Mayfield v. Gilliam

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

CENTRAL DIVISION

WILLIAM T. MAYFIELD PLAINTIFF

#659228

V. NO. 4:23-cv-01214-ERE

WADE GILLIAM, et al. DEFENDANTS

ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT1

I. Overview

On December 26, 2024, pro se plaintiff William T. Mayfield filed this lawsuit

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that officers at the Saline County Detention Center

(“Detention Center”) failed to protect him from an inmate attack on November 26,

2023 (“November 26 incident”). Doc. 2. Defendants are Captain/Jail Administrator

Wade Gilliam and Deputy/Correctional Officers Shakara King, Mollie Blain, and

Noah Alvarez.2 Mr. Mayfield sues each Defendant in his or her individual and

official capacities and seeks monetary and injunctive relief.

1 The parties consented in writing to have a United States Magistrate Judge conduct all

proceedings in this case including but not limited to entry of final judgment. Doc. 54.

2 The Clerk is instructed to update the docket sheet to reflect the full names of Defendants

Blain and Alvarez – Mollie Blain and Noah Alvarez. Docs. 79-2; 79-4.

Defendants have now filed a motion for summary judgment, supporting brief,

and statement of facts. Docs. 77, 78, 79. Mr. Mayfield has responded (Doc. 81), and

Defendants’ motion is now ripe for review.

For reasons explained below, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment

(Doc. 77) is granted.

II. Summary Judgment Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate when the record, viewed in a light most

favorable to the nonmoving party, demonstrates that there is no genuine dispute as

to any material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986);

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-50 (1986). The moving party

bears the initial burden to demonstrate the absence of a genuine dispute of material

fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. Once that has been done, the nonmoving party must

come forward with specific facts demonstrating a material dispute for trial. See FED.

R. CIV. P. 56(c); Torgerson v. City of Rochester, 643 F.3d 1031, 1042 (8th Cir. 2011).

A party is entitled to summary judgment if -- but only if -- the evidence shows that

there is no genuine dispute about any fact important to the outcome of the case. See

FED. R. CIV. P. 56; Odom v. Kaizer, 864 F.3d 920, 921 (8th Cir. 2017).

Even when the parties dispute exactly what happened, summary judgment

may still be appropriate. First, “[o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the

outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of

summary judgment.” Doe v. Dardanelle Sch. Dist., 928 F.3d 722, 725 (8th Cir.

2019) (omitting citation). Second, while the court must construe all evidence in a

light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment, “[w]hen opposing

parties tell two different stories, one of which is blatantly contradicted by the record,

so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not adopt that version of

the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment” Scott v. Harris,

550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007).

III. Background

A. Mr. Mayfield’s Version of Events3

During his January 21, 2025 deposition, Mr. Mayfield recounted that on

November 26, 2023, a muscular inmate known as Mohawk “beat [his] ass bad.” Doc.

79-5 at 7, 15. A related jail incident report identifies “Mohawk” as Keston Damarius

Muldrew. Doc. 79-1.

Mr. Mayfield testified that for a month before the November 26 incident, he

told “them,” in person and through the Detention Center kiosk system, that he felt

threatened in his pod and requested to be transferred. Doc. 79-5 at 7. However, Mr.

Mayfield could not recall a specific instance before the November 26 incident when

3 These facts are taken from Mr. Mayfield’s deposition testimony. Doc. 79-5.

he reported to any one of the named Defendants that he felt threatened or wanted to

move from his pod.

Mr. Mayfield stated that before the November 26 incident, he sent a kiosk

message to Lieutenant Burrus (a non-party) after inmate Muldrew had repeatedly

threatened to steal his commissary items. Id. at 39-40. Detention Center records

confirm that on October 17, 2023, Mr. Mayfield posted a message on the kiosk

system to Lieutenant Burrus stating that he was “scared to death” in his pod and was

not safe. Doc. 79-1 at 78. However, in a follow-up posted two days later, he reported

that he had “made some friends” and was “good in here now.” Id. at 77. And on

October 27, Mr. Mayfield posted that his October 17 grievance was “resolved.” Id.

Mr. Mayfield explained that other inmates made him withdraw his October

17 kiosk grievance to Lieutenant Burrus. He stated that “they” extorted him and stole

his “stuff” and knew about his kiosk message because they “would get on [his]

tablet.” Doc. 79-5 at 40. Importantly, however, Mr. Mayfield specifically conceded

that no named Defendant knew about his October 17 kiosk message to Lieutenant

Burrus. Id. at 43 (“They didn’t know nothing about the kiosk.”). In addition, he

stated: “I’m only accusing them of not stopping [the fight] and pulling me out.” Id.

at 43-44.

Later in his deposition, Mr. Mayfield stated that he wrote Defendant Gilliam

a letter “because [he]wanted something to be done.” Id. at 46. However, he provided

no details regarding the content or timing of his letter to Defendant Gillam.

Mr. Mayfield stated that the day of the incident, he and inmate Muldrew were

in the chow hall waiting in line for a food tray. Id. at 20-21. Mr. Mayfield believed

that inmate Muldrew was planning to steal his tray and told him, “You ain’t getting

my tray.” Id. at 21. Mr. Mayfield and inmate Muldrew then engaged in a verbal

argument, which Mr. Mayfield estimated lasted “probably a minute.” Id. at 22.

Mr. Mayfield recalled that each Defendant was present in the chow hall,

watching and laughing as he and inmate Muldrew argued. Id. at 23. He initially

stated that Defendants King, Alverez, and Blain were just “standing” in the doorway

and “didn’t even come in” but then recalled that King, Alverez, and Blain stood in

the doorway serving food with Defendant Gilliam. Id. at 24. When asked whether

he was sure that Defendant Gillam, a jail captain and administrator, was serving food

to inmates, Mr. Mayfield responded, “What I remember, yeah.” Doc. 79-5 at 24. He

stated, “I was a little disillusioned, but I know he was there.” Id. at 47. Later in his

deposition, however, Mr. Mayfield acknowledged that Defendant Gillam was not

present during the physical altercation and “came up afterwards.” Id. at 49.

Mr. Mayfield recounted that his one-minute squabble with inmate Muldrew

turned physical—that inmate Muldrew suddenly began hitting him, and he attempted

to block the blows by raising his arms. Id. He stated that inmate Muldrew “wailed

on me[,]” “smoked my ass[,]” and “walked me all the way across the floor . . . from

wall to wall.” Doc. 79-5 at 26-27. Mr. Mayfield stated that he could not recall how

may “licks” he took because he blacked out.4 Id. at 26.

Mr. Mayfield estimated that the physical part of the altercation lasted “a good

30 seconds,” and he opined that Defendants should have used a taser to stop inmate

Muldrew. Id. at 22, 28, 45, 47.

Mr. Mayfield initially testified that he heard “guards” say, “Fuck that white

boy, beat his ass.” Id. at 16. Later in his testimony, when asked to name the guards

who made those statements, he recalled only that Defendant King said, “beat him

up.” Id. at 27. When asked how he knew Defendant King was the person he heard

say “beat him up,” Mr. Mayfield explained, “I know her voice. [She] was the only

black lady working there.” Id.

Mr. Mayfield stated that he heard an “all call” for officer assistance only “after

the dude done beat me up.” Id. at 27. It is undisputed that after the incident,

Detention Center officials transported Mr. Mayfield to the Saline County Memorial

Hospital, where medical staff made no diagnosis. Id. at 29. Mr. Mayfield complains

4 At one point during his deposition, Mr. Mayfield inexplicably stated, “They were holding

my head and they got me down on the ground. They brought me all the way across the pod and

everything.” Doc. 79-5 at 16 (emphasis added). When asked whether he was stating that more than

one person attacked him, he responded, “You’re right. I did say there was only one guy.” Id.

that he suffered swelling and continues to have ringing in his ears as a result of the

incident. Id. at 30, 32.

B. Defendants’ Version of Events5

Each Defendant has submitted an affidavit regarding the November 26

incident. Defendant Gillam states that he was not present during the incident (Doc.

79-1 at 2), which agrees with Mr. Mayfield’s ultimate testimony Defendant Gillam

“came up afterwards.”

Consistent with Mr. Mayfield’s testimony and the related jail incident report,

Defendants Alvarez and Blain state that on November 26, 2023, at approximately

4:50 p.m., they were serving “chow” in H pod when inmate Muldrew and Mr.

Mayfield began arguing. Defendants Alvarez and Blain both state that when the

inmates began to “get into each other’s faces,” Defendant Blain told them to

separate. Docs. 79-2 at 1; 79-3 at 1. Both Defendants recall that inmate Muldrew

initially began to walk away, but Mr. Mayfield said something, which caused inmate

Muldrew to turn and walk back toward Mr. Mayfield. Id. According to Defendants

Blain and Alverez, both inmates began swinging at the other, Defendant Blain “then”

advised Defendant Alverez to call for an “all available,” and “when both detainees

5 These facts are taken from Defendant Gilliam’s jail file and each Defendants’ affidavit.

Docs. 79-1; 79-2; 79-3; 79-4.

ended the fight and separated . . . , they were . . . escorted out of H pod after gathering

their belongings.” Docs. 79-2 at 2; 79-3 at 1-2.

Defendants Alvarez and Blain state that the “entire event” lasted

approximately 45-60 seconds. Id. This is consistent with Mr. Mayfield’s testimony

that his verbal argument with inmate Muldrew lasted a minute, and the physical

altercation lasted 30 seconds.

Defendant King states that on November 26 at approximately 4:50 p.m., she

was assigned to the booking desk when she heard Defendant Alvarez call for an “all

available.” Doc. 79-4 at 1. Defendant King states that she did not leave her assigned

station in booking, where Mr. Mayfield was escorted after his altercation with inmate

Muldrew. Id.

Each Defendant testified that he or she was unaware of any request by Mr.

Mayfield to be assigned to a different pod. Docs. 79-1 at 2; 79-2 at 2; 79-3 at 2; 79-

4 at 1.

IV. Discussion

A. Individual-Capacity Claims

Mr. Mayfield claims that each Defendant: (1) failed to protect him by moving

him to another pod before the November 26 incident; and (2) failed to take any action

to stop the November 26 incident once it began.

The Eighth Amendment6 “requires prison officials to take reasonable

measures to guarantee inmate safety by protecting them from attacks by other

prisoners.” Patterson v. Kelley, 902 F.3d 845, 851 (8th Cir. 2018) (quoting Farmer

v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994)). “Yet a constitutional claim does not lie every

time one inmate attacks another. Rather, prison officials violate the Eighth

Amendment only when they exhibit a ‘deliberate or callous indifference’ to an

inmate’s safety.” Id. To prevail on a failure-to-protect claim, an inmate must show:

“(1) an objective component, [that] there was a substantial risk of harm to the inmate,

and (2) a subjective component, [that] the prison official was deliberately indifferent

to that risk.” Id. (cleaned up). An official is deliberately indifferent only if he or she

actually knows of the substantial risk of harm and fails to take reasonable measures

in response. Schoelch v. Mitchell, 625 F.3d 1041, 1046 (8th Cir. 2010) (quoting

Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837). “Negligence on the part of the prison official is

insufficient to satisfy the subjective component. The official must recklessly

disregard a known, excessive risk of serious harm to the inmate. Norman v.

