Com. v. Shelton, S.

J-S14035-25

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

: PENNSYLVANIA

:

v. :

:

:

SIDDIQ SHELTON :

:

Appellant : No. 2546 EDA 2024

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered September 13, 2024

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at

No(s): CP-51-CR-0013343-2014

BEFORE: DUBOW, J., BECK, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY STEVENS, P.J.E.: FILED JUNE 2, 2025

Appellant, Siddiq Shelton, appeals from the order entered by the Court

of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County dismissing as untimely his petition

under the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546.

We affirm.

In this Court’s 2021 memorandum decision affirming the PCRA court

order dismissing Appellant’s first PCRA petition, we summarized the facts and

procedural history as follows:

On July 28, 2014, the decedent, Elisha Bull [(“Bull”)], along with

Shantee Porter [(“Shantee”)], Francheska Quinones

[(“Quinones”)], Tatiyana Porter [(“Tatiyana”)], Michel Benjamin

[(“Benjamin”)], Tynisha Moore, and an eight[-]month[-]old baby

were hanging out on the porch of 4902 North Front Street in

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. At approximately 12:19 a.m.,

[Shelton] and an unknown male approached the porch and began

shooting at the individuals on the porch. After shooting ... at least

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* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

J-S14035-25

15 times, [Shelton and the unknown male] fled. Quinones was

shot once in the thigh. Tatiyana [ ] was shot in her arm and her

ankle. Benjamin was shot in his thigh. Bull was shot a total of [six]

times[:] twice in the head, once in the collarbone, once in the

chest, once in the left wrist, and once in the right ankle. All four

individuals were rushed to the Temple Hospital. Bull was

pronounced dead shortly thereafter. The medical examiner

determined that the cause of death was from multiple gunshot

wounds.

Following the shooting, the police recovered surveillance footage

of the shooting. They also conducted multiple interviews of the

surviving victims. Quinones identified [Shelton] as one of the

shooters from a photo array. Benjamin also implicated [Shelton]

as one of the shooters. Tatiyana [ ] selected two individuals from

a photo array, one of whom was [Shelton], and stated that the

shooter was one of th[e] two individuals [that she identified].

Finally, while Shantee [ ] was preparing for trial with Detective

Laura Hammond [(“Detective Hammond”)] on September 12,

2016, just days before trial commenced, she told Detective

Hammond that Benjamin had told her that [Shelton] was one of

the shooters.

On September 21, 2016, after a jury trial, Shelton was found

guilty of first-degree murder and related offenses. Shelton

subsequently entered into a sentencing agreement with the

Commonwealth, wherein Shelton agreed to waive his direct

appeal rights in exchange for a life sentence in lieu of the death

penalty. The trial court sentenced Shelton, in accordance with the

sentencing agreement, to an aggregate term of life plus 72 to 144

years in prison.

On August 15, 2017, Shelton filed a timely, pro se, [first] PCRA

Petition. The PCRA court appointed counsel. On February 28,

2019, after a change in counsel, PCRA counsel filed an Amended

PCRA Petition. In the Amended Petition, Shelton alleged, inter

alia, that he is entitled to a new trial based upon after-discovered

evidence of Detective James Pitts’s (“Detective Pitts”) habit and

routine of coercing witnesses into signing false statements.

On February 28, 2020, the PCRA court filed a Pa.R.Crim.P. 907

Notice of Intent to Dismiss Shelton's Petition without a hearing.

On July 7, 2020, the PCRA court dismissed Shelton's PCRA

Petition. Shelton filed a timely Notice of Appeal and a court-

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ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) Concise Statement of errors

complained of on appeal.

Commonwealth v. Shelton, 253 A.3d 294, at *1 (non-precedential decision)

(Pa. Super. 2021). On October 5, 2021, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court

denied Appellant’s petition for allowance of appeal.

