The opinion
ACCEPTED
15-25-00035-CV
FIFTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS
AUSTIN, TEXAS
5/27/20251 12:00
/ 31 AM
CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE
15-25-00035-CV CLERK
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
FILED IN
15th COURT OF APPEALS
Texas Fifteenth Court of Appeals AUSTIN, TEXAS
5/27/2025 12:00:00 AM
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Steven J Stringfellow Texas Comptroller CHRISTOPHER
Judiciary A.Section
PRINE
Clerk
10160 Hwy 242 Asst. Atty. General Anthony Dolcefino
Ste 800-4117 <~v~> P.O. Box 12548, Capitol Station
Conroe, TX 77385-4379 Austin, Texas 78711-2548
(512) 571-2036 (512) 936-1327
TheFederalExitParty@gmail.com Anthony.Dolcefino@oag.texas.gov
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Appellant's Reply Brief
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
1. Table of Contents 4.3. Statutory Entitlement to
1. Table of Contents.......................p.1 Relief Was Indeed Established (p.6)
2. Index of Authorities...................p.2 4.4. Appellee's Arguments vs
3. Statement of the Case................p.3 Claims to Sovereign Government
4. Issues Presented.........................p.3 Immunity are Contradictory (p.7)
4.1. Jurisdictional Prerequisites 4.5. Sovereignty Has Made Legal
Are Inapplicable to this Cause, Demand for Jurisprudence in This Case
Administrative Prerequisites Were So (p.8)
Attempted (p.3) 5. Statement of Facts.......................p.8
4.2. Recession's Clause Places the 6. Summary of the Argument........p.12
Burden of Proof Directly Away from 7. The Argument.............................p.13
Appellee (p.5)
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2. Index of Authorities
I. Article III Precedent Law for Civil Sovereign Immunity (recession's extenuation
for secession's union in refederation ever higher under The Declaration of Independence
and the 10th & 14th US Amendments) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . p.(most
of document)
II. Delegation of Federal Law in Texas Courts by Section 1 of Texas Consitution
through the 9th/10th US Amendments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . p.4, 25
III. Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code Chapter 103 . . . . . . p.(most of document)
VI. Texas in Federal Rules of Evidence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . p.4, 25
VI. Texas Government Code Section 311.016 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . p.29
VII. Texas Rule 91. Special Exceptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . p.3, 8, 14, 15, 16, 21, 28, 31
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3. Statement of the Case
3.1. Appellee has filed their response brief to Appellant's brief, to which this
reply brief is being submitted. Hencefrom Appellant's brief Appellee makes several
arguments and assertions which may be replied against based upon sovereign logic as
has been presented hitherto. Appellant has also since filed a motion for special
exception under Rule 91 as well as an amended exhibit, Exhibit P.4 (Amended).
Recessions Clause, and a new exhibit, Exhibit P.8. Plaintiff's DPS Record.
4. Issues Presented
4.0. Several issues exist with respect to the Appellee's argument infrom the
Appellant's sovereign cause which this Court should consider for appeal.
4.1. Jurisdictional Prerequisites Are Inapplicable to this Cause,
Administrative Prerequisites Were So Attempted - Appellee asserted that the
courts do not have jurisdiction over this cause due to Section 103.051(e) stating
that a claimant may seek mandamus relief only after the Comptroller denies an
application which must be filed with the Texas Supreme Court. That assertion
would be paradoxical and so invalid toward this cause due to the fact that this case
is for a tort claim centering around the allegation that the Comptroller Judiciary
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section did not process the Appellant's application for compensation for wrongful
imprisonment in the first place, which had been sent via postal mail within the
correct stipulations for jurisdictional prerequisites under Chapter 103. Such
insovereign legal argument was furthered by the Appellee by stating that the
Appellant did not did not plead facts showing that the Comptroller issued a denial
of his application (or ever received it), much less that we pursued any prerequisite
administrative remedies. Appellee's argument is directly incorrect considering
that the evidence was clearly in favor of the Appellant towards the Comptroller's
Judiciary Section having not even processed the Appellee's application per Texas
Rule in Federal Rules of Evidence (TxRE 401, FRE 301, 302, 401, 402, 404 by
TX Const Sec 1, 9th/10th Amd), which should exempt the Appellant from any
statutory argument asserting that the Comptroller must first deny applications
before mandamus relief can be sought due to the fact that the application was
apparently not processed according to law in the first place because the Appellee
has produced no evidence rebutting that of Appellant's in-so-far, with that
evidence proving that the Judiciary Section's office seemed to be having technical
issues in recession in exhibits P.2 and P.4 which also should stand as the necessary
perquisite administrative remedy contrary to Appellee's claim because the error
surrounding the Comptroller Judiciary Section's email system was in-from an
email sent to them by the Appellant attempting to properly exhaust administrative
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remedy as pre-required by law. Because the Appellee could not be properly
contacted to exhaust such remedy and because sufficient evidence existed
showing that further attempts would most likely result in further wasted process
(exhibit P.4) the necessary complaint was filed under the extenuation, rendering
Appellee's assertion as inapplicable. (And the fact that prerequisite administrative
remedies are implicit under constitutional law should uphold similar arguments
herein being based upon same principle).
