Vela v. Lewis

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT June 03, 2025

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS Nathan Ochsner, Clerk

HOUSTON DIVISION

RODOLPHO VELA, §

§

Plaintiff, §

§

VS. § CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:23-CV-3376

§

ANTHONY LEWIS, CHANCE TALBOTT, §

LOUIS MEDINA, LELAND FAIRCHILD, §

and CHRISTOPHER ADOLPH, §

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

This is a § 1983 suit arising from Plaintiff Rodolfo Vela, Sr.’s encounter with several

members of the Harris County Sheriff’s Office. Vela brings claims for excessive force, fabrication

of evidence, failure to intervene, and civil conspiracy.

Before the Court are three Motions for Summary Judgment: one filed by Defendants Louis

Medina and Christopher Adolph (ECF No. 45), a second filed by Defendant Leland Fairchild (ECF

No. 46), and a third filed by Defendants Chance Talbott and Anthony Lewis (ECF No. 47). For

the reasons that follow, the Court finds that all three Motions for Summary Judgment should be

denied.

I. BACKGROUND

a. Factual History

At around 4:00 a.m. on September 9, 2021, two Harris County Sheriff’s Office (HSCO)

deputies, Defendants Anthony Lewis and Chance Talbott, initiated a traffic stop of Plaintiff’s son,

Rudy Vela Jr. (“Rudy Jr.”) for speeding. ECF No. 48-7 (HCSO Incident Report) at 4. Defendants

then engaged in a high-speed pursuit of Rudy Jr. which reached speeds of 100 miles per hour. Id.

During the pursuit, Rudy Jr. called his father, Vela, who told him to surrender to the police. ECF

No. 54-2 (Vela Depo. Tr.) at 18:13-25. The two men agreed that Rudy Jr. would drive to Vela’s

house and surrender there so Vela could “see what they were going to do.” Id. at 19:1-20:12. Vela

exited his house wearing only slacks to observe his son’s arrest. Id. at 36:5-8; see also ECF No.

48-5 (Lewis Body Camera) at 4:05:23. Vela was holding his cell phone when Defendants arrived,

and he again instructed his son to surrender to the police. ECF No. 54-2 at 40:6-15.

Rudy Jr. pulled into the driveway of Vela’s house, with Deputy Talbott pulling in directly

behind him and Deputy Lewis parking on the street. ECF No. 48-4 (Talbott Body Camera) at

4:05:11; ECF No. 48-5 at 4:05:19. After Rudy Jr. pulled into Vela’s driveway, he promptly

complied with the officers’ instructions to exit his vehicle and get on the ground with his hands

visible. Id.; see also ECF No. 48-1 (Talbott Aff.) ¶ 6 (“The driver and sole occupant of the pursued

vehicle complied with commands to get out of the vehicle and lay on the ground.”).

Body camera footage shows that when Defendants Lewis and Talbott arrived at his house,

Vela was standing under a tree in his front yard. ECF No. 48-4 at 4:05:13; ECF No. 48-5 at 4:05:23.

As Defendants approached Rudy Jr., Vela made no movements towards the officers or Rudy Jr.,

did not speak to the officers, and kept his hands visible at all times. ECF No. 48-5 at 4:05:19-27;

ECF No. 48-4 at 4:05:10-27. Vela contends that he was not standing in the officers’ way and that

the officers had a clear path from their vehicles to Rudy Jr. See ECF No. 54-3 (Image from Lewis

Body Camera at 4:05:19); ECF No. 54-4 (Image from Talbott Body Camera at 4:05:22).

Yet instead of taking a straight route toward Rudy Jr., Defendant Lewis veered left toward

Vela and pushed him to the ground. ECF No. 48-5 at 4:05:23-25; ECF No. 48-4 at 4:05:21-23. As

he ran toward Vela, Defendant Lewis shouted “get out of the way, get out the way” just one to two

seconds before he made contact and repeated the command after he pushed Vela to the ground.

ECF No. 48-5 at 4:05:23-27. Shortly before the contact, Deputy Talbott yelled a series of

commands including “let me see your fucking hands, get down, get, move.” ECF No. 48-4 at

4:05:10-18; see also ECF No. 54-5 (Talbott Depo. Tr.) at 117:13-118:9 (explaining that “move”

was the only portion of the commands directed at Vela). Deputy Talbott asserts that he also

directed Vela to move with his left hand, although the hand movement is not clear in the body

camera footage. ECF No. 48-1 (Talbott Aff.) ¶ 6.

Defendants Lewis and Talbott proceeded to handcuff Rudy Jr. while Vela lay on the ground

in pain. Despite allegedly considering Vela a threat, Vela was at no point frisked, handcuffed, or

placed under arrest. See ECF No. 48-5 at 4:05-27. Instead, Vela, a 66-year-old man, remained on

the ground in pain and was later transported to a clinic in an ambulance because he was unable to

stand up on his own. ECF No. 54-2 at 52:7-15

While Vela lay on the ground in pain, Deputy Lewis stood over him yelling and pointing

his finger. ECF No. 48-5 at 4:06-07; see also ECF No. 54-8 (Image from Lewis Body Camera at

4:07:55). Deputy Lewis also mocked Vela in conversations with his fellow officers, commenting

“he’s just enjoying the view I gave him from the ground.” Id. at 4:14:13-19; id. at 4:26:26-38

(“He’s saying that his shoulders hurt. I mean, maybe next time his turd-ass son decides to run from

the police he won’t get in the way”). When superior officers arrived on the scene, Deputy Lewis

admitted “I knocked his dad to the ground pretty hard” while he “just stood there.” ECF No. 48-5

at 4:08:45-53; see also id. at 4:11:05-25 (admitting that Vela was “standing right here” in his yard

and “just stood there” when Deputy Lewis “hit him pretty hard”). He also remarked to Deputy

Talbott, “dude, I hit his dad hard, bro.” Id. at 4:09:30. Later, Deputy Lewis joked that he gave Vela

“a pretty good little jolt” but “he got out of our way though.” Id. at 4:13:55-14:05.

Defendants Leland Fairchild and Louis Medina, sergeants in the Harris County Sheriff’s

Office, and Defendant Christopher Adolph, a lieutenant in the Harris County Sheriff’s Office,

arrived on the scene after Deputy Lewis pushed Vela to the ground. Body camera footage captured

the officers’ discussions about Deputy Lewis’s use of force. Vela characterizes these discussions

as attempts by Deputies Lewis and Talbott to get their stories straight and brainstorm how they

would justify the use of force. They agreed that they told Vela to get out of the way multiple times.

ECF No. 48-5 at 4:09, 4:13. They also agreed that Vela had put Deputy Talbott “in a really bad

spot” by standing “in between” the officers and Rudy Jr. Id. at 4:13:00-10, 4:40. After hearing

Deputy Lewis’s account of events, Sergeant Fairchild told Deputy Lewis that “you need to go for

interfering” when talking to the district attorney. Id. at 4:12:10-25. Sergeant Fairchild then

reiterated to Deputy Talbott that the deputies “need to go for interfering at this point” because

“we’ve used force.” Id. at 4:13:30-38. Defendants argue that Sergeant Fairchild’s full statement

that “you need to go for interfering at this point. We used force as well so” was intended to remind

Talbott and Lewis to consider all actors in their investigation and seek appropriate charges. ECF

No. 48-3 (Fairchild Aff.) ¶ 7.

Deputy Talbott called the assistant district attorney (“ADA”) to seek charges while Deputy

Lewis, Sergeant Fairchild, and others listened. ECF No. 48-4 at 4:47:50. Deputy Talbott told the

ADA that Vela was standing in the driveway, ECF No. 48-4 at 4:48:50, even though he actually

remained under the tree in his front yard during the entire encounter, ECF No. 48-5 at 4:05. Deputy

Talbott also told the ADA that Vela “kept walking into the line of fire”:

As we got out, he walked directly between the path of us and the driver, and we gave him

multiple directions to get out of the way. He failed to move, kept walking into the – into

the line of fire. One of my deputies had to actually physically move him out of the way in

order to make contact, so we want to get interfering on the father as well.

ECF No. 48-4 at 4:49:10-40; see also id. at 4:50:05-10 (repeating that Vela “walked into our line

of fire, directly between us and the driver”). Body camera footage shows, however, that Vela did

not move from his spot under the tree until Deputy Lewis pushed him. ECF No. 48-5 at 4:05. In

his deposition, Deputy Talbott admitted that his statements to the ADA were “an error.” ECF No.

54-5 at 74:25-75:16; see also ECF No. 48-1 ¶ 9. As Deputy Talbott spoke to the ADA, Sergeant

Fairchild told the other officers listening to the call, “I’ll call the chief, they’ll take it. This is clear

cut and dry interfering. Regardless of use of force, it’s interfering, but especially when you have

used force, you have to, you need charges.” ECF No. 48-4 at 4:50:10-25. The ADA agreed to the

interference charge on Vela. Id. at 4:55:10-40.

In the HCSO Incident Report, Deputy Talbott, Deputy Lewis, Sergeant Fairchild, and

Lieutenant Adolph all made or approved statements about the encounter with Vela. See ECF No.

48-7. Deputy Talbott reported that Vela was “standing in the driveway,” “was positioned between

myself and the driver,” “disregarded” multiple commands to move, and “had to be physically

moved by Deputy Lewis in order to reach and detain the driver.” Id. at 4. In a supplemental report

that listed Sergeant Fairchild as the supervisor, Deputy Lewis stated that Vela was “standing

between deputies and the male suspect,” was “directly in our line of site [sic] and fire,” and

“ignored verbal commands” to back up. Id. at 11. Deputy Lewis also stated that Vela “fell

backwards to the ground” as Deputy Lewis “redirceted [sic] [Vela] back from the traffic stop.” Id.

Before these reports were filed, Lieutenant Adolph reviewed them to “make sure that everything

is correct” and “consistent” with the body camera footage. ECF No. 54-10 (Adolph Depo. Tr.) at

74:2-25. Lieutenant Adolph later admitted that details in the reports were not consistent with the

body camera footage. Id. at 192:3-193:9, 197:5-198:4.

Deputy Talbott repeated his statements in a probable cause affidavit that was used to secure

an arrest warrant against Vela, including that Vela “was standing in the driveway between the

affiant [Deputy Talbott] and the Vela Jr. defendant,” “was given multiple commands to move,

which he disregarded,” and “had to be physically moved in order to reach and detain Vela Jr.”

ECF No. 48-10 at 1-2. The probable cause affidavit was witnessed by Sergeant Medina, indicating

he reviewed the document and determined it “sounded like an accurate depiction of what

occurred.” ECF No 54-6 at 50:11-52:12.

Vela was charged with interference with public duties, a Class B misdemeanor, but the

charge was dismissed less than two weeks later. ECF No. 48-11.

b. Procedural History

Vela brought this lawsuit on September 8, 2023. ECF No. 1. Vela filed his First Amended

Complaint on September 19, 2023 with claims under § 1983 alleging excessive force, fabrication

of evidence, failure to intervene, and civil conspiracy. ECF No. 9.

Defendants Anthony Lewis and Chance Talbott filed a Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 20, as

did Defendants Christopher Adolph, Louis Medina, and Leland Fairchild, ECF No. 14. On March

6, 2024, the Court issued a Memorandum & Order denying Lewis and Talbott’s Motion to Dismiss

and granting in part and denying in part Adolph, Medina, and Fairchild’s Motion to Dismiss. ECF

No. 28. The Court dismissed the fabrication of evidence claims against Adolph and Medina. Id.

Now before the Court are Defendant Medina and Adolph’s Motion for Summary Judgment

(ECF No. 45), Defendant Fairchild’s Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 46), and Defendant

Talbott and Lewis’s Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 47).

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment under Rule 56 “is proper ‘if the pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no

genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter

of law.’” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)). A

genuine issue as to a material fact arises “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return

a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).

The Court must draw all “reasonable inferences . . . in favor of the nonmoving party, but the

nonmoving party ‘cannot defeat summary judgment with conclusory allegations, unsubstantiated

assertions, or only a scintilla of evidence.’” Hathaway v. Bazany, 507 F.3d 312, 319 (5th Cir. 2007)

(quoting Turner v. Baylor Richardson Medical Center, 476 F.3d 337, 343 (5th Cir. 2007)).

“[T]he movant bears the initial responsibility of demonstrating the absence of a genuine

issue of material fact with respect to those issues on which the movant bears the burden of proof

at trial.” Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Avenell, 66 F.3d 715, 718 (5th Cir. 1995). “For any matter on

which the non-movant would bear the burden of proof at trial, however, the movant may merely

point to the absence of evidence and thereby shift to the non-movant the burden of demonstrating

by competent summary judgment proof that there is an issue of material fact warranting trial.” Id.

at 718–19.

III. ANALYSIS

In each of the three summary judgment motions, Defendants raise similar arguments.

Specifically, Defendants argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity on each of Vela’s claims

and that Vela’s punitive damages claim fails as a matter of law. ECF No. 45 at 5; ECF No. 46 at

5; ECF No. 47 at 5.

Qualified immunity is an affirmative defense that shields a government official “from civil

damages liability unless [he] violated a statute of constitutional right that was clearly established

at the time of the challenged conduct.” Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 664 (2012). When a

defendant invokes qualified immunity, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the defense does not

apply. See King v. Handorf, 821 F.3d 650, 653 (5th Cir. 2016); see also Dyer v. Houston, 964 F.3d

374, 380 (5th Cir. 2020) (plaintiff “must rebut the defense [of qualified immunity] by establishing

a genuine fact [dispute] as to whether the official’s allegedly wrongful conduct violated clearly

established law”).

To overcome a claim of qualified immunity, the plaintiff must “(1) allege facts that ‘make

out a violation of a constitutional right,’ and (2) show that the ‘right at issue was clearly established

at the time of the defendants’ alleged misconduct.’” Espinal v. City of Houston, 96 F.4th 741, 748

(5th Cir. 2024). At the summary judgment stage, the evidence that shows potential violation of a

constitutional right must be taken “in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury.”

Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650, 655-56 (2014).

a. Excessive Force

Vela asserts a claim against Deputy Lewis for excessive force in violation of the Fourth

Amendment.

i. Constitutional Violation

Starting with the first prong of the qualified immunity analysis, the Court, viewing the facts

in the light most favorable to Vela, considers whether Deputy Lewis’s actions violated Vela’s

Fourth Amendment rights. Individuals have a Fourth Amendment right to be free from excessive

force in the course of an investigatory stop or arrest. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989);

Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985); Tarver v. City of Edna, 410 F.3d 745, 751 (5th Cir. 2005).

