essential
1 || motion for summary judgment may be deemed to be a consent by Plaintiff to the granting o
2 || the motion, and granting of judgment against Plaintiff without a trial. See Ghazali v.
3 || Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53-54 (9th Cir. 1995) (per curiam); Brydges v. Lewis, 18 F.3d 651, 653
4 |) (9th Cir. 1994),
5 5. Defendants shall file a reply brief no later than fourteen (14) days after
6 || Plaintiff's opposition is filed.
7 6. The motion shall be deemed submitted as of the date the reply brief is due.
8 || No hearing will be held on the motion unless the Court so orders at a later date.
9 7. All communications by the Plaintiff with the Court must be served on
10 || Defendants, or Defendants’ counsel once counsel has been designated, by mailing a true
11 || copy of the document to Defendants or Defendants’ counsel.
8. Discovery may be taken in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil
13. || Procedure. No further court order under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30(a)(2) or Local
S 14 || Rule 16-1 1s required before the parties may conduct discovery.
15 9. It is Plaintiff's responsibility to prosecute this case. Plaintiff must keep the
a 16 || court informed of any change of address and must comply with the court’s orders in a
17 || timely fashion. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of this action for failure to
18 prosecute pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b).
19 10. Extensions of time must be filed no later than the deadline sought to be
20 || extended and must be accompanied by a showing of good cause.
21 11. — Plaintiff’'s motion for clarification shall be terminated as moot by this order.
22 || Dkt. No. 24.
23 This order terminates Docket No. 24.
24 IT IS SO ORDERED.
25 || Dated: June 3, 2025 □□□
26 EDWARD J. DAVILA
United States District Judge
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