4.2. Recession's Clause Places the Burden of Proof Directly Away from
Appellee - Even if the Comptroller Judiciary Section's email system had been
functioning and they had been contacted and had refused to re-process Appellee's
application, relief would still be requited from within the sovereign [civil] caveat
due to recession's clause being a type of malfeasance which rules of evidence
would apply to in favor of, implying that civilians within caveat be ruled toward
against government in recession at least moreso under the hypocrisy, as shown by
exhibit P.4 (Amended) and re-affirmed by exhibit P.6. And as stated, recession's
clause would uphold that the Judiciary Section were not functioning properly due
to they not having processed Appellee's application after their email system had
malfunctioned, implying that the courts did and do have jurisdiction, and with it
being a wasted process to injunction for the Comptroller Judiciary Section to
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retroactively process another application according to law due to the courts having
the jurisdiction to order the necessary compensation in relief most directly.
Sovereign immunity under the Article III precedent law demands that the law
bend in favor of the caveat when and where ever possible, defaulting to civil
immunity versus government immunity when the caveat is properly cited by
civilians as it was in exhibit P.3, implying that the legal grounds being clung to by
the Appellee must indeed be the cannibal clause as claimed due to sovereign
immunity superseding normal code.
4.3. Statutory Entitlement to Relief Was Indeed Established - The final set
of arguments presented by the Appellee are just as inaccurate and otherwise
extenuatingly oriented towards government away from civil sovereignty, with
their Counsel actually improperly citing the law from Texas Civil Practice and
Remedies Code Sec. 103.001(a), which in itself could've been seen as grounds to
seek their disbarment. Sections 103.001(a)(2)(B),(C) clearly state "....in
accordance with a writ of habeas corpus..." and not "under" which was the term
used by Appellee and not only would be illegal in general but also misleading
towards this litigation and enough for appeal notwithstanding, if not suggesting
ulteriorily that judgment itself be cannibalized in favor of relief. Appellee also
asserted that wrongful imprisonment may not apply to jail time for those
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inordinately incarcerated due to Section 103.001(a)(1) use of the term "prison"
which would be incoherent with sovereign federal constitution due to the fact that
prison time would be the most tortious form of incarceration and so any type of
incarceration thereunder may be interpreted in favor of civil plaintiffs, with civil
sovereignty superseding government sovereignty, implying that the cannibal
clause described by the Appellant would be the reason behind the Appellee's
argument moreso, being tied to their assertion that the state courts do not have
jurisdiction over such causes due to federal removal of those causes in federal
recession (when total debt eclipses half of total assets) able to inure the caveat
moreso.
4.4. Appellee's Arguments vs Claims to Sovereign Government Immunity
are Contradictory - The fact that Appellee claims sovereign immunity on one
hand and then argues lack of jurisdiction and statutory entitlement on the other is
completely contradictory and a sign of malfeasance, due to the empirical fact that
immunity would necessarily exempt a party claiming it from a certain illegality,
which is what the Appellee did, but yet on the other hand makes claims that there
would be no malfeasance to be exempted from by asserting that the courts lacked
jurisdiction from statutory requirements not being met in the first place...though
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perhaps only as far as litigatory stuffing would be concerned (due from the
mentioned cannibal clause).
4.5. Sovereignty Has Made Legal Demand for Jurisprudence in This Case -
This cause may be seen as exceptional under superluminal consideration due to
the prerequisite of the cannibal clause of federal recession to even be for itself,
with the Appellee in dire need of emergency funding, upon special request from
the sovereign Appellant whom the government would serve just as much as any
other profession would their consumer, with a corresponding motion having been
filed under Rule 91 (Motion for Special Exception), also supported by the overtly
incorrect arguments and citations of the Appellee, which may be interpreted by
jurisprudence as technically legal through consideration that such were ulteriorily
supportive of extenuated granting of relief.
5. Statement of Facts
5.1. Since the facts leading up to the submission of the Appellant's brief
the Appellee has filed their response brief which contains several points which litigate
against the Appellant.
5.2. Appellee began their response's arguments by attempting to assert
that jurisdictional prerequisites were not met by the Appellant in that the Comptroller
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must first deny applications for compensation before judicial remedy may be sought,
and that such never had occurred to wit and so therefore our cause lacked appeal. The
further argument in section I of their response brief pertaining to jurisdiction argued that
administrative prerequisites were also not remedied for. This section of Appellee's brief
is referenced as an issue in 4.1 above in this reply.
5.3. In section II, Appellee argues that Appellant failed to establish
statutory entitlement to relief under Tex Civ Prac & Rem Code Chapter 103, with their
interpretation of parts of 103.001(a) revolving around a modified term being used
differently than what the actual law states in that section. Appellee uses the term
"under" when the law states the "in accordance with." Appellee then volleys that
because code in Ch 103 uses the term "prison" for codifying conditions qualifying as
wrongful imprisonment the Appellee's claim to compensation for wrongful
imprisonment in state jail would be invalid. This section's issues are referenced in 4.3
herein.
5.4. Appellant's main contention continues with this reply, which centers
around sovereign immunity and that whether or not the state's counsel is misinterpreting
the law would be irrelevant due to there being a type of cannibal clause in federal
recession which may allow state courts to rule against ostensible lawfulness due to the
need to both remedy those not in caveat for progress' legality as well as further extenuate
relief for those who are within by aggravating and compelling just causes to federal
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court through the only type mechanism allowable--that regarding superluminal
refederation via secessionary logic--being the caveat of jurisdiction of such sovereignty
in recession's extenuation (meaning that the secession's advent would be the most
ultimate goal, and with recession being used counter-intuitively to trigger it...in-turn
suggesting that in certain cases wherein it may be shown that too much recession may be
usurping its own designs that the courts may exercise jurisprudence by stinting relief).
5.5. From the common facts, the legal violation that was originally
charged to the Appellant was rescinded, with Appellant having been then charged with a
different type of crime than the original from what the imprisonment in question was
ordered for after being found innocent (at least moreso under preponderance), of which's
definition exists as a separate type of offense in a different section of code that carries a
much lesser sentence. The fact that the Appellant was found innocent of the original
crime would indicate an error in the indictment which prima facie is a tort that may be
relieved according to the 5th and 9th Amendments under Section 1 Texas Constitution,
which may be traced back to the witnesses who made statements in the police report
who refused to participate in the prosecution of the trial commensurately, as it was
claimed by the Appellant that those statements had been falsified in order to wrongfully
imprison us.
5.6. The issues surrounding the reasons behind the original altercation
which impinged the wrongful imprisonment were allegedly tied to ongoing corruption
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and crime relating to the dark net and government infiltration by such organized crime
who had recessively singled out the Appellee most likely via an affiliate hacker clan who
canvass the internet using online FPS gaming matches in order to determine the most
likely candidates for law enforcement and other justice positions in youth before they
mature enough to enter those fields, as so they then set about with subversive tactics
using internet based crime bad hacking and other known techniques such as "sacking"
(paying off/instructing corrupt individuals/officials to instigate altercations/falsify
statements and reports in order to cause wrongful imprisonments) against those targets
which then tie hand in hand to other corrupt tactics such as using affiliate corrupt mental
health doctors to unjustly deem such targets as incompetent in order procure the
mandatory commitments that result in revocations of 2nd Amendment rights which in-
turn bar those just threats from being able to ever even become law enforcement
officers, military, etc...whilst at the same time DNA of theirs left on bedsheets and
laundry at the jails and hospitals can be illegally obtained for use in their child-
trafficking black markets which usually compounds disenfranchisements as well as
overall deteriorates society's mental health (with these more capable targets being
society's more valued citizens) while exorbitantly increasing the profits and powers of
these criminals who then use those funds and power to systematically obstruct further
justice attempting to be sued for by these victims through bribes and access to their
newborn traffick-children grown in the meantime in clandestine in-vitro labs with
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surrogates likely in remote hidden bases and/or in third world countries, etc likely in
conjunction with exotic tech, which may even be the actual end of a type of quantum
warfare being conducted through quantum possession apparatus by other competing
worlds now beyond us through federal metamorphosis via NBE tech that we have yet to
classify, it is and was alleged.
6. Summary of the Argument
6.1. The total time served by the Appellant was over the maximum
sentence for the adjudicated charge and so the excess time that was spent imprisoned in
jail did and does not fall under any sort of code or tort otherwise under sovereign
principle (as also outlined in exhibit P.3). Appellant's appeal was based upon the simple
logic that because excess time was endured against the law in tort at the least, which
may also be accounted for/affirmed by code in Tex Civ Prac & Rem Code Ch 103, the
courts have the responsibility to relieve that injustice either way, which may occur
through Ch 103 though may also be rectified in tort, necessarily able to exempt
arguments based upon Ch 103 requirements against relief at any level, and with
recession's sovereign caveat being passed toward civil immunity for Appellant under the
Article III precedent law (which gives favor toward sovereign immunity when and
where the law shall be interpreted so).
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7. The Argument
7.1. For a state to declare sovereign immunity against its own code would
be overtly illogical unto ridiculous, only justifiable under recession's clause toward
secession's refederation, which would mean that the state could only do so against those
not within caveat for civil immunity from stately recession. But because recession is
now federal, a type of cannibal clause would exist that could allow the courts to compel
those matters to federal court for extenuate reliefs for those in caveat.
7.2. No matter how post-logical the cannibal clause may be towards
compelling the inurement of sovereign caveat in federal causes impelled by such
counter-intuitive judgment against them, such clause may not function without fodder to
consume in the first place as far as litigation would be concerned, and so a direct request
was made by the Appellant in this case for the Bench to please exercise due
jurisprudence and so award the relief requested so that the next iteration of secession's
superluminal refederation may even come about, for it would be obvious that judging
mechanically across the board with respect to the caveat federally unfederated could be
unwise considering that there may have been areas of the law which may not have been
aware of the extenuation at hand prior who may have violated the rights of sovereignty
by not recognizing when and where such would not be appropriate which could in-
theory have undercut the entire process and must be accounted for diligently, which
would tend to be confirmed moreso by organic soventry declaring that they were not
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expectant toward federal advent accordingly (per the motion for special exception). The
point of recession's extenuation is to inure the caveat by upholding sovereignty, which
may be done via the cannibal clause evermore in empirical theory, though in cases
where it may be seen that sovereignty had not been being perfectly respected by the state
et al and obviously would have endangered these delicate high-stakes processes simply
from affidavit of sovereignty, the state may be compelled to stint if such may be possible
when especially requested. Because there are several other ongoing cases with respect
to similar claims as well as more to come and because the Appellee is low on funding
and short on time, the caveat would be better supported into a federal circumstance via
triageing with just one simple case such as this one being relieved at a state level,
thereby satisfying the hypocrisy. Just because secession's keel may allow us to tact into
the wind and that federal recession may allow us to metaphorically foil for even greater
speed, that does not mean that we should lock in such speed when and if we notice that
perhaps our ship was not perfectly constructed, the water too rough our our course
needing to be adjusted first, etc. The sheer definition of the federal would be
hypocritically violated if the law were not able to bend and flex with the implicit nature
of recession's extenuation.
7.3. Even though recession is necessary to cause secession
notwithstanding, the public must still be able to function well enough to even be able to
secede against recession for the superluminal refederation higher to be gained in the first
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place, and to judge otherwise would be incompetent unto criminal. Just as much as
someone without sovereign caveat may apply for a driver's license or a work visa and
still obtain one, someone within caveat with a legitimate cause who has been improperly
disenfranchised for whatever reason who has brought legitimate proof before a court
may be judged in favor of if they so sovereignly request it when it may be seen that they
are indigent in federal need as long as they have been pursuing federal direction
otherwise, for common sense would show that secession's sovereignty must prevail even
against itself, implying that in certain cases special exceptions may be made when and
where appropriate which this case may be preponderated as for due to the clear and
present evidence in favor of the Appellant against explicit code. In this cause such
necessity may be seen as apparent due to the entire circumstance which had caused this
wrongful imprisonment having been due to the State's poor oversight of the legal
system, which only may be exonerated under recession's extenuation for secession...and
so to hypocritically block attempts at that same cause by those succumbing to such
detriment would be illogical and insovereign, because it has been shown that however
counter-intuative such may be toward federal relief via, this case may be seen as a
special exception due to natural shortcomings elsewhere, for not everyone had been
perfectly aware of the extenuation upon the extenuation...and afterall federal form bears
the shape of time in nature: past and future in present, matter and space in potential of
spacetime.
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7.4. Though furthermore, Appellee's arguments and assertions in their
response brief precisely confirm those of the Appellant's argued in our brief, in-turn
upholding judgment in favor of our cause, however. If there were a case that could be
spared for the sake of federal form, this one would be it...for federal form may apply
both ways and also one or more in such fractal, in support of jurisprudence. That
jurisprudence should see the depravity of the Appellee's arguments and spare the State
such embarrassment if not prosecution in-from a federal setting less in line with caveat.
Let us begin with the end of Appellant's response and work our way back through in
order to better lend towards decisiveness under special exception.
7.5. The final argument by the Appellee regards section 103.001(a)(1)
which states "A person is entitled to compensation if: (1) the person has served in whole
or in part a sentence in prison under the laws of this state; and...." Constitutional law
would show us that stating "in prison or jail" instead of just "in prison" would be
technically less than lawful due to it being well understood that prison is a more criminal
type of incarceration than jail and with such a statement therefore being a waste of ink in
time against higher deprivation to even code. One may argue that the law would have
stated the term "incarceration" if indeed prison had implied any form of detention
withunder, though such argument may be seen as less than federal due to the need for
the law to flex with respect to sovereign immunity for secession's extenuation better for
certain cases wherein plaintiffs are not in caveat for sovereign civil immunity, and using
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the term incarceration could have been less conducive, supported by the fact that
sovereignty is the highest extenuation in precedent of federal government (in that self-
governance would be impossible without superluminal capability, as shown by exhibit
P.3), which when combined with constitutional need to exploit such implicit nature
would lend preponderance toward assuming that jail may be considered withunder
prison moreso, which would tend to make even more sense when we imagine that undue
jail time would indeed warrant some sort codification for compensation too.
7.6. Having the code of the law written as implicit as possible is able to
exploit the extenuation most expediently in order to bring about greater net constitution
in the end. Another example of such would be the lack of codification for intentional
torts committed by government which allows arguments of sovereign immunity to
prevail much more readily...or perhaps at the very least would lend much less towards
vigilante retribution from recessive civilians being judged against outside of normalcy
(which would be very obvious in this case too...for it would be much easier to have
recession walk away fooled rather than incorrigibly believing they had been wronged by
the law).
7.7. Such assertion should be seen as moreso probable than not due to
prima facie logic, e.g. a person who commits a felony who receives prison time will
spend some of that time in jail before being transferred to prison, though their
incarceration record will indicate the time they were imprisoned as being that spent in
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jail combined with their time in prison, and usually with time served in pre-trial
detention being added to the total. The constitutional implication of the law combined
with the superluminal efficacy of secession's union ever higher indelibly would indicate
that the term "prison" would be used in conjunction with wrongful imprisonment moreso
in code of law which should be able to be applied to incarcerations which occur in jail or
mental health facilities though only when sovereign caveat is passed most primarily.
And the latter would be so rare as to have lent towards confusion in Appellee's litigation
which one might suspect, though only if one were not aware of the cannibal clause of
federal recession which would tend to support ignoring sovereign caveat even so just the
same in order to impel even higher reliefs in federal court, whilst also perhaps giving the
states just cause to secede against federal government if and when those cases are judged
against (if not for demonstration's purpose alone). Finally, recession's clause places the
burden of proof for such arguments firmly on the side of sovereign civilians away from
government moreso, meaning that if it can be preponderated for the people it may...and
with it very clear and present that uncontrolled generational recession would have
compelled higher authorities to write the law's code to be as sharp as possible with
respect aligning the caveat under such pressing extenuation, hence the term prison being
used with jail more than likely being implicit, however elusive...and at least such could
have occurred blindly from the entanglement as proven by exhibit P.3.
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7.8. The fact that the Attorney General's auspices have argued sovereign
immunity in other cases against the Appellant, such as the case against DPS now being
reviewed for writ of certiorari in the Supreme Court (Stringfellow v. TXDPS 15-24-
00024-CV) would show that the Appellee would be both well-aware of sovereign
immunity and also following the most ostensibly legal potential to wit. The fact that our
great Nation has arrived at this majestic point in socio-technological progress for federal
advent through secession's metamorphosis should only support the state's verity all the
more, with it being explicit that the state is the people moreso...and so the fact that this
litigation from a civilian withof that would support both the Appellant and the Appellee
(both the people and of the state) should be a clear sign to the Bench that the arguments
herein are well and federally valid.
7.9. Technically speaking, not a single case in a federal recession may fall
under the jurisdiction of a state court for those within or without sovereign caveat (being
the entire population) due to the former not being progressive and so at fault for causing
their own recession unto themselves, and the latter for the reasons perscribed herein
pertaining to federal removal. From such fact, one may discount caselaw not explicitly
citing sovereign immunity and so in-turn the cases cited by the Appellant wherein
sovereign immunity was being asserted by the government against citizen parties not
within caveat due to civil sovereignty superseding government sovereignty as in this
case, with both categories covering all of the caselaw used by the Appellee (or any
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caselaw otherwise not under this particular extenuation), the logic of which was
explained in our brief.
7.10. According to atomically sovereign federal logic, every point or
citation used by the Appellee may be preponderated in favor of the Appellant as well, of
course through the cannibal clause, though of which technically should be overruled in
favor of the Appellant by jurisprudence in this case in favor of appeal due to extenuation
within extenuation upon the extenuation under special exception considering natural
human error and the lack of ability otherwise to account for such mistakes. Though of
furthermost concern should be the preservation of the state's reputation, for federal
metamophosis is a civil process and so should be kept as such when and wherever
possible...implying that cases wherein there could be violations of actual code, the
cannibal clause could apply lesser due to the implicit nature of constitutional law being
secession's keel's method of actuation, and so to apply it toward violations of code
would tend to be cruder, if not for creating caselaw which could ruin the intelligent
surprise for the next generation for being less aerodynamic. Afterall, hypocrisy should
still rule, and so why should not the state judge against itself in order to generate federal
cases internally of its own in order to further sovereignty's progress towards federal
refederation from secession's union? A judge in this cause may see both an extenuating
need for emergency funding to a sovereign civilian already with other more resonant
cases and also the ability to create much needed friction within governmental operations
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that is seemingly not present in order to encourage more proper federal momentum from
the AG's office towards secession's advent, with both of those directions tending to
support the caveat moreso than just yet another counter-intuitive ruling compelling yet
another case of an indigent pro se litigant terribly short on time and funding thusly to yet
another drawn-out monotlithic federal ordeal (with monolithic and federal being more of
an oxymoron)...as if the Appellant had been fed too much at one time and could choke
without proper federal jurisprudence.