To sustain a claim for excessive force under § 1983, a plaintiff must plead an “(1) injury (2) which

resulted directly and only from a use of force that was clearly excessive, and (3) the excessiveness

of which was clearly unreasonable.” Freeman v. Gore, 483 F.3d 404, 416 (5th Cir. 2007) (quoting

Tarver, 410 F.3d at 751).

Deputy Lewis contests only the third element, arguing that the use of force was “objectively

reasonable.” ECF No. 47 at 7. The reasonableness of force is determined by analyzing “the facts

and circumstances of each particular case.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 396. Relevant considerations are

“the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of

the officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by

flight.” Id. “The ‘reasonableness’ of a particular use of force must be judged from the perspective

of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.” Id. Thus, the

overarching question is “whether the officers’ actions are ‘objectively reasonable’ in light of the

facts and circumstances confronting them.” Id. at 397.

On the first Graham factor, the severity of the crimes at issue, Deputy Lewis points to the

“felony pursuit [of Rudy Jr.] where speeds reached 100 miles per hour.” ECF No. 47 at 11.

However, Vela was not suspected of any crime during the traffic stop, and the sole target of the

stop was Rudy Jr. The severity of Rudy Jr.’s alleged crime is therefore not the relevant metric for

the excessive force analysis as to Vela. See, e.g., Newman v. Guedry, 703 F.3d 757, 762 (5th Cir.

2012) (“As to the severity of the underlying crime, Willie, not Newman, was pulled over for a

mere traffic violation. Mario, not Newman, was arrested for unpaid parking tickets.”).

Instead, the relevant charge for the severity of the crimes factor is interference with public

duties, a Class B misdemeanor. Under the facts and circumstances of this case, a reasonable jury

could conclude that the interference with public duties charge brought against Vela was pretextual.

Alternatively, a reasonable jury could conclude, consistent with Fifth Circuit caselaw, that the use

of force was excessive for such a low-level crime. See Westfall v. Luna, 903 F.3d 534, 547 (5th

Cir. 2018) (“Westfall was arrested for interference with public duties—a minor offense.”);

Trammell v. Fruge, 868 F.3d 332, 340 (5th Cir. 2017) (“[P]ublic intoxication is a Class C

misdemeanor, see Tex. Penal Code § 49.02(c), and thus is a minor offense militating against the

use of force”); Reyes v. Bridgewater, 362 F. App’x 403, 407 n.5 (5th Cir. 2010) (finding the

severity factor militated against use of force where the alleged crime was “likely at most a

misdemeanor”).

Turning to the second Graham factor, a fact question exists as to whether Vela posed an

immediate threat to the safety of officers or others. Deputy Lewis points to the overall context of

the high-speed pursuit of Rudy Jr. at 4:00 a.m. “suddenly terminating at Vela’s residence with

Vela alone approaching the deputies in the driveway.” ECF No. 47 at 11. But viewing the facts in

the light most favorable to Vela, it is not clear that a reasonable officer would have perceived Vela

as a threat. A jury viewing the body camera footage could find that Deputy Lewis’s account of

“Vela alone approaching the deputies in the driveway” is contradicted by the video evidence. Body

camera footage shows that when Deputies Lewis and Talbott arrived at his house, Vela was

standing under a tree in his front yard. ECF No. 48-4 at 4:05:13; ECF No. 48-5 at 4:05:23.

Furthermore, as Defendants approached Rudy Jr., Vela made no movements towards the officers

or Rudy Jr., did not speak to the officers, and kept his hands visible at all times. ECF No. 48-5 at

4:05:19-27; ECF No. 48-4 at 4:05:10-27. At minimum, there is a fact issue as to whether a

reasonable officer would have perceived Vela as a threat and therefore a fact issue as to whether

the dangerousness factor bears in favor of using force against Vela.

As to the third and final Graham factor, it is clear that Vela was not attempting to flee or

actively resisting arrest. Deputy Lewis concedes that “Vela did not resist” but asserts that “he

certainly did not comply with directions to move and get out of the way.” ECF No. 47 at 11. The

Fifth Circuit has explained that “officers may consider a suspect’s refusal to comply with

instructions . . . in assessing whether physical force is needed to effectuate the suspect’s

compliance.” Deville v. Marcantel, 567 F.3d 156, 167 (5th Cir. 2009). However, there is a genuine

dispute of material fact as to whether Vela refused to comply with directions from Deputies Lewis

and Talbott. Body camera footage shows that, as he ran toward Vela, Deputy Lewis shouted “get

out of the way, get out the way” just one to two seconds before he made contact with Vela. ECF

No. 48-5 at 4:05:23-27. Footage also shows that Deputy Talbott’s instruction to Vela to “move”

was delivered in the middle of a series of commands (“let me see your fucking hands, get down,

get, move”) directed at Rudy Jr. ECF No. 48-4 at 4:05:10-18; see also ECF No. 54-5 at 117:13-

118:9. Finally, Deputy Talbott’s alleged hand movement directing Vela to move is not clear in the

body camera footage. ECF No. 48-1 ¶ 6. Based on this evidence, a reasonable jury could conclude

that Vela did not refuse to comply with commands from Deputies Lewis and Talbott but instead

did not have the opportunity to comply with their commands.

