Estate of F.R Jr. v. County of Yuba

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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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12 ESTATE OF F.R. Jr. and No. 2:23-cv-00846 WBS CKD

LORI ROSILES,

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Plaintiffs,

14 MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE:

v. DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR

15 SUMMARY JUDGMENT

COUNTY OF YUBA, YUBA COUNTY

16 SHERIFF’S OFFICE, TAMARA PECSI,

and JAVIER ZEPEDA,

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Defendants.

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20 Plaintiffs Estate of F.R. and Lori Rosiles, F.R.’s

21 mother, brought this action against municipal defendants County

22 of Yuba and Yuba County Sheriff’s Office, and individual

23 defendants Tamara Pecsi and Javier Zepeda (“defendant officers”),

24 alleging (1) deprivation of substantive due process under a

25 theory of state-created danger; (2) deprivation of substantive

26 due process under a theory of special relationship; (3)

27 unreasonable post-seizure care in violation of the Fourth

28 Amendment; (4) interference with familial association under the

1 First Amendment; (5) interference with familial association under

2 the Fourteenth Amendment; (6) violation of the Tom Bane Act; (7)

3 intentional infliction of emotional distress; (8) negligence; and

4 (9) wrongful death. (First. Am. Compl. (“FAC”) (Docket No. 20).)

5 Defendants have moved for summary judgment on all claims.

6 (Docket No. 24.)

7 I. Factual and Procedural Background

8 On February 5, 2023, at around 7:41 p.m., a car drove

9 past a residence in Olivehurst, California and the driver shot at

10 the house several times. (See Defs.’ Statement of Undisputed

11 Facts (Docket No. 24-2) ¶¶ 1-4.) F.R. was inside the residence,

12 which belonged to a relative, and was shot in the abdomen. (See

13 id. ¶¶ 2-5, 24.) Several family members attempted to call 911,

14 and F.R.’s brother eventually got through to the operator. (Id.

15 ¶ 7.) At the same time, F.R.’s family members placed F.R. into a

16 truck belonging to F.R.’s uncle in order to transport F.R. to the

17 hospital. (J.R. Dep. at 13:1-16:16; A.L. Dep. at 16:21-24,

18 22:22-23.)1

19 The defendant officers -- Sergeant Pecsi and Deputy

20 Zepeda of the Yuba County Sheriff’s Office -- learned of the

21 shooting via radio and drove to the scene in their patrol cars.

22 (Pecsi Dep. at 12:24-13:14; Zepeda Dep. at 7:18-25.) Pecsi and

23 Zepeda were not wearing body cameras at the time because they

24 were off duty and driving home when they learned of the shooting.

25 (Pecsi Dep. at 20:18-21:2; Zepeda Dep. at 7:11-20.)

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27 1 The parties lodged with the court the full transcripts

of the depositions as well as body camera videos which are

28 referenced in this Order.

1 After the truck transporting F.R. had driven a short

2 distance, one of the defendant officers’ patrol cars “blocked”

3 the truck from leaving. (See J.R. Dep. at 15:27-17:4; A.L. Dep.

4 at 24:5-23, 28:2-10.) F.R. was removed from the vehicle and

5 placed on the ground. (See J.R. Dep. at 17:6-26, 18:7-19:13;

6 A.L. Dep. at 30:12-31:16, 33:6-16.)

7 A short time later, Deputy Young arrived at the scene,

8 followed shortly thereafter by Deputy Johannes. (See Zepeda Dep.

9 at 28:14-21; Young Decl. (Docket No. 24-3 at 127-29) ¶ 4.)

10 Deputies Young and Johannes, who are not parties to this action,

11 were on duty and wearing body cameras. (See Pecsi Dep. at 40:1-

12 13.) The timestamped body camera footage shows the defendant

13 officers, along with other officers and medical personnel,

14 providing medical aid to F.R. (See Young Body Camera

15 (YUBA101_LL0101); Johannes Body Camera (YUBA141_LL0141); Spiers

16 Body Camera (YUBA120_LL0120).) During this time, F.R. remained

17 lying on the ground in the midst of a crowd of people, which

18 included several screaming family members. (See id.) Paramedics

19 then moved F.R. to the ambulance and took him to the hospital.

20 (Johannes Body Camera at 19:54:22-20:01:10.) F.R. was declared

21 dead at 8:17 p.m. (Docket No. 26-1 at 95.)

22 II. Legal Standard

23 Summary judgment is proper “if the movant shows that

24 there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the

25 movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ.

26 P. 56(a). A material fact is one “that might affect the outcome

27 of the suit under the governing law,” and a genuine issue is one

28 that could permit a reasonable trier of fact to enter a verdict

1 in the non-moving party’s favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,

2 Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Any inferences drawn from the

3 underlying facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to

4 the non-moving party. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith

5 Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).

6 III. Federal Claims

7 A. Interference With Familial Association (Fourth and

Fifth Claims)

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9 The right to familial association “is entirely judge-

10 made; it does not appear in the text of the Constitution itself.”

11 Keates v. Koile, 883 F.3d 1228, 1235 (9th Cir. 2018). The Ninth

12 Circuit has explained that “[t]he constitutional right to

13 familial association derives from the First and Fourteenth

14 Amendments.” Murguia v. Langdon, 61 F.4th 1096, 1118 (9th Cir.

15 2023), cert. denied sub nom. Tulare v. Murguia, 144 S. Ct. 553

16 (2024). However, the Ninth Circuit “analyze[s] the right of

17 intimate association in the same manner regardless [of] whether

18 [the court] characterize[s] it under the First or Fourteenth

19 Amendments.” Mann v. City of Sacramento, 748 F. App’x 112, 115

20 (9th Cir. 2018); see also Scanlon v. County of Los Angeles, 92

21 F.4th 781, 797–98 (9th Cir. 2024) (indicating that there is a

22 single standard for a familial association claim premised on

23 removal of child from parent, regardless of whether it is framed

24 as a violation of the First or Fourteenth Amendment).

25 “The standard for analyzing a § 1983 claim for

26 interference with the right to familial association depends on

27 the context in which the case arises.” Murguia, 61 F.4th at

28 1118. In the context of a familial association claim premised on

1 police conduct, “a plaintiff must establish that an officer’s

2 conduct ‘shocks the conscience.’” Scott v. Smith, 109 F.4th

3 1215, 1228 (9th Cir. 2024); see also Garcia through AG v. County

4 of Napa, No. 23-15056, 2024 WL 1734125, at *1 (9th Cir. Apr. 23,

5 2024) (“Official conduct must ‘shock the conscience’ to create a

6 First and Fourteenth Amendment claim for loss of familial

7 association.”) (citing Porter v. Osborn, 546 F.3d 1131, 1142 (9th

8 Cir. 2008)).2

9 In determining whether police conduct shocks the

10 conscience, “the court must first ask whether the circumstances

11 are such that actual deliberation by the officer is practical.”

12 Wilkinson v. Torres, 610 F.3d 546, 554 (9th Cir. 2010) (cleaned

13 up). “Where actual deliberation is practical, then an officer’s

14 ‘deliberate indifference’ may suffice to shock the conscience.”

15 Id. “On the other hand, where a law enforcement officer makes a

16 snap judgment because of an escalating situation, his conduct may

17 only be found to shock the conscience if he acts with a purpose

18 to harm unrelated to legitimate law enforcement objectives.” Id.

19 Deliberate indifference requires that a state actor

20 “recognize an unreasonable risk and actually intend to expose the

21 plaintiff to such risks without regard to the consequences to the

22 plaintiff. In other words, the defendant knows that something is

23 going to happen but ignores the risk and exposes [the plaintiff]

24 to it.” Patel v. Kent School Dist., 648 F.3d, 965 974 (9th Cir.

25 2011) (cleaned up). Deliberate indifference exists where

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27 2 It is undisputed that Lori Rosiles, as F.R.’s mother,

has standing to bring a familial association claim. See Keates,

28 883 F.3d at 1237.

1 “extended opportunities to do better are teamed with protracted

2 failure even to care.” Porter, 546 F.3d at 1139 (quoting County

3 of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 853 (1998)).

4 The court need not decide whether the “deliberate

5 indifference” or “purpose to harm” standard applies here. Even

6 under the lower deliberate indifference standard, the evidence

7 establishes that the conduct of the defendant officers does not

8 shock the conscience.

