Sascha B. Koch v. City of Los Angeles

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES —- GENERAL ‘<O’

Case No. 2:23-cv-07714-CAS-PDx Date June 2, 2025

Title Sascha B. Koch v. City of Los Angeles et al

Present: The Honorable CHRISTINA A. SNYDER

Catherine Jeang Deborah Parker N/A

Deputy Clerk Court Reporter / Recorder Tape No.

Attorneys Present for Plaintiffs: Attorneys Present for Defendants:

Indira CameronBanks Rebecca Hunter

Proceedings: DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE

PLEADINGS (Dkt. 29, filed on April 28, 2025)

I. INTRODUCTION

On September 15, 2023, plaintiff Sascha B. Koch (“plaintiff”) filed this action

against defendants City of Los Angeles (the “City”); Officer Laura Brinkman

(“Brinkman”); Officer Joshua Towe (“Towe’”): Officer Manuel Vargas (“Vargas”): and

Does 1-20 (collectively, “defendants”). Dkt. 1 (“Compl.”’). Plaintiff asserts six claims

for relief: (1) unlawful search and seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment pursuant

to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section 1983”), against Brinkman, Towe, Vargas, and Does 1-20;

(2) a custom or policy of unlawful search and seizure in violation of the Fourth

Amendment pursuant to Section 1983 against the City; (3) a violation of the Bane Civil

Rights Act, Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1, against all defendants; (4) false arrest/imprisonment

against all defendants; (5) negligence against all defendants: and (6) intentional infliction

of emotional distress (“ITED”) against all defendants. Compl. {| 53-120.

On April 28, 2025, the City, Brinkman, Towe, and Vargas filed the instant motion

for judgment on the pleadings. Dkt. 29 (“Mot.”). Defendants also submitted a request

for judicial notice. Dkt. 30 (“RJN’).

On May 1, 2025, upon joint stipulation of the parties, the Court dismissed

plaintiff's first claim as to defendant Vargas only and dismissed plaintiff's second claim

in its entirety. Dkts. 31-32.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES —- GENERAL ‘<O’

Case No. 2:23-cv-07714-CAS-PDx Date June 2, 2025

Title “Sascha B. Koch v. City of Los Angeles et al

On May 16, 2025, plaintiff filed an opposition to the motion for judgment on the

pleadings. Dkt. 35 (“Opp.”). In the opposition brief, plaintiff voluntarily dismissed his

fourth claim for false arrest/imprisonment and fifth claim for negligence.’ Opp. at 1.

On May 23, 2025, defendants filed a reply.* Dkt. 36 (“Reply”).

On June 2, 2025, the Court held a hearing. Having carefully considered the

parties’ arguments and submissions, the Court finds and concludes as follows.

Il. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff alleges the following facts in his complaint.

Plaintiff is an individual resident of Los Angeles County, California. Compl. 16.

The City is the principal employer of defendants Brinkman, Towe, and Vargas, who were

police officers in the Los Angeles Police Department, a municipal agency. Id. § 17.

Defendants Does 1-20 were authorized employees of the Los Angeles Police Department

and agents of the City. Id. §[ 23-24. At all material times, plaintiff alleges that

Brinkman, Towe, Vargas, and Does 1-20 acted with “the complete authority and

ratification” of the Los Angeles Police Department and “implied and actual permission

and consent of the City” and the Los Angeles Police Department. Id. 24, 26.

Plaintiff states that he is a “German-born immigrant to the United States who

found success as a productive businessman and entrepreneur, performer|,| and producer.”

Id. § 33. Plaintiff alleges that on November 18, 2021, defendants arrived at 19458

Ventura Boulevard, “heavily armed with full tactical gear and armored police vehicles.”

Id. § 34. Plaintiff states that the officers were members of the Los Angeles Police

Department’s West Valley Vice Unit, Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) Unit, and

West Valley Gang Enforcement Unit. Id. Plaintiff states that 19458 Ventura Boulevard

! Plaintiff also states in his opposition brief that he “voluntarily dismissed all claims

against one of the three individuals.” Opp. at 1. At oral argument, plaintiff's counsel

clarified that all claims against defendant Vargas have been dismissed.

? Defendants argue that the Court should not consider plaintiff's opposition brief because

it was filed three days late, in violation of Local Rule 7-9, forcing defendants to file their

reply brief late. Reply at 1. The Court considers both the opposition brief and the reply

brief, but admonishes plaintiff to abide by all Local Rules going forward.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES —- GENERAL ‘<O’

Case No. 2:23-cv-07714-CAS-PDx Date June 2, 2025

Title Sascha B. Koch v. City of Los Angeles et al

consists of a “strip mall” with various business establishments, but the door of each unit

is clearly marked with a unit number, including Unit 6 and Unit 7. Id. 35. When

defendants arrived, plaintiff alleges that he was inside his unit, marked as Unit 6. Id. §

36. At the time, plaintiff asserts that he was “socializing with friends and business

colleagues playing card games,” when his dog alerted him to a disturbance outside of the

unit. Id. Plaintiff states that he stepped outside a little after 9:40 pm and was met with

bright lights pointed at his face and officers “pointing firearms and shouting at him.” Id.

Plaintiff alleges that he put his hands in the air and went back into his unit to alert

his guests, who then exited with their hands raised. Id. Plaintiff alleges that the officers

continued to shine bright lights and point their firearms at plaintiff and his guests, all of

whom were detained, forced to provide identification materials, and questioned. Id. □ 38.

Plaintiff describes this as a “terrifying experience.” Id.

Subsequently, plaintiff alleges that defendant Towe pulled him away from Unit 6

and “began interrogating him.” Id. 4 39. Plaintiff states that he was never told why he

was being questioned, that he was under arrest, advised of his Fifth Amendment rights, or

presented with a warrant to search Unit 6. Id. Further, plaintiff states that he did not give

any of the officers his voluntary consent to enter the premises. Id. § 40. Plaintiff alleges

that at the time of the initial encounter, defendants encountered the entrances to both Unit

7 and Unit 6 of the strip mall, which were “clearly marked as separate units and could not

be mistaken for each other.” Id. § 41. However, according to plaintiff, the Los Angeles

Police Department only had a search warrant for Unit 7, not Unit 6. Id. § 42. Plaintiff

states that even though the officers, including Brinkman, Towe, and Vargas, observed

and understood the clearly marked entrances, they engaged in “an extensive search” of

Unit 6 starting at 10 pm, and “began unlawfully seizing personal property” within it and

interrogating plaintiff and his guests. Id.

Plaintiff next states that he was placed in handcuffs and then into a police vehicle,

in which he was transported to the Los Angeles Police Department’s offices and further

questioned by officers, including Towe and Brinkman, “into the early morning hours.”

Id. § 44. Plaintiff alleges that he was questioned even after invoking his right to not be

questioned without an attorney. Id. Plaintiff states that he was arrested for a

misdemeanor offense, but booked and placed in a Los Angeles County jail for over four

days. Id. 4 45. According to plaintiff, he was confused as to why he was there because

he had no criminal history, and he was “shocked and terrified,” “denied medical attention

and treatment for his health conditions,” and “left to languish and suffer.” Id. § 45.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES —- GENERAL ‘<O’

Case No. 2:23-cv-07714-CAS-PDx Date June 2, 2025

Title Sascha B. Koch v. City of Los Angeles et al

Plaintiff alleges that it was not until 11:55 pm, or “hours” after the search, seizure,

and arrest of plaintiff, that the Los Angeles Police Department secured an amendment to

their warrant for Unit 7 to include Unit 6. Id. § 43. In this legal process, plaintiff states

that defendant Vargas filed an affidavit with “patent omissions of material fact,” not

mentioning that the officers had already searched Unit 6, seized property from inside it,

and detained and interrogated individuals. Id. Plaintiff alleges that material

misrepresentations and omissions were also made to support the arrest and charges

brought against him. Id. § 46. In a preliminary hearing in his criminal case on August

17, 2022, plaintiff states that Brinkman falsely testified that she and the other officers did

not enter and search Unit 6 or seize evidence from it until after securing a warrant. Id. 4

47. Plaintiff alleges that this “was directly contradicted by videos of the [p]remises”

showing the officers entering, searching, and seizing personal property. Id.

Plaintiff states that on August 25, 2022, his criminal case was dismissed. Id. § 48.

According to plaintiff, the Los Angeles County Superior Court found that the officers had

illegally entered and searched Unit 6, and that their conduct was not honest and

reasonable because they knew, or should have known, that they only had a warrant to

enter Unit 7. Id. Plaintiff asserts that the Los Angeles County Superior Court found that

the warrant for Unit 6 was issued two hours after the officers had illegally entered,

searched it, and seized property from within: that Vargas’s affidavit omitted material

facts that negated probable cause: and that the officers had violated the Fourth

Amendment. Id.

Plaintiff alleges that the dismissal of the criminal complaint has not redressed the

harm inflicted upon him. Id. § 49. Plaintiff states that defendants “deliberately and

unconstitutionally characterized” him as “participating in a felony conspiracy,”

irreparably harming his reputation and entrepreneurial business ventures. Id. 49-50.

Additionally, plaintiff alleges that he had spent years preparing to be a United States

citizen, but was ultimately “turned away from his own naturalization ceremony” and

denied citizenship because of the “unsubstantiated” arrest and charges brought against

him. Id. 751. Plaintiff states that he continues to suffer “extreme anguish and distress,”

as well as financial and business losses. Id. 4 52.

Il. LEGAL STANDARD

A motion for judgment on the pleadings brought pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c)

provides a means of disposing of cases when all material allegations of fact are admitted

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES —- GENERAL ‘<O’

Case No. 2:23-cv-07714-CAS-PDx Date June 2, 2025

Title Sascha B. Koch v. City of Los Angeles et al

in the pleadings and only questions of law remain. See McGann v. Emst & Young, 102

F.3d 390, 392 (9th Cir. 1996). Such a motion may be brought “after the pleadings are

closed—but early enough not to delay trial.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). “Analysis under Rule

12(c) is substantially identical to analysis under Rule 12(b)(6) because, under both rules,

a court must determine whether the facts alleged in the complaint, taken as true, entitle

the plaintiff to a legal remedy.” Chavez v. United States, 683 F.3d 1102, 1108 (9th Cir.

2012). Accordingly, while the complaint “does not need detailed factual allegations, a

plaintiff's obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitlement to relief’ requires more

than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of

action will not do.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).

“|FJactual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative

level.” Id.

In considering a Rule 12(c) motion, as with a 12(b)(6) motion, the district court

must view the facts presented in the pleadings and the inferences to be drawn from them

in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. NL Indus. v. Kaplan, 792 F.2d 896,

898 (9th Cir. 1986); In re Century 21-Re/Max Real Estate Adver. Claims Litig., 882 F.

Supp. 915, 921 (C.D. Cal. 1994). However, “[i|n keeping with these principles a court

considering a motion to dismiss can choose to begin by identifying pleadings that,

because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.

While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be

supported by factual allegations.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950

(2009): Moss v. United States Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009) (“[F]or a

complaint to survive a motion to dismiss, the non-conclusory ‘factual content,’ and

reasonable inferences from that content, must be plausibly suggestive of a claim entitling

the plaintiff to relief.”’) (citing Twombly and Iqbal). Ultimately, “[d]etermining whether

a complaint states a plausible claim for relief will . . . be a context-specific task that

requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.”

Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950. For purposes of a Rule 12(c) motion, the moving party

concedes the accuracy of the factual allegations of the complaint, but does not admit

other assertions that constitute conclusions of law or matters that would not be admissible

in evidence at trial. 5C Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Edward H. Cooper,

Federal Practice and Procedure § 1368 (3d ed. 2004).

Unless a court converts a Rule 12(b)(6) or 12(c) motion into a motion for summary

judgment, a court generally cannot consider material outside of the complaint (e.g., facts

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES —- GENERAL ‘<O’

Case No. 2:23-cv-07714-CAS-PDx Date June 2, 2025

Title Sascha B. Koch v. City of Los Angeles et al

presented in briefs, affidavits, or discovery materials). In re American Cont’]

Corp./Lincoln Sav. & Loan Sec. Litig., 102 F.3d 1524, 1537 (9th Cir. 1996), rev’d on

other grounds sub nom Lexecon, Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523

U.S. 26 (1998). A court may, however, consider exhibits submitted with or alleged in the

complaint and matters that may be judicially noticed pursuant to Federal Rule of

Evidence 201. Inre Silicon Graphics Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 970, 986 (9th Cir. 1999):

Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 689 (9th Cir. 2001).

IV. DISCUSSION

Defendants argue that plaintiffs third, fourth, fifth, and sixth claims (the “state law

claims”’) fail due to lack of compliance with California’s Government Claims Act, Cal.

Gov't Code § 900 et seq. (the “GCA”) and defendants’ immunity. Mot. at 3, 10.

Defendants also argue that the false arrest/imprisonment, Bane Act, and negligence

claims fail for independent reasons. Id. at 7. The Court addresses each issue in turn.

As an initial matter, the Court takes judicial notice of defendants’ Exhibit A, the

criminal court docket in The People of the State of California v. Sascha Benjamin Koch,

Los Angeles County Superior Court Case No. LAVLA095857-01. See dkt. 29-2. This is

because pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 201(b), the Court “may take notice of

proceedings in other courts, both within and without the federal judicial system, if those

proceedings have a direct relation to matters at issue.” U.S. ex rel. Robinson Rancheria

Citizens Council v. Borneo, Inc., 971 F.2d 244, 248 (9th Cir. 1992). Second, the Court

takes judicial notice of defendants’ Exhibit B, the claim submitted by plaintiff pursuant to

the GCA on February 14, 2023. Dkt. 29-3. It appears to the Court that the date of

submission of this claim is not subject to reasonable dispute and that the claim 1s a record

of a municipal administrative body. See Mack v. S. Bay Beer Distributors, Inc., 798 F.2d

1279, 1282 (9th Cir. 1986). Third, for the same reasons, the Court takes judicial notice of

plaintiff's Exhibit B, which is the City’s response to plaintiff's GCA claim, dated March

17, 2023. See id.; dkt. 35-3.

A. Government Claims Act

Defendants argue that the state law claims fail for lack of compliance with the

GCA. Mot. at 3. Defendants argue that plaintiffs state law claims accrued when he was

allegedly arrested, the premises were searched, his property was seized, and he was held

in custody for four days. Id. at 6. Defendants thus contend that plaintiff's claims accrued

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES —- GENERAL ‘<O’

Case No. 2:23-cv-07714-CAS-PDx Date June 2, 2025

Title “Sascha B. Koch v. City of Los Angeles et al_

on November 22, 2021, and any tort claim must have been presented to the City within

six months of that date (or within a year, if plaintiff had sought leave to file a late claim).

Id. Because plaintiff did not submit his tort claim to the City until February 14, 2023,

defendants assert that his state law claims fail. Id.

In opposition, plaintiff argues that the City waived its right to assert a statute of

limitations or GCA defense when it failed to raise the issue in its rejection of plaintiff's

claim on March 17, 2023. Opp. at 3. Plaintiff contends that his administrative claim was

submitted on February 14, 2023, within six months of the dismissal of his criminal case.

Id. at 4. Plaintiff states that the City denied his claim on March 17, 2023, but the denial

did not mention that the claim was untimely or notify plaintiff that he should seek leave

for additional time to file the clam. Id, Because the City failed to comply with the

notice provisions of Cal. Gov't Code § 911.3(a), plaintiff argues that the City is precluded

from raising the statute of limitations or GCA defense. Id.

The GCA “requires a claimant to present a claim to the public entity within a

specified time after accrual of the cause of action.” Phillips v. Desert Hosp. Dist., 49 Cal.

3d 699, 705 (1989). Under Cal. Gov't Code § 911.3(a) (“Section 911.3(a)”), where a

public entity receives an untimely claim, the entity has 45 days to provide written notice

to the claimant that his claim was not timely filed and that it is “being returned without

further action.” Cal. Gov't Code § 911.3(a). The statute directs that the written notice

“shall be in substantially the following form”:

The claim you presented to the (insert title of board or officer) on (indicate date) is

being returned because it was not presented within six months after the event or

occurrence as required by law. Because the claim was not presented within the

time allowed by law, no action was taken on the claim.

Your only recourse at this time is to apply without delay to (name of public entity)

for leave to present a late claim. Under some circumstances, leave to present a late

claim will be granted.

You may seek the advice of an attorney of your choice in connection with this

matter. If you desire to consult an attorney, you should do so immediately.

Id. (internal citations omitted). The following provision, Section 911.3(b), states that if

the public entity fails to provide written notice to the claimant as required by Section

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES —- GENERAL ‘<O’

Case No. 2:23-cv-07714-CAS-PDx Date June 2, 2025

Title “Sascha B. Koch v. City of Los Angeles et al_

911.3(a), “any defense as to the time limit for presenting a claim... 1s waived.” Cal.

Gov't Code § 911.3(b): see also Green v. State Ctr. Cmty. Coll. Dist., 34 Cal. App. 4th

1348, 1354 (1995) (“[T]he filing of a claim for damages which fails to comply

substantially with the [GCA] triggers a duty by the public entity to notify the potential

claimant of the claim’s insufficiency stating, with particularity, the defects or omissions.