Alternatively, a reasonable jury could conclude that Vela’s mere passive resistance to

instructions did not justify Deputy Lewis’s use of force. The Fifth Circuit has instructed that

“officers must assess not only the need for force, but also ‘the relationship between the need and

the amount of force used.’” Deville, 567 F.3d at 167. The Fifth Circuit has repeatedly found that

use of force is not justified when an individual’s conduct amounts only to passive resistance. See

Hanks v. Rogers, 853 F.3d 738, 746 (5th Cir. 2017) (holding that plaintiff’s initial refusals to

follow officer instructions after being stopped for a “minor traffic violation” amounted to, “at most,

passive resistance” that did not justify the officer’s “resort to overwhelming physical force”);

Deville, 567 F.3d at 168 (describing plaintiff’s failure to comply with officer instructions during a

traffic stop as “resistance [that] was, at most, passive in that she merely refused to leave her

grandchild and exit the vehicle until [her husband] came to get the child”).

The cases that Deputy Lewis cites to support his invocation of qualified immunity are

clearly distinguishable since each one involves suspects engaging in active resistance rather than

the, at most, passive resistance of Vela. See Bailey v. Ramos, 125 F.4th 667, 673 (5th Cir. 2025)

(holding that officers were entitled to qualified immunity on excessive force claim because

plaintiff was “immediately hostile” to the police officers as shown by his yelling expletives,

disobeying repeated commands to move back, moving around and toward the officers, and refusing

to comply with orders to sit down even after being handcuffed); Betts v. Brennan, 22 F.4th 577,

583 (5th Cir. 2022) (reversing denial of summary judgment where body camera footage showed

that “Betts repeatedly contested why he was stopped, ignored dozens of Brennan's commands,

disputed Brennan's authority, accused him of lying, batted away his hand, warned Brennan to call

other officers, and dared Brennan to tase him,” and where the officer did not “immediately resort”

to force “without attempting to use physical skill, negotiation, or even commands”); Griggs v.

Brewer, 841 F.3d 308, 314 (5th Cir. 2016) (“[O]ur precedent does not clearly establish that this

‘takedown’ maneuver—against a drunken, erratic suspect who is resisting arrest—is

constitutionally unreasonable.”); Poole v. City of Shreveport, 691 F.3d 624, 628-29 (5th Cir. 2012)

(affirming grant of summary judgment where “the officers were presented with a suspect who had

been driving recklessly” and “raised his hands at an officer and actively resisted arrest” and the

officers “responded with ‘measured and ascending’ actions that corresponded to Poole’s escalating

verbal and physical resistance”). Vela’s case is instead comparable to Fifth Circuit cases finding

that officers were not entitled to qualified immunity for using force against arrestees engaged in

passive resistance. See Westfall, 903 F.3d at 540; Hanks, 853 F.3d at 746.

In sum, Vela has presented sufficient facts to allege a violation of his constitutional right

to be free from excessive force against Deputy Lewis.

ii. Clearly Established Law

Next, the Court turns to whether Vela’s right to be free from excessive force was clearly

established at the time of the events. A right is clearly established where “prior decisions gave

reasonable warning that the conduct at issue violated constitutional rights.” Hope v. Pelzer, 536

U.S. 730, 740 (2002). Alternatively, qualified immunity is unavailable if the constitutional

violation was “obvious.” Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 199 (2004). Upon review, the Court

reiterates its previous holding that Vela’s right to be free from excessive force was clearly

established at the time of the incident. ECF No. 28 at 7-8.

When applying the Graham factors, the Fifth Circuit has repeatedly found that it is clearly

established law that using force against a person suspected only of a low-level misdemeanor, who

is neither actively resisting nor attempting to flee, is objectively unreasonable. See, e.g., Trammell,

868 F.3d at 337 (“[T]he law at the time of Trammel’s arrest [for public intoxication] clearly

established that it was objectively unreasonable for several officers to tackle an individual who

was not fleeing, not violent, not aggressive, and only resisted by pulling his arm away from an

officer’s grasp.”); Hanks, 853 F.3d at 738 “[C]learly established law demonstrated that an officer

violates the Fourth Amendment if he abruptly resorts to overwhelming physical force rather than

continuing verbal negotiations with an individual who poses no immediate threat or flight risk,

who engages in, at most, passive resistance, and whom the officer stopped for a minor traffic

violation.”); Tarver, 410 F.3d at 753 (affirming denial of summary judgment where “the severity

of the crime at issue was minimal, Tarver did not pose an immediate threat to anyone’s safety, and

according to the testimony of four witnesses, there was no risk of Tarver trying to escape police

custody”).