9 In the Ninth Circuit case Sinclair v. City of Seattle,

10 the mother of the decedent brought a substantive due process

11 claim3 against the fire and police officials who responded after

12 the decedent had been shot by a third party at a protest. 61

13 F.4th 674, 676 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 144 S. Ct. 88 (2023).

14 The fire department “had an ambulance staged just a block and a

15 half from [the decedent’s] location. A man implored the

16 paramedics to help [the decedent], but the medics were apparently

17 waiting for a green light from [the police department];

18 meanwhile, [the police department] was confused about the

19 paramedics’ location. The miscommunication caused a response

20 delay of around 20 minutes before first responders finally

21 arrived to treat [the decedent].” Id. at 677. The Ninth Circuit

22 affirmed the district court’s holding that these allegations did

23 not show deliberate indifference. Id. at 681. The court

24 reasoned that while the response was delayed, “medics tried to

25 provide [the decedent] care” and “the City did not prohibit them

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27 3 Substantive due process claims are also evaluated under

the “shocks the conscience” standard. See Lewis, 523 U.S. at

28 846–47.

1 from doing so.” Id. Further, “[h]ad the City been deliberately

2 indifferent to [the decedent’s] particular plight, they would

3 have ignored [the bystanders’] pleas for help altogether. They

4 did no such thing.” Id.

5 The facts of the Third Circuit case Vargas v. City of

6 Philadelphia, 783 F.3d 962 (3d Cir. 2015), are eerily similar to

7 the instant case. There, officers responded to a 911 call and

8 encountered a “tense and chaotic scene” with a group of screaming

9 people surrounding an unconscious child experiencing a medical

10 emergency. Id. at 974. The officers prevented the child’s

11 mother from transporting the child to the hospital, including by

12 “us[ing] their police cruiser to block [a cousin’s] car from

13 leaving for the hospital.” Id. at 970, 974. Because the

14 officers knew “an ambulance was about to arrive, they had

15 everyone wait for the paramedics.” Id. at 974. The Third

16 Circuit concluded that the plaintiff could not maintain a

17 substantive due process claim because the officers “assisted in a

18 form of rescue -- facilitating an ambulance pick-up -- rather

19 than arresting or abandoning the person in need of aid,” and it

20 “is a stretch to say that these facts rise even to the level of

21 negligence, let alone to deliberate indifference or an intent to

22 harm.” Id.

23 Similarly to the officers in Sinclair and Vargas, the

24 officers here facilitated the provision of medical aid to F.R.

25 Although the officers prevented F.R.’s family from either

26 transporting him to the hospital or approaching him to provide

27 aid, it is undisputed that the defendant officers knew the

28 emergency dispatcher had already called for both the fire

1 department and paramedics to respond to the scene. (See J.R.

2 Dep. at 15:27-17:4; A.L. Dep. at 24:5-23, 28:2-10, 34:19-22;

3 Pecsi Dep. at 25:25-27:23; Zepeda Dep. at 24:22-25:12; Linda Fire

4 EMS Report (Docket No. 24-2 at 92-97) at 1; Bi-County Ambulance

5 Report (Docket No. 24-2 at 99-106) at 1.) It is also undisputed

6 that after arriving on the scene, Pecsi contacted dispatch to

7 request that paramedics enter immediately upon arrival. (See

8 Pecsi Dep. at 26:11-27:16, 38:18-19; Dispatch Call Info. (Docket

9 No. 24-3 at 108-119) at 1.)

10 There is no evidence tending to show that the

11 defendants “recognize[d] an unreasonable risk” that waiting for

12 the ambulance would lead to F.R.’s death and “actually intend[ed]

13 to expose the plaintiff to such risks without regard to the

14 consequences to the plaintiff.” See Patel, 648 F.3d at 974.

15 Because the defendant officers knew paramedics were already en

16 route, it was not unreasonable to wait for the ambulance to

17 arrive rather than allow unknown people to transport F.R. in a

18 private vehicle. See Vargas, 783 F.3d at 974. And there is no

19 indication that allowing F.R.’s family members, several of whom

20 were children and none of whom appear to have had any medical

21 training, to either transport F.R. to the hospital in a private

22 vehicle or approach F.R. would have prevented F.R.’s death.

23 Although F.R.’s siblings testified that the defendant

24 officers provided no medical aid (see J.R. Dep. at 19:26-20:4;

25 A.L. Dep. at 34:4-35:4), their testimony is directly contradicted

26 by the available body camera videos. The footage shows that when

27 Deputy Young arrived, both defendants were kneeling beside F.R.’s

28 body and Pecsi was pressing her hands over the bullet wound.

