Blythe v. City of San Diego

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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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11 DON BLYTHE, an individual, Case No.: 24-cv-02211-GPC-DDL

12 Plaintiff,

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND

13 v. DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT’S

MOTION TO DISMISS

14 CITY OF SAN DIEGO,

15 Defendant. [ECF No. 20]

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17 INTRODUCTION

18 Plaintiff Don Blythe challenges the constitutionality of City of San Diego

19 Ordinance O-21822 (“the Ordinance”), which regulates certain types of speech within

20 100 feet of health care facilities, places of worship, and school grounds (the “Covered

21 Facilities”). ECF No. 18 (“FAC”) ¶¶ 26; see ECF No. 20-2 at 21–48 (the Ordinance).

22 Within this radius, the Ordinance prohibits individuals from “knowingly and willfully

23 approach[ing] within eight feet of a person in the public right-of-way or sidewalk area

24 seeking to enter or exit a health care facility, place of worship, or school grounds” to pass

25 leaflets, display signs, or engage in oral protest, education, or counseling, unless the

26 individual first obtains consent. FAC ¶ 26.

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1 The City of San Diego (the “City”) closely modeled the Ordinance after an

2 ordinance the Supreme Court upheld in Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703 (2000). While the

3 language regulating speech is identical, the Ordinance here includes places of worship

4 and school grounds, while the ordinance in Hill applied only to health care facilities. Id.

5 at 707. The essence of Plaintiff’s challenge is that the City’s inclusion of places of

6 worship and, particularly, school grounds places this Ordinance outside of what is

7 constitutionally permissible.

8 On November 25, 2024, Plaintiff Don Blythe sued the City of San Diego. ECF

9 No. 1 (“Compl.”). After the Court denied Plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction,

10 ECF No. 17, Plaintiff filed the FAC on January 27, 2025, claiming that the Ordinance

11 violates his free speech rights under the First Amendment of the United States

12 Constitution, on its face and as applied, and that the Ordinance is unconstitutionally

13 vague and overbroad. FAC ¶¶ 32–40. Currently before the Court is Defendant’s motion

14 to dismiss the FAC. ECF No. 20. Defendant opposed the motion, ECF No. 24, and

15 Plaintiff replied, ECF No. 25. On May 2, 2025, the Court held a hearing on the motion.

16 ECF No. 26. Having considered the papers on file in this matter and the parties’

17 arguments at the hearing, the Court grants in part and denies in part the City’s motion to

18 dismiss for the reasons below.

19 BACKGROUND

20 On January 27, 2025, Plaintiff filed the FAC against the City of San Diego (the

21 “City”), challenging City of San Diego Ordinance O-21822 (the “Ordinance”) as

22 unconstitutional. See generally FAC. The Ordinance, which the City enacted on June

23 11, 2024, id. ¶ 22; ECF No. 20-2 at 22, reads in relevant part:

24 (c) Consent Required. Within a radius of 100 feet of a

health care facility, place of worship, or school grounds,

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unless the person or motor vehicle occupant consents, no

26 person shall:

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1 (1) knowingly and willfully approach within eight feet

of a person in the public right-of-way or sidewalk

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area who is seeking to enter or exit a health care

3 facility, place of worship, or school grounds, to:

(i) pass a leaflet or handbill to that person;

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(ii) display a sign to that person;

5 (iii) engage in oral protest, education, or

counseling.

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FAC ¶ 26; ECF No. 20-2 at 27–28. Plaintiff claims that the Ordinance “prohibits

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constitutionally protected speech and assembly on public streets and sidewalks.” FAC ¶

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2. More specifically, Plaintiff argues that the Ordinance, on its face and as applied to

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him, violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution

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because it violates his Free Speech rights and is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad.

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Id. ¶¶ 31–40.

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The Ordinance recognizes a “constitutional right to privacy in accessing

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healthcare, including reproductive healthcare, to exercise religion, and to access equal

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educational opportunities, and that intentional efforts to harass or prevent a person from

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exercising these rights are contrary to the interests of the people of San Diego.” ECF No.

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20-2 at 24. Accordingly, the City’s stated purpose for passing the Ordinance is “to strike

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a balance between protecting the rights of those who seek access to healthcare, to practice

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their religion, and access educational services, while also protecting the rights of those

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who wish to express themselves.” Id. In support of this purpose, the Ordinance states

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that “demonstration activities around Covered Facilities have subjected students,

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teachers, [and] parents . . . to harassment and abuse from people who attempt to block

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entrances and exits to Covered Facilities and parking lots used to access these locations.”

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Id. at 23. The Ordinance further states that “aggressive demonstration activities pose

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significant public safety threats” and that “places of worship and schools are increasingly

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exposed to demonstration activities.” Id. The legislature also considered the City

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Attorney’s staff report on the Ordinance, which provided the City with evidence that

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1 there may be an uptick in aggressive demonstration activities near Covered Facilities in

2 San Diego. See id. at 49–54. Plaintiff adamantly disputes the veracity of the evidence

3 the City relied upon in passing the Ordinance. FAC ¶¶ 10–21.

4 Plaintiff, “[m]otivated by his moral, religious, and political beliefs, . . . regularly

5 engages in pro-life, anti-abortion speech activities in California.” FAC ¶ 4. Plaintiff’s

6 activities “include hand-to-hand leafleting, education about abortion, and holding signs

7 with a pro-life, anti-abortion message.” Id. Above all, however, Plaintiff “seeks to

8 display and distribute written information and engage in thoughtful discussions with

9 college and high school students” dozens of times each year. Id. Plaintiff intends to

10 engage in these activities near high schools in the City of San Diego. Id. ¶¶ 27–29.

11 Plaintiff alleges that he, alongside others, intends to come within eight feet of students as

12 they leave school grounds to pass leaflets. Id. ¶ 28. However, Plaintiff alleges that

13 “[o]btaining consent is an unrealistic requirement for distributing literature to multiple

14 people arriving in waves,” id. ¶ 30, and he is therefore concerned that he will be arrested

15 for violating the Ordinance if he engages in his intended activities, id. Because of these

16 concerns, Plaintiff is currently refraining from engaging in these activities, but “is and

17 has been ready, willing, and able to engage in” the activities. Id.

18 On November 25, 2024, Plaintiff brought the instant lawsuit against the City. See

19 generally Compl. On December 13, 2024, Plaintiff filed a motion for a preliminary

20 injunction, seeking to enjoin enforcement of the Ordinance. ECF No. 9-1 at 1-2. On

21 January 14, 2025, the Court denied issuance of a preliminary injunction in large part

22 because the Supreme Court’s opinion in Hill, 530 U.S. at 703, controlled the presented

23 legal issues, and therefore Plaintiff could not show a likelihood of success on the merits.

24 ECF No. 17. On January 27, 2025, Plaintiff filed the FAC. See generally FAC. On

25 February 10, 2025, the City filed a motion to dismiss the FAC, which is now before the

26 Court. ECF No. 20.

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1 REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE

2 The City requests that the Court take judicial notice of the following exhibits: (A)

3 City of San Diego Ordinance O-17897; (B) City of San Diego Ordinance O-18452; (C)

4 City of San Diego Ordinance O-21822;1 and (D) a City Attorney Staff Report regarding

5 the Ordinance at issue in this case. ECF No. 20-2. Under Federal Rule of Evidence 201,

6 a Court may take judicial notice of facts that are not subject to reasonable dispute because

7 they “can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot

8 reasonably be questioned.” Fed. R. Evid. 201(b)(2).

