Opinion

Vargas v. Sarkar

  • 2020 NY Slip Op 35747(U)
Court
New York Supreme Court, Bronx County
Filed
Dec 21, 2020
Status
Unpublished
Author
Ben R. Barbato
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 36.0%

The opinion

Vargas v Sarkar

2020 NY Slip Op 35747(U)

December 21, 2020

Supreme Court, Bronx County

Docket Number: Index No. 30572/2018E

Judge: Ben R. Barbato

Cases posted with a "30000" identifier, i.e., 2013 NY Slip

Op 30001(U), are republished from various New York

State and local government sources, including the New

York State Unified Court System's eCourts Service.

This opinion is uncorrected and not selected for official

publication.

FILED: BRONX COUNTY CLERK 01/14/2021 11:02 AM INDEX NO. 30572/2018E

NYSCEF DOC. NO. 29 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 01/14/2021

NEW YORK SUPREME COURT - COUNTY OF BRONX

PART/~ Case Disposed

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK Settle Order IJ

COUNTY OF BRONX: Schedule Appearance Cl

-------------·-------X

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Index NG. c?o S-? ,2../1'.?

, 1:::-

-agains~- Hon.. HON. BEN. R. BARBATO. J.S.C.

Justice.

-------------·- ---X

The following papers numbered 1 to Read on this moti~

Noticed on and dul~tted as No. on the Motion Calendar of

fAPERS NQMBIREP

Notice of Motion - Order to Show Cause - Exhibits and Affidavits ADnc:xed

Answl:rin& Affidavit and Exhibits

Replying Affidavit 111d Exlu'bits

Affi&vitl and Exhibits

'

Pleadinp • Exln"bit

Stipulation(s)- Referee's R.cpon - Minutes

Filed Papers

Memoranda of Law

Upon the foregoing papers thi$

~otion is decided in accordance

with memorandum decision filed

tJerewith

ated: "~ / ,:i:..i I .:J.e> ~

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FILED: BRONX COUNTY CLERK 01/14/2021 11:02 AM INDEX NO. 30572/2018E

NYSCEF DOC. NO. 29 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 01/14/2021

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

COUNTY OF BRONX, PART 14

-------------------------------------------------------------------X

YLUMINADA VARGAS Index Mi. 30572/2018E

-against- Hon. BEN R. BARBATO

MD SARKAR, GUIMIN LIANG AND "JOHN Justice Supreme Court

DOE" an unknown person intended to be the driver

of said motor vehicle owned by GUIMIN LIANG

-------------------------------------------------------------------X

The following NYSCEF docs numbered 11 to 27 were read on this motion (NYSCEF and CASE

MANAGEMENT Seq. No.I) DISMISS noticed and submitted on October 22, 2020.

Notice of Motion - Order to Show Cause - Exhibits and Affidavits Annexed NYSCEF No(s). 11-20

Notice of Cross-Motion -Exhibits and Affidavits Annexed NYSCEF No(s). 21-27

Answering Affidavit and Exhibits NYSCEF No(s).

Upon the foregoing papers, defendant Guimin Liang ("Liang") moves for an order

pursuant to CPLR §3126, dismissing plaintiff s complaint or, in the alternative, precluding

plaintiff from offering evidence of any injuries. Plaintiff opposes the motion and cross-moves

for an order granting plaintiff summary judgment on the issue ofliability.

The cause of action is for personal injuries allegedly sustained by the plaintiff in a motor

vehicle accident that occurred on July 5, 2017 on Junction Boulevard in Queens County.

Liang alleges that pursuant to a Preliminary Conference Order dated March 15, 2019,

plaintiff was directed to appear for a physical examination 45 days after her deposition. A

Compliance Conference Order was held on October 25, 2019, directing that plaintiff appear for a

physical examination within 30 days of her deposition. Plaintiffs deposition was held on

November 20, 2019 but plaintiff has not appeared for an independent medical examination

("IME"). An appointment was scheduled for an IME on June 25 , 2020 but plaintiff failed to

appear. The appointment was then re-scheduled to August 13 , 2020 but plaintiff again, failed to

appear. Additionally, Liang asserts that medical reports and certain authorizations have not been

turned over by the plaintiff despite plaintiff being directed to do so in the Preliminary

Conference Order. Therefore, the plaintiffs complaint should be dismissed or she should be

precluded from offering evidence at trial as to her injuries.

Plaintiff opposes the motion and takes issue with the fact that IMEs were scheduled

during a "worldwide pandemic." Plaintiff further contends that defendant has failed to make any

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FILED: BRONX COUNTY CLERK 01/14/2021 11:02 AM INDEX NO. 30572/2018E

.

NYSCEF DOC. NO. 29

'

RECEIVED NYSCEF: 01/14/2021

"good faith" efforts to resolve the issue of the IME by calling plaintiffs counsel and said

defendant has also failed to appear for a deposition in violation of preliminary, compliance, and

status conference orders.

Plaintiff further cross-moves for summary judgment on the issue of liability since

plaintiff was a rear-seat passenger in a taxi operated by defendant MD Sarkar. In support of the

cross-motion, plaintiff submits her deposition testimony as well as a copy of the police accident

report. Plaintiff asserts in her deposition that the taxi she was riding in was involved in a motor

vehicle accident. Plaintiff argues that as an "innocent passenger" she is entitled to summary

judgment since she is not to blame for the accident. Moreover, her entitlement to summary

judgment is not restricted by potential issues of comparative negligence between the drivers.

With respect to Liang's motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR §3126, it has been held that,

"The drastic sanction of striking pleadings is only justified when the moving party shows

conclusively that the failure to disclose was willful, contumacious or in bad faith, a burden born

by the movant... " (Christian v. City of New York, 269 A.D.2d 135 [l51 Dept. 2000]). The court

finds that Liang has failed to show that plaintiffs conduct in failing to appear for IMEs was

willful, contumacious, or in bad faith.

Plaintiffs counsel appears to imply that plaintiff has not appeared for her IME due to the

Covid-19 pandemic. However, the IMEs were scheduled for June of 2020 and August of 2020

and not in the early days of the pandemic. Moreover, plaintiffs counsel does not address why

the outstanding authorizations and medical reports have not been provided to the moving

defendant. CPLR §3126, " .. . broadly empowers a trial court to craft a conditional order - an

order 'that grants the motion and imposes [a] sanction ' unless within a specified time the

resisting party submits to the disclosure"' (citation omitted). Gibbs v. St. Barnabas Hospital, 16

N.Y.3d 74 [2010].

Accordingly, plaintiff is directed to provide the moving defendant with any outstanding

medical reports and authorizations within thirty (30) days of the date of this order with notice of

entry. Plaintiff is directed to appear for an IME within sixty (60) days of the date of this order

with notice of entry. Failure of the plaintiff to comply may result in preclusion upon further

application to the court.

Plaintiffs cross-motion for summary judgment on the issue ofliability was unopposed.

[* 3] 3 of 4

FILED: BRONX COUNTY CLERK 01/14/2021 11:02 AM INDEX NO. 30572/2018E

NYSCEF DOC. NO. 29 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 01/14/2021

•

To be entitled to the "drastic" remedy of summary judgment, the moving party "must

make a prima facie showing of entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, tendering sufficient

evidence to demonstrate the absence of any material issues of fact from the case." (Winegrad v.

New York University Medical Center, 64 N. Y.2d 851 [1985]. The failure to make such prima

facie showing requires denial of the motion, regardless of the sufficiency of any opposing papers

(id., see also, Alvarez v. Prospect Hosp., 68 N.Y.2d 320, 324 [1986]). Once a movant meets his

initial burden, the burden shifts to the opponent, who must then produce sufficient evidence, also

in admissible form, to establish the existence of a triable issue of fact. (Zuckerman v. City of

New York, 49 N.Y.2d 557 [1980]).

It is well established that, " ... the right of an innocent passenger to summary judgment is

not in any way restricted by potential issues of comparative negligence as between defendant and

the driver of the vehicle in front ... " (Johnson v. Phillips, 261 A.D.2d 269 [Pt Dept. 1999]; see

also, Garcia v. Tri-County Ambulette Service, Inc., 282 A.D.2d 206 [1 st Dept. 2001]). In the

case at bar, the plaintiff has demonstrated her entitlement to summary judgment on the issue of

liability. "Plaintiff's entitlement to partial summary judgment as a blameless passenger is not

contingent upon the apportionment of liability between [the drivers] .. ." (Basabe v. Carrozza,

106 A.D.3d 641 [1 st Dept. 2013]).

Accordingly, plaintiff's cross-motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability

only, is granted.

This constitutes the Decision and Order of this Court.

Dated: Hon.

I. CHECK ONE.. ...... .. ........ ... ... .................... □ CASE DISPOSED IN ITS ENTIRETY □ CASE STILL ACTIVE

2. MOTION IS .............. .. ............................ .. □ GRANTED □ DENIED □ GRANTED IN PART □ OTHER

3. CHECK IF APPROPRIATE ....... ............. .

□ SETTLE ORDER □ SUBMIT ORDER □ SCHEDULE

APPEARANCE

□ FIDUCIARY APPOINTMENT □ REFEREE APPOINTMENT

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This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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