for the Estate of Brent Richardson v. Tennessee

WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE

EASTERN DIVISION

ESTATE OF BRENT RENARD )

RICHARDSON, JR., by Next of Kin )

PATRICE RICHARDSON, )

)

Plaintiff, ) No. 1:24-cv-01128-STA-jay

v. )

)

CORECIVIC, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS OF DEFENDANTS

WHITEVILLE CORRECTIONAL FACILITY, CORECIVIC,

CHANCE LEEDS, AND KENDRICK SMITH

Plaintiff, Patrice Richardson, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Brent Renard

Richardson, Jr., filed this action against Whiteville Correctional Facility (“WCF”) and its owner

CoreCivic, WCF Warden Chance Leeds, WCF Officers Kendrick Smith and William Delgado,

individually and officially, the State of Tennessee, and Tennessee Governor William (“Bill”) B.

Lee.1 Plaintiff brings her claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of the Eighth and Fourteenth

Amendments, negligence under Tennessee law, and related constitutional and statutory violations.

(ECF No. 19.) Defendants WCF, CoreCivic, Warden Leeds, and Officer Smith have filed a motion

to dismiss (ECF No. 23) pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiff

has filed a response to the motion (ECF No. 30), and Defendants have filed a reply to the response.

(ECF No. 32.) For the reasons set forth below, the motion to dismiss is GRANTED.

1 Officer Delgado is not a party to this motion, and it is unclear from the record whether Delgado

has been served with process. The State of Tennessee and Governor Lee have been dismissed

A defendant may move to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief

can be granted under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). In order to avoid dismissal under

Rule 12(b)(6), a plaintiff must include in its pleading “either direct or inferential allegations

respecting all material elements necessary for recovery under a viable legal theory.” Luis v. Zang,

833 F.3d 619, 625–26 (6th Cir. 2016) (quoting Kreipke v. Wayne St. Univ., 807 F.3d 768, 774 (6th

Cir. 2015)). When assessing the sufficiency of a complaint, the Court must view the factual

allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Taylor v. City of Saginaw, 922 F.3d 328, 331

(6th Cir. 2019) (citing Keys v. Humana, Inc., 684 F.3d 605, 608 (6th Cir. 2012)). While the Court

must accept all the well-pleaded factual allegations of the pleading as true, the Court need not

accept legal conclusions masquerading as fact claims. Wood v. Moss, 572 U.S. 744, 757 n.5 (2014)

(citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009)).

A complaint need only contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the

pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Although this standard does not require

“detailed factual allegations,” it does require more than “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic

recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681; Bell Atlantic Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). In the final analysis, the plaintiff must allege facts that, if

accepted as true, are sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level” and to “state a

claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. “A claim has facial

plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable

inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

Background

The Court accepts the following facts as true for the purpose of deciding this motion only.

On June 28, 2023, Brent Richardson (“the Decedent”), an inmate at WCF, was found unresponsive

during a “routine count.” Officer Delgado and Shift Supervisor Smith initiated CPR and

administered doses of Narcan. Officers then transported the Decedent to medical at WCF, where

nurses administered additional doses of Narcan. EMS arrived at WCF, and the Decedent was

transported to Bolivar General Hospital, where he was later pronounced deceased. An investigation

into the events revealed that Delgado failed to perform mandatory rounds and did not address a

window violation in the Decedent’s cell. As a result, Delgado was placed on administrative leave

without pay.

Plaintiff alleges that WCF and CoreCivic were aware of the drug problem within the facility

and yet failed to implement adequate measures to prevent the introduction and distribution of drugs

within the facility. Warden Leeds was responsible for the management and operations of WCF,

while Officer Kendrick was “responsible for supervising correctional officers and ensuring the

safety and security of inmates.” (Amd. Cmplt. ¶ 6, ECF No. 19.) However, “Defendants Leeds and

Smith and these Defendants failed to supervise Delgado or ensure compliance with established

safety protocols, creating a foreseeable and preventable risk of harm to Richardson.” (Id. ¶ 35.) She

further alleges that Delgado’s “neglect in performing rounds and addressing security violations

directly resulted in a lack of timely intervention and medical care for Richardson, contributing to his

death.” (Id. ¶ 26.)

Analysis

Plaintiff has either conceded or has not contested the portions of Defendants’ motion

contending that (1) Plaintiff’s claims are governed by the Eighth Amendment and, therefore, she

does not have a claim under the Fourteenth Amendment; (2) Plaintiff’s wrongful death claim must

be dismissed because “Tennessee’s wrongful death statute does not create a new cause of action for

the beneficiaries but instead preserves the right of action of the decedent.” Lynn v. City of Jackson,

sued in this matter; (4) Plaintiff’s official capacity claims against Defendants Leeds and Smith are

redundant in that official capacity claims against individual defendants are really claims against the

defendant corporation; and (5) Plaintiff has failed to state a claim against Defendants pursuant to

Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 41-1-103 and 8-8-201. Accordingly, the motion to dismiss is granted on these

claims.

Section 1983 Claims

Defendants correctly state that §1983 imposes liability on any “person who, under color

of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any State” subjects another to “the

deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws.” 42

U.S.C. § 1983. In order to prevail, a § 1983 plaintiff must establish “(1) that there was the

deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution and (2) that the deprivation was caused by a

person acting under color of state law.” Wittstock v. Mark A. Van Sile, Inc., 330 F.3d 899, 902

(6th Cir. 2003). “Section 1983 is not the source of any substantive right, but merely provides a

method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.” Humes v. Gilless, 154 F. Supp. 2d

1353, 1357 (W.D. Tenn. 2001) (citing Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989)).

Generally, local governments are not considered to be “persons” under § 1983 and, thus,

are not subject to suit. Monell v. N.Y.C. Dept. of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978). The

Sixth Circuit has applied the standards for assessing municipal liability to claims against private

corporations that operate prisons, such as CoreCivic. See Thomas v. Coble, 55 F. App’x 748, 748

(6th Cir. 2003) (“A private corporation that performs the traditional state function of operating a

prison acts under the color of state law for purposes of § 1983.”) When “execution of a

government’s [or private prison’s] policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those

whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the [complained of]

“person” for purposes of § 1983. Bd. Of Cnty. Com’rs of Bryan Cnty., Okl. v. Brown, 520 U.S.

397, 403 (1997) (citing Monell).

Accordingly, § 1983 liability does not attach to CoreCivic based on the actions of its

employee tortfeasors under the doctrine of respondeat superior; instead, such liability is imposed

on the basis of the prison’s own customs or policy. See Street v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 102 F.3d

810, 814 (6th Cir. 1996) (stating that, although a private corporation that operates a prison acts

under the color of state law for purposes of § 1983, a plaintiff may not sue such a corporation

solely on the basis of respondeat superior liability); see also D’ Ambrosio v. Marino, 747 F.3d

378, 386 (6th Cir. 2014) (reiterating that, under § 1983, entities are responsible only for their

own illegal acts and may not be held vicariously liable for the actions of their employees (relying

on Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350, 1359 (2011)). Thus, plaintiffs who seek to impose

liability on private prisons under § 1983 must prove that an action pursuant to an official policy

or custom caused their injury.

Official policy includes the decisions or the acts of its policymaking officials. Pembaur

v. Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 480 – 481 (1986); see also Bryan Cnty., 520 U.S. at 403-04

(explaining that “official policies” are “decisions of … those officials whose acts may fairly be

said to be those of the” entity itself). Alternatively, a “custom” is a practice that, while not

formally approved, “may fairly subject a [private prison] to liability on the theory that the

relevant practice is so widespread as to have the force of law.” Id. at 404. Such a custom “must

include ‘[d]eeply embedded traditional ways of carrying out state policy.’” Doe v. Claiborne

County, Tenn., 103 F.3d 495, 507 (6th Cir.1996) (quoting Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis

Ry. Co. v. Browning, 310 U.S. 362, 369 (1940)).

incident resulting in a constitutional violation. Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 823-824

(1985). Furthermore, a private prison is not liable unless there is an “affirmative link between the

policy and the particular constitutional violation alleged” or “causal connection.” Id. Thus, to

establish liability under § 1983, Plaintiff “must adequately plead (1) that a violation of a federal

right took place; (2) that the defendant acted under color of state law; and (3) that the private

prison’s policy or custom caused that violation to happen.” Bright v. Gallia Cnty., Ohio, 753

F.3d 639, 660 (6th Cir. 2014) (citing Lambert v. Hartman, 517 F.3d 433, 439 (6th Cir. 2008)).

See also Price v. Bailey, 2009 WL 198962, at *2 (W.D. Mich. Jan. 26, 2009) (explaining that the

plaintiff must identify the policy, connect the policy to the governmental entity, and show that

the particular injury was incurred because of the execution of that policy).

Here, Plaintiff has generally pled that the Eighth Amendment rights of the Decedent were

violated by Defendants. However, Defendants contend that Plaintiff has not pled facts to show an

actual Eighth Amendment violation. That is, Defendants contend that Plaintiff has not pled

sufficient facts to show that CoreCivic adopted a policy and/or custom of deliberately

understaffing WCF or failing to implement safety measures in such a way that would lead to

unconstitutional results and has not pled sufficient facts to support a claim that any of the

individual defendants had any personal involvement in the Decedent’s death.

The Eighth Amendment prohibits cruel and unusual punishment and requires prison

officials to “ensure that inmates receive adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care, and

[to] take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511

U.S. 825, 832 (1994). In order to establish an Eighth Amendment claim for deliberate

indifference to an inmate’s safety, the inmate must satisfy a two-prong test: (1) the deprivation

alleged must be objectively serious and (2) the official responsible for the deprivation must have

must demonstrate that “(1) the alleged mistreatment was objectively serious; and (2) the

defendant subjectively ignored the risk to the inmate’s safety.” Bishop v. Hackel, 636 F.3d 757,

766 (6th Cir. 2011) (citations omitted).

Plaintiff alleges that CoreCivic’s “profit-driven understaffing policy prioritized cost-

cutting over inmate safety” and its failure “to implement adequate training and supervision of

correctional staff to address contraband issues” (Amd. Cmplt. ¶¶ 48, 102) were the moving force

behind the alleged constitutional violations. She also generally alleges that prison officials failed

to investigate prior overdoses. However, it is not enough for a complaint to contain conclusory

allegations of unconstitutional conduct by persons acting under color of state law. Some factual

basis for such claims must be set forth in the pleadings to support the allegations. Chapman v.

City of Detroit, 808 F.2d 459, 465 (6th Cir. 1986). “Blanket assertions” or a “formulaic

recitation of the elements of a cause of action” are not sufficient to state a claim under § 1983.

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555-56 n.3.

Although Plaintiff has alleged that a “policy” of understaffing at WCF led to an influx of

illegal drugs that resulted in the death of the Decedent, she does not allege when WCF was

understaffed, how it was understaffed, what posts were understaffed, or how understaffing led to

the drugs entering WCF. Additionally, although she alleges that WCF failed to address a known

contraband and drug overdose problem at WCF prior to the death of the Decedent, she does not

allege when these incidents occurred or what CoreCivic should have done to prevent the

overdoses or how the other overdoses were related to that of the Decedent, including that any of

the overdoses were in the Decedent’s pod.

The necessity for pleading specific facts was discussed in Zakora v. Chrisman, 44 F.4th

452 (6th Cir. 2022), and reiterated in Caraway v. CoreCivic of Tennessee, LLC, 98 F.4th 679

involved a § 1983 action against officials and employees of Michigan Department of Corrections

(“MDOC”) and Michigan State Police (“MSP”). The complaint alleged that the defendants were

responsible for an inmate’s death from an overdose of fentanyl because (1) they failed to protect

him from the allegedly rampant problem of drug smuggling at the facility and (2) they failed to

promptly investigate two other incidents of drug overdoses in the inmate’s unit that occurred

within two days of his own death in violation of the inmate’s Eighth Amendment rights. The

complaint also alleged that two corrections officers were deliberately indifferent to the inmate’s

serious medical needs by not heeding warnings from other inmates about the inmate’s health

status immediately before he died. Id. at 460.

The Court summarized the following facts from the amended complaint.

On the morning of January 22, 2017, Zakora was found lying unresponsive in his

bunk in the C-Unit of Lakeland by defendant Steven Johnson, a corrections

officer at the facility. Responding officers determined that Zakora was already

dead due to the presence of rigor mortis, and the cause of death was later found to

be accidental fentanyl toxicity. Earlier that morning, another prisoner allegedly

told Johnson and/or defendant Chadwick Mobley (another corrections officer at

Lakeland) to “check on Mr. Zakora because he was not doing well or because

there appeared to be something wrong with him.” The complaint alleges that these

warnings went unheeded, and that Zakora was never checked on, foreclosing the

possibility of any lifesaving medical treatment.

Mobley worked the night shift in Zakora’s housing unit from 10:00 p.m. on

January 21 until 6:00 a.m. the next morning, at which time Johnson’s shift started.