9 As the Court acknowledged in its Order denying Plaintiff’s motion for a

10 preliminary injunction, ECF No. 17 at 3 n.1; Blythe v. City of San Diego, No. 24-cv-

11 02211-GPC-DDL, 2025 WL 108185, at *1 n.1 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 14, 2025), “[m]unicipal

12 ordinances are proper subjects for judicial notice.” Tollis, Inc. v. County of San Diego,

13 505 F.3d 935, 938 n.1 (9th Cir. 2007); see also Long Beach Area Peace Network v. City

14 of Long Beach, 574 F.3d 1011, 1025 n.1 (9th Cir. 2009) (taking judicial notice of a city

15 ordinance); Santa Monica Food Not Bombs v. City of Santa Monica, 450 F.3d 1022, 1025

16 n.2 (9th Cir. 2006) (same). The Court further took judicial notice of the staff report in

17 that same Order, ECF No. 17 at 10 n.3; Blythe, 2025 WL 108185, at *4 n.3, because such

18 legislative reports are proper subjects of judicial notice. See San Diego Cnty. Lodging

19 Association v. City of San Diego, 561 F. Supp. 3d 960, 964 n.3 (S.D. Cal. 2021) (taking

20 judicial notice of staff report to San Diego City Council); Comm. to Protect our Agric.

21 Water v. Occidental Oil & Gas Corp., 235 F. Supp. 3d 1132, 1152 (E.D. Cal. 2017)

22 (taking judicial notice of staff report on revisions to a county ordinance).

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26 1 Exhibits A and B are earlier versions of Exhibit C, which is the Ordinance at issue in this lawsuit. See

ECF No. 20-2 at 4–48.

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1 However, Plaintiff now opposes judicial notice of all four exhibits “to the extent …

2 that encompasses judicial notice of any purported ‘facts’ stated therein.” ECF No. 24 at

3 9. Plaintiff argues that “[t]he description, characterization, and effects of past

4 demonstration activity in San Diego and elsewhere” are not the proper subjects of judicial

5 notice. Id. However, the Court need not take these facts into consideration in deciding

6 the motion to dismiss. The relevance of the evidence the City relied upon in passing the

7 Ordinance is the fact that the City relied on it in reaching its legislative decision, not

8 whether it should be taken as true. Accordingly, the Court will take judicial notice of the

9 City’s proffered exhibits, but only for their existence and their contents, and not the truth

10 of the facts therein. In particular, the Court will consider the City’s rationales for

11 applying the Ordinance, but not whether the underlying factual bases for the rationales

12 are true. See Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. County of Santa Clara, No.

13 18-cv-07650-BLF, 2019 WL 5087593, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 10, 2019) (taking judicial

14 notice of a staff report and other legislative documents proffered “to demonstrate the

15 plausibility of several rationales for applying the Ordinance,” but only for their existence

16 and contents, and not for the truth of the facts asserted therein); see also Lee v. City of

17 L.A., 250 F.3d 668, 688 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that a court may take judicial notice of

18 “undisputed matters of public record,” but not any disputed facts therein) (emphasis in

19 original), overruled on other grounds by Galbraith v. County of Santa Clara, 307 F.3d

20 1119, 1125–26 (9th Cir. 2002)).

21 LEGAL STANDARDS

22 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 12(b)(6) permits dismissal for “failure to

23 state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is

24 appropriate where the complaint fails to state a cognizable legal theory or allege

25 sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal theory. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t,

26 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990).

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1 “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual

2 matter, accepted as true, ‘to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft

3 v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,

4 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content

5 that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the

6 misconduct alleged.” Id. “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,

7 supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id.

8 When reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court accepts all facts alleged in the

9 complaint as true and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party.

10 Chubb Custom Inc. v. Space Sys./Loral, Inc., 710 F.3d 946, 956 (9th Cir. 2013).

11 Although the general rule prohibits a district court from considering evidence outside the

12 pleadings in reviewing a motion to dismiss, it may properly consider “documents

13 attached to the complaint, documents incorporated by reference in the complaint, or

14 matters of judicial notice[.]” United States v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903, 908 (9th Cir. 2003).

15 DISCUSSION

16 I. Scope of Plaintiff’s First Amendment Challenge

17 The classification of a challenge “as facial or as-applied affects the extent to which

18 the invalidity of the challenged law must be demonstrated and the corresponding ‘breadth

19 of the remedy.’” Bucklew v. Precythe, 587 U.S. 119, 138 (2019) (citation omitted). “An

20 as-applied challenge contends that the law is unconstitutional as applied to the litigant’s

21 particular speech activity, even though the law may be capable of valid application to

22 others.” Foti v. City of Menlo Park, 146 F.3d 629, 635(1998) (citing Members of the City

23 Council of L.A. v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 803 & n.22 (1984)). On the other

24 hand, a facial First Amendment challenge seeks to strike down a law in its entirety, and a

25 plaintiff must show that “a substantial number of [the law’s] applications are

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1 unconstitutional, judged in relation to the statute’s plainly legitimate sweep.” Moody v.

2 NetChoice, LLC, 603 U.S. 707, 723 (2024).

3 The label Plaintiff affixes to his claim is not what matters, Doe v. Reed, 561 U.S.

4 186, 194 (2010), because “[t]he line between facial and as-applied challenges can

5 sometimes prove ‘amorphous,’ … and ‘not so well-defined,’” Bucklew, 587 U.S. at 139

6 (citations omitted). “Instead, ‘[t]he important point’ for identifying the nature of a

7 challenge is whether a plaintiff's ‘claim and the relief that would follow … reach beyond

8 the particular circumstances’ of that plaintiff.” Project Veritas v. Schmidt, 125 F.4th 929,

9 940 (9th Cir. 2025) (en banc) (quoting Doe v. Reed, 561 U.S. at 194).

10 Here, Plaintiff makes a facial and as-applied challenge. But the parties dispute

11 whether Plaintiff has adequately pleaded an as-applied challenge to the Ordinance. ECF

12 No. 20-1 at 19–20; ECF No. 24 at 24–25. In his Complaint, Plaintiff seeks a declaratory

13 judgment that the Ordinance is unconstitutional as applied to his activity. FAC at 8.

14 Plaintiff specifically alleges that he “often seeks to display and distribute written

15 information and engage in thoughtful discussion with” students near high schools. Id. ¶¶

16 4, 27. Plaintiff’s intended activities include “hand-to-hand leafleting, education about

17 abortion, and holding signs with a pro-life, anti-abortion message.” Id. ¶ 4. He intends to

18 engage in these activities near two specific exits outside Patrick Henry High School as

19 students leave the school grounds for the day. Id. ¶ 28. Plaintiff argues that because this

20 timing involves hundreds of students leaving school grounds during a short period of

21 time, the consent requirement leaves him without viable alternatives. ECF No. 24 at 25.

22 Plaintiff contrasts his circumstances with attempts to leaflet outside of health care

23 facilities, where patients tend to either arrive alone or with a companion and arrive in

24 much smaller waves. Id.

25 The Court finds these allegations sufficient to raise an as-applied challenge to the

26 Ordinance. Plaintiff intends on passing pro-life, anti-abortion leaflets at a specific time

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1 outside of a specific high school. He claims that the Ordinance, as applied to these

2 specific circumstances, creates an insurmountable barrier to engaging in these activities.

3 These allegations are even more specific than those in Project Veritas, where the

4 plaintiffs generally intended to both secretly and openly record conversations with

5 government officials, law enforcement officers, and protestors, as well as encounters

6 between the latter two groups. 125 F.4th at 940. The Ninth Circuit found that these

7 allegations of specific conduct raised an as-applied challenge. Id. at 940–41. Similarly,

8 here, the Court construes the FAC as raising both a facial and as-applied challenge.