Schuetzle, 585 F.3d 1097, 1104 (8th Cir. 2009).7

6 At the time of the November 26 incident, Mr. Mayfield was detained for a parole violation

on a prior conviction. Doc. 79-5 at 12. Accordingly, his claims are analyzed under the Eighth

Amendment, which applies to convicted prisoners.

7 An unpublished decision in McCrary v. Baldwin, 500 Fed. Appx. 551, 551–52 (8th Cir.

2013) incorrectly indicates that Norman was overruled on other grounds by Pearson v. Callahan,

555 U.S. 223 (2009). However, the Eighth Circuit has noted: “The Supreme Court decided

Pearson in January 2009, nearly ten months before we decided Norman. Consequently, Pearson

Each Defendant asserts qualified immunity, which protects government

officials from personal liability for damages “insofar as their conduct does not

violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable

person [in their positions] would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800,

818 (1982). At the summary judgment stage, a defendant is entitled to qualified

immunity unless: “(1) the facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff,

demonstrate the deprivation of a constitutional or statutory right; and (2) the right

was clearly established at the time of the deprivation.” Howard v. Kansas City Police

Dep’t, 570 F.3d 984, 988 (8th Cir. 2009). “District courts may address these two

questions in any order but may not deny qualified immunity without answering both

questions in the plaintiff’s favor.” Walton v. Dawson, 752 F.3d 1109, 1116 (8th Cir.

2014) (citation omitted).

Finally, in deciding the question of qualified immunity, I cannot treat

Defendants as “one unified group,” but must consider each Defendant’s conduct to

determine whether evidence against that “individual officer [is] sufficient to

overcome qualified immunity.” Manning v. Cotton, 862 F.3d 663, 668 (8th Cir.

2017) (quoting Roberts v. City of Omaha, 723 F.3d 966, 974 (8th Cir. 2013)).

could not have overruled Norman.” Walls v. Tadman, 762 F.3d 778, 783 (8th Cir. 2014).

1. Failure to Prevent the Attack

Mr. Mayfield argues that Defendants were deliberately indifferent to his

safety by failing to move him to another pod before the November 26 incident.

However, he specifically testified that he did not notify Defendants King, Blain, or

Alvarez about problems he was having with inmate Muldrew before the November

26 incident. Although Mr. Mayfield requested assistance from non-party Lieutenant

Burrus, he acknowledged that Defendants were not aware of his kiosk message to

her. Doc. 79-5 at 43.

In addition, although Mr. Mayfield testified that he wrote a letter to Defendant

Gilliam about problems he was having in his pod, he failed to explain: (1) the date

of the letter; (2) specific information he included the letter; or (3) whether Defendant

Gilliam actually received any such letter.

Because Mr. Mayfield has failed to provide any evidence that a single

Defendant had specific knowledge that inmate Muldrew posed a threat to his safety

before the November 26 incident, no reasonable juror could conclude that a named

Defendant was subjectively aware that inmate Muldrew posed a danger to Mr.

Mayfield and demonstrated deliberate indifference to his safety by failing to move

him to another pod. As a result, each Defendant is entitled to qualified immunity on

this claim.

2. Failure to Act Once the Attack Began

Prison officials have no duty to physically intervene in a prison fight if it doing

so would cause them serious injury or worsen the situation, Arnold v. Jones, 891

F.2d 1370, 1372 (8th Cir. 1989), and they are only required to “take reasonable

measures to abate substantial risks of harm, of which [they] were aware.” Blades v.

Schuetzle, 302 F.3d 801, 803 (2002) (quoting Reece v. Groose, 60 F.3d 487, 491 (8th

Cir. 1995)).

For example, in Cohrs v. Norris, 210 F.3d 378 (8th Cir. 2000), the Eighth

Circuit denied qualified immunity to a prison guard who, from the safety of his

control booth, did nothing and watched for twenty-five minutes while an inmate was

beaten by several other inmates. Similarly, in Martinez v. Norris, 751 Fed. Appx.

959 (8th Cir. 2019), the court affirmed denial of qualified immunity where facts

showed that in the course of fifteen minutes, an inmate attacked several fellow

inmates in full view of guards, who did nothing. Conversely, the Eighth Circuit has

affirmed the grant of qualified immunity in cases involving a surprise inmate attack,

where prison guards had insufficient time to intervene. Tucker v. Evans, 276 F.3d

999, 1002 (8th Cir. 2002) (“[B]y the time Daniels knew something was wrong, the

fight was already over. Therefore . . . Daniels would not have been able to intervene

in time to rescue Tucker.”); see also Schoelch v. Mitchell, 625 F.3d 1041, 1047–48

(8th Cir. 2010) (concluding that a physical attack that followed a lunch-line quarrel

played out so quickly that it was finished before a prison guard reasonably could

have intervened).

a. Defendant Gilliam

Although Mr. Mayfield initially testified that Defendant Gilliam was present

during the November 26 incident, he later clarified that Defendant Gilliam arrived

after the altercation ended. Doc. 79-5 at 49. No reasonable factfinder could conclude

that Defendant Gilliam, who was not present at the time of the attack, demonstrated

deliberate indifference to Mr. Mayfield’s safety by failing to intervene. Defendant

Gilliam is clearly entitled to qualified immunity on this claim.

b. Defendants Blain and Alvarez

It is undisputed that during the verbal argument between Mr. Mayfield and

inmate Muldrew, which preceded the physical confrontation, Defendant Blain

directed them to separate, and Mr. Muldrew began walking away but then turned

and walked back toward Mr. Mayfield after Mr. Mayfield said something to him.8

According to Mr. Mayfield, inmate Muldrew then suddenly began beating him, and

8 Docs. 79, ¶ 10 (Defs.’ Stmt. Facts); 79-2, ¶ 3 (Blain Aff.); 79-3. ¶ 3 (Alvarez Aff.).

Although instructed to do so (Doc. 80 at 3), Mr. Mayfield failed to submit a statement of facts

pursuant to Local Rule 56.1. Thus, all uncontroverted, material facts set forth in Defendants’

statement of facts are deemed admitted.

In his response in opposition to summary judgment, Mr. Mayfield states that he read in a

report that Defendant King told him and inmate Muldrew to separate. Doc. 81 at 2 (emphasis

added). He states: “That is a lie. The only thing Deputy King had ever said was, “Fuck that white

boy” and “[b]eat his ass.” Id. Mr. Mayfield fails to controvert Defendants’ statement of facts and

affidavit testimony that Defendant Blain directed he and inmate Muldrew to separate.

“walked him all the way across the floor . . . from wall to wall.” Doc. 79-5 at 27.

Mr. Mayfield could not say how may “licks” he took because he blacked out. Id. at

26. I credit Mr. Mayfield’s testimony that after 30 seconds or so, inmate Muldrew

stopped the attack. Doc. 79-5 at 25 (“The only reason he stopped is because, I guess,

he thought I was dead or something. I was on the ground.”).

It is undisputed that after the physical altercation began, Defendant Blain told

Defendant Alverez to call for officer assistance. Mr. Mayfield agrees that someone

called for assistance but contends that they “called after the dude done beat me up.”

Doc. 79-5 at 28.

It is unclear how Mr. Mayfield, who was on the ground and rendered

unconscious from the attack, could recall when Defendant Alvarez called for

assistance. Although I am obliged at the summary judgment stage to credit all

evidence that favors Mr. Mayfield, I am not required to select and credit only those

portions of his deposition testimony that weigh in his favor while ignoring

inconsistencies. Elsewhere in his testimony, Mr. Mayfield indicated that Defendant

Alvarez called for assistance while the 30-second physical altercation was in

progress. Specifically, he stated: “Instead of calling for help, they should have just

pulled out a taser and shot the dude, you know.” Id. In sum, Mr. Mayfield offers no

congruent account regarding when the call for help occurred or evidence that

Defendant Blain or Alvarez purposely waited until after inmate Muldrew stopped

hitting him to call for officer assistance.

By Mr. Mayfield’s own account, the physical attack lasted only 30 seconds,

and there is no evidence that a call for assistance could have been made sooner or

that additional officers could have arrived and stopped the altercation before inmate

Muldrew voluntarily stopped the attack. Nor is there evidence that Defendants could

have abated harm to Mr. Mayfield by employing a taser.

The facts, viewed in a light most favorable to Mr. Mayfield, fail to show that

actions taken by Defendant Blain and Alvarez, even if arguably negligent, amounted

to deliberate indifference. Both Defendants are therefore entitled to qualified

immunity on claims that they demonstrated deliberate indifference by failing to take

reasonable action once the attack began.

c. Defendant King

As with Defendants Blain and Alvarez, given the suddenness and brevity of

the November 26 incident, and the undisputed call for additional officers, no

reasonable fact finder could conclude that inaction on Defendant King’s part

amounted to deliberate indifference.9

9 Defendant King states that she was not present in H pod; she was stationed at the booking

desk when the November 26 incident occurred. Doc. 79-4 at 1. For the purpose of summary

judgment review, I accept Mr. Mayfield’s testimony that Defendant King was present in H pod at

the time, serving food to inmates.

Mr. Mayfield’s allegations against Defendant King are somewhat different

from those against the other Defendants. In addition to alleging that she failed to act

once the altercation began, he alleges that she stated, “beat his ass.” However, he

does not contend that Defendant King’s alleged utterance incited or caused the

attack, which he acknowledges happened suddenly on the heels of his verbal

argument with inmate Muldrew. Nor does Mr. Mayfield assert that Defendant

King’s words exacerbated his injuries, and I cannot speculate that such is the case.

Brown v. Fortner, 518 F.3d 552, 558 (8th Cir 2008) (citation omitted) (“As with

any summary judgment motion, while we are required to make all reasonable

inferences in favor of the non-moving party, we do not resort to speculation.”).

Viewing the facts in a light most favorable to Mr. Mayfield, Defendant King’s

alleged words, while despicable, did not amount to an Eighth Amendment violation.

See Hopson v. Fredericksen, 961 F.2d 1374, 1378 (8th Cir. 1992) (concluding that

officer’s use of racial slur and threat to knock prisoner’s teeth out was not

actionable); but see Burton v. Livingston, 791 F.2d 97, 99–100 (8th Cir. 1986)

(recognizing an exception to the general rule that verbal harassment does not amount

to a constitutional deprivation where prison guard engaged in a “wanton act of

cruelty” by subjecting a prisoner to death threats and racial epithets at gunpoint.)

The facts, viewed in a light most favorable to Mr. Mayfield, fail to demonstrate that

Defendant King subjected him to a constitutional violation, and she is therefore

entitled to qualified immunity on this claim.

B. Official-Capacity Claims

Mr. Mayfield’s official-capacity claims are functionally claims against Saline

County. Brewington v. Keener, 902 F.3d 796, 800 (8th Cir. 2018). Saline County

cannot be held vicariously liable under § 1983 for the acts of county employees, and

can face liability only when its own policies, customs, or practices cause a

constitutional deprivation. /d., 902 F.3d at 801-02. Here, Mr. Mayfield fails to present

any evidence that would allow a reasonable juror to conclude that a Saline County

policy, practice, or custom caused his injury. As a result, Defendants are entitled to

judgment as a matter of law on Mr. Mayfield’s official capacity claims.

Vv. Conclusion

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED THAT:

1. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment (Doc. 77) is GRANTED.

2. Pursuant to the Judgment entered with this Order, Mr. Mayfield’s

claims are DISMISSED, with prejudice.

3. The Clerk is instructed to close this case.

Dated 2 June 2025. .

AMMEN

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

17