On April 6, 2023, Appellant filed a counseled, second PCRA petition

(“Second Petition”), which is here at issue. As the PCRA court explains,

On February 28, 2024, Appellant filed, as exhibits, statements

taken from various Commonwealth witnesses to supplement his

Second Petition [that asserted the Commonwealth improperly

denied Appellant his due process rights to a fair trial when it

suppressed materials related to misconduct committed by former

Detective Pitts in prior cases unrelated to Appellant’s.]. On May

2, 2024, the Commonwealth filed a motion to dismiss. On July

23, 2024, the PCRA Court issued notice, pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P.

907, of its intent to dismiss Appellant’s Second Petition without a

hearing (“907 Notice”). The PCRA court then dismissed

Appellant’s Second Petition on September 13, 2024.

Appellant has now appealed the PCRA Court’s dismissal of his

Second Petition, raising the following claim:

[Appellant] claims that the PCRA Court erred in finding

that [he] was not entitled to relief on his claim that

the Commonwealth violated [Appellant’s] rights under

the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the

Pennsylvania and U.S. Constitutions when it failed to

disclose Brady[1] evidence related to Det. Pitts.

See Appellant’s 1925(b) Statement of Matters Complained of on

Appeal. . . (“Statement of Errors”).

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) Opinion, 11/06/24, at 1-3.

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1 Brady v. Maryland, 373 W.S. 83 (1963).

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Appellant’s brief reiterates his Rule 1925(b) statement as the sole issue

raised on appeal. See Brief of Appellant, at 6. In support of this issue,

Appellant sets forth the testimonies of eyewitnesses who, on the witness stand

at Appellant’s jury trial, recanted the prior incriminating statements that they

had given to investigators, including Detective Pitts, during the investigation

of the shootings in question. Appellant contends that such recantation

testimonies would likely have been believed when viewed in conjunction with

evidence of Detective Pitts’s habit of employing coercive interview and

interrogation techniques.2

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2 This Court rejected an essentially identical argument offered in support of

an after-discovered evidence claim raised by Appellant in his first PCRA appeal

from the order dismissing his timely-filed, counseled first PCRA petition, which

we discuss, infra. Specifically, this Court noted:

Shelton claims that the PCRA court erred in denying his request

for a new trial based upon after-discovered evidence of Detective

Pitts's “judicially recognized pattern and habit of abusing

witnesses.”

...

Shelton argues that such evidence is not being used purely for

impeachment purposes, but rather to establish Detective Pitts's

pattern and practice of coercing witness statements. Id. Shelton

claims that if the jury had known of Detective Pitts's pattern, then

it would have rendered a not guilty verdict. Id. at 11-12.

...

Even if Shelton had preserved this claim for our review, the PCRA

court addressed it as follows:

The record demonstrates ... that Detective Pitts was not

involved in any interview of witnesses [ ] Quinones and

(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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Tatiyana [ ], both of whom identified [Shelton] as the

shooter from a photo array. [Shelton] has not offered any

evidence of misconduct regarding any of the detectives

who took the statements from these witnesses.

Moreover, while Detective Pitts was involved in taking two

of Shantee[’s] [ ] statements, Shantee [ ] did not implicate

[Shelton] in either of those statements. While Shantee [ ]

was preparing for trial with Detective [ ] Hammond on

September 12, 2016, just days before trial commenced,

she told Detective Hammond that Benjamin had told her

that [Shelton] was one of the shooters. Detective

Hammond then took a statement from Shantee [ ], which

was presented to the jury at trial. Detective Pitts was not

involved at all in that statement.

Finally, it is true that Detective Pitts, along with [his

partner], took [ ] Benjamin's statement on July 28, 2014.

In this statement, Benjamin implicated [Shelton] as one of

the shooters. It is also true that at trial, Benjamin recanted

his identification of [Shelton] and alleged that Detective

Pitts coerced Benjamin into implicating [Shelton] as the

shooter. Specifically, Benjamin alleged that Detective Pitts

punched him repeatedly when he told the detectives [that]

he did not know who was involved in the shooting.

Benjamin further testified that the detectives told him that

they were aware of multiple robberies [that Benjamin] had

committed[,] and that if he gave them names of the

shooters, then [Benjamin] would be free to go. Benjamin

further stated that it was Detective Pitts who first

suggested that [Shelton] was the shooter, and that

Benjamin implicated [Shelton] so that he could go home to

his family.

However, Benjamin gave a second statement to Detective

[John] Harkins [(“Detective Harkins”)] and [his partner] on

August 4, 2014, without Detective Pitts being present[. I]n

[this statement] he confirmed that everything he had told

detectives during his July 28, 2014, interview was

accurate. During this interview, Benjamin did not complain

of any misconduct on the part of Detective Pitts, and did

(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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____________________________________________

not claim that his first statement was inaccurate or

coerced. Although Benjamin denied that this interview

with Detective [ ] Harkins and [his partner] occurred,

Detective Harkins directly contradicted that denial.

Benjamin's denial of his interview with Detective Harkins

and [his partner] is also contradicted by Benjamin's

testimony at the preliminary hearing, in which he

acknowledged that the interview [with Detective Harkins]

took place. [Shelton] has proffered no evidence of any

misconduct regarding Detective [ ] Harkins or [his

partner].

Moreover, while Benjamin emphatically attempted to

recant his statements to police[,] in which he implicated

[Shelton] in the shooting, he also gave substantial

testimony at trial that supported the Commonwealth's

case. In particular, while [Benjamin] claimed that

[Shelton] was not a shooter, he nevertheless identified

[Shelton] as being present with another male at the time

and place of the shooting. [Benjamin] also confirmed that

he had told Shantee [ ] to tell the police that [Shelton] was

involved with the shooting[,] ... corroborating Shantee[’s]

statement to Detective Hammond....

Accordingly, the findings in Judge Sarmina's unrelated case

regarding Detective Pitts would not likely compel a

different verdict if [Shelton] were granted a new trial. No

relief is due.

PCRA Court Opinion, 9/16/20, at 5-7 (citations omitted).

Our review of the record confirms the PCRA court's findings,

analysis, and conclusion. Moreover, the testimony at trial,

coupled with the video surveillance, demonstrates that two

men, one of which was Shelton, fired multiple rounds at the

individuals on the porch, and into the house. See N.T. (Jury

Trial Vol. 1, Day 2), 9/16/16, at 46-66 (wherein Detective

Thorsten Lucke provided narration of the video surveillance

depicting two individuals firing multiple rounds at the porch

and house); see also N.T. (Jury Trial Vol. 1, Day 1), 9/15/16,

at 155-57, 181-82, 185-86 (wherein Quinones testified that

(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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When examining a post-conviction court's grant or denial of relief, this

Court's review is limited to determining whether the PCRA court's findings are

supported by the record and its order is otherwise free of legal error.

Commonwealth v. Patterson, 690 A.2d 250 (Pa. Super. 1997). The

findings of the PCRA court will not be disturbed unless they lack support from

the record. Commonwealth v. McClucas, 548 A.2d 573 (Pa. Super. 1988).

Additionally, we observe that “a PCRA petitioner is not automatically entitled

to an evidentiary hearing. We review the PCRA court's decision dismissing a

petition without a hearing for an abuse of discretion.” Commonwealth v.

Miller, 102 A.3d 988, 992 (Pa. Super. 2014).

Before addressing Appellant's issue on appeal, we must determine

whether his PCRA petition was timely filed and, if not, whether he has satisfied

____________________________________________

both men were shooting at the house, and Quinones identified

Shelton in a photo array as one of the shooters); N.T. (Jury

Trial Vol. 2, Day 1), 9/17/16, at 183-92, 194-97, 205-10

(wherein Detective Harkins read the prior witness statements,

identifying Shelton as one of the shooters, to the jury). Thus,

Judge Sarmina's ruling in Thorpe would not have compelled a

different verdict. See Ford, supra; see also Padillas,

supra; Commonwealth v. Brown, 52 A.3d 1139, 1170-71

(Pa. 2012) (stating that prior inconsistent statements are

sufficient to support a conviction so long as the statements,

taken as a whole, can establish every element beyond a

reasonable doubt, and the finder of fact could have reasonably

relied upon the statements in arriving at its decision).

Shelton, 253 A.3d 294 at *2, *3-4.