Both Johnson and Mobley stated in unrebutted affidavits that they had no

knowledge either before or during the night shift that Zakora possessed, ingested,

or intended to ingest illegal drugs. Mobley stated that he did not speak with

Zakora during that shift, and no one advised him to check on Zakora or to watch

Zakora closely. According to Johnson’s affidavit, he discovered Zakora dead in

his bunk on January 22 at 7:58 a.m., only seconds after a prisoner who was

exiting the unit said that Zakora was not “doing too good” or “words to that

effect.” Johnson also asserts that no one advised him that he should check on

Zakora or watch him closely prior to that time.

The C-Unit of Lakeland is a single enclosure that houses between 12 to 16

prisoners. Two other prisoners in the C-Unit were hospitalized from drug

overdoses in the two days prior to Zakora’s death, but no immediate investigation

the facility. The dog’s alerts gave positive indications of contraband in the C-Unit.

Zakora’s overdose, according to the complaint, was the consequence of a

longstanding problem of drug smuggling into Lakeland and other Michigan state

prisons. At the time of Zakora’s death, illegal drugs were allegedly being

smuggled into Lakeland in basketballs that were thrown over the facility’s fence.

This scheme was allegedly orchestrated by defendant Jane Doe — an unidentified

female corrections officer — and a prisoner with whom she was romantically

involved.

According to the complaint, an unidentified prisoner had informed defendant

Troy Chrisman, an inspector at Lakeland, about the drug-smuggling ring “on

more than one occasion prior to Zakora’s death, ... provid[ing] information to the

officers with details of how the drugs were coming in and who was providing

them.” Chrisman allegedly relayed this information to another inspector at

Lakeland, defendant Matthew Huntley, but neither took any action nor undertook

any investigation. This information was then allegedly passed on by Chrisman

and Huntley to their supervisors, defendant Bonita Hoffner (the Warden at

Lakeland) and defendant Steve Rivard (the Assistant Deputy Director of the

MDOC), but they allegedly either ignored the information or instructed Chrisman

and Huntley to not investigate the accusations. Defendant Russell Rurka (the

Administrative Assistant to the Warden of Lakeland) and defendant Heather Lass

(a detective with the MSP) allegedly told Brandy Zakora that they knew about the

scheme involving the drug-filled basketballs, but that they had not been able to

catch the perpetrator. The prisoner who gave the information to the inspectors was

subsequently charged with and convicted of smuggling drugs into Lakeland,

allegedly to avoid any internal investigation into the female corrections officer

who was involved in the smuggling.

As alleged in the complaint, drug smuggling by corrections officers is a chronic

problem throughout the Michigan state prisons. The complaint recounts two

incidents from 2016 when MDOC employees reported drug smuggling by

corrections officers, but no investigation was undertaken. One of the employees

allegedly sent his report to the MSP, and the other emailed his concerns directly

to defendant Heidi Washington, the Director of the MDOC. Both of these

employees were allegedly fired, only to be reinstated after instituting litigation

and a civil-service hearing, respectively.

Id. at 460-62.

The Court of Appeals found that the following allegations against the MSP defendants

were “insufficient to state an Eighth Amendment failure-to-protect claim.” Id. at 468.

[T]he MSP Defendants “were involved with the drug smuggling ring and/or a

cover up of Mr. Zakora’s death,” and [] the MSP Defendants “knew that a

‘cop/officer’ was the person bringing suboxone and heroin into the facility but did

Mr. Zakora’s death.” In addition, the complaint alleged that the MSP Defendants

“knew [of] and ... participated in the drug smuggling and knew of the risks and

harm associated with dangerous illegal drugs.” The complaint also faulted the

MSP Defendants for failing to bring a drug-detecting dog in to investigate the

presence of contraband in the C-Unit before Zakora’s death despite the two prior

drug overdoses.

Id. at 468. The Court found the complaint to be defective in the following ways.

[It] failed to explain with any specificity how any of the MSP Defendants were

involved in the drug-smuggling scheme or how each (or any) of them knew that a

police officer was responsible for the operation. Nor did the Estate plausibly

allege how any of the MSP Defendants came to obtain any knowledge about the

prevalence of drugs at Lakeland, how they ignored that knowledge, or how they

failed to curb the introduction, spread, and usage of drugs at Lakeland.

Id. “As the district court determined, virtually all of the allegations against the MSP Defendants

were ‘legal conclusions couched as facts.’” Id. (citing 16630 Southfield Ltd. P’ship v. Flagstar

Bank, F.S.B., 727 F.3d 502, 504 (6th Cir. 2013) ([A] plaintiff cannot overcome a Rule 12(b)(6)

motion to dismiss simply by referring to conclusory allegations in the complaint that the

defendant violated the law.”)).

However, the appellate court found the allegations against the MDOC defendants to be

specific enough to meet the Eighth’s Amendment’s objective and subjective prongs. As for the

objective prong, the complaint generally alleged that “the MDOC Defendants failed to protect

Zakora from the dangers of illegal drugs by failing to ‘do anything to curb the introduction,

spread, and usage of dangerous drugs in prison, despite their direct knowledge from prisoners

snitching to them and from two previous overdoses.’” Id. at 469. The complaint specifically

alleged that drugs were “so prevalent inside Zakora’s C-Unit that two other inmates in his 12-to-

16-person unit had overdosed in the two days prior to Zakora’s death, yet … no investigation

was undertaken until after Zakora died. Only after Zakora’s death did MDOC officials order a

full investigation and have the MSP bring a drug dog into the C-Unit to check for drugs.” Id. at

470. The Court found that “failing to investigate the presence of drugs after the first two

was “sufficiently serious,’ such that Zakora was ‘incarcerated under conditions posing a

substantial risk of serious harm.’” Id. at 470-71 (citing Farmer.)

Concerning the subjective prong, the Court found that the complaint sufficiently alleged

that the MDOC defendants “had knowledge about the substantial risk of serious harm to a

particular class of persons,” id. at 472, and that Zakora was in that class.

The two drug overdoses in the relatively small C-Unit of Lakeland that occurred

in the two days prior to Zakora’s fatal overdose presented a sufficiently obvious

risk to infer that the MDOC Defendants who worked within Lakeland (i.e.,

Chrisman, Huntley, Hoffner, and Rurka) had knowledge of a substantial risk of

harm to the other inmates in the C-Unit. Yet they failed to conduct a prompt

investigation in an effort to rid the space of the drugs, thereby ignoring the risk of

harm to the other prisoners within that space.

.…

In addition, the complaint alleges that Inspector Chrisman knew of such a risk to

Zakora in particular from the uncontrolled flood of drugs into Lakeland.

Specifically, a prisoner allegedly told Inspector Chrisman “of the drug smuggling

ring on more than one occasion prior to Mr. Zakora’s death and provided

information to the officers with details of how the drugs were coming in and who

was providing them,” giving “step by step details of how and when drugs were

entering the facility and ... about the individuals supplying large amounts of drugs

to Mr. Zakora.” Inspector Chrisman, in turn, allegedly relayed this information to

his colleague, Inspector Huntley, and to his supervisors, Warden Hoffner and

Assistant Deputy Director Rivard, all of whom likewise failed to act. The

prisoner’s detailed warning, considered in conjunction with the two prior

overdoses, allows us to draw a “reasonable inference” that MDOC Defendants

Chrisman, Huntley, Hoffner, Rivard, and Rurka knew of a substantial risk of harm

to Zakora.

Id. at 472-73 (citing Iqbal). That level of detail and specificity was not pled in the present case.

The allegations here are more akin to those made in Zakora against Director Washington

which were found to be insufficient.

The complaint alleges generally that she “had notice that corrections officers were

smuggling drugs into prisons.” To support this allegation, however, the Estate

offers only two alleged incidents from 2016 when MDOC employees at other

Michigan correctional facilities reported drug smuggling by corrections officers,

but where no investigations were undertaken. Director Washington was allegedly

contacted directly by the whistleblower at one of these other facilities, but this

any substantial risk of harm at Lakeland.

Id. at 473.

The Zakora Court “acknowledge[d] that the Estate would have no claim if this were

simply a run-of-the-mill drug-overdose case.”2 Id.

Instead, the Estate claims that the relevant prison officials knew of Zakora’s

heavy drug use, knew that two of his immediate cellmates had been hospitalized

in the 48 hours prior to Zakora’s death due to drug overdoses, and yet they failed

to initiate a timely investigation to remove the lethal substances from that cell that

would have saved Zakora’s life. Because the relevant defendants allegedly knew

that Zakora was at risk and ignored that risk, this is directly comparable to the

suicide “deliberate-indifference” cases where this court has allowed the claim to

proceed beyond the pleading stage.

Id. at 473-74 (citation omitted). In the present case, there are no facts alleged in the complaint to

show that Defendants knew that the Decedent was at risk and ignored that risk.

Next, the Court addressed the allegations that “defendants Washington, Hoffner, and

Rivard failed to train and supervise Jane Doe and other prison employees to prevent the entry of

illegal drugs into Lakeland and other MDOC facilities. It also alleged that these defendants failed

to adequately supervise their subordinates by acquiescing in the subordinates’ failure to take any

remedial action to address the drug problem at Lakeland.” Id. at 474. The Court affirmed the

dismissal of the claims against Director Washington but reversed the dismissal of the claims

against Hoffner and Rivard.

Defendants Washington, Hoffner, and Rivard [allegedly] failed to train and

supervise Jane Doe and other prison employees to prevent the entry of illegal

drugs into Lakeland and other MDOC facilities. It also alleged that these

defendants failed to adequately supervise their subordinates by acquiescing in the

subordinates’ failure to take any remedial action to address the drug problem at

Lakeland.

2 The use of the term “run-of-the-mill drug-overdose case” was not intended by the Zakora

Court to diminish the death of the inmate in that case and is not intended now to diminish the

death of Plaintiff’s Decedent.

failing to order a prompt investigation into drug smuggling at Lakeland or by

failing to promulgate additional or alternative policies aimed at preventing drug

smuggling altogether. With regard to Director Washington, this claim fails. As

explained above, the complaint does not adequately allege that Washington knew

of the drug problem at Lakeland generally or of the two prior overdoses

specifically, which is not surprising considering that the overdoses occurred just

two days prior to Zakora’s death. There is thus no basis to infer that Washington

abdicated her job responsibilities in failing to order a prompt investigation or to

take any other action at Lakeland.

The Estate is thus left with the assertion that Washington knew of a drug-

smuggling problem throughout MDOC facilities. But to support this, the

complaint alleges only that Director Washington was aware of two accusations of

officer-involved smuggling at other MDOC facilities, which is insufficient to

show a substantial risk of harm to all MDOC inmates. See D’Ambrosio v. Marino,

747 F.3d 378, 388 (6th Cir. 2014) (recognizing that a county’s knowledge of only

three prior instances of constitutional violations by its prosecutors could not

establish notice of habitually unconstitutional conduct in support of a failure-to-

train claim). Even coupled with the complaint’s allegation that “anti[-]overdose

drugs have been used approximately 150 times” over the past two years, the

allegations are insufficient because the figure is unaccompanied by any context

that would allow us to infer that the problem was so severe that Washington

“must have known” that all MDOC inmates were at a substantial risk of serious

harm. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 842–43, 114 S. Ct. 1970, 128

L.Ed.2d 811 (1994). The complaint therefore does not adequately allege that

Washington was deliberately indifferent by failing to promulgate additional or

alternative policies in MDOC facilities.

Defendants Hoffner and Rivard, however, allegedly did have knowledge of the

risk of harm at Lakeland and abdicated their job responsibilities in failing to take

steps to abate that risk. The complaint alleges that Warden Hoffner and MDOC

Assistant Deputy Director Rivard were told by Inspectors Chrisman and Huntley

about the drug-smuggling problem at Lakeland, but Hoffner and Rivard allegedly

either ignored the information or instructed Chrisman and Huntley not to

investigate the accusations. In either scenario, a plausible claim is stated for

failure to train or supervise their subordinates.

Hoffner and Rivard, as supervisors of the inspectors at MDOC, are directly

responsible for giving orders to the inspectors. Failing to order an investigation

into the drug smuggling, particularly after the two overdoses inside the C-Unit on

consecutive days, could be found to constitute “knowing acquiescence” to the

constitutional violation of exposing the inmates in the C-Unit to a substantial risk

of serious harm. See Howard v. Knox County, 695 F. Appx 107, 115 (6th Cir.

2017) (holding that the plaintiff stated a claim for supervisory liability against a

school principal by alleging that the principal “made no efforts to investigate,

report, train, or terminate” a teacher who abused students, even after receiving

complaints about the teacher); see also Davis v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Ed., 526

complaint alleging that a school board “made no effort whatsoever either to

investigate or to put an end” to sexual harassment by a classmate “suggests that

petitioner may be able to show ... deliberate indifference on the part of the

Board”).

When supervisors responsible for inmate health and safety ignore known threats

to those inmates, they are more than simply failing to act. In Hill v. Marshall, 962

F.2d 1209, 1213 (6th Cir. 1992), this court held that that a medical official could

be held liable in his supervisory capacity for failing to respond to an inmate’s

medical needs because he personally ignored the inmate’s complaint of not

getting medication, and instead referred the complaint to the head nurse whom he

knew was altering and destroying the inmate's prescriptions. The court rejected

the medical official's argument that his mere “failure to act” was an insufficient

basis to hold him liable for the violations of his employee because his actions in

ignoring the inmate's complaint meant that he had “abandon[ed] the specific

duties of his position.” Id.

So too here. The complaint adequately alleged that Hoffner and Rivard, in the

face of a known threat to inmate safety “personally had a job to do” in ordering an

investigation into the known presence of drugs at Lakeland (and inside the C-Unit

specifically), “and [they] did not do it.” Id. (emphasis in original). This alleged

failure could be found to have directly resulted in a violation of Zakora’s Eighth

Amendment right to be free from the substantial risk of harm. The Estate has

therefore stated a claim for failure to supervise against defendants Hoffner and

Rivard.

Id. at 476-77.

The Court found that the district court erred in granting the motion to dismiss of Johnson

and Mobley but properly granted their motion for summary judgment.

The Estate alleged that Defendants Johnson and Mobley were deliberately

indifferent to Zakora’s serious medical needs when they failed to check on him

after a prisoner, at some point during the “night/early morning” of January 22,

2017, informed them that Zakora was “not doing well” or that “there appeared to

be something wrong with him.” According to the complaint, Zakora could have

received lifesaving medical treatment had Johnson and Mobley timely checked on

him.

Id. at 477. “Despite these warnings, the complaint alleges, neither Johnson nor Mobley

investigated at all. This suffices to state a claim for deliberate indifference to a serious medical

need.” Id. (citation omitted). Therefore, it was error to grant the motion to dismiss. However,

summary judgment was appropriate in light of unrefuted affidavits “that neither Johnson nor

ingest drugs. Moreover, Mobley attested that no one ever told him to check on Zakora, and

Johnson checked on Zakora ‘only seconds’ after another inmate first alerted him to a problem.”

Id. at 478.

The Caraway Court pointed out three alleged facts that led to the Court of Appeals’

conclusion in Zakora.

First, the complaint contained detailed allegations about the “widespread presence

of drugs” at Zakora’s facility. Second, in the two days before Zakora’s overdose,

two other inmates in his twelve-to-sixteen-inmate unit had also overdosed. Third,

prison officials failed to investigate those overdoses. Taken together, those factual

allegations permitted the reasonable inference that Zakora had “unfettered access

to deadly drugs” in prison, creating an objectively excessive risk of overdose.

98 F.4th at 684 (citations omitted). The Court in Williams v. CoreCivic of Tennessee, LLC, 2025

WL 952241 (W.D. Tenn. Mar. 28, 2025), compared the facts in Zakora to the facts in its own

case and found the allegations wanting.

The first key fact present in Zakora is arguably present here. While Plaintiff’s

claim of a “widespread presence of drugs” in the WCF is not supported by the

same type of “detailed allegations” as were present in Zakora, see 44 F.4th at 461

(alleging basketballs containing illegal drugs were being tossed over the fence of

the facility and that a prisoner had informed an inspector at the facility of a “drug-

smuggling” ring and provided details “of how the drugs were coming in and who

was providing them”), she does contend that Cole [the decedent] “would routinely

refuse periodic drug tests, would test positive for illegal drugs when drug tests

were administered, and suffered a prior opioid drug overdose on March 18,

2023.” These allegations plausibly allege a widespread presence of drugs at the

WCF. However, she has not alleged the other two key facts present in Zakora.

She points to Cole’s prior overdose that was not investigated; but, unlike in

Zakora, where the prior overdoses and the failure to investigate the same took

place in the same small unit and in the two days prior to Zakora’s overdose,

Cole’s prior overdose and the alleged failure to investigate took place in a

different unit, two weeks before. There are no allegations of prior overdoses or

access to drugs in the KD unit where Cole was housed at the time of his fatal

overdose. Importantly, analysis of the objective prong “must consider the

likelihood of harm to the injured party in the context of the circumstances that led

to the injury.” Zakora, 44 F.4th at 472 (emphasis added). The relevant context

here is the KD unit in the time immediately preceding Cole’s overdose and death

and Plaintiff has not alleged a presence of illegal substances nor a failure to

investigate in this pod.

Williams, 2025 WL 952241, at *6 (record citations and some case citations omitted).

The Williams Court rejected the plaintiff’s argument that CoreCivic engaged in deliberate

understaffing, which led to the deprivation of the decedent’s constitutional rights because, “[a]s

explained in Caraway, the failure to adequately staff a prison - even a deliberate failure - is not

itself a constitutional violation.” 98 F.4th at 685 (citing Agramonte v. Shartle, 491 F. App’x 557,

560 (6th Cir. 2012)).

Plaintiff avers that “[l]ack of sufficient staffing directly leads to the increase of

illegal substances, including fentanyl, within prisons because existing staff was

not sufficient to conduct proper security searches of individuals entering the

prison, including searches of corrections staff.” These allegations are similar to

those found to be insufficient in Caraway. 98 F.4th at 686 (“The complaint

contains only generalized allegations that Whiteville’s understaffing ‘led to’

rampant drug use, apparently in part because officials couldn’t perform adequate

head counts and inspections. That kind of conclusory statement, unaccompanied

by factual support, receives no presumption of truth.”) (first citing Iqbal, 556 U.S.

at 678; and then citing Chapman v. City of Detroit, 808 F.2d 459, 465 (6th Cir.

1986)). Plaintiff does claim that understaffing “contributed to the lack of searches,

sweeps, and inspections within the prison to discover the presence of illegal

contraband, including fentanyl and other drugs, which had already been brought

into the prison” and attempts to support this claim with the assertion that an hour

and a half went by without a head count or security sweep prior to Cole’s death,

in violation of the set requirement. However, this assertion alone is insufficient to

demonstrate more than a “mere possibility” that understaffing is what led to the

violation and Cole’s death. Caraway, 98 F.4th at 686.

Williams, 2025 WL 952241, at *7 (record citations omitted).

Looking to the principles set out in Zakora and Caraway for guidance and as applied in

Williams, the Court finds that the allegations in the present case do not nearly rise to the level

needed to state an Eighth Amendment claim. Instead, Plaintiff’s allegations are “conclusory

statement[s], unaccompanied by factual support” - a pleading standard that was specifically

rejected in Caraway based on Iqbal.

Concerning CoreCivic, Plaintiff alleges that it had a policy and/or custom of

understaffing its facilities and this understaffing led to an influx of illegal drugs which ultimately

to the drugs that killed the Decedent. As pointed out by Defendants, she does not cite any recent

arrests, incidents, or other facts that would allow the Court to plausibly conclude that there was

actually an “ongoing contraband problem” at WCF prior to the Decedent’s death, nor does she

assert facts necessary to show that there were temporally-proximate prior overdoses at WCF. “A

broad assertion that an unconstitutional policy exists is nothing more than a bare recitation of

legal standards.” See e.g., Osberry v. Slusher, 750 F. App’x 385, 398 (6th Cir. 2018). See also

Minick v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville, 2014 WL 3817116, at *2 (M.D. Tenn. Aug. 4, 2014) (“The

court recognizes that presenting municipal liability claims is more difficult after Twombly and

Iqbal, but the prevailing view within this circuit and within this district is that allegations that

essentially amount to notice pleading of a municipal liability claim are insufficient.”); Morris v.

City of Memphis, 2012 WL 3727149, at *3 (W.D. Tenn. Aug. 27, 2012) (“Plaintiff’s claims

regarding Defendant’s custom, policy, or practice concerning the misbehavior of the rank and

file of its police force amount to legal conclusions unaccompanied by additional factual

assertions. Thus, Plaintiff’s allegations simply recite the elements of a § 1983 claim.”)

Additionally, as in Williams, Plaintiff’s allegations do not rise to the level of “sufficiently

serious” to satisfy the objective prong of the failure-to-protect claim, but, even if they did,

Plaintiff has failed to adequately plead the subjective prong. To be held liable under the

deliberate-indifference standard, a prison official must “know[ ] of and disregard[ ] an excessive

risk to inmate health or safety. The official must both be aware of facts from which the inference

could be drawn and that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the

inference.” Zakora, 44 F.4th at 472 (citation omitted). “A factfinder may conclude that a prison

official knew of a substantial risk from the very fact that the risk was obvious.” Farmer, 511

U.S. at 842 (citation omitted). “[T]he correct inquiry is whether [the defendant] had knowledge

who the particular victim turned out to be.” Zakora, 44 F.4th at 472 (second alteration in

original) (quoting Taylor v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr., 69 F.3d 76, 81 (6th Cir. 1995)). “Deliberate

indifference” entails more than just mere negligence. Cabaniss v. City of Riverside, 231 F. App’x

407, 414 (6th Cir. 2007). An inmate must show that prison officials had “a sufficiently culpable

state of mind” in committing the acts which form the basis of the claim. Brown v. Bargery, 207

F.3d 863, 867 (6th Cir. 2000).

Here, Plaintiff appears to allege that Defendants are liable because Delgado “fail[ed] to

perform rounds and address the window violation” 3 and supposedly “there had been multiple

documented incidents of drug overdoses within the Whiteville Correctional Facility, indicating a

known and ongoing issue with contraband substances entering the facility.” (Amd. Cmplt. ¶¶ 19,

22.) Plaintiff’s factual allegations show that WCF staff (1) discovered the Decedent

unresponsive, (2) responded, initiated CPR, and administered Narcan in an attempt to save his

life, (3) transported him to medical at WCF, (4) called EMS, (5) transported him to Bolivar

General Hospital where - “despite continuous efforts” – the Decedent was later pronounced

deceased, and (6) performed an investigation into the incident resulting in discipline against

Officer Delgado for violating WCF policy. (Id. ¶¶ 12-16, 19-20). These measures do not equate

to deliberate indifference.

As for Plaintiff’s claim that “there had been multiple documented incidents of drug

overdoses” at WCF, a plaintiff must show “a clear and persistent pattern” of unconstitutional

conduct. Even citing examples of multiple discrete instances is not enough to draw such a

conclusion. Peet v. City of Detroit, 502 F.3d 557, 568 (6th Cir. 2007) (concluding that three

instances of misconduct is not enough to establish a “custom”); see also Pineda v. City of

3 As mentioned above, Delgado is not a party to this motion.

Houston, 291 F.3d 325, 329 (Sth Cir. 2002) (determining that evidence of eleven incidents of

unconstitutional conduct by police officers was insufficient to establish a “custom”).

As for Delgado’s alleged failure to perform rounds, merely missing cell checks does not

equate to deliberate indifference. See Burwell v. City of Lansing, 7 F.4th 456, 470-76 (6th Cir.

2021). Similarly, “the failure to follow internal policies [does not], without more, constitute

deliberate indifference.” Winkler v. Madison Cnty., 893 F.3d 877, 891 (6th Cir. 2018). Moreover,

Plaintiff has not alleged any facts showing that Defendants were subjectively aware of a

substantial risk of serious harm to the Decedent from which they actually drew such inference.

Thus, Plaintiff failed to sufficiently plead facts to demonstrate that any of the movant Defendants

acted with deliberate indifference.#

Plaintiffs failure to train and failure to supervise claims fail for the same reasons that

those claims failed in Zakora. To state a claim based on a failure to train or supervise theory, a

plaintiff must plead: (1) the training or supervision was inadequate for the tasks performed; (2)

the inadequacy was the result of the municipality’s deliberate indifference; and (3) the

inadequacy was closely related to or actually caused the injury. Ellis v. Cleveland Mun. Sch.

Dist., 455 F.3d 690, 700 (6th Cir. 2006). Plaintiff has pled none of those elements.

As explained in Zakora,

Turning to the adequacy of the complaint’s allegations, individual liability on a

failure-to-train or supervise theory “must be based on more than respondeat

superior, or the right to control employees.” Shehee v. Luttrell, 199 F.3d 295, 300

(6th Cir. 1999) (citation omitted). A simple failure to act, without “a showing of

‘direct responsibility’ for the actions of the individual officers,” will not suffice to

establish supervisory liability. Hays v. Jefferson County, 668 F.2d 869, 873-74

(6th Cir. 1982) (quoting Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 376, 96 S. Ct. 598, 46

L.Ed.2d 561 (1976)). Instead, “supervisory liability requires some ‘active

unconstitutional behavior’ on the part of the supervisor.” Peatross v. City of

Memphis, 818 F.3d 233, 241 (6th Cir. 2016) (quoting Bass v. Robinson, 167 F.3d

1041, 1048 (6th Cir. 1999)).

As relevant here, a supervisor may be liable if he or she “abandons the specific

duties of his [or her] position in the face of actual knowledge of a breakdown in

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877, 898 (6th Cir. 2018) (citation and internal alterations omitted). The supervisor

must have abdicated his or her job responsibility, and the “active performance of

the [supervisor’s] individual job function” must have directly resulted in the

constitutional injury. Gregory v. City of Louisville, 444 F.3d 725, 752 (6th Cir.

2006) (emphasis in original). This means that, “at a minimum, the plaintiff must

show that the defendant at least implicitly authorized, approved, or knowingly

acquiesced in the unconstitutional conduct of the offending officers.” Peatross,

818 F.3d at 242 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The subjective

prong is the same as it is for the subordinate officers: “The supervisor need not

have known of the substantial risk to the injured party but rather must have

possessed knowledge of potential danger to a particular class of persons.”

Troutman v. Louisville Metro Dep’t of Corr., 979 F.3d 472, 488 (6th Cir. 2020)

(citation omitted).

Zakora, 44 F.4th at 476. Zakora allowed the failure to train and/or supervise claims against

Defendants Hoffner and Rivard to go forward because there were allegations that “Warden

Hoffner and MDOC Assistant Deputy Director Rivard were told by Inspectors Chrisman and

Huntley about the drug-smuggling problem at Lakeland, but Hoffner and Rivard allegedly either

ignored the information or instructed Chrisman and Huntley not to investigate the accusations.”

Id.

Hoffner and Rivard, as supervisors of the inspectors at MDOC, are directly

responsible for giving orders to the inspectors. Failing to order an investigation

into the drug smuggling, particularly after the two overdoses inside the C-Unit on

consecutive days, could be found to constitute “knowing acquiescence” to the

constitutional violation of exposing the inmates in the C-Unit to a substantial risk

of serious harm. See Howard v. Knox County, 695 F. App’x 107, 115 (6th Cir.

2017) (holding that the plaintiff stated a claim for supervisory liability against a

school principal by alleging that the principal “made no efforts to investigate,

report, train, or terminate” a teacher who abused students, even after receiving

complaints about the teacher); see also Davis v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Ed., 526

U.S. 629, 654, 119 S. Ct. 1661, 143 L.Ed.2d 839 (1999) (concluding that a

complaint alleging that a school board “made no effort whatsoever either to

investigate or to put an end” to sexual harassment by a classmate “suggests that

petitioner may be able to show ... deliberate indifference on the part of the

Board”).

Id. at 477. Thus, a plaintiff cannot survive a motion to dismiss a failure to train and/or supervise

claim when she fails to plead any facts to support those claims, as in the present case.

of their staff also fail to state a claim. According to Plaintiff, “Defendants CoreCivic, Warden

Leeds, and Shift Supervisor Smith ratified the unconstitutional actions and omissions of their

subordinates, including those of Officer Delgado, by failing to address, investigate, or discipline

these actions effectively.” (Amd. Cmplt. ¶ 72). Ratification occurs when an individual with

policymaking authority issues a final decision affirming a subordinate’s decision and, thereby,

adopts it as municipal policy. St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 127 (1988) (plurality

opinion); Flagg v. City of Detroit, 715 F.3d 165, 175 (6th Cir. 2013). Even when a plaintiff can

show that an official with final decision-making authority ratified a decision, the plaintiff must

still “prove that the ratification was a ‘moving force’ in causing the constitutional violation.”

Feliciano v. City of Cleveland, 988 F.2d 649, 656 (6th Cir. 1993) (“Ratification of a

subordinate’s action requires more than acquiescence - it requires affirmative approval of a

particular decision made by a subordinate.”) For ratification by a policymaker’s final approval to

be the “moving force” behind a constitutional violation, the plaintiff must show that there was a

history or pattern of unconstitutional decision-making by the policymakers. Id.; see also

Alexander v. Beale St. Blues Co., 108 F. Supp. 2d 934, 949 (W.D. Tenn. 1999) (“Even if

plaintiffs could prove that the City ratified the officers conduct by failing to discipline them for

it, plaintiffs would still have to prove that the ratification was a ‘moving force’ behind the

constitutional violation.”)

Here, Plaintiff provides no factual support showing that CoreCivic ratified alleged

constitutional violations at WCF. Instead, Plaintiff merely alleges that “CoreCivic leadership’s

failure to implement meaningful oversight or provide necessary resources to its employees

constitutes ratification of the unconstitutional and negligent conduct leading to Richardson’s

death” - referencing nonspecific, undated, and unfounded “incidents” related to “delayed medical

conclusively stating so without reference to any specific instance does not make plausible a

claim that ratification of unconstitutional behavior occurred such that was the “moving force” of

the Decedent’s death. Beyond that, Plaintiff appears to contend the matter was not investigated

and no employee was disciplined, despite it being undisputed that an investigation did take place

and Delgado was, in fact, disciplined. In short, Plaintiff has failed to plead facts evidencing a

history or pattern of unconstitutional decision-making by the policymakers at WCF. Thus, this

theory fails.

Plaintiff has also failed to adequately plead liability based on a final policymaker theory.

An entity may be liable under Section 1983 for actions of its authorized policymakers when “a

deliberate choice to follow a course of action is made from among various alternatives by the

official or officials responsible for establishing final policy with respect to the subject matter in

question.” Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 483 (1986). Here, Plaintiff has not pled

any facts to show (1) that any policy acted as the moving force of an alleged constitutional

deprivation, or (2) that any of the alleged “policymakers” made a “deliberate choice” to

understaff WCF or to allow drugs into the facility. See Caraway, 98 F.4th at 686 (determining

that, when a complaint “contains only generalized allegations” of “understaffing,” such

conclusory statements are insufficient to state a claim).

As for the individual defendants, those claims also must be dismissed because Plaintiff

fails to make any specific factual allegations against them. To state a cognizable § 1983 claim,

the plaintiff must allege some personal involvement by each of the named defendants. See

Heyerman v. County of Calhoun, 680 F.3d 642, 647 (6th Cir. 2012) (requiring personal

involvement to state a § 1983 claim). Likewise, “[b]ecause § 1983 liability cannot be imposed

under a theory of respondeat superior, proof of personal involvement is required for a supervisor

to incur personal liability.” Grinter v. Knight, 532 F.3d 567, 575 (6th Cir. 2008) (quoting Miller

v. Calhoun Cnty., 408 F.3d 803, 817 n. 3 (6th Cir. 2005)).

The liability of supervisors, such as Leeds and Smith, cannot be based solely on the right

to control employees or “simple awareness of employees’ misconduct.” Leary v. Daeschner, 349

F.3d 888, 903 (6th Cir. 2003). Courts have repeatedly explained that a supervisory official’s

failure to supervise, control, or train the offending individual is not actionable unless the

supervisor either encouraged the specific incident of misconduct or in some other way directly

participated in it. See, e.g., Shehee v. Luttrell, 199 F.3d 295, 300 (6th Cir. 1999). A plaintiff must

allege that a supervisory defendant “did more than play a passive role in the alleged violation or

showed mere tacit approval of the goings on.” Bass v. Robinson, 167 F.3d 1041, 1048 (6th Cir.

1999). “At a minimum a plaintiff must show that the official at least implicitly authorized,

approved, or knowingly acquiesced in the unconstitutional conduct of the offending officers.”

Combs v. Wilkinson, 315 F.3d 548, 558 (6th Cir. 2002). That is, a plaintiff must demonstrate

personal involvement by a particular defendant. See Bass, 167 F.3d at 1048 (emphasis in

original).

# Plaintiff alleges without factual support that Smith, among others, “knew or should have

known about the ongoing contraband problem” at WCF. (Amd. Cmplt. § 33). As addressed

above, simply stating that a “contraband problem” existed at WCF does not provide a basis for

constitutional liability. Moreover, even if Smith were aware of a “contraband problem,” that does

not make it plausible that Smith was aware of a specific risk of harm to the Decedent which he

then disregarded. In that regard, there are no allegations related to any previous interactions

between Smith and the Decedent, nor are there any facts alleged showing that Smith knew that

the Decedent was specifically at risk for an overdose. In fact, the only interaction Smith had with

the Decedent concerns Smith’s attempts to save his life after he overdosed.#Plaintiff’s failure to

23

allege facts as to what actions Smith failed to take, when he failed to take them, or how those

alleged failures led to the Decedent’s death is fatal to her claims against Smith.

# Plaintiff also makes allegations against Leeds without facts providing a basis for

individual liability against him. As with Smith, Plaintiff fails to allege facts to show that Leeds

“knew of and disregarded an excessive risk” to the Decedent’s health or safety beyond his

contention that Leeds and others were aware of a “contraband problem.” Plaintiffs alleges that

“(bly failing to investigate or discipline Officer Delgado for neglecting mandatory rounds or

ignoring Richardson’s distress call, ... Leeds and Smith condoned and ratified this conduct as

acceptable practice.” (Amd. Cmplt. § 78). However, the only factual allegation concerning the

purported “distress call” made by the Decedent is that “[a] phone call made by Richardson at

08:47 on the day of the incident [suggested that] Richardson had consumed drugs.” (/d. □ 17).

However, there are no allegations (1) about who this call was made to, (2) whether the Decedent

voiced being in “distress” or asked for help, or (3) that Leeds or Smith were aware of this phone

call. Plaintiff fails to allege what specific actions Leeds failed to take, when he failed to take

them, or how those alleged failures led to Decedent’s death. Additionally, there is nothing in the

complaint alleging that Leeds knew the Decedent, that he was aware the Decedent suffered from

any medical distress, or that he knew the Decedent had previously taken illegal drugs. Moreover,

Plaintiff concedes that an investigation was conducted concerning the Decedent’s overdose and

Delgado was disciplined for his actions/inactions.#

Plaintiff generally alleges that Leeds and Smith had actual knowledge of illegal

contraband coming into WCF, but she makes no factual allegations as to what specific

information they possessed, how they obtained the information, or when they learned it. This

lack of specificity is in contrast to that found in Zakora in which two drug overdoses occurred in

a small unit in the two days prior to Zakora’s fatal overdose. Furthermore, one of the individual

24

death of the decedent. Those details included “how the drugs were coming in and who was

providing them, … step by step details of how and when drugs were entering the facility and ...

[information] about the individuals supplying large amounts of drugs to Mr. Zakora.” 44 F.4th at

472-73. The individual defendant receiving the information passed this information along to a

colleague and to the defendant supervisors. “The prisoner’s detailed warning, considered in

conjunction with the two prior overdoses, allows us to draw a ‘reasonable inference’ that MDOC

Defendants Chrisman, Huntley, Hoffner, Rivard, and Rurka knew of a substantial risk of harm to

Zakora.” Id. at 473. In this case, Plaintiff’s claims against the individual defendants are

conclusory, and they must be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6).

Plaintiff has failed to allege facts necessary to establish that an official policy or custom

of CoreCivic was the moving force behind any alleged constitutional deprivations related to the

death of the Decedent, and CoreCivic cannot be held liable under § 1983 solely on a respondeat

superior theory. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims against CoreCivic must be dismissed.

Likewise, Plaintiff has failed to plead sufficient facts to state a claim against the individual

defendants, and the claims against them must be dismissed as well.

State Law Claims

In light of the dismissal of the federal claims, the Court declines to exercise its

supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law claims. Retaining supplemental jurisdiction

over state claims that arise out of the same facts that form a basis for a federal claim is a matter

of discretion with the court. United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726,

(1966); Vandiver v. Hardin County Board of Education, 925 F.2d 927, 935 (6th Cir. 1991). The

factors to be analyzed in making that determination are judicial economy, comity, convenience,

and fairness to the litigants. If all federal claims are dismissed before trial, as in the present case,

Mellon University v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, n.7 (1988). As explained in Medlin v. City of Algood,

355 F. Supp. 3d 707 (M.D. Tenn. 2019),

With the dismissal of Medlin’s federal claims against Bilbrey, the Court will not

retain jurisdiction over the state law claims against that Defendant because,

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), there is a “strong presumption in favor of

declining to exercise jurisdiction over supplemental state-law claims after

dismissing federal anchor claims[.]” Martinez v. City of Cleveland, 700 F. App’x

521, 523 (6th Cir. 2017). This holds true even where, as here, federal claims

remain against other defendants. Retention of state law claims, however, may be

appropriate where the case has been pending for a long time, discovery has been

completed, the record is voluminous, a court has spent significant time on the

litigation, and there are pending motions for summary judgment. Harper v.

AutoAlliance Int’l, Inc., 392 F.3d 195, 211 (6th Cir. 2004).

Medlin, 355 F. Supp. 3d at 719 (some citations omitted).

As in Medlin, this case is neither old nor voluminous. It was filed approximately a year

ago on June 21, 2024, and there have only been approximately thirty-five docket entries thus far.

No scheduling order has been entered. The only real involvement in this case by the Court so far

has been to rule on the present motion and that of the State and Governor Lee. In light of these

factors, the Court will not retain jurisdiction over the supplemental state law claims, and those

claims are dismissed without prejudice.

Summary and Conclusion

Because Plaintiff has failed to state a claim against Defendants under the Eighth

Amendment and the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state

law claims, Defendants’ motion to dismiss is GRANTED.

claim, and the claim brought pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 41-1-103 and 8-8-201. The motion is

granted without prejudice as to the remaining state law claims.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

s/ S. Thomas Anderson

S. THOMAS ANDERSON

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Date: June 2, 2025.