9 II. As-Applied Free Speech Challenge

10 The Court first addresses Plaintiff’s as-applied free speech challenge. “The First

11 Amendment, applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, prohibits the

12 enactment of laws ‘abridging the freedom of speech.’” Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S.

13 155, 163 (2015) (citing U.S. Const., Amend. 1). Content based regulations of speech

14 “are presumptively unconstitutional and may be justified only if the government proves

15 that they are narrowly tailored to serve compelling state interests.” Reed v. Town of

16 Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155, 163 (2015). “Government regulation of speech is content based if

17 a law applies to particular speech because of the topic discussed or the idea or message

18 expressed.” Id. For instance, laws are content based if they “target speech based on its

19 communicative content,” id., or “single[] out particular content for differential

20 treatment,” Berger v. City of Seattle, 569 F.3d 1029, 1051 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc).

21 A content neutral regulation, on the other hand, is valid if it is a “reasonable time,

22 place, and manner restriction[] on speech.” A.C.L.U. of Nev. v. City of Las Vegas, 466

23 F.3d 784 (9th Cir. 2006); McCullen v. Coakley, 573 U.S. 464, 477 (2014) (quoting Ward

24 v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989)). Such regulations must survive

25 intermediate scrutiny. City of Austin v. Reagan Nat’l Advert. of Austin, LLC, 596 U.S. 61

26 (2022). Under intermediate scrutiny, content neutral regulations must be “narrowly

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1 tailored to serve a significant governmental interest” and “leave open ample alternative

2 channels for communication of the information.” McCullen, 573 U.S. at 477 (quoting

3 Ward, 491 U.S. at 791).

4 The Court will first consider whether the Ordinance is content based, and then it

5 will consider whether the Ordinance survives the applicable level of scrutiny.

6 A. Content Neutrality

7 The Court must first determine whether the Ordinance is content based or content

8 neutral. Plaintiff argues that holding the Ordinance to be content neutral would be an

9 impermissible extension of the Supreme Court’s decision in Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. at

10 703, and would be in friction with the Supreme Court’s other relevant First Amendment

11 cases. ECF No. 24 at 10–13. The City maintains that the Ordinance is content neutral

12 because it merely makes a distinction between broad categories of speech and does not

13 distinguish based on the subject matter of the speech. ECF No. 20-1 at 8–10. Therefore,

14 the City argues, Hill controls here. Id. at 9–10.

15 At the heart of this issue is the Supreme Court’s decision in Hill v. Colorado, 530

16 U.S. at 703. There, the Court considered a nearly identical ordinance which made it

17 unlawful within 100 feet of the entrance to a health care facility to “‘knowingly

18 approach’ within eight feet of another person, without that person’s consent, ‘for the

19 purpose of passing a leaflet or handbill to, displaying a sign to, or engaging in oral

20 protest, education, or counseling with such other person[.]”2 Id. at 707. The plaintiffs,

21 “sidewalk counselors” who engaged in “efforts to educate, counsel, persuade, or inform

22 passersby about abortion and abortion alternatives by means of verbal or written speech,”

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25 2 The only material difference between the ordinance at issue in Hill and the Ordinance at issue here is

that the Ordinance here applies within 100 feet of places of worship and schools as well as health care

26 facilities, ECF No. 20-2 at 27–28, whereas the ordinance in Hill only applied within 100 feet of health

care facilities, Hill 530 U.S. at 707.

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1 claimed that the ordinance violated their right to free speech under the First Amendment.

2 Id. at 708. The Court found the ordinance to be content neutral for three reasons. Id. at

3 719–20. First, “it [was] not a ‘regulation of speech,’” but rather “a regulation of the

4 places where some speech may occur.” Id. at 719. Second, the restriction of speech “was

5 not adopted because of disagreement with the message it conveys,” as it “appl[ied]

6 equally to all demonstrators, regardless of viewpoint” or content. Id. “Third, the State’s

7 interests in protecting access and privacy” are unrelated to the content of the regulated

8 speech. Id. at 720. In short, the Court found that the ordinance “places no restrictions

9 on—and clearly does not prohibit—either a particular viewpoint or any subject matter

10 that may be discussed by a speaker. Rather, it simply establishes a minor place

11 restriction on an extremely broad category of communications with unwilling listeners.”

12 Id. at 723.

13 Hill’s content neutrality analysis is directly on-point here. Like the ordinance in

14 Hill, the Ordinance here does not regulate speech based on the topics, ideas, or

15 viewpoints expressed. Rather, it applies to all leafleting, all signage, and all oral protest,

16 education, and counseling equally. The Ordinance regulates these broad categories of

17 speech regardless of the subject matter of signs or the political leanings of oral protestors.

18 Without any mention of viewpoints or the subject matter of the communications, the

19 Ordinance cannot be said to “draw[] distinctions based on the message a speaker

20 conveys.” Reed, 576 U.S. at 163; Hill 530 U.S. at 720 (“As we have repeatedly

21 explained, government regulation of expressive activity is ‘content neutral’ if it is

22 justified without reference to the content of regulated speech.”).

23 The Court in Hill also rejected the argument that the ordinance was content based

24 because the content of the speech “must sometimes be examined” to determine whether it

25 is covered by the ordinance at all. 530 U.S. at 720. The Court reasoned that it is not

26 “improper to look at the content of an oral or written statement in order to determine

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1 whether a rule of law applies to a course of conduct.” Id. at 721. And it is unlikely that

2 there would often be a need to examine speech closely to determine whether it was “oral

3 protest, education, or counseling” rather than innocuous conversation. Id. at 721. Even if

4 such a need did arise, “the kind of cursory examination that might be required to exclude

5 casual conversation from the coverage of a regulation of picketing” would not be

6 problematic. Id. at 722. The same reasoning applies to the Ordinance here, which

7 requires a cursory examination of speech to determine whether people are leafleting,

8 displaying signs, or orally protesting. Such an examination does not make the Ordinance

9 a content based regulation.

10 The Supreme Court’s other jurisprudence in this sphere supports a finding that the

11 Ordinance is content neutral. For instance, in Heffron v. International Society for

12 Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 643–44 (1981), the Court considered a

13 religious society’s challenge of a rule that required all sales, exhibitions, or distributions

14 of materials at a fair to take place “only from fixed locations on the fairgrounds.” The

15 Court held that the rule was content neutral because it “applie[d] evenhandedly to all who

16 wish to distribute and sell written materials or to solicit funds.” Id. at 648–49. Similarly,

17 the Ordinance here applies evenhandedly to all who wish to handbill, display signs, or

18 engage in oral protest or counseling. See Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 477 (1988)

19 (accepting lower courts’ conclusion that complete ban on picketing in residential areas,

20 regardless of the underlying subject matter, was content neutral).

21 Plaintiff argues that the Supreme Court’s decision in Reed cautions against

22 expanding Hill’s analysis. ECF No. 24 at 10–12. There, the Court considered a sign

23 code that subjected “‘Temporary Directional Signs Relating to a Qualifying Event,’

24 loosely defined as signs directing the public to a meeting of a nonprofit group,” to more

25 stringent restrictions than other signs, such as “Ideological Signs” and “Political Signs.”

26 576 U.S. at 159–61. The Court found that the sign code was clearly “content based on its

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1 face.” Id. at 164. The code defined each type of sign differently, differentiating between

2 signs that directed the public to church (“Temporary Directional Signs Relating to a

3 Qualifying Event”), were designed to influence elections (“Political Signs”), or

4 communicated any other messages or ideas (“Ideological Signs”), and then “subject[ed]

5 each of these categories to different restrictions.” Id. Simply put, the code’s restrictions

6 “depend[ed] entirely on the communicative content of the sign.” Id. Unlike the code in

7 Reed, the Ordinance here does not depend on the communicative content of the speech,

8 but rather the broad type of speech at issue. Rather than distinguishing between speech

9 supporting nonprofits, speech about politics, and speech about abortion rights, the

10 Ordinance merely distinguishes between leafleting and casual conversation, for instance,

11 without regard to the subject matter of the speech. Reed does not alter Hill’s application

12 to the Ordinance; if anything, Reed reinforces Hill’s application to the Ordinance.