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an exception to the PCRA time bar. Any PCRA petition “shall be filed within a

year of the date judgment becomes final.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). A

judgment of sentence becomes final “at the conclusion of direct review,

including discretionary review in the Supreme Court of the United States and

the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, or at the expiration of time for seeking

review.” Id. at 9545(b)(3). The PCRA's timeliness requirements are

jurisdictional in nature, and a court may not address the merits of the issues

raised if the PCRA petition was not timely filed. Commonwealth v. Albrecht,

994 A.2d 1091, 1093 (Pa. 2010). “Without jurisdiction, we simply do not have

the legal authority to address the substantive claims.” Commonwealth v.

Reeves, 296 A.3d 1228, 1231 (Pa. Super. 2023) (quoting Commonwealth

v. Lewis, 63 A.3d 1274, 1281 (Pa. Super. 2013)).

There is no dispute that Appellant’s present PCRA petition, his second,

is patently untimely. However, Pennsylvania courts may consider an untimely

petition if the petitioner can explicitly plead and prove one of the three

exceptions set forth at 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii). Those three

exceptions are as follows:

(i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the result of

interference by government officials with the

presentation of the claim in violation of the Constitution

or laws of this Commonwealth or the Constitution or laws

of the United States;

(ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were

unknown to the petitioner and could not have been

ascertained by the exercise of due diligence; or

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(iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was

recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States or

the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after the time period

provided in this section and has been held by that court

to apply retroactively.

Id. Any petition invoking one of these exceptions “shall be filed within one

year of the date the claim could have been presented.” Id. at § 9545(b)(2).

“The PCRA petitioner bears the burden of proving the applicability of one of

the exceptions.” Commonwealth v. Spotz, 171 A.3d 675, 678 (Pa. 2017).

Here, Appellant presents his Brady claim as qualifying for both the

newly discovered fact and the government interference time-bar exceptions

under Section 9545(b)(1)(i) and (ii), respectively. See Brief for Appellant, at

16. We disagree.

Regarding Section 9545(b)(1)(ii), we have recently acknowledged:

“The newly-discovered facts exception [ ] does not

require any merits analysis of the underlying claim,

and application of the time-bar exception, therefore,

does not necessitate proof of the elements of a claim

of after-discovered evidence.” Commonwealth v.

Small, 238 A.3d 1267, 1286 (Pa. 2020) (original

quotation marks omitted) (noting that, the newly-

discovered facts exception to the jurisdictional time-

bar is distinct from an after-discovered evidence

claim, which is a substantive basis for relief pursuant

to 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(2)(iv)); see also

Commonwealth v. Fears, 250 A.3d 1180, 1189 (Pa.

2021) (stating, an analysis pertaining to whether a

petitioner has sufficiently pleaded and proven the

newly-discovered facts exception to the jurisdictional

time-bar prohibits a merits analysis of the underlying

claim). For purposes of the newly-discovered facts

exception, a determination that the facts were

unknown to the petitioner is circumstance-dependent

and requires an analysis of the petitioner's knowledge.

Small, 238 A.3d at 1283.

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Commonwealth v. Branthafer, 315 A.3d 113, 128 (Pa. Super.

2024) (brackets omitted; some citations modified).

Incumbent on the petitioner is the obligation to,

demonstrate he did not know the facts upon

which he based his petition and could not have

learned those facts earlier by the exercise of due

diligence.... Additionally, the focus of this exception is

on the newly discovered facts, not on a newly

discovered or newly willing source for previously

known facts.

As an initial jurisdictional threshold, Section

9545(b)(1)(ii) requires a petitioner to allege and

prove that there were facts unknown to him and that

he exercised due diligence in discovering those facts.

See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(ii). Once jurisdiction

is established, a PCRA petitioner can present a

substantive after-discovered-evidence claim. See 42

Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(2)(vi) ....

Reeves, 296 A.3d at 1232 (brackets omitted; emphasis added).

Commonwealth v. Brown, No. 1766 EDA 2024, 2025 WL 848842, at *4-5

(non-precedential decision) (Pa. Super. filed Mar. 18, 2025). 3 It is well-settled

that a petitioner must first satisfy the requirements of a time bar exception,

such as the newly discovered fact provision of the PCRA, before they may gain

merits review of a Brady claim raised in a facially untimely petition. Id.

Important for present purposes is this Court’s well-settled interpretation

of Section 9545(b)(1)(ii) as mandating that “the ‘fact’ on which the petitioner

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3 Non-precedential decisions filed after May 1, 2019, may be cited for their

persuasive value. See Pa.R.A.P. 126(b)(1)-(2).

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predicates his claim to an exception to the time-bar must bear some logical

connection to a plausible claim for relief.” Commonwealth v. Myers, 303

A.3d 118, 122 (Pa. Super. 2023) (emphasis added) (citing Commonwealth

v. Robinson, 185 A.3d 1055, 1062 (Pa. Super. 2018) (en banc)).

In the case sub judice, Appellant’s newly discovered facts4 claim and his

government interference claim rely on the same underlying facts, namely, the

Commonwealth’s purported failure to disclose findings made and conclusions

reached in the internal investigation of former Detective Pitts confirming he

routinely used coercive and abusive means during his career to obtain

statements in investigations and interrogations.5 We find persuasive a recent

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4 Appellant indicates he seeks relief based upon “newly discovered evidence.”

See Brief of Appellant, at 16 (emphasis added).

5 Notably, in Appellant’s Brady claim, in which he asserts the Commonwealth

failed to disclose the detective’s misconduct history to the deprivation of his

due process rights, he includes publicly available sources of such information,

such as a 2018 judicial opinion of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia

County, Commonwealth v. Thorpe, (CP-51—CR-0011433-2008) (filed

6/7/18) and other court orders and decisions filed of public record prior to the

submission of his counseled amended first PCRA petition and subsequent

proceedings. See Brief of Appellant, at 17-19. Indeed, as discussed supra,

this Court reviewed Appellant’s counseled appeal from the order denying relief

on his first PCRA petition, and though we deemed his appeal waived for an

inadequately developed brief, we alternatively conducted merits review of his

after-discovered evidence claim with reference to the record, notes of

testimony, and the PCRA court opinion. In affirming, we concluded that the

evidence concerning Detective Pitts’s coercive and abusive interrogation

methods in other cases would not have compelled a different verdict when

viewed against the great weight of evidence presented against Appellant at

trial, which included incriminating testimony and video surveillance evidence

demonstrating that two men, one of which was Shelton, fired multiple rounds

at the individuals on the porch, and into the house. Commonwealth v.

(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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decision of this Court that rejected virtually identical Brady-based

government interference and newly discovered fact claims deriving from

investigations into Detective Pitts’s methods employed in other, unrelated

cases.

In Brown, petitioner Brown filed pro se a facially untimely first PCRA

petition raising, inter alia, both a newly discovered fact claim referencing a

newspaper article dated July 28, 2023, that reported on the findings and

conclusions of an internal investigation into Detective Pitts—who worked on

the investigation of Brown—and a corresponding Brady claim charging the

Commonwealth with failing to disclose to the defense Detective Pitts’s verified

history of misconduct. Brown’s counseled amended PCRA petition “alleged

numerous additional instances of misconduct by Detective Pitts in other,

unrelated criminal cases” and asserted that “at least 10 cases tied to

[Detective] Pitts have been dropped, dismissed, or overturned over the

years[, reaching back to 2017,] and petitions alleging coercion remain pending

in a number of others.” Id. at *2.

The Commonwealth responded by acknowledging the findings made

against former Detective Pitts during his tenure with the Philadelphia Police

Department and conceding that, more recently, he had been indicted for

perjury. Id. at *3. Nevertheless, the Commonwealth maintained that

petitioner Brown was not entitled to a hearing because he failed to prove

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Shelton, 253 A.3d 294 at **3-4 (non-precedential decision) (Pa. Super. filed

April 19, 2021).

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prejudice, that is, that such findings, if submitted as evidence, would likely

result in a different verdict in his case. Id.