The Fifth Circuit has also found an “obvious case” of excessive force where officers used

force against a person who had “committed no crime, posed no threat to anyone's safety, and did

not resist the officers or fail to comply with a command” but was merely a bystander to another

person’s stop or arrest. Newman, 703 F.3d at 762-64 (affirming denial of summary judgment where

plaintiff was a passenger in a traffic stop); see also Westfall, 903 F.3d at 547-48 (reversing

dismissal based on qualified immunity where an officer body-slammed a woman during an

investigation into her son’s possession of marijuana).

Accordingly, the law at the time of the incident clearly established that Vela had a right to

be free from excessive force either as a person suspected only of a low-level misdemeanor, who

was neither actively resisting nor attempting to flee, or as a bystander to his son’s traffic stop.

Given that Vela has presented sufficient facts to allege a violation of his constitutional right to be

free from excessive force and his right to be free from excessive force was clearly established at

the time of the incident, Deputy Lewis is not entitled to qualified immunity on this claim.

b. Fabrication of Evidence

Next, Vela asserts a fabrication of evidence claim against Deputy Lewis, Deputy Talbott,

and Sergeant Fairchild. Vela alleges Defendants engaged in fabrication of evidence to support

charging him with interference with public duties. The Court previously dismissed Vela’s

fabrication of evidence claims against Lieutenant Adolph or Sergeant Medina. ECF No. 28 at 10.

Fabrication of evidence, even if it does not ultimately result in conviction, is a violation of

the Fourteenth Amendment. Cole v. Carson, 802 F.3d 752, 773 (5th Cir. 2015), judgment vacated

sub nom. Hunter v. Cole, 580 U.S. 994 (2016), opinion reinstated in relevant part, 905 F.3d 334

(5th Cir. 2018). To succeed on his fabrication-of-evidence claim, Vela must show that (1) the

officers fabricated evidence; (2) for the purposes of falsely obtaining a charge; and (3) that the

evidence influenced the decision to charge.” Crim v. Cnty. of Aransas, No. 2:20-CV-00270, 2022

WL 4546878, at *3 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 6, 2022).

On the first factor, there is a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether the officers

fabricated evidence during the phone call with the ADA, in the HCSO Incident Report, and in the

probable cause affidavit used to secure a warrant for Vela’s arrest. During the phone call with the

ADA, Deputy Talbott stated that Vela was standing in the driveway, ECF No. 48-4 at 4:48:50,

“walked directly between the path of us and the driver,” and “kept walking into the – into the line

of fire” after being given “multiple directions to get out of the way. ECF No. 48-4 at 4:48:50;

4:49:10-40; 4:50:05-10. While Deputy Talbott spoke to the ADA, Sergeant Fairchild told the other

officers listening to the call, “I’ll call the chief, they’ll take it. This is clear cut and dry interfering.

Regardless of use of force, it’s interfering, but especially when you have used force, you have to,

you need charges.” Id. at 4:50:10-25. In the HCSO Incident Report, Deputy Talbott reported that

Vela was “standing in the driveway,” “was positioned between myself and the driver,”

“disregarded” multiple commands to move, and “had to be physically moved by Deputy Lewis in

order to reach and detain the driver.” ECF No. 48-7 at 4. In a supplemental report, Deputy Lewis

stated that Vela was “standing between deputies and the male suspect,” was “directly in our line

of site [sic] and fire,” and “ignored verbal commands” to back up. Id. at 11. Deputy Lewis also

stated that Vela “fell backwards to the ground” as Deputy Lewis “redirceted [sic] [Vela] back from

the traffic stop.” Id. Deputy Talbott repeated several of his statements in a probable cause affidavit

that was used to secure an arrest warrant against Vela, including that Vela “was standing in the

driveway between the affiant [Deputy Talbott] and the Vela Jr. defendant,” “was given multiple

commands to move, which he disregarded,” and “had to be physically moved in order to reach and

detain Vela Jr.” ECF No. 48-10 at 1-2. Defendants argue that this “alleged fabrication evidence

falls far short of actual fabrication and more along the lines of reasonable mistakes of perception

and recall,” but their own argument raises a fact question for the jury to decide.

Just as a reasonable jury could conclude that the officers fabricated evidence, a reasonable

jury could also conclude that the evidence was fabricated for the purposes of falsely obtaining a

charge and that the fabricated evidence influenced the decision to charge. After all, body camera

footage shows the officers discussing the “need” to obtain an interfering charge against Vela before

and during the call to the ADA (ECF No. 48-5 at 4:13:30-38; ECF No. 48-4 at 4:50:10-25), and

several of the allegedly false statements were made directly to the ADA who signed off on the

charge against Vela. A jury could conclude that if the ADA was given an alternative account of

Vela’s actions, namely that he stood motionless under a tree in his front yard with his hands visible

observing his son’s arrest, the ADA would not have charged him with interference with public

duties.