7.11. The litigation of the Appellee should be an extreme factor in such
special extenuation, if not for ancient unspoken rules that could be seen as damning at a
later date namely with respect to Appellee's use of the term "under" instead of
transcribing code verbatim by perscribing "in accordance with" when referencing Tex
Civ Prac & Rem Code 103.001(a)(2)(B),(C). Such an error on behalf of the state no less
should be otherwise seen as a federal violation of the law not exercising due care--so
egregious as to not just warrant disbarment but also enough for the Bench to judge
against if not for plausible deniability alone, for who would want to sign their name right
under such an overt violation as if one were begging those reading to call the appropriate
departments and make the appropriate complaints as well as inform the votership and
rival parties. As covered in the other filings, there may exist ulterior dimensions
concerting with the law as would be proven by civil consideration of recession's paradox
which posits that the necessary recession requited by at least the initial instance of
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secession's demonstrative advent would occur entanglements untoward the population
which could result in incidents perhaps less than civil which would in-turn requite and
so legally suggest the involvement of higher civilizational technology in order for the
process to remain purely civil in complete lawfulness via civil rule under God.
Judgment against the caveat in such cases as these when there were overt, egregious
violations by the law may be seen as opportunities for those perhaps working through us
quantumally to be able to prove their existence in order to further processes due
regarding their and our sovereignty, which could be at hand in this case as would tend to
be the only other explanation.
7.12. Such logic would be deductive, which may also be used to
definitively object to the Appellant's other arguments which revolve around statutory
entitlement per Section 103.001(a). The excerpt from that section has been provided
below:
"Sec. 103.001. CLAIMANTS ENTITLED TO COMPENSATION AND
HEALTH
BENEFITS COVERAGE. (a) A person is entitled to compensation if:
(1) the person has served in whole or in part a sentence in
prison under the laws of this state; and
(2) the person:
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(A) has received a full pardon on the basis of innocence for the crime for
which the person was sentenced;
(B) has been granted relief in accordance with a writ of habeas corpus that is
based on a court finding or determination that the person is actually innocent
of the crime for which the person was sentenced; or
(C) has been granted relief in accordance with a writ
of habeas corpus and:
(i) the state district court in which the charge against the person was pending
has entered an order dismissing the charge; and
(ii) the district court's dismissal order is based on a motion to dismiss in
which the state's attorney states that no credible evidence exists that
inculpates the defendant and, either in the motion or in an affidavit, the
state's attorney states that the state's attorney believes that the defendant is
actually innocent of the crime for which the person was sentenced."
The fact that 103.001(a)(2)(B) & (C) both state different criteria for relief being granted
in accordance with a writ of habeas corpus would deductively prove that an applicant
does not necessarily have to be released from wrongful imprisonment due from their
filing of a writ of habeas corpus as a direct result of it being processed, because such
being done would only be able to occur in one circumstance, yet in (B) and (C) there are
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two separate possible circumstances, implying that the use of "in accordance with" was
codified in order to requite that a writ of habeas corpus would have had to at least have
been filed by an applicant during their wrongful imprisonment. The logic is very simple
because an prisoner wrongfully imprisoned could have filed their writ of habeas corpus
though in the meantime have been found innocent of the crime and/or have had their
charges dismissed via a separate proceeding though still technically would be owed for
the time spent wrongfully imprisoned after their habeas corpus was dismissed due to a
lack of jurisdiction from their already having been released, as did occur to the
Appellant (exhibit P.7). The wording of Section 103.001(a)(2)(B),(C) is also very clear
by the use of "a court finding" and especially within (C)(i) which states "the state district
court in which the charge against the person was pending" because it would be
impossible for that such court to render a dismissal if "in accordance with a writ of
habeas corpus" implied an applicant being released under it due to the paradox--in that
the charge would no longer be pending then. Such logic would deduce irrevocably to
the fact that a writ of habeas corpus having been filed and then an applicant having had
their charges dismissed in the meantime would have to be a circumstance being covered
by 103.001(a)(2), and one can see the same in (B), which could apply directly to a
court's finding processing the writ of habeas corpus or another court processing a
counter-suit claiming innocence when a habeas corpus had been filed elsewhere; and so
would under civil preponderance via rules of evidence...which are the opposite of
25 / 31
criminal law, in that if it can be preponderated in favor of a plaintiff then it must, end of
story.