13 The above readings of Hill and Reed also defeat Plaintiff’s argument that the only

14 way to square the two cases is to accept that health care facilities involve “special

15 sensitivities,” and thus the constitutional principles in Hill were unique and not applicable

16 to other contexts. ECF No. 24 at 11. While the ordinance in Hill applied equally to all

17 speech regardless of content and only distinguished between “extremely broad

18 categor[ies] of communications,” 530 U.S. at 723, the sign code in Reed clearly

19 distinguished based on the content of the speech on its face, 576 U.S. at 164. It is

20 therefore easy to square the two cases without any mention of the regulated locations.

21 Plaintiff also cites to Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191 (1992), but that case is of

22 no help to him. There, the Supreme Court considered a code which prohibited

23 solicitation of votes or the display of campaign materials within 100 feet of the entrance

24 to a polling place. Id. at 193. The Court found the code to be content based because it

25 was “a prohibition of public discussion of an entire topic”—political campaigns. Id. at

26 197. Plaintiff cherry picks the following language from the opinion: “distinguishing

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1 among types of speech requires that the statute be subject to strict scrutiny.” Id. at 207.

2 But the “types of speech” the Court was referring to were different subject matters:

3 speech regarding political campaigns versus speech about any other subject matter. See

4 id. at 197. This reasoning also falls in line with Hill and Reed, as it prohibits distinctions

5 based on communicative content. Burson therefore does not change the outcome here.

6 Tellingly, the Ninth Circuit recently endorsed this reading of the Supreme Court’s

7 content neutrality precedents in Project Veritas v. Schmidt, 125 F.4th 929 (9th Cir. 2025).

8 There, the court considered a First Amendment challenge to an Oregon law prohibiting

9 the recording of oral conversations without the knowledge of all participants. Id. at 937.

10 Plaintiff, who frequently violated the law while engaged in undercover journalism,

11 believed that announcing the recording of a conversation would cause individuals to

12 refuse to talk or talk with less candor. Id. The law included carve-outs for recordings

13 during felonies and recordings of conversations in which a law enforcement officer is a

14 participant. Id. at 938–39. Plaintiff argued that these exceptions rendered the law

15 “content based because one must examine the content of an unannounced recording to

16 determine whether it is lawful or unlawful.” Id. at 949. The court, however, noted that

17 the principal inquiry “is whether the government has adopted a regulation of speech

18 because of disagreement with the message it conveys.” Project Veritas, 125 F.4th at 947

19 (quoting Hill, 530 U.S. at 719). The court then explained that the Supreme Court in Hill

20 did not find it “improper to look at the content of an oral or written statement in order to

21 determine whether a rule of law applies to a course of conduct.” Id. (quoting Hill, 530

22 U.S. at 721–22); see also City of Austin, 596 U.S. at 72 (“restrictions on speech may

23 require some evaluation of the speech and nonetheless remain content neutral”).

24 With these principles in mind, the Ninth Circuit found Oregon’s recording law to

25 be content neutral. Project Veritas, 125 F.4th at 950. Regarding the law enforcement

26 exception in particular, the court reasoned that the law applies “regardless of what the

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1 conversation is about” and “draws a line based on the circumstances in which a recording

2 is made, not on the content of the conversation recorded.” Id. at 951–52. The exception

3 “applies evenhandedly … regardless of the subject matter of the conversation.” Id. at 952

4 (quoting Heffron, 452 U.S. at 649; citing Hill, 530 U.S. at 722–23). Oregon did not seek

5 to “proscrib[e] speech … because of disapproval of the ideas expressed,” or “based on

6 hostility—or favoritism—towards the underlying message[.]” Id. (internal citation

7 omitted). The Ninth Circuit’s recent acceptance of Hill’s analysis reinforces the Court’s

8 finding here.

9 Lastly, Plaintiff argues that, with the Ordinance, the City is “inverting” the First

10 Amendment “hierarchy” by subjecting “the most protected categories of speech”—

11 leafleting, oral protest, signage—to more stringent restrictions than more casual speech,

12 which is not covered by the Ordinance. ECF No. 24 at 12–13. In making this argument,

13 Plaintiff alludes to the commercial speech doctrine, which affords less constitutional

14 protection to commercial speech than non-commercial speech. Id. at 12.

15 In the context of the content neutrality analysis, this argument is little more than a

16 red herring. Whether a speech restriction is content neutral has nothing to do with the

17 relative degree of protection that the Constitution affords different categories of speech.

18 For example, in Frisby, the Supreme Court found an outright ban on picketing in

19 residential areas to be content neutral, notwithstanding the fact that the ordinance

20 restricted picketing—a quintessential First Amendment activity—but not casual

21 neighborhood conversations. 487 U.S. at 480. This makes sense, after all, as the City is

22 seeking to limit harassment and disruptive speech activities, which is unlikely to spawn

23 from casual conversation. See Hill, 530 U.S. at 724 (“[t]he statutory phrases, ‘oral

24 protest, education, or counseling’ distinguish speech activities likely” to constitute

25 harassment or be a nuisance from speech that is “most unlikely to have those

26 consequences”). Because the Supreme Court’s teachings confirm that the City may

27

1 implement content neutral time, place, and manner regulations on protected speech, so

2 long as the regulation is reasonable, Plaintiff’s argument fails. See id. at 722 (“we have

3 never suggested that the kind of cursory examination that might be required to exclude

4 casual conversation from the coverage of a regulation of picketing would be

5 problematic”).

6 Accordingly, the Court finds the Ordinance to be a content neutral regulation on

7 speech which triggers intermediate scrutiny.

8 B. Time, Place, or Manner Restriction

9 Having found the Ordinance to be content neutral, the Court must now determine

10 whether the Ordinance survives intermediate scrutiny. The City contends that it has a

11 significant interest in protecting students entering and exiting schools, that the Ordinance

12 is narrowly tailored to serve that interest, and that the Ordinance leaves open ample

13 alternative channels for communication. ECF No. 20-1 at 11–17. Plaintiff contests each

14 of these arguments, while also arguing that the City’s staff report on the Ordinance, see

15 ECF No. 20-2 at 49–54, cannot support the City’s arguments here. ECF No. 24 at 13–22.

16 i. Significant Governmental Interest

17 The City asserts that the Ordinance’s purpose is to “protect[] the rights of those

18 who seek access to … educational services” by forbidding “intentional efforts to harass

19 or prevent a person from exercising these rights[.]” ECF No. 20-2 at 24. Specifically,

20 the Ordinance “ensure[s] students can attend school free from harassment, obstruction, or

21 intimidation,” a goal which is supported by the evidence presented in the staff report.

22 ECF No. 20-1 at 12–13. The parties dispute whether students are a vulnerable population

23 such that the City has a legitimate interest in protecting them as they enter and exit school

24 grounds. ECF No. 20-1 at 11–14; ECF No. 24 at 13–15.

25 Here, the City again relies on the Supreme Court’s decision in Hill. There, the

26 Court noted that “[s]tates and municipalities plainly have a substantial interest in

27

1 controlling the activity around certain public and private places,” including “schools,

2 courthouses, polling places, and private homes.” Id. at 728-29. Further supporting the

3 City’s interest in regulating speech near schools is Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S.

4 104, 118 (1972), where the Court found a significant governmental interest in restricting

5 speech that “materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion of

6 the rights of others.” Id. at 118 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist.,

7 393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969)). This is because “public schools in a community are important

8 institutions” which “could hardly tolerate boisterous demonstrators who . . . block

9 entrances[.]” Id. at 118-19. The city thus had a “compelling interest in having an

10 undisrupted school session conducive to the students’ learning[.]” Id. at 119. This is

11 precisely the same interest the City purports to have here: protecting students near

12 schools from “harassment, obstruction, or intimidation.” ECF No. 20-1 at 12; see also

13 ECF No. 20-2 at 24. Therefore, the Supreme Court’s precedent supports a finding that

14 the City’s asserted interest in controlling activity around schools is important.

15 Lower courts have consistently applied the Supreme Court’s precedent to find

16 similar interests to be significant. See Jacobs v. Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist., 526 F.3d 419,

17 435–36 (9th Cir. 2008) (“it is hard to think of a government interest more important than

18 the interest in fostering a conducive learning environment for our nation’s children”);

19 PETA v. Rasmussen, 298 F.3d 1198 (10th Cir. 2002) (“hold[ing] that there is a significant

20 government interest in preventing disruptions to classes or substantial order,” even

21 immediately after school); Rothner v. City of Chicago, 929 F.2d 297, 303 (7th Cir. 1991)

22 (“Government has few interests more compelling than its interest in insuring that children

23 receive an adequate education”); Taylor v. Roswell Indep. Sch. Dist., 713 F.3d 25, 38

24 (10th Cir. 2013) (noting the “special characteristics of the school environment, where the

25 government has a compelling interest in protecting the educational mission of the school

26 and ensuring student safety”) (cleaned up); Klein v. City of Laguna Beach, 594 F. Supp.

27

1 2d 1142, 1145 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (finding amplified sound buffer around school to be

2 narrowly tailored to “the City's important interests in maintaining a productive learning

3 environment, tranquility, and, most importantly, safety”); Morgan v. Plano Indep. Sch.

4 Dist., 589 F.3d 740, 747 (5th Cir. 2009) (acknowledging school district’s interest in

5 “providing a focused learning environment for its students”); Slotterback By & Through

6 Slotterback v. Interboro Sch. Dist., 766 F. Supp. 280, 299 (E.D. Pa. 1991) (“[e]nsuring

7 the safety of persons on public property and preventing the disruption of education at

8 public schools are significant government interests”); see also New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469

9 U.S. 325, 340 (1985) (“maintaining security and order in the schools requires a certain

10 degree of flexibility in school disciplinary procedures”).

11 Plaintiff argues that while the City may have an interest in regulating speech that

12 disrupts schools, it does not have an interest in protecting “vulnerable” students

13 themselves from harassment or distractions. ECF No. 24 at 13–14. Plaintiff’s argument

14 ignores the fact that safeguarding schools from disruption goes hand-in-hand with

15 protecting the students from the activity likely to cause disruption, particularly if it might

16 involve harassment or other inappropriate behavior near school grounds.

17 Several cases illustrate this point. The Seventh Circuit, in reviewing an ordinance

18 that prohibited minors from playing video games during school hours, stated that the

19 “[g]overnment has few interests more compelling than its interest in insuring that

20 children receive an adequate education.” Rothner, 929 F.2d at 303. Rothner shows that

21 protecting children from disruptions—in that case, video games—is tantamount to

22 maintaining an effective educational environment. See also Taylor, 713 F.3d at 38 (“the

23 government has a compelling interest in protecting the educational mission of the school

24 and ensuring student safety”) (emphasis added) (citing Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393,

25 406–07 (2007); Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682 (1986); New

26

27

1 Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340 (1985)). The Ninth Circuit has also highlighted the

2 importance of protecting children from distractions near school grounds:

3 We are mindful that this case involves a special circumstance, the presence

of children. In particular, the evidence suggests that children were distracted

4

by the Plaintiffs' pictures, and this distraction perhaps posed a danger as

5 students crossed the streets around the school. Children may well be

particularly susceptible to distraction or emotion in the face of controversial

6

speech, and may not always be expected to react responsibly.

7

Ctr. for Bio-Ethical Reform, Inc. v. L.A. Cnty. Sheriff Dep’t, 533 F.3d 780, 790 (9th Cir.

8 2008), overruled on other grounds by Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009);3 see

9

also Bering v. SHARE, 721 P.2d 918, 935 (Wash. 1986) (en banc) (finding that the state

10

“has a compelling interest in avoiding subjection of children to the physical and

11

psychological abuse inflicted by the picketers’” offensive speech). In all, decades of case

12

law shows that the City’s interest in protecting children and, by extension, schools, from

13

harassment, obstruction, or intimidation are intertwined.

14

Plaintiff also asserts that Grayned, Hill, and Tinker do not acknowledge “a

15

governmental interest in shielding purportedly ‘vulnerable’ students from protected

16

expressive activity peacefully and quietly taking place outside the school grounds, much

17

less when school is out of session.” Id. at 15 (emphasis in original). On this point, PETA

18

v. Rasmussen, 298 F.3d at 1198, is instructive. There, the Tenth Circuit considered a

19

statute that prohibited conduct near schools that interfered with or disrupted students or

20

school activities, and, more specifically, the statute’s application to peaceful protests that

21

took place across the street from a junior high school both at lunch time and shortly

22

before classes ended. Id. at 1201–02. The court relied on Tinker and Grayned but noted

23

24

25 3 While the Ninth Circuit in Center for Bio-Ethical Reform discussed “the presence of children” in the

context of a heckler’s veto analysis, and not in the context of whether the government had a significant

26 interest in an intermediate scrutiny analysis, its discussion of the importance of protecting children from

distractions near school grounds is still relevant here.

27

1 that “Grayned did not explicitly find a significant governmental interest after school

2 hours and did not define ‘normal school activities.’” Id. at 1205. Nonetheless, the court

3 found “that disruptions immediately after school can affect the school's learning

4 environment and that leaving school can properly be considered a ‘normal school

5 activity’ for a junior high school.” Id. The Court agrees with this interpretation of

6 Grayned, and thus finds that the City has an interest in protecting students from

7 potentially disruptive speech near school grounds, even outside of school hours. See id.

8 at 1202 (“[t]he protests were not noisy, but some students allegedly were distracted,

9 stayed late, missed their rides, or sought to interact with the protesters”); see also Klein,

10 594 F. Supp. 2d at 1145 (finding that, in implementing sound ordinance near high school,

11 the city had an important interest in “maintaining a productive learning environment,

12 tranquility, and, most importantly, safety,” especially because plaintiff “would engage in

13 his activities ‘at the moment the school dismisses its students’”).

14 Accordingly, the Court finds that “ensur[ing] students can attend school free from

15 harassment, obstruction, or intimidation” is a significant government interest. See ECF

16 No. 20-1 at 12.4

17 ii. Narrow Tailoring

18 The Court must next determine whether the Ordinance is narrowly tailored to serve

19 the City’s interests in protecting students leaving school from harassment, obstruction, or

20 intimidation. “For a content-neutral time, place, or manner restriction to be narrowly

21 tailored, it must not ‘burden substantially more speech than is necessary to further the

22

23

24

4 Plaintiff briefly takes issue with the Court’s previous characterization of individuals coming and going

from places of worship as “vulnerable.” See ECF No. 24 at 14 n.5. The Ninth Circuit has found that

25 protecting those “engaging in worship from harassment or intimidation” and “ensuring access to …

places of worship” are legitimate government interests in a case involving a floating buffer zone around

26 places of worship. Edwards v. City of Santa Barbara, 150 F.3d 1213, 1216 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing

Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of W. N.Y., 519 U.S. 357, 376 (1997)).

27

1 government’s legitimate interests.’” McCullen, 573 U.S. at 486 (quoting Ward, 491 U.S.

2 at 799). The regulation need not be the least restrictive means of serving the

3 government’s interests, but the government “may not regulate expression in such a

4 manner that a substantial portion of the burden on speech does not serve to advance its

5 goals. Id. (quoting Ward, 491 U.S. at 798–99).

6 Plaintiff’s chief argument is that the City did not consider sufficient evidence

7 demonstrating that the Ordinance advances its interests in protecting students leaving

8 school from harassment, obstruction, or intimidation. ECF No. 24 at 17–21. Plaintiff

9 argues that there have not been any instances in San Diego where demonstrators have

10 engaged in the kind of aggressive and disruptive activity the City is concerned about, and

11 that the City does not provide adequate findings that such activity is forthcoming. ECF

12 No. 24 at 17–21. The City responds (1) that it relied on its own experience, the City

13 Attorney’s staff report, and the experience of other jurisdictions, ECF No. 20-1 at 12–13;

14 (2) that it relied on “history, consensus, and simple common sense,” id. at 13 (quoting

15 Renton v. Playtime Theaters, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 51 (1986)); and (3) that it did not need to

16 wait for disturbances to occur before enacting the Ordinance, id. at 13–14. Accordingly,

17 the question is whether sufficient evidence supports the City’s enactment of the

18 Ordinance.

19 “The First Amendment does not require a city, before enacting such an ordinance,

20 to conduct new studies or produce evidence independent of that already generated by

21 other cities, so long as whatever evidence the city relies upon is reasonably believed to be

22 relevant to the problem that the city addresses.” Renton, 475 U.S. at 51–52; see Gammoh

23 v. City of La Habra, 395 F.3d 1114, 1127 (9th Cir. 2005) (“No precedent requires the

24 City to obtain research targeting the exact activity that it wishes to regulate: the City is

25 only required to rely on evidence ‘reasonably believed to be relevant’ to the problem

26 being addressed.”) (quoting City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425,

27

1 438 (2002)). While courts “generally defer to the legislative body passing the law in

2 determining whether the government’s ends are advanced by a regulation,” G.K. Ltd.

3 Travel v. City of Lake Oswego, 436 F.3d 1064, 1073 (9th Cir. 2006), “[t]his is not to say

4 that a municipality can get away with shoddy data or reasoning.” Alameda Books, 535

5 U.S. at 438. If a plaintiff fails to cast doubt on a city’s rationale, “either by

6 demonstrating that the municipality's evidence does not support its rationale or by

7 furnishing evidence that disputes the municipality's factual findings,” the city meets

8 Renton’s standard. Id. at 438–39. But if a plaintiff does cast doubt on the city’s

9 rationale, “the burden shifts back to the municipality to supplement the record with

10 evidence renewing support for a theory that justifies its ordinance.” Id. at 39.

11 Here, the Ordinance states that “demonstration activities around Covered Facilities

12 have subjected students, teachers, [and] parents . . . to harassment and abuse from people

13 who attempt to block entrances and exits to Covered Facilities and parking lots used to

14 access these locations.” ECF No. 20-2 at 23. The Ordinance further states that

15 “aggressive demonstration activities pose significant public safety threats” and that

16 “places of worship and schools are increasingly exposed to demonstration activities.” Id.

17 In support of these findings, the legislature considered the City Attorney’s staff report on

18 the Ordinance. See id. at 49–54. The staff report cited a Governor Newsom press release

19 regarding an authorization of $30 million in funding to protect places of worship from

20 “violent attacks and hate crimes.”5 The staff report also notes that “[e]lementary, middle,

21 and high schools have become assembly places for people to express positions on

22 LGBTQ+ issues in schools, among others, and given proposed budget cuts statewide,

23 further demonstration activity is anticipated.” Id. In support of this, the report cited

24

25

5 Governor Newsom Doubles Funding to Bolster Safety and Security in Faith Communities and Takes

26 Action to Immediately Increase Police Presence at Places of Worship, GOVERNOR GAVIN NEWSOM (Oct.

18, 2023), https://www.gov.ca.gov/2023/10/18/faith-security-funding/.

27

1 recent protests regarding LGBTQ+ issues at school facilities in southern California. Id.

2 at 52 n.3. The report further mentioned a disruptive protest that led the Poway school

3 district’s board of directors to adjourn a public meeting. Id. at 52. Lastly, the report

4 described a San Diego school board member’s testimony to the City Council’s Public

5 Safety Committee regarding “multiple instances of anti-vaccine protestors blocking

6 school operations during the pandemic.” Id.

7 A close examination of the proffered evidence, however, raises doubts as to

8 whether the evidence is “reasonably believed to be relevant to” the City’s purported

9 interest in protecting students from harassment, obstruction, and intimidation near

10 schools. The Ordinance seeks to restrict individuals from passing leaflets and handbills;

11 displaying signs; and engaging in oral protest, education, or counseling near schools,

12 FAC ¶ 26, and Plaintiff specifically intends on passing leaflets near schools, id. ¶¶ 4, 27–

13 30. But the City’s evidence does not support a finding that the Ordinance, by restricting

14 Plaintiff’s leafleting activities, will further its interests.

15 To start, Governor Newsom’s authorization of funds to protect places of worship

16 has nothing to do with speech at schools, so it is entirely irrelevant. And Plaintiff

17 vehemently disputes whether San Diego school board member’s testimony “cite[d] any

18 instances of particular demonstrations.” Because the Court is not considering the factual

19 assertions in the staff report as true, the Court will resolve this factual dispute in

20 Plaintiff’s favor at this stage. See Khoja v. Orexigen Therapeutics, Inc., 899 F.3d 988,

21 1014 (9th Cir. 2018) (“courts must interpret the allegations and factual disputes in favor

22 of the plaintiff at the pleading stage”). Accordingly, neither of these pieces of evidence

23 support the City’s justification for the Ordinance.

24 As such, the only relevant evidence that the City considered in passing the

25 Ordinance are the recent school protests cited in the staff report. The report cites a brawl

26 between protestors at the Glendale Unified School District Headquarters, where police

27

1 officers had to separate protestors who had opposing views on the district’s recognition

2 of June as Pride Month.6 The report also cited a peaceful high school walkout in

3 Temecula regarding a school district’s anti-LGBTQ policies.7 And the report cited a

4 disruptive protest that led the Poway school district’s board of directors to adjourn a

5 public meeting.8 While this evidence generally shows that schools are increasingly

6 forums for First Amendment activity, notably, none of it deals with leafleting or one-on-

7 one conversations. And only one of these examples—the peaceful school walkout—even

8 took place at an actual school.9 Therefore, the evidence is not reasonably relevant to

9 whether a restriction on leafleting or one-on-one oral protest near schools would further

10 the City’s interests in protecting students from disruption.

11 In addition to the weak connection between the evidence and the restrictions the

12 City is imposing on Plaintiff’s intended activities, it is important to note what the City did

13 not present. In cases where cities have met the Renton standard, they have relied on some

14 robust combination of studies, public comments, extensive deliberation, or other city’s

15 findings as to whether a law furthers a city’s stated goals. See, e.g., Renton, 475 U.S. at

16 50–52 (finding sufficient evidence where the city relied on very detailed studies produced

17

18

6 Protesters brawl as Southern California school district decides whether to recognize Pride Month,

19 ASSOCIATED PRESS (June 6, 2023), https://apnews.com/article/glendale-school-district-pride-month-

protests-fighting-adcb1e4f9051256a4f35fb3174137229.