Defendants make several arguments for qualified immunity, none of which are compelling.

First, they argue the “quest for accuracy in reports” is “aspirational” “especially for rookies such

as Lewis and Talbott.” ECF No. 47 at 12. However, the test for qualified immunity is objective

rather than subjective, so the inexperience of the rookie deputies does not alter the analysis.

Second, Defendants argue that there was probable cause for Vela’s charge for interference with

public duties. Id. Defendants then cite Fifth Circuit caselaw finding that officers were entitled to

qualified immunity on unlawful arrest and malicious prosecution claims where probable cause

existed. See Eisenbach v. Zatzkin, 728 F. App’x 307, 310 (5th Cir. 2018); Haggerty v. Texas S.

Univ., 391 F.3d 653, 655 (5th Cir. 2004). Yet, this Court has already explained that malicious

prosecution is a distinct claim from fabrication of evidence, as is unlawful arrest, so the cited

caselaw is irrelevant to Vela’s claims. ECF No. 28 at 9-10. Third, Defendants assert that there is

“no absolute right to a completely accurate police report.” ECF No. 47 at 12. Defendants cite Fifth

Circuit caselaw recognizing that there is no clearly established constitutional right to a ‘completely

accurate police report” or “to be free from inaccuracies in an after-the-fact police report.” Smith v.

Patri, 99 F. Appx 497, 498 (5th Cir. 2004); Rich v. Palko, 920 F.3d 288, 297 (5th Cir. 2019).

However, the cited cases involve claims for inaccurate police reports that are distinct from the

fabrication of evidence claim Vela brings.

By contrast, there is a clearly established right to be free from fabrication of evidence, even

when there is probable cause for an arrest. Traylor v. Yorka, No. 22-10783, 2024 WL 209444, at

*4 (5th Cir. Jan. 19, 2024) (quoting Cole, 802 F.3d at 771). As the Fifth Circuit has explained,

“[d]eliberate framing of a person by the state offends the most strongly held values of our nation.”

Cole, 802 F.3d at 772. Thus, the Fifth Circuit held that, even before the Cole decision, “no

reasonable law enforcement officer would have thought it permissible to frame somebody for a

crime he or she did not commit.” Id. at 773. Furthermore, the clearly established right to be free

from fabrication of evidence extends to cases where probable cause exists for an arrest. Id. (“To

hold that police officers, having lawfully arrested a suspect, are then free to fabricate false

[evidence] at will, would make a mockery of the notion that Americans enjoy the protection of due

process of the law and fundamental justice.”). Therefore, district courts in the Fifth Circuit have

held that a plaintiff need not establish an unlawful arrest or wrongful conviction but “must allege

that an officer used the fabricated evidence against him to state a valid fabrication of evidence

claim.” Brown v. Williams, No. CV 24-423, 2025 WL 958219, at *6 (E.D. La. Mar. 31, 2025)

(collecting cases). As discussed above, Vela clearly satisfied this standard. Defendants’ cited

caselaw about similar but distinct claims, such as malicious prosecution or unlawful arrest, does

not alter the clearly established right to be free from fabrication of evidence or the elements of the

fabrication of evidence claim.

In conclusion, Vela has presented sufficient facts to allege a violation of his constitutional

right to be free from deliberate fabrication of evidence, and his right to be free from deliberate

fabrication of evidence, even where probable cause existed for an arrest, was clearly established

at the time of the incident. Deputy Lewis, Deputy Talbott, and Sergeant Fairchild are not entitled

to qualified immunity on Vela’s fabrication of evidence claim.

c. Failure to Intervene

Vela alleges that all five officers failed to intervene in the fabrication of evidence by

Deputy Lewis, Deputy Talbott, and Sergeant Fairchild. A bystander officer may be liable for

failure to intervene where the officer “(1) knows that a fellow officer is violating an individual’s

constitutional rights; (2) has a reasonable opportunity to prevent the harm; and (3) chooses not to

act.” Whitley v. Hanna, 726 F.3d 631, 646 (5th Cir. 2013); Hale v. Townley, 45 F.3d 914, 919 (5th

Cir. 1995). Although failure to intervene, also called bystander liability, generally arises in the

context of another officer’s use of force, it has also been applied when an officer fails to intervene

in another’s fabrication of evidence. See, e.g., Villegas v. City of El Paso, No. EP-15-CV-00386-

FM, 2020 WL 981878, at *9 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 28, 2020), aff'd sub nom. Villegas v. Arbogast, 836

F. App’x 334 (5th Cir. 2021).

Defendants’ sole argument for summary judgment on Vela’s failure to intervene claim is

that there was no underlying constitutional violation and, thus, no duty to intervene. ECF No. 45

at 10-11; ECF No. 46 at 12; ECF No. 47 at 14. As discussed above, there are genuine disputes of

material fact as to the underlying constitutional violation for fabrication of evidence. Thus,

Defendants are not entitled to summary judgment on Vela’s failure to intervene claim on this basis.

d. Civil Conspiracy

Finally, Vela alleges that all five of the officers engaged in a civil conspiracy to fabricate

evidence or ignore the fabrication of evidence in order to deprive him of his constitutional rights.

“To establish a cause of action based on conspiracy a plaintiff must show that the defendants

agreed to commit an illegal act.” Arsenaux v. Roberts, 726 F.2d 1022, 1024 (5th Cir. 1982); Dayse

v. Schuldt, 894 F.2d 170, 173 (5th Cir. 1990). Defendants correctly point out that “[c]onclusory

allegations that do not reference specific factual allegations tending to show an agreement do not

suffice to state a civil rights conspiracy claim under § 1983.” Montgomery v. Walton, 759 F. App’x

312, 315 (5th Cir. 2019) (per curiam) (citing Arsenaux, 726 F.2d at 1023-244).

Conspiracy claims frequently rely on circumstantial evidence, as conspiracies “are rarely

evidenced by explicit agreements.” Mack v. Newton, 737 F.2d 1343, 1350-51 (5th Cir. 1984);

Zervas v. Faulkner, 861 F.2d 823, 836 (5th Cir. 1988) (“[A] conspiracy is usually proved by

circumstantial evidence.”). Yet Vela asserts that this is the “rare” case where the conspiracy claim

is evidenced by an explicit agreement. Specifically, Vela points to the body camera footage

showing Defendants discussing the “need” to obtain an interfering charge against Vela and

coordinating their stories. See, e.g., ECF No. 48-5 at 4:13:30-38; ECF No. 48-4 at 4:50. Defendants

argue that the quoted discussions were intended only to remind Talbott and Lewis to consider all

actors in their investigation and seek appropriate charges. ECF No. 48-3 ¶ 7.

Although it is true that mere conclusory allegations are insufficient to establish a

conspiracy claim, Vela has tied his allegations to specific facts in the summary judgment record

and alleged an explicit agreement to commit an illegal act. See Morales v. Carrillo, 625 F. Supp.

3d 587, 608 (W.D. Tex. 2022) (denying summary judgment on conspiracy claim based on similar

circumstantial evidence of coordination between officers). A reasonable jury could conclude that

the evidence as a whole demonstrates that Defendants engaged in a conspiracy to frame Vela to

cover up Deputy Lewis’s assault. Of course, Defendants put forward an alternative

characterization of the body camera footage and evidence in the record. However, this

disagreement only highlights that Vela has presented more than conclusory allegations and that

there is a genuine dispute of material fact for the jury to resolve. Therefore, Defendants are not

entitled to summary judgment on Vela’s civil conspiracy claim.

e. Punitive Damages

Vela’s First Amended Complaint includes a request for punitive damages. ECF No. 9 ¶ 88.

At the end of each Motion for Summary Judgment, Defendants make an identical argument for

summary judgment on Plaintiff’s claim for punitive damages. ECF No. 45 at 11; ECF No. 46 at

13; ECF No. 47 at 14. They each argue that “Plaintiff has failed to show any evidentiary basis for

an award of punitive damages,” citing Heaney v. Roberts, 846 F.3d 795, 803 (5th Cir. 2017),

because Defendants assert that they harbored no ill will or malice toward Vela. Id.

“Punitive damages may be awarded in § 1983 cases ‘when the defendant’s conduct is

shown to be motivated by evil motive or intent, or when it involves reckless or callous indifference

to the federally protected rights of others.’” Heaney, 846 F.3d at 803 (quoting Smith v. Wade, 461

U.S. 30, 56 (1983)). Reckless indifference has been described by the Supreme Court as

“‘subjective consciousness’ of a risk of injury or illegality and a ‘criminal indifference to civil

obligations.’” Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass'n, 527 U.S. 526, 536 (1999). Although Defendants assert

that they harbored no ill will or malice toward Vela, there is clearly a genuine dispute over whether

they acted with reckless or callous indifference to the federally protected rights of Vela. Further,

the Fifth Circuit has held that allegations of a conspiracy to fabricate evidence can provide

sufficient basis for an award of punitive damages. Boyd v. Driver, 495 F. App’x 518, 525 (Sth Cir.

2012) (“Boyd’s allegations of a conspiracy by prison guards to maliciously fabricate evidence and

engage in perjury also satisfy the alternative ‘evil intent’ standard, as those allegations are plainly

inconsistent with an innocent or merely negligent mindset.”). Therefore, Defendants have not

shown that they are entitled to summary judgment on punitive damages, and the decision to award

or deny punitive damages belongs to the jury.

IV. CONCLUSION

Defendants Louis Medina and Christopher Adolph’s Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF

No. 45), Defendant Leland Fairchild’s Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 46), and

Defendants Chance Talbott and Anthony Lewis’s Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 47)

are DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

SIGNED at Houston, Texas on this the 3rd day of June, 2025.

YS P Ct Sn

ITH P. ELLISON

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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