Hughes v. Haynes

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

CENTRAL DIVISION

BRIAN RAMON HUGHES PLAINTIFF

ADC #119986

V. NO. 4:24-cv-00932-BSM-ERE

HAYNES, et al. DEFENDANTS

ORDER

Pro se plaintiff Brian Ramon Hughes has filed: (1) a motion for default

judgment against Defendants Haynes, Brown, and Malone; and (2) a motion for

summary judgment. Docs. 33, 34. For the following reasons, Mr. Hughes’ motions

are denied.

1. Motion for Default Judgment

Although Mr. Hughes requests that the Court enter a default judgment against

Defendants Haynes, Brown, and Malone, those Defendants have not yet been served.

As a result, no factual or legal basis exists to find that any of these Defendants are

in default.

On December 9, 2024, summonses were returned unexecuted for these

Defendants. Docs. 17, 18, 19. ADC officials provided Defendants Brown and

Malone’s last-known addresses to the Court under seal. Docs. 18, 19. ADC officials

were unable to identify Defendant Haynes. Doc. 17. The next day, the notice of the

bankruptcy stay was filed. Doc. 21. As a result, the Court has not yet re-issued

summonses for those Defendants. The Court will re-issue summonses for

Defendants Malone and Brown now. The Court will attempt to contact Wellpath

representatives in an attempt to serve Defendant Haynes.

2. “Motion for Summary Judgment”

Mr. Hughes’ motion, although styled as a motion for summary judgment, is

mistitled. His motion fails to contain the minimum requirements for such a motion.

In addition, the filing of summary judgment motions is premature.

Summary judgment is appropriate when the record, viewed in a light most

favorable to the nonmoving party, demonstrates that there is no genuine dispute as

to any material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986);

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-50 (1986). The moving party

bears the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine dispute of material

fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. Once that has been done, the nonmoving party must

present specific facts demonstrating that there is a material dispute for trial. See FED.

R. CIV. P. 56(c); Torgerson v. City of Rochester, 643 F.3d 1031, 1042 (8th Cir. 2011).

Mr. Hughes’ motion fails to include any evidence even arguably suggesting

that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact such that he is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law as to any of his pending claims. Mr. Hughes also fails

to provide a brief in support of his motion, which is required by this Court’s Local

Rules. See Local Rule 7.2 (a).

In addition, Mr. Hughes’ motion is premature. At this time, the parties have

not had an opportunity to engage in discovery. See Jackson v. Reibold, 815 F.3d

1114, 1121 (8th Cir. 2016) (“The general rule is that summary judgment is

appropriate ‘only after the nonmovant has had adequate time for discovery.””).

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED THAT:

1. Mr. Hughes’ motion for default judgment (Doc. 33) is DENIED.

2. Mr. Hughes’ motion for summary judgment (Doc. 34) is DENIED.

3. The Clerk is instructed to prepare new summonses for Defendants

Stephen Brown and L. Malone.

4. The United States Marshal is directed to serve the reissued summons,

the complaint and the amended complaint (Docs. 2, 5), including any attachments,

and a copy of this Order without requiring prepayment of fees or costs. Service

should be attempted at these Defendants’ last-known private home addresses,

provided to the Court under seal. Importantly, these addresses must be redacted from

the return of service and from any other public portion of the record.

SO ORDERED 3 June 2025.

J, IM Zlyvw_.

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE