Newcomer v. Mountain

IN THE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

SPRINGFIELD DIVISION

BOSTYN NEWCOMER,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 3:24-cv-03286-JEH

BRANT MOUNTAIN,

Defendant.

Order

This matter is now before the Court on Defendant Brant Mountain’s Motion

for Judgment on the Pleadings under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c). (Doc.

27). For the reasons stated below, Defendant’s Motion is GRANTED.

I

On October 15, 2024, Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, filed a Complaint under 42

U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that Defendant Mountain, a correctional lieutenant at

Western Illinois Correctional Center, violated his Eighth Amendment rights by

using excessive force against him on May 29, 2024. (Docs. 1 and 20).

On May 6, 2025, Defendant filed a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings

arguing that judgment should be entered in his favor because Plaintiff’s claim is

barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). (Doc. 27). The Clerk issued a

Notice warning Plaintiff that if he failed to respond to Defendant’s Motion within

fourteen days, the Court may grant the motion and dismiss the case. (Doc. 28). To

date, Plaintiff has not responded to Defendant’s Motion or requested additional

time to do so.

II

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) allows a party to move for judgment

on the pleadings “after the pleadings are closed – but early enough not to delay

trial.” FED. R. CIV. P. 12(c). Pleadings “include the complaint, the answer, and any

written instruments attached as exhibits.” Federated Mut. Ins. Co. v. Coyle Mech.

Supply, Inc., 983 F.3d 307, 312-13 (7th Cir. 2020). A motion for judgment on the

pleadings is subject to the same standard as a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss and

is to be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Nat’l Fid. Life

Ins. Co. v. Karaganis, 811 F.2d 357, 358 (7th Cir. 1987) (citing Republic Steel Corp. v.

Pennsylvania Eng’g Corp., 785 F.2d 174, 177 n. 2 (7th Cir. 1986)). To survive a Rule

12(b)(6) motion, a complaint must contain sufficient facts, accepted as true, to state

a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).

A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows

the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the

misconduct alleged. Id. “A motion for judgment on the pleadings may be granted

only if the moving party clearly establishes that no material issue of fact remains

to be resolved and that he or she is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Nat’l

Fid. Life Ins. Co., 811 F.2d at 358 (citing Flora v. Home Fed. Savings & Loan Ass’n, 685

F.2d 209, 211 (7th Cir. 1982)); Bannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 503 F.3d 623, 628 (7th Cir.

2007).

III

In his Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant used excessive force

against him on May 29, 2024. (Doc. 1). An Adjustment Committee hearing was

held on June 6, 2024. Id. at p. 16. According to the Adjustment Committee hearing

summary, Plaintiff was found guilty of assaulting a staff member, intimidation or

threats, disobeying a direct order essential to safety and security, and insolence

and sentenced to three months of C-grade, two months of segregation, the

revocation of three months GCC or SCT, and six months contact visits restriction.

Id. at pp. 16-17.

In his Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, Defendant argues that

Plaintiff’s claims are barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), as a favorable

judgment on Plaintiff’s claim would necessarily imply the invalidity of his

disciplinary conviction. (Doc. 27).

In Heck, the Supreme Court held that, to challenge the validity of a

conviction or sentence in a § 1983 action, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the

sentence of conviction has been reversed or invalidated by another tribunal or

called into question by the issuance of a federal habeas corpus petition. Id. at 487;

see also Savory v. Cannon, 947 F.3d 409 (7th Cir. 2020) (finding that Heck’s favorable

termination requirement controls outcome whenever § 1983 claim implies

invalidity of conviction or sentence, regardless of availability of habeas relief). The

Supreme Court further held that “[a] claim for damages bearing that relationship

to a conviction or sentence that has not been so invalidated is not cognizable under

§ 1983.” Heck, 512 U.S. at 487 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).

Under Heck and Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641 (1997), a prisoner deprived

of good credit time in a disciplinary proceeding cannot bring a suit for damages

that would imply the invalidity of the disciplinary conviction and sanctions.

Whether the plaintiff asserts that his disciplinary conviction and sanctions are not

supported by evidence or that he was denied a procedural protection, he cannot

bring a suit for damages or declaratory relief unless “the conviction or sentence

has previously been invalidated.” Balisok, 520 U.S. at 643, 648. Heck applies even

when a plaintiff has been released from custody and can no longer utilize habeas

proceedings to invalidate the revocation. See Savory, 947 F.3d at 419-428.

As Heck instructs, Plaintiff must demonstrate that the disciplinary

conviction and related revocation of good time credits (GCC) has been vacated.

However, exhibits submitted with his Complaint and the docket in his case

pending before the state court in Brown County show that his disciplinary

conviction has not been vacated. Plaintiff attached a copy of a Writ of Certiorari as

an exhibit in support of his claim. (Doc. 1 at pp. 20-35). The Writ was filed in Brown

County on August 23, 2024, and was assigned Case No. 2024MR7. Id. The Writ

asked the State Court to “vacate the disciplinary decisions” against him and to

return him to “the position he was in before the disciplinary sanctions were

imposed.” Id. at p. 34. The Writ describes his claims against Defendant Mountain

regarding the events of May 29, 2024, and alleges officers used excessive force. Id.

at pp. 24, 27-28. The Brown County docket shows that the state court did not vacate

his parole revocation and has taken no action on the Writ. (Doc. 27-1; Docket for

Case No. 2024MR7). A district court may take judicial notice of matters of public

record when considering a motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Rule

12(c). United States v. Wood, 925 F.2d 1580, 1582 (7th Cir. 1991).

The Court finds that Plaintiff failed to show his disciplinary violation was

vacated or that his good time credits were restored. As such, Plaintiff’s claims are

barred by Heck. Plaintiff did not file a response to Defendant’s Motion or present

any arguments or documentation to the contrary. Therefore, Defendant’s Motion

for Judgment on the Pleadings is GRANTED. This case is DISMISSED WITHOUT

PREJUDICE.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:

(1) Defendant's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings [27] is GRANTED.

Defendant Mountain is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Plaintiff takes

nothing. Each party is to bear their own attorney's fees, costs, and expenses. The

Clerk is DIRECTED to enter judgment and close this case.

(2) Although Plaintiff's case has been dismissed, he remains responsible

for the remainder of the $350.00 filing fee. (10/15/2024).

(3) If Plaintiff wishes to appeal this judgment, he must file a notice of

appeal with this Court within 30 days of the entry of judgment. FED. R. APP. P.

4(a)(4).

(4) If Plaintiff wishes to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal, his motion

for leave to appeal in forma pauperis must identify the issues he will present on

appeal to assist the Court in determining whether the appeal is taken in good

faith. FED. R. APP. P. 24(a)(1)(c); Celske v. Edwards, 164 F.3d 396, 398 (7th Cir.

1999) (an appellant should be given an opportunity to submit a statement of his

grounds for appealing so that the district judge "can make a responsible

assessment of the issue of good faith."); Walker v. O'Brien, 216 F.3d 626, 632 (7th

Cir. 2000) (providing that a good faith appeal is an appeal that "a reasonable

person could suppose . . . has some merit" from a legal perspective). If Plaintiff

chooses to appeal, he will be liable for the $605.00 appellate filing fee regardless

of the outcome of the appeal.

It is so ordered.

Entered: June 3, 2025

s/Jonathan E. Hawley

U.S. District Judge