7.13. "These truths we hold to be self-evident" is the opening line of the
Declaration of Independence and it is well understood that the deductive, implicit nature
of constitutional law is inarguable due to its own lawfulness not violating itself by
depraving us of the time wasted stating its obviousness. Those who attempt to hide in
these crevasses are arguably less than evolved and one day may find themselves as
fodder for all we know. Though anyone reading may see that the contortions of the
State's Counsel would be extenuatingly sovereign, with their claim to sovereign
immunity only justifiable by a coincidence that should be seen as perfectly explanatory
as toward how the efficacy of federal law may re-affirm our own employees whilst also
upholding the public most efficiently. Tort claims are the bread and butter of personal
injury suits based upon sovereign logic of constitution, which this case was filed as,
though it was based off of Tex Civ Prac & Rem Code Ch 103. The argument herein
reasserts such tort claim by appealing to the fact that if criteria had been met for
compensation under Ch 103 and it could be proven that Appellant's application had not
been processed duly, which was proven so under US and Texas Rules of Evidence (with
Sec 1 TX Const by the 9th/10th Amds implying that FRE Rule 301 be applied, though
not necessarily needed under recession's clause by TxRE Rule 401) then relief would be
requited if sovereignty was passed, which would be further supported by exhibit P.6
26 / 31
which consists of video evidence of government officials who had obviously been
trained on sovereignty identifying material belonging to the Appellant regarding our
website ExitFederal.org as being classified as sovereign [explicative].
7.14. The evidence was and is very much in favor of the claim that the
Appellant's application was not duly processed for some reason, a claim that must be
taken as moreso true than not with respect to recession's malfeasance (exhibit P.4
(Amended) if and when sovereignty exists for the claimant, which was shown by exhibit
P.3, with exhibit P.2 tending to affirm that such recession did occur on behalf of the
Comptroller Judiciary Section as alleged, which in-turn would support relief at the very
least at an amount equal to what would have been approved for by the Comptroller.
Furthermore, a copy of the Appellant's DPS criminal history record has been filed as
Exhibit P.8 which has no record of the conviction/adjudication in question because that
charge was obviously entirely dropped from Appellant's record due to our having been
found completely innocent entirely then, though even if the class A misdemeanor had
still remained the Appellant should still be justly owed the difference between the time
served for that charge and the maximum sentence for that class of charge (because we do
not pay our government to make mistakes with our lives), which should be based upon
the most pertinent code of the state's, being that in Ch 103, which was what was prayed
for in the relief--all according to very well founded law that only prejudice or some
other far out extenuation could deny. Even further, the copy of our DPS criminal history
27 / 31
record chosen by the Appellant is from an exhibit in our case against DPS wherein our
public record was tampered with by someone placing photos on it that were not in order
with constitutional law due to a photo with temporary markings that was both outdated
and perhaps illegible for law enforcement purposes being used as our main photo...much
less with it being insovereign towards suggesting to recessive law enforcement and other
officials moreso likely then to be confused that the Appellant were less than ostensibly
lawful, being against the Article III precedent for sovereign immunity...and with that
culprit even posting legible photographs that could have been used just to prove their
point and also even modifying their posted dates inconsistently though in a way which
would have proven to those questioning in that case, and in the public such as for
background checks that the injuries in the photograph were not in conjunction with the
assault charge from 2017 also pertinent to this cause which has since been removed--
proving that there has been other fraud afoot with respect to the Appellant which may
not be denied, upholding sovereignty hereof. And even if the same bad-hackers who it
is alleged unlawfully modified Appellant's DPS and TransUnion records in our other
cases (exhibit P.5) had erased the misdemeanor charge in question via the all but
purposefully weak ASCII standard such an occurrence would still support relief because
it would show that the same culprits most likely caused my application for compensation
to become obstructed too...though perhaps would support relief even moreso considering
that weaknesses on behalf of the state were and are present, just as DOGE is uncovering
28 / 31
trillions of dollars worth. That a sovereign citizen could be presenting a solid case made
even more hardcore by the removal of the record of the adjudicated charge relating to
this issue by a clandestine team of bad-hackers would be perhaps the most ulterior
reason to grant extenuated relief as fast as possible, especially if such a litigant were low
on funds and also prosecuting other more advanced cases elsewhere against such
criminals directly and also recession in general, if not also spearheading a commensurate
political party to wit, if not being for federal advent itself. In fact, judging against such a
civilian could be seen as indicative of criminal liaisons perhaps in some respect,
especially under the shadows of recession's clause...or perhaps even suggestive of
quantum possession by some sort of weaponry's apparatus from another world not our
own from another dimension of technology we have yet to grasp, much like Natives on
our world saw sails on the horizon not knowing what they were before they died from
plagues...with there being mental health issues ripping through our society which could
be traced back to demonic entities perhaps being automated by such class of quantum
tech.
7.15. With that being said, the State's counsel's only claim to sovereignty
may be through the Court's judgment in favor of relief due to their own overt error in
transcribing Section 103.001(a) by using the term "under" as covered. Such an immense
error should only be interpreted in a legal sense as having been toward compelling the
Bench to rule in favor of relief under special exception in this cause due to there being
29 / 31
no other way to express such legitimate intent withunder the federal cannibal clause
whilst still needing to recognize the further extenuation at the same time while adhering
to laws preventing advising of the public. The Court would have little other option than
to allow this appeal to be judged in favor of the Appellant due to the implication of such
error being able to be seen as perhaps the only way that the Appellee could be seen as
oddly lawful under three extenuations at the same time, which may be affirmed by their
assertion that jail time would not qualify under the term prison, which would be
technical towards constitutional implication by the necessitation of sovereign caveat's
better alignment, and with it being obvious that Appellee's Counsel would have argued
that the state would have used the term "incarceration" if they had specifically meant for
jail time to be included. Because the use of the term prison is more implicit for
sovereignty's ends and because the Appellee does not argue with respect to the term
incarceration and also overtly, improperly and egregiously transcribes the cited code
from Sec 103.001(a)(2) in a manner otherwise strikingly odd for such a higher
professional, such could be interpreted as their actually being in favor of relief being
granted in the only way professionally acceptable due to the other pole of the possibility
being judgment in favor of a serious legal offense by the state against a sovereign
civilian via such incorrect quotation of code, which would simply not be acceptable
without, implying at least moreso that relief be granted duly under civil rule in
preponderance.
30 / 31
7.16. At the very least though the Court may recount that this cause is a tort
claim at its core being based off of Ch 103 which the state may either choose to process
as such or choose to have processed under Ch 103, whichever is more becoming, with
the latter perhaps able to be seen as more legitimate...for how could the Comptroller
deny an application that they had never processed? If the Appellant's argument is upheld
in the respect that compensation be granted for wrongful imprisonment from prison and
not jail time, then one would also be left with the assumption that compensation for
wrongful imprisonment regarding undue jail time would have to be pursued via tort
claim, which this cause would stand as as well. Therefore, whether or not criteria were
met for Chapter 103 would not necessarily the crux of this cause being relieved due to
the fact that there was excess time spent in incarceration that was not within the bounds
of the law and so the courts have the duty to relieve that injustice in favor of the people
under the Constitution of Texas in the US in some way somehow, such would be well
understood...though the arguments and evidence that would show that even so the
Appellant's application should and may be processed under Ch 103 should stand as mere
stout affirmation that relief would indeed still be due notwithstanding. And so the issue
would come down to a question of sovereign immunity--being the only legal extenuation
able to overrule normal constitutional efficiency superluminally, in that would the
Appellant be immune from recession?
31 / 31
7.17. Sovereign caveat was shown to be within the Appellant by exhibit
P.3, and with sovereign immunity being waived due to the statutory language of the law
clearly defaulting toward civil sovereign immunity versus government sovereign
immunity per the 9th/10th Amd. The fact that notice of intent to file a complaint was
sent to the Comptroller Judiciary Section via email and that that email was returned
undeliverable two separate times from two different addresses from two separate email
providers should be the type of coincidental proof made for Hollywood that just cannot
be denied. A civil court may defer to sovereign civilians in recession when they present
proof, with recession standing as such quantumally moreso at any and every positive
rate in time's motion, though even so the Appellant furnished proof of the further
arguable shortcoming in exhibit P.2 albeit directly relating to the obstruction of proper
prerequisites being satisfied, and of which the same chapter of Government Code would
support interpenetration of in favor of Appellant, being Section 311.016, e.g. "may"...in
coincidental support again. Because the people would be more sovereign than their
government of whom they employ, sovereign civil immunity waives sovereign
government immunity when a violation of law has occurred to those civilian plaintiffs
versus their government (discounting ministerial and discretionary immunity which may
not apply to this case). Therefore, relief may be granted for this cause in this appeal,
with reason to override the cannibal clause having been expressed under special
exception.
___________________________________________________________________________________
I, Plaintiff Steven J Stringfellow, hereby certify that all of the foregoing is true and correct under
penalty of law.
Federally Submitted,
05/26/2025
___________________________________________ Dated: ______________
Steven J Stringfellow
10160 Hwy 242
Ste 800-4117
Conroe, TX 77385-4379
(512) 571-2036
thefederalexitparty@gmail.com
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Certificate of Service
_______________________________
I certify that a copy hereof has been furnished towards:
Texas Comptroller Judiciary Section
111 E. 17th St.
Austin, TX 78711
(512) 936-5985
Adam.Fellows@cpa.texas.gov
Elena.Bendea@cpa.texas.gov
Texas Office of the Attorney General
300 W. 15th Street
Austin, TX 78701
(512) 463-2100
Anthony.Dolcefino@oag.texas.gov
Sarah.Orr@oag.texas.gov
Return service to:
Steven J Stringfellow
10160 Hwy 242
Ste 800-4117
Conroe, TX 77385-4379
(512) 571-2036
thefederalexitparty@gmail.com
Automated Certificate of eService
This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system.
The filer served this document via email generated by the efiling system
on the date and to the persons listed below. The rules governing
certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a
certificate of service that complies with all applicable rules.
Envelope ID: 101252156
Filing Code Description: Brief Not Requesting Oral Argument
Filing Description: Appellant's Reply Brief
Status as of 5/27/2025 7:41 AM CST
Case Contacts
Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status
Sarah Orr Sarah.Orr@oag.texas.gov 5/26/2025 10:22:02 PM SENT
Atty General Anthony.Dolcefino@oag.texas.gov 5/26/2025 10:22:02 PM SENT