If the public entity fails to send this notice, it waives any defenses as to the sufficiency of

the claim based upon a defect or omission.”) (emphasis in original).

Unlike the form of notice required by Section 911.3(a), the notice sent by the City

to reject plaintiff's GCA claim stated as follows:

The subject claim against the City has been referred to this office.

After reviewing the circumstances of the claim and the applicable law, it has been

determined that the claim should be denied.

This letter represents a formal notice to you that said claim has been denied. In

view of this action, we are required by law to give you the following warning:

***W ARNING***

“Subject to certain exceptions, you have only six (6) months from the date this

notice was personally delivered or deposited in the mail to file a court action

alleging state causes of action. The time within which federal causes of action

must be filed is governed by federal statutes.”

“You may seek the advice of an attorney of your choice in connection with this

matter. If you desire to consult an attorney, you should do so immediately.”

Dkt. 35-3. The notice provided by the City 1s not in “substantially” the same form as

Section 911.3(a). Specifically, it does not state that plaintiff's claim was denied because

it was untimely or that plaintiffs “only recourse at this time” is to apply for leave to

present a late claim. See Cal. Gov't Code § 911.3(a). Accordingly, as mandated by

Section 911.3(b), “any defense as to the time limit for presenting a claim... is waived.”

See also Kyles v. Baker, 72 F. Supp. 3d 1021, 1047 (N_D. Cal. 2014) (“The reason that

defendants have waived a timeliness defense here is that the notice sent to Kyles does not

comply with section 911.3(a). The notice completely omits the second paragraph of the

exemplary language provided in the statute.”); Phillips, 49 Cal. 3d at 711 (“[A]s [the

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES —- GENERAL ‘<O’

Case No. 2:23-cv-07714-CAS-PDx Date June 2, 2025

Title “Sascha B. Koch v. City of Los Angeles et al

hospital] failed to notify plaintiffs of any timeliness defects (§ 911.3, subd. (a)), the

hospital has similarly waived any defenses it might have raised on the ground of

plaintiffs’ asserted failure to present a timely claim (§ 911.3, subd. (b)).”’); Jackson v.

Brown, No. 1:13-CV-1055-LJO-SAB, 2015 WL 5522088, at *10, n.8 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 17,

2015), opinion amended and superseded in part, 134 F. Supp. 3d 1237 (E.D. Cal. 2015),

and rev'd in part sub nom. Hines v. Youseff, 914 F.3d 1218 (9th Cir. 2019) (Finding that

the public entity waived any timeliness defense under the GCA because “[t]he notice [it]

provided to Belton only states, in relevant part, that Belton’s ‘claim is accepted only to

the extent that it was presented no later than six months after the accrual of the cause of

action.” The notice 1s far from substantially similar to the language provided for in §

911.3(a).”). Accordingly, the Court finds that the City waived a timeliness defense to

plaintiff's state law claims because its response to plaintiff's GCA claim does not comply

with Section 911.3(a).

B. State Law Immunities

Defendants contend that they are immune from prosecution on the state law claims.

Mot. at 10. First, defendants argue that, pursuant to Cal. Gov't Code § 820.2, public

employees cannot be held liable for an act or omission that was the result of an exercise

of discretion. Id. Next, defendants assert that, pursuant to the immunity afforded by Cal.

Gov't Code § 821.6 and Cal. Civ. Code § 47, “any claims based on the prosecution itself,

including alleged misrepresentations during court, cannot form the basis of this civil

action.” Id. at 11. Defendants contend that, if plaintiff attempts to state a claim based on

the fact that felony charges were filed in lieu of misdemeanor charges, such prosecutorial

decisions are also immunized. Id.

In opposition, plaintiff contends that defendants cannot be immune from their

intentional decision to enter and search Unit 6 knowingly without a warrant. Opp. at 8.

In reply, defendants assert that plaintiff did not address their arguments in his

opposition brief. Reply at 4.

The Court addresses each statutory provision in turn. Cal. Gov't Code § 820.2

states: “Except as otherwise provided by statute, a public employee is not liable for an

injury resulting from his act or omission where the act or omission was the result of the

exercise of the discretion vested in him, whether or not such discretion be abused.”

However, discretionary immunity under California law only applies to “deliberate and

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES —- GENERAL ‘<O’

Case No. 2:23-cv-07714-CAS-PDx Date June 2, 2025

Title Sascha B. Koch v. City of Los Angeles et al

considered policy decisions, in which a [conscious] balancing [of] risks and

advantages... took place.” Caldwell v. Montoya, 10 Cal. 4th 972, 981 (1995) (emphasis

in original) (citation omitted). California cases “have carefully preserved the distinction

between policy and operational judgments,” rejecting claims of immunity for a “bus

driver’s decision not to intervene in one passenger’s violent assault against another” and

“a police officer’s negligent conduct of a traffic investigation once undertaken.” Id. at

981-982. Defendants have the burden to demonstrate “that they are entitled to § 820.2

immunity for a specific policy decision made by an employee who consciously balanced

the decision’s risks and benefits.” AE ex rel. Hernandez v. Cnty. of Tulare, 666 F.3d

631, 639 (9th Cir. 2012).

“Routine, discretionary decisions part of a person’s normal job duties are not

covered by this immunity.” Gogue v. City of Los Angeles, No. CV 09-02610 DMG

(EX), 2010 WL 11549706, at *16 (C.D. Cal. June 15, 2010). Rather, “immunity under

section 820.2 turns on the reasonableness of the conduct complained of, not simply

whether or not a public employee exercised his or her discretion.” Buckhalter v. Torres,

No. 2:17-CV-02072-KJM-AC, 2019 WL 3714576, at *12 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 7, 2019)

(citing Stoddard-Nunez v. City of Hayward, No. 3:13-CV-4490 KAW, 2013 WL

6776189, at *9 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 23, 2013)).

The Court finds that defendants have not met their burden to establish that

discretionary immunity applies to their alleged conduct. Defendants’ motion does not

identify a specific policy decision by any specific defendant or that a specific defendant

consciously balanced the risks and benefits of that decision. Even if defendants were to

identify such a policy decision, the Court finds that this issue is better decided on a

motion for summary judgment, where the Court will have a more complete record before

it. See Ordonez v. Stanley, 495 F. Supp. 3d 855, 869 (C.D. Cal. 2020) (Finding that,

because defendants had not met their burden to demonstrate § 820.2 immunity, “the

Court cannot conclude Section 820.2 applies based merely on the pleadings before it, but

that issue may be raised at a later stage of this litigation.””); United Motors Int'l, Inc. v.

Hartwick, No. CV 17-00243 BRO (EX), 2017 WL 888304, at *9 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 6,

2017) (“At this time, the Court cannot find, based merely on the pleadings before it, that

the Government Defendants are absolutely immune... the factual basis pleaded does not

appear to rest entirely on the exercise of protected governmental duties or functions.”).

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES —- GENERAL ‘<O’

Case No. 2:23-cv-07714-CAS-PDx Date June 2, 2025

Title “Sascha B. Koch v. City of Los Angeles et al

Additionally, the Court concludes that defendants are not immune from plaintiffs

claims pursuant to Cal. Gov't Code § 821.6. Cal. Gov't Code § 821.6 states that “[a]

public employee is not liable for injury caused by his instituting or prosecuting any

judicial or administrative proceeding within the scope of his employment, even if he acts

maliciously and without probable cause.” However, the Ninth Circuit, relying on

Sullivan v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 12 Cal. 3d 710, 721 (1974), has held that § 821.6

immunity only applies to claims of malicious prosecution. Garmon v. Cnty. of Los

Angeles, 828 F.3d 837, 847 (9th Cir. 2016). Here, plaintiff does not bring a state law

claim for malicious prosecution, and as such, § 821.6 does not apply. See Ordonez v.

Stanley, 495 F. Supp. 3d 855, 868 (C.D. Cal. 2020) (same).

Finally, the Court finds that Cal. Civ. Code § 47 does not render defendants

immune from all of plaintiff's state law claims, but may immunize statements made in

plaintiff's criminal proceedings. In pertinent part, Cal. Civ. Code § 47 states:

A privileged publication or broadcast is one made:

(a) In the proper discharge of an official duty.

(b) In any (1) legislative proceeding, (2) judicial proceeding, (3) in any other

official proceeding authorized by law, or (4) in the initiation or course of any other

proceeding authorized by law and reviewable pursuant to Chapter 2 (commencing

with Section 1084) of Title 1 of Part 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure, except as

follows...

Cal. Civ. Code § 47. “[S]ection 47(b) operates to bar civil liability for any tort claim

based upon a privileged communication, with the exception of malicious prosecution.”

Hagberg v. California Fed. Bank, 32 Cal. 4th 350, 375 (2004). The privilege “protects

attorneys, Judges, jurors, witnesses, and other court personnel.” Mattco Forge, Inc. v.

Arthur Young & Co., 5 Cal. App. 4th 392, 402 (1992). “The usual formulation is that the

privilege applies to any communication (1) made in judicial or quasi-judicial

proceedings; (2) by litigants or other participants authorized by law; (3) to achieve the

objects of the litigation: and (4) that have some connection or logical relation to the

action.” Silberg v. Anderson, 50 Cal. 3d 205, 212 (1990), as modified (Mar. 12, 1990).

Defendants appear to argue that any statements made by Vargas, Brinkman, and

Towe in plaintiff's criminal case are privileged. To the extent that plaintiff's remaining

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES —- GENERAL ‘<O’

Case No. 2:23-cv-07714-CAS-PDx Date June 2, 2025

Title Sascha B. Koch v. City of Los Angeles et al

state law claims (the Bane Act claim and the ITED claim) are based on statements made

by the officers in plaintiff's criminal proceedings, the Court finds that these statements

are protected by the litigation privilege in Cal. Civ. Code § 47(b).? See Santana v. Cnty.

of Yuba, No. 2:15-CV-00794-KJM-EFB, 2016 WL 1268107, at *22 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 31,

2016) (“[T]he defendants’ testimony in the criminal trial falls squarely within the

confines of section 47(b).”). However, to the extent that plaintiff's state law claims are

based on the officers’ other alleged conduct, including entering Unit 6 knowingly without

a warrant, the Court finds that Cal. Civ. Code § 47 does not apply.

C. False Arrest/Imprisonment Claim

Defendants argue that plaintiff's fourth claim for false arrest/imprisonment is

barred by the statute of limitations. Mot. at 6. In opposition, plaintiff states that he will

voluntarily dismiss the false arrest/imprisonment claim. Opp. at 1. Therefore, the Court

does not reach this issue.

D. Bane Act Claim

Defendants argue that, to the extent that plaintiff's Bane Act claim is based on an

alleged Fifth Amendment violation, it fails as a matter of law. Mot. at 7. Specifically,

defendants contend that the only remedy for alleged Miranda violations is exclusion of

statements from criminal court proceedings, while no civil remedy 1s available. Id.

In opposition, plaintiff argues that the Bane Act claim is not “solely premised” on

defendants’ failure to provide a Miranda warning. Opp. at 6. Plaintiff asserts that the

complaint alleges that Brinkman and Towe specifically intended to violate plaintiff's

Fourth Amendment rights by “entering the unit without a warrant, searching the unit and

3 The Court notes that Cal. Civ. Code § 47 does not apply to plaintiffs Section 1983

claim, as “[i]t is well settled... that the California litigation privilege does not apply to a

federal cause of action.” Carnegie v. City of Los Angeles Dep't of Animal Servs., No.

14-7053-DMG-AGR«x, 2015 WL 13915968, at *6 (C_D. Cal. Apr. 21, 2015). See also

Kimes v. Stone, 84 F.3d 1121, 1127 (9th Cir. 1996) (California litigation privilege does

not bar plaintiff's § 1983 claim due to the Supremacy Clause). Further, under Section

1983, “government investigators may be liable for violating the Fourth Amendment when

they submit false and material information in a warrant affidavit.” Galbraith v. Cnty. of

Santa Clara, 307 F.3d 1119, 1126 (9th Cir. 2002).

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES —- GENERAL ‘<O’

Case No. 2:23-cv-07714-CAS-PDx Date June 2, 2025

Title Sascha B. Koch v. City of Los Angeles et al

seizing items within it without a warrant, and specifically threatening [p|laintiff outside

the unit to obtain passcodes to safes inside the unit that [they] did not have a warrant to

search.” Id. at 5-6. Further, plaintiff contends that the City may be held liable for the

Bane Act violations of its employees. Id. at 6. Plaintiff asserts that these allegations

have been confirmed through discovery, and requests leave to amend the complaint if the

Court requires more facts for this claim. Id. at 6-7.

In reply, defendants contend that plaintiff did not rebut their arguments regarding

the Bane Act, and therefore “the issue is conceded.” Reply at 2.

“The Bane Act civilly protects individuals from conduct aimed at interfering with

rights that are secured by federal or state law, where the interference is carried out by

threats, intimidation or coercion. Section 52.1 provides a cause of action for violations of

a plaintiff's state or federal civil rights committed by threats, intimidation, or coercion.”

Reese v. Cnty. of Sacramento, 888 F.3d 1030, 1040 (9th Cir. 2018) (citations and

quotations omitted). The Bane Act requires “a specific intent to violate the arrestee’s

right to freedom from unreasonable seizure,” but “does not require the “threat,

intimidation or coercion’ element of the claim to be transactionally independent from the

constitutional violation alleged.” Id. at 1043.

A plaintiff can “adequately state[| a cause of action under section 52.1 where they

warrantless, unconsented searches and unlawful detention.” Id. at 1044 (quoting

Venegas v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 32 Cal. 4th 820, 843 (2004)). Accordingly, the Court

finds that plaintiff's complaint adequately alleges a Bane Act claim based on an allegedly

unreasonable search of his premises and unreasonable search and seizure of property

inside his premises. Compl. § 85. Further, plaintiff alleges that defendants acted with

malicious intent and reckless and callous indifference to plaintiff's rights. Id. § 100. See

also John v. Lake Cnty., No. C 18-06935 WHA, 2019 WL 859227, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Feb.

22, 2019) (“Plaintiffs have adequately pled [a Bane Act claim] that defendant officers

searched their homes without a warrant or probable cause, threatened violence, and

alleged that it was done willfully and maliciously.”).

Thus, while the complaint contains a Bane Act claim independent of the Miranda-

related allegations, defendants argue that the Bane Act claim should be dismissed to the

extent it relies on a Miranda violation. Defendants assert that, under Vega v. Tekoh, 597

US. 134, 152 (2022), a Miranda violation can never form the basis of a Bane Act claim.

Mot. at 7. As one federal district court stated, “Vega strongly suggests, even if it does

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES —- GENERAL ‘<O’

Case No. 2:23-cv-07714-CAS-PDx Date June 2, 2025

Title Sascha B. Koch v. City of Los Angeles et al

not outright hold, that Miranda warnings are not the kind of ‘law of the United States’

that are actionable in civil suits.” Young v. City of Menifee, No. EDCV 17-1630-JGB-

SPx, 2023 WL 11053618, at *21 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 14, 2023) (citation omitted). While

Vega held that a Miranda violation cannot form the basis of a Section 1983 claim, there

appears to be no authority addressing the impact of Vega on potential Bane Act claims.

The Court declines to reach this issue, as dismissal is warranted on an alternate basis.

Assuming arguendo that Miranda can constitute predicate federal law for a Bane

Act claim, the Court still finds that plaintiff fails to state a Bane Act claim based on

Miranda. This is because “the Fifth Amendment is not violated ‘unless and until

allegedly coerced statements were used against the suspect in a criminal case’... there is a

completed violation of such a right only if the testimony is used at trial[.]’” Chavez v.

Robinson, 12 F.4th 978, 995 (9th Cir. 2021) (citation omitted) (discussing Miranda

violations in the Section 1983 context). Here, plaintiff has not alleged that any un-

Mirandized statements he made to the officers were used at trial. Rather, his criminal

case was dismissed before trial, on August 25, 2022. Compl. 48. Accordingly, the

Court dismisses plaintiff's Bane Act claim only to the extent that it is predicated on

alleged Miranda violations. See Young, 2023 WL 11053618, at *22 (same).

E. Negligence Claim

Defendants argue that plaintiff's fifth claim for negligence fails as a matter of law.

Mot. at 7. In opposition, plaintiff argues that he will voluntarily dismiss the negligence

claim. Opp. at 1. Therefore, the Court does not reach this issue.

F. HED

Plaintiff asserts that the complaint adequately states an ITED claim. Opp. at 7.

Because defendants did not move for dismissal of this claim, other than their argument

that it failed to comply with the GCA, the Court does not reach this issue.

V. CONCLUSION

In accordance with the foregoing, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN

PART defendants’ motion. The Court GRANTS the motion to the extent it seeks

dismissal of state law claims based on defendants’ statements in criminal proceedings.

The Court GRANTS the motion to dismiss plaintiff's Bane Act claim only to the extent

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES — GENERAL ‘oO’

Case No. 2:23-cv-07714-CAS-PDx Date June 2, 2025

Title Sascha B. Koch v. City of Los Angeles et al

that it is based on a Miranda violation. The Court DENIES the motion in all other

respects.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

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