The PCRA court dismissed Brown’s patently untimely petition pursuant

to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 upon finding that he could not prevail under a PCRA time-

bar exception where the information was publicly available since 2017 and

where Brown’s claim of the detective’s misconduct in his own case was known

to him before trial and could have been used to impeach the detective’s

credibility as a witness.

On appeal to this Court, Brown raised a single issue contending the PCRA

court erred by failing to consider “newly-discovered evidence [sic] of a

horrendous history of misconduct by Detective [] Pitts, which was not

disclosed by the Commonwealth to [Brown] before [t]rial, either willfully or

negligently, in violation of Brady[.]” Id. at *3. Brown maintained such

evidence was relevant to his case because Detective Pitts’s “habitual pattern

of egregious police misconduct” in other cases “evidenced his lack of proper

training and inexperience as a homicide investigator[,]” and he argued that

“evidence of Detective Pitts’s inadequate training and police misconduct was

probative and material regarding deficiencies in the police investigation of

[Brown] relevant [to] the issue of reasonable doubt[.]” Id. at *4.

We rejected Brown’s appeal because he could not show that the findings

of fact and conclusions made from investigations into Detective Pitts’s conduct

in unrelated cases bore on his case. We observed,

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“newspaper articles referencing misconduct [by police] in

matters unrelated to [the petitioner] do not constitute

newly-discovered facts.” [Commonwealth v.] Reeves, [296

A.3d 1228,] 1233 (emphasis added).

“Further, the ‘fact’ on which the petitioner predicates his claim to

an exception to the time-bar must bear some logical

connection to a plausible claim for relief.” Commonwealth

v. Myers, 303 A.3d 118, 122 (Pa. Super. 2023) (emphasis added)

(citing Commonwealth v. Robinson, 185 A.3d 1055, 1062 (Pa.

Super. 2018) (en banc)).

Instantly, Appellant claims that a newspaper article alerted him to

newly-discovered facts excepting his PCRA petition from the

PCRA's jurisdictional time-bar. See Pro Se PCRA Petition,

11/28/23, at 5; Appellant's Brief at 24. However, as the

newspaper article undisputedly did not pertain to Appellant's case,

it does not constitute a newly-discovered fact that would rescue

his request for PCRA relief from the PCRA's time-bar. See

Reeves, 296 A.3d at 1233; see also Commonwealth v.

Daniels, 240 A.3d 127, 3005 EDA 2019 (Pa. Super. 2020)

(unpublished memorandum at 10)[] (reviewing a PCRA appeal that

alleged the disclosure of Detective Pitts’s misconduct constituted

newly-discovered facts and concluding that because the new facts

did not pertain to Daniels’ case, they did “not provide a factual

basis for any claim Daniels could make.” (citing Commonwealth

v. Brown, 134 A.3d 1097, 1109 (Pa. Super. 2016) (concluding

that a new trial was not warranted where the evidence concerning

Detective Pitts did not relate to the case at bar)).

Here, as in Reeves, Appellant “cites no new information in his

case.” Reeves, 296 A.3d at 1233 (emphasis in original).

Accordingly, this Court is without jurisdiction to consider the

substance of Appellant's claim, Reeves, 296 A.3d at 1231, and

the PCRA court did not abuse its discretion in denying Appellant's

PCRA petition without a hearing. See [Commonwealth v.]

Miller, 102 A.3d [988,] 992 [Pa. Super. 2014)].

Brown, at *5 (emphasis in original).

As in Reeves, Daniels, and Brown, we are confronted with an

appellant who “cites no new information in his case.” See Brown, at *5

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(quoting Reeves). It follows, therefore, that just as the petitioners in

Reeves, Daniels, and Brown could not avail themselves of a PCRA time-bar

exception by relying on citations to credible reports of Detective Pitts’s

improper conduct in other unrelated cases, so too is Appellant precluded for

his failure to present a “new fact” pertinent to his own case, as he has

submitted information of Detective Pitts’s misconduct in other, unrelated

cases only. Guided by persuasive and germane decisional law, therefore, we

discern no error below. Accordingly, we deny Appellant’s request for relief.

Order affirmed.

Date: 6/2/2025

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