The opinion
J-S09028-25
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
CHRISTIAN ARTHUR WEBER, JR. :
:
Appellant : No. 2716 EDA 2024
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered August 21, 2024
In the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-09-CR-0000723-2024
BEFORE: LAZARUS, P.J., BECK, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*
MEMORANDUM BY BECK, J.: FILED JUNE 2, 2025
Christian Arthur Weber, Jr. (“Weber”) appeals from the judgment of
sentence entered by the Bucks County Court of Common Pleas (“trial court”)
after it convicted him of possession of a controlled substance, possession of
drug paraphernalia, and public drunkenness (a summary offense). 1 On
appeal, Weber challenges the trial court’s denial of his suppression motion.
Because we find no error in the trial court’s decision, we affirm.
The trial court summarized the factual and procedural histories of this
case as follows:
In the early morning hours of November 20, 2023, Officer
Brown of the Upper Southampton Police Department received a
bystander report of a man standing in a busy roadway. Officer
____________________________________________
* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
1 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(16), (32); 18 Pa.C.S. § 5505.
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Brown located [Weber] in the roadway, noticed several signs of
intoxication, and placed [him] under arrest. Following the search
incident to arrest, Officer Brown discovered a capped syringe in
[Weber]’s pocket, a blue wax baggy containing a solid white
substance later determined to be fentanyl, as well as three vials
in [his] wallet. [Weber] was charged with possession of a
controlled substance, possession of drug paraphernalia, and public
drunkenness.
On August 6, 2024, [Weber] filed a motion to suppress,
challenging the legality of his arrest and subsequent search
incident to arrest. On August 21, 2024, after a hearing on
[Weber]’s motion, [the trial court] denied [Weber]’s motion to
suppress. [Weber] then proceeded with a stipulated waiver trial
and [the trial court] found [Weber] guilty of possession of a
controlled substance, possession of drug paraphernalia, and public
drunkenness. That same day, [the trial court] sentenced [Weber]
to a term of probation for twelve months on the count of
possession of a controlled substance, with no further penalty on
the remaining counts.
On August 30, 2024, [Weber] filed a [post-sentence
motion]. On [September] 4, 2024, the motion was denied. On
October 3, 2024, [Weber] filed a notice of appeal to the Superior
Court of Pennsylvania.
On October 7, 2024, [the trial court] ordered [Weber] to file
a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal. After [the
trial court] granted [Weber]’s motion for extension of time, on
October 22, 2024, [Weber] filed a timely concise statement.
Trial Court Opinion, 12/3/2024, at 1-2 (footnotes and unnecessary
capitalization omitted). Weber presents one issue for review: “Did the trial
court err in denying suppression where police lacked probable cause to arrest
[him] for public drunkenness?” Weber’s Brief at 4.
Our standard of review for the denial of a suppression motion is well-
settled:
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Our standard of review in addressing a challenge to the
denial of a suppression motion is limited to determining whether
the suppression court’s factual findings are supported by the
record and whether the legal conclusions drawn from those facts
are correct. Because the Commonwealth prevailed before the
suppression court, we may consider only the evidence of the
Commonwealth and so much of the evidence for the defense as
remains uncontradicted when read in the context of the record as
a whole. Where the suppression court’s factual findings are
supported by the record, we are bound by these findings and may
reverse only if the court’s legal conclusions are erroneous. The
suppression court’s legal conclusions are not binding on an
appellate court, whose duty it is to determine if the suppression
court properly applied the law to the facts. Thus, the conclusions
of law of the courts below are subject to our plenary review.
Moreover, appellate courts are limited to reviewing only the
evidence presented at the suppression hearing when examining a
ruling on a pre-trial motion to suppress.
Commonwealth v. Carey, 249 A.3d 1217, 1223 (Pa. Super. 2021).
Weber raises two arguments in support of his claim of error. First,
Weber argues that police lacked probable cause to arrest him for public
drunkenness because he immediately complied with Officer Brown’s command
to remove himself from the road and he was cooperative with police
throughout the encounter. Weber’s Brief at 15. He maintains that his conduct
after police arrived at the scene demonstrated that he was not an ongoing
danger to himself, other persons, or property, and thus, police did not have
the authority to conduct a warrantless arrest for a summary offense. Id. at
17-18.
Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution and the Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution protect individuals from
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unreasonable searches and seizures. Interactions between citizens and police
fall into three separate categories:
The first, a “mere encounter,” does not require any level of
suspicion or carry any official compulsion to stop or respond. The
second, an “investigative detention,” permits the temporary
detention of an individual if supported by reasonable suspicion.
The third is an arrest or custodial detention, which must be
supported by probable cause.
Commonwealth v. Lyles, 97 A.3d 298, 302 (Pa. 2014) (citations omitted).
“Probable cause exists where the facts and circumstances within the
officer's knowledge are sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution in
the belief that an offense has been or is being committed.” Commonwealth
v. Saunders, 326 A.3d 888, 897 (Pa. 2024) (quotation marks and citations
omitted). “Probable cause is a practical, non-technical concept that is
evaluated under a traditional totality-of-the-circumstances test.” Id.
(quotation marks and citations omitted).
The Pennsylvania Crimes Code defines public drunkenness as follows:
“[a] person is guilty of a summary offense if he appears in any public place
manifestly under the influence of alcohol or a controlled substance … to the
degree that he may endanger himself or other persons or property, or annoy
persons in his vicinity.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 5505. Importantly, section 8902(a)(1)
of the Judicial Code authorizes police officers to arrest individuals without a
warrant for the summary offense of public drunkenness “upon probable cause
when there is ongoing conduct that imperils the personal security of any
person or endangers public or private property.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 8902(a)(1).
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In rejecting Weber’s claim that police lacked probable cause to arrest
Weber for public drunkenness, the trial court explained:
[T]he totality of the facts was sufficient to justify a person of
reasonable caution in believing that [Weber] had committed the
crime of public drunkenness. While the crime of public
drunkenness is a summary offense, … Officer Brown had no
alternative but to take [Weber] into custody in the interest of
[Weber]’s own safety and the safety of others. [Weber]’s location
in the roadway posed a risk of danger to himself and others
traveling on the roadway. Therefore, Officer Brown possessed
probable cause necessary to support the warrantless arrest of
[Weber] for public drunkenness.
Trial Court Opinion, 12/3/2024, at 5.
The record reflects that at the hearing on Weber’s suppression motion,
Officer Brown testified that on the night in question, he was on a routine patrol
near the Redwood Shopping Center in Upper Southhampton Township when
an individual drove up to him at around 12:00 a.m. and informed him that
there was a man standing in the roadway at the nearby intersection of Second
Street Pike and Knowles Avenue. N.T., 8/21/2024, at 5-6. Officer Brown
stated that he immediately traveled to the intersection where he encountered
Weber. Id. at 7. Officer Brown explained that upon his arrival at the scene,
Weber was standing in the roadway and that “[h]is knees were bent, his head
was forward, and based on my training and experience, it appear[ed] he was
nodding out or dipping out, which is a common term for someone who is under
the influence of an opiate[.]” Id. Officer Brown also indicated that there was
traffic on the roadway where Weber was standing. Id. at 8. Officer Brown
testified that when he approached Weber, he noticed that Weber appeared
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nearly asleep, his knees were buckling, he was slurring his speech, his eyelids
were droopy, and he was unsteady on his feet. Id. at 11. Officer Brown
stated that Weber’s mannerisms were delayed, he did not know the time, and
he had difficulty explaining where he was traveling. Id. Officer Brown
reported that eventually, Weber informed him that he was walking home from
a nearby gas station and that he lived roughly a mile-and-a-half away. Id. at
16, 20. Officer Brown explained that when he asked Weber for identification,
Weber initially provided his debit card. Id. at 12.
Officer Brown testified that, based on his training and experience, Weber
was displaying “telltale signs of someone who was under the influence of an
opiate.” Id. Additionally, Officer Brown stated that although Weber denied
having used drugs, Weber eventually admitted that to having taken
prescription medication. Id. at 21. Officer Brown explained that at that point,
he did not believe Weber would be able to safely walk home, that he was a
danger to himself and drivers in the area, and consequently, he placed him
under arrest for public drunkenness. Id. at 13-15.
We emphasize that the trial court found Officer Brown’s testimony
credible, and Weber concedes this point. See Weber’s Brief at 17. Instead,
Weber asserts that because he complied with Officer Brown’s instruction to
remove himself from the roadway and because he was cooperative with police,
he displayed no ongoing conduct that imperiled the personal security of any
person or endangered any public or private property sufficient for the officer
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to conduct a warrantless arrest for a summary offense under section
8902(a)(1). See Weber’s Brief at 17-18. Weber’s argument, however, is
entirely belied by the record, as Officer Brown’s testimony revealed that
Weber was barely able to stand, let alone walk, he was confused as to his
whereabouts, and was slurring his speech. See N.T., 8/21/2024, at 5-21.
Furthermore, video from Officer Brown’s Mobile Video Recorder and body
camera shows that Weber was impeding traffic and that a vehicle had to slow
down and drive around Weber to avoid hitting him. See id., Exhibits CS-1, 2.
Evidence that Weber was compliant with Officer Brown’s instructions is
not evidence that he no longer presented an ongoing danger to himself or
others, and he cites to no evidence indicating that his intoxicated condition
somehow improved throughout the course of his interaction with police. Thus,
the record plainly supports Officer Brown’s determination that Weber
presented a danger to himself and drivers in the area.
Accordingly, based on the foregoing, our review reveals that the trial
court’s factual findings are supported by the record. Additionally, we discern
no error in the trial court’s determination that the evidence established
Weber’s “ongoing conduct that imperil[ed] the personal security of any
person,” 42 Pa.C.S. § 8902(a)(1), and that Officer Brown had probable cause
to arrest Weber for public drunkenness.
Second, Weber argues that police did not have the authority to arrest
him for a summary offense because “conducting arrests in summary public
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drunkenness cases is disfavored in the Commonwealth and is only appropriate
in exceptional circumstances.” Weber’s Brief at 11. In addition to noting
section 8902(a)’s requirement that an arrest for public drunkenness must
include ongoing dangerous conduct, Weber relies on the explanatory comment
to Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 440, which he claims limits
warrantless arrests for summary offenses to “exceptional circumstances” that
involve violence, the threat of violence, or a risk that the defendant will flee,
and that no such circumstances existed in this case. Id. at 13-14, 18.
Rule 440 states that “[w]hen an arrest without a warrant in a summary
case is authorized by law, a police officer who exhibits some sign of authority
may institute proceedings by such an arrest.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 440. Weber is
correct that the explanatory comment to Rule 440 states that “[o]nly a police
officer, … may institute a summary criminal proceeding by arrest. It is
intended that these proceedings will be instituted by arrest only in exceptional
circumstances such as those involving violence, or the imminent threat of
violence, or those involving a danger that the defendant will flee.” Id.,
Explanatory Comment. However, we previously rejected the argument that
Weber makes here—that the comment to Rule 440 precludes an arrest for
public drunkenness where the Commonwealth establishes “ongoing conduct
that imperils the personal security of any person or endangers public or private
property” pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 8902(a)(1). See Commonwealth v.
Williams, 568 A.2d 1281 (Pa. Super. 1990).
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In Williams, the appellant likewise relied on the explanatory comment
to Rule 4402 to argue that the proper procedure for dealing with nonviolent
summary offenses was to issue a citation as opposed to conducting a custodial
arrest. Id. at 1282, 1284-85. We rejected this claim and explained that
“[t]he comments, while often helpful in resolving ambiguities, are not
controlling. To the extent the comment purports to restrict express authority
to arrest conferred by statute, it must be rejected.” Id. at 1285 (citation
omitted); see also Commonwealth v. Crosby, 329 A.3d 1141, 1149 (Pa.
2025) (stating that to the extent that a comment conflicts with the text of a
statute, the text of the statute controls).
In this case, as Weber concedes, section 8902(a)(1) plainly authorized
Officer Brown to arrest Weber if he displayed ongoing conduct that imperils
the personal security of any person or endangers public or private property.
See 42 Pa.C.S. § 8902(a)(1). As we explained above, the record supports
Officer Brown’s determination that Weber’s condition at the time of the
encounter presented an ongoing danger, and that he therefore possessed
probable cause to arrest him for the summary offense of public drunkenness.
Thus, Weber’s arrest was authorized by law, satisfying both the relevant
statute and the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure. See id.;
Pa.R.Crim.P. 440.
____________________________________________
2At the time we decided Williams, Rule 440 was numbered Rule 70. See
Williams, 568 A.2d at 1284-85; see also Pa.R.Crim.P. 440.
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As such, the trial court correctly determined that Officer Brown had both
probable cause and the authority to arrest Weber for public drunkenness. We
therefore conclude that the trial court did not err in denying Weber’s
suppression motion.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Date: 6/2/2025
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