20

7 Rob McMillan, High school students in Temecula stage walkout over alleged anti-LGBTQ policies,

21 KABC TELEVISION, LLC (Sept. 22, 2023), https://abc7.com/temecula-high-school-lgbtq-

protest/13816822/.

22

8 Elizabeth Marie Himchak, Protestors disrupt Poway Unified board meeting, cause its adjournment,

23 THE SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE (October 11, 2021),

https://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/2021/09/09/protesters-disrupt-poway-unified-board-meeting-

24 cause-its-adjournment/.

25 9 The others took place at school district buildings or other administrative locations. See infra notes 6 &

8. While it is not clear to the Court whether these are Covered Facilities under the Ordinance, see ECF

26 No. 20-2 at 26–27, it makes little difference here because Plaintiff only intends to engage in his

activities at schools, FAC ¶ 27–29.

27

1 by the city of Seattle, as well as testimony heard by the Washington Supreme Court, in a

2 case challenging a similar Seattle ordinance); Alameda Books, 535 U.S. at 435, 439

3 (finding sufficient evidence where the city relied on a study that showed a direct

4 connection between the ordinance and its justification for the ordinance); Lorillard

5 Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 558–61 (2001) (detailing numerous FDA studies

6 and “ample documentation of the problem with underage use of smokeless tobacco and

7 cigars”); Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 626–29 (1995) (detailing 106-page

8 summary of two-year study, and commenting on the “breadth and detail” of the anecdotal

9 record in support of the bar’s justifications for regulating direct-mail solicitation); G.K.

10 Ltd. Travel, 436 F.3d at 1015 (finding that the city’s sign code “was the result of much

11 legislative deliberation, a dynamic dialogue with the City’s residents and businesses and

12 extensive hearings,” and that the city relied on these conversations and “the experience of

13 other cities, [which] produced strong evidence of the need for” the sign code); Gammoh,

14 395 F.3d at 1126 (finding sufficient evidence where the city council considered 17

15 studies, multiple reports, declarations, interviews, and numerous judicial decisions).

16 Here, however, the City did not rely on any other city’s findings or any studies or reports

17 that provide support for the Ordinance’s justification. Based on the record before the

18 Court, it appears that the City’s justification for enacting the Ordinance is based on little

19 more than “mere conjecture,” “hypotheticals,” and “vague allusions to practical

20 experience” regarding the need to restrict leafleting and one-on-one conversations near

21 schools. Porter v. Gore, 354 F. Supp. 3d 1162, 1178 (S.D. Cal. 2018) (Curiel, J.)

22 (quoting Citizens for Clean Gov’t v. City of San Diego, 474 F.3d 647, 653–54 (9th Cir.

23 2007); see also id. (denying motion to dismiss plaintiff’s First Amendment challenge to

24 regulation of vehicle horns where the record contained little evidence of the state’s

25 justification for the regulation).

26

27

1 Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff sufficiently casts doubt on the City’s

2 rationale in enacting the Ordinance. At the motion to dismiss stage, this is sufficient to

3 find that, based on the current record, the Ordinance is not narrowly tailored to serve the

4 City’s interests in protecting students leaving schools from harassment, obstruction, and

5 intimidation. See Duncan v. Becerra, 265 F. Supp. 3d 1106, 1121 (S.D. Cal. 2017) (“It

6 may well be that on a more robust evidentiary showing, made after greater time and

7 testimony is taken, that the State will be able to establish a reasonable fit. But not yet.”)

8 iii. Alternative Channels for Communication

9 While the Court’s finding that the Ordinance is not narrowly tailored is fatal to the

10 City’s motion to dismiss the as-applied free speech claim, the Court will still address the

11 alternative channels for communication. Plaintiff alleges that “[o]btaining consent is an

12 unrealistic requirement for distributing literature to multiple people arriving in waves and

13 leaves Plaintiff unable to engage in the critical literature distribution aspect of his free

14 speech activity.” FAC ¶ 30. Because “[t]here is no communicative equivalent to handing

15 out literature,” Plaintiff claims that the Ordinance fails to provide any alternative

16 channels of communication. ECF No. 24 at 21.

17 Even taking Plaintiff’s allegations as true, the Supreme Court foreclosed this

18 argument in Hill. There, the Supreme Court found ample alternative channels of

19 communication when dealing with a substantially similar ordinance. 530 U.S. at 726–27.

20 The Court reasoned that the ordinance might in fact aid the readability of signs and that

21 the eight-foot buffer zone allows oral protestors to engage at a “normal communication

22 distance.” Id. While the Court did acknowledge a “more serious” impact on leafleting,

23 as Plaintiff alleges, it still reasoned that the ordinance does not “prevent a leafletter from

24 simply standing near the path of oncoming pedestrians and proffering his or her material,

25 which the pedestrians can easily accept.” Id. at 727.

26

27

1 The reasoning in Hill leads the Court here to similarly conclude that there are

2 ample alternative channels for Plaintiff to communicate his message. The Ordinance

3 does not hinder the readability of signs and oral communication, nor does it prevent

4 Plaintiff from standing in students’ paths and distributing leaflets to willing recipients.

5 Id. at 726–27. Therefore, even accepting Plaintiff’s allegations regarding the

6 impracticability of leafleting in his preferred manner under the Ordinance, the Court finds

7 that he still has ample alternatives for communicating his message to students near

8 schools without disrupting unwilling listeners. See Edwards v. City of Santa Barbara,

9 150 F.3d 1213, 1217 (9th Cir. 1998) (finding that driveway buffer zone at health care

10 facilities “permits ample alternative avenues of communication[] by placing no limit on

11 speech or expressive activity outside a narrow zone”). After all, “an alternative channel

12 need not be ideal, but merely adequate.” Project Veritas, 125 F.4th at 957 (citing

13 Heffron, 452 U.S. at 654–55). Because the Ordinance does not “eliminate[] the only

14 method of communication by which [Plaintiff] can convey [his] message to a particular

15 audience,” and in fact leaves open ample alternative methods, Plaintiff’s argument fails.

16 Id. (citing Bay Area Peace Navy v. United States, 914 F.2d 1224, 1229–30 (9th Cir.

17 1990)).10

18 Accordingly, the Court finds that the Ordinance provides ample alternative

19 channels of communication. However, because Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged that the

20 Ordinance is not narrowly tailored, the Court finds that the Ordinance is not a reasonable

21

22

23

24

10 While Plaintiff alleges that obtaining consent from students near school exits when classes end for the

25 day is an “unrealistic requirement,” the Court notes that the alleged difficulties are largely due to the

time and place of Plaintiff’s activities, and not the Ordinance itself. Irrespective of the consent

26 requirement, it is difficult to attract students’ attention as they leave a crowded school from the same

exits at the same time.

27

1 time, place, and manner restriction. Therefore, the Court DENIES the City’s motion to

2 dismiss Plaintiff’s as-applied free speech claim.

3 III. Facial Free Speech Challenge

4 Generally, “a plaintiff cannot succeed on a facial challenge unless he establishes

5 that no set of circumstances exists under which the law would be valid, or he shows that

6 the law lacks a plainly legitimate sweep.” Moody, 603 U.S. at 723. In the First

7 Amendment context, however, the Supreme Court has employed a less-demanding,

8 though still rigorous, standard for facial challenges. Id. “The question is whether a

9 substantial number of the law's applications are unconstitutional, judged in relation to the

10 statute's plainly legitimate sweep.” Id. (internal quotation marks, citation, and brackets

11 omitted).

12 This inquiry has two parts. First, the Court must “assess the state laws’ scope” and

13 ask: “What activities, by what actors, do the laws prohibit or otherwise regulate?” Id. at

14 724. Second, the Court must “decide which of the laws’ applications violate the First

15 Amendment, and to measure them against the rest.” Id. at 725. In the end, the

16 challenging party has the burden to show that the law “prohibits a substantial amount of

17 protected speech relative to its plainly legitimate sweep.” Id. at 744; see also Project

18 Veritas, 125 F.4th at 961 (“[t]he party asserting substantial overbreadth bears the burden

19 of establishing it”).11

20 First, the Court decides what the Ordinance’s scope is. Moody, 603 U.S. at 724.

21 This step is simple. The Ordinance requires one to obtain consent before coming within

22 eight feet of an individual to pass leaflets, display signs, or engage in oral protest,

23

24

25 11 The parties’ briefing focuses on more general overbreadth arguments. See ECF No. 20-1 at 17–18;

ECF No. 24 at 24. However, as the Ninth Circuit has recognized, “the test described here applies to

26 both First Amendment facial challenges and overbreadth challenges.” NetChoice, LLC v. Bonta, 113

F.4th 1101, 1115 n.6 (9th Cir. 2024).

27

1 education, or counseling within 100 feet of health care facilities, places of worship, or

2 schools.

3 “The next order of business is to decide which of the law[‘s] applications violate

4 the First Amendment, and to measure them against the rest.” Id. at 725. However, much

5 like in Project Veritas, 125 F.4th at 961, Plaintiff fails to carry his burden here because

6 his arguments almost exclusively focus on his own intended speech activities. While

7 Plaintiff argues that the Ordinance is unlawful as applied to his intended activities near

8 schools, “these applications represent only a sliver of the conversations to which [the

9 Ordinance] may apply.” Id. To be sure, Plaintiff does briefly contend that the Ordinance

10 “applies to hundreds of ‘Covered Facilities,’” and suggests in passing that the Ordinance

11 may unconstitutionally cover students discussing a math assignment with other students,

12 or even parents, teachers, or staff.12 ECF No. 24 at 24. But even assuming these

13 speakers would meet the Ordinance’s scienter requirement, Plaintiff still “makes little

14 effort to identify and weigh the [Ordinance’s] lawful and unlawful applications[.]”

15 Project Veritas, 125 F.4th at 961. The lack of any analysis of the Ordinance’s

16 applications dooms Plaintiff’s facial challenge.

17 Therefore, Plaintiff’s claim that the Ordinance violates the First Amendment on its

18 face fails.

19 IV. Vagueness

20 Plaintiff alleges that the Ordinance is an “unconstitutionally vague restriction on

21 expressive activity.” FAC ¶¶ 34, 36. Plaintiff specifically challenges § 52.003(c) of the

22

23

24

12 Though it is not vital to the Court’s reasoning here, it is worth noting that the Ordinance provides an

25 exemption for “employees, agents, or volunteers of the … school or school district operating on school

grounds acting within the scope of their employment, agency, or volunteer service.” ECF No. 20-2 at

26 28. Thus, the Ordinance would not cover a student discussing their homework with a teacher on school

grounds, as Plaintiff has suggested in his briefing and at the hearing on the motion.

27

1 Ordinance (the “consent provision”), ECF No. 20-2 at 27–28, because the words

2 “protest,” “education,” and “counseling” are vague. ECF No. 24 at 23.

3 “A statute can be impermissibly vague for either of two independent reasons.

4 First, if it fails to provide people of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to

5 understand what conduct it prohibits. Second, if it authorizes or even encourages

6 arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.” Hill, 530 U.S. at 732.

7 On the first point, the Ordinance’s scienter requirement ameliorates any vagueness

8 concerns, as the Supreme Court found in Hill. Id. The Ordinance here, much like the

9 ordinance in Hill, requires “knowing” and “willful” unconsented approaches “for the

10 purpose of “engaging in oral protest, education, or counseling.” Compare ECF No. 20-2

11 at 27–28 with Hill, 530 U.S. at 732. “The likelihood that anyone would not understand

12 any of those common words seems quite remote.” Hill, 530 U.S. at 732.

13 Plaintiff offers hypothetical scenarios to show where confusion can arise as to what

14 conduct the Ordinance prohibits. For instance, a student might be “protesting” by stating

15 that a teacher should have given her extra credit, or a parent dropping their child off at

16 school might be “counseling” their child by advising them to study hard. The confusion

17 surrounding these scenarios, in Plaintiff’s eyes, might “hobble” normal social activities

18 near schools. But, as the Supreme Court recognized in Hill, the fact that “imagination

19 can conjure up hypothetical cases in which the meaning of these terms will be in nice

20 question” does not make the Ordinance vague. Id. at 733 (quoting Am. Commc’ns Ass’n

21 v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 412 (1950)). In the end, legislators are “[c]ondemned to the use

22 of words,” and courts cannot “expect mathematical certainty from our language.”

23 Grayned, 408 U.S. at 110. With this in mind, the Court finds that it is sufficiently “clear

24 what the ordinance as a whole prohibits.” Id.

25 Plaintiff also argues that, because the Ordinance can be enforced in numerous

26 random social interactions, the City obviously expects arbitrary and discriminatory

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1 enforcement concentrated towards the speech the City is most concerned about. But this

2 argument again ignores the Ordinance’s scienter requirement. Law enforcement can only

3 enforce the Ordinance against those who are knowingly and willfully engaging in the

4 unconsented interactions the Ordinance clearly defines. This would not include potential

5 enforcement against two students chatting while leaving school grounds, not because of

6 selective enforcement, but because the Ordinance does not cover such interactions at all.

7 Like the ordinance in Hill, the Ordinance here provides specific definitions and requires

8 the exercise of an acceptable degree of police judgment. 530 U.S. at 733.

9 Accordingly, the Court finds that the Ordinance is not unconstitutionally vague.

10 V. Leave to Amend

11 Where a motion to dismiss is granted, “leave to amend should be granted ‘unless

12 the court determines that the allegation of other facts consistent with the challenged

13 pleading could not possibly cure the deficiency.’” DeSoto v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc.,

14 957 F.2d 655, 658 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting Schreiber Distrib. Co. v. Serv-Well Furniture

15 Co., 806 F.2d 1393, 1401 (9th Cir. 1986)). In other words, where leave to amend would

16 be futile, the Court may deny leave to amend. See DeSoto, 957 F.2d at 658; Schreiber,

17 806 F.2d at 1401.

18 Here, the Court largely decides the motion to dismiss on strictly legal grounds.

19 The Court therefore finds that amendment would be futile as to the facial overbreadth

20 claim and the vagueness claim because Plaintiff cannot allege any additional facts that

21 would cure the deficiencies in his legal theories. Accordingly, the Court DENIES

22 Plaintiff leave to amend those claims.

23 However, Plaintiff’s facial free speech challenge can benefit from allegations that

24 show “whether a substantial number of the law's applications are unconstitutional, judged

25 in relation to the statute's plainly legitimate sweep.” Moody, 603 U.S. at 723.

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1 || Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff leave to amend the complaint as to the facial

2 || free speech challenge.

3 CONCLUSION

4 For the above reasons, the Court GRANTS the City’s motion to dismiss □□□□□□□□□□□

5 || facial overbreadth and vagueness claims without leave to amend; GRANTS the City’s

6 || motion to dismiss Plaintiffs facial free speech claim with leave to amend; and DENIES

7 City’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff's as-applied free speech claim. Plaintiff must file

8 amended complaint within 21 days of this Order.

9 IT IS SO ORDERED.

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11 Dated: June 2, 2025 <=

13 United States District Judge

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