1 (See Young Body Camera at 19:51:50-19:52:27.) As Deputy Young

2 unpacked his medical bag, Pecsi continued to apply pressure to

3 the wound while Zepeda talked to F.R. and tried to keep him

4 conscious. (See Young Body Camera at 19:52:28-19:53:02; Zepeda

5 Dep. at 27:6-19.) Zepeda then used Deputy Young’s medical shears

6 to cut off F.R.’s shirt to assist with treating the gunshot

7 wound. (See Young Body Camera at 19:52:48-55; Zepeda Dep. at

8 26:11-17.) Shortly thereafter, Deputy Johannes, the

9 firefighters, and the paramedics arrived and further aid was

10 provided, including the placement of a seal over the wound and

11 administration of oxygen. (See Johannes Body Camera at 19:53:20-

12 19:56:40; Zepeda Dep. at 28:22-29:16.) F.R. was then moved to

13 the ambulance and taken to the hospital. (See Johannes Body

14 Camera at 19:56:41-20:01:28.)

15 Based on the video footage, it is undisputed that the

16 defendant officers provided medical aid prior to the intervention

17 of paramedics and did not interfere with F.R. being transported

18 to the hospital in the ambulance. See Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S.

19 372, 380 (2007) (where the non-moving party’s version of events

20 is “blatantly contradicted” by unchallenged video evidence, “a

21 court should not adopt that version of the facts for purposes of

22 ruling on a motion for summary judgment”).

23 Construing the conflicting video footage and deposition

24 testimony in plaintiffs’ favor, it is theoretically possible that

25 the defendant officers provided no medical aid prior to the

26 arrival of Deputy Young but began providing care upon his

27 arrival. However, the footage shows that by the time Deputy

28 Young arrived, the defendant officers were already kneeling next

1 to F.R., F.R.’s shirt had been pulled up to give the officers

2 access to the gunshot wound, and Pecsi was holding her hands over

3 the wound. (See Young Body Camera at 19:51:50-19:52:21.) A

4 version of events in which the defendant officers did nothing to

5 aid F.R. for several minutes,4 then suddenly jumped into place

6 around F.R.’s body to appear helpful when Deputy Young arrived,

7 strains credulity and is unsupported by any affirmative evidence.

8 See Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586 (“When the moving party has

9 carried its burden under Rule 56(c), its opponent must do more

10 than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the

11 material facts.”).

12 Regardless, the fact remains that the defendant

13 officers did provide medical aid rather than “ignor[ing] . . .

14 pleas for help altogether,” Sinclair, 61 F.4th at 676, or

15 “abandoning the person in need of aid,” Vargas, 783 F.3d at 974.

16 Under the circumstances here, any purported delay in providing

17 medical aid during the short period of time between the defendant

18 officers’ arrival and the arrival of Deputy Young is insufficient

19 to establish a genuine dispute of material fact as to deliberate

20 indifference. Cf. Lemire v. California Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab.,

21 726 F.3d 1062, 1077–78 (9th Cir. 2013) (finding genuine dispute

22 of material fact as to deliberate indifference where prison

23 officials were trained in CPR and had CPR masks in their

24 possession but failed to administer CPR or provide any care prior

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4 The parties dispute the length of time that elapsed

between the arrival of the defendant officers and the arrival of

27 Deputy Young. However, it is undisputed that it was a matter of

minutes. F.R. was shot at around 7:41 and Deputy Young arrived

28 at 7:51. (See Young Body Camera at 19:51:50.)

1 to arrival of medical staff).

2 The evidence before the court does not show a

3 “protracted failure even to care,” see Porter, 546 F.3d at 1139,

4 but rather establishes that the officers tried to aid F.R. and

5 were not deliberately indifferent. As the Supreme Court has

6 explained, “only the most egregious official conduct” can be

7 considered “conscience shocking, in a constitutional sense.” See

8 Lewis, 523 U.S. at 846. Accordingly, summary judgment in

9 defendants’ favor will be granted on the familial association

10 claims.

11 B. State-Created Danger (First Claim)

12 Under the state-created danger rule, state actors may

13 be held liable under the Fourteenth Amendment for a deprivation

14 of substantive due process where (1) “[t]he officer’s affirmative

15 conduct’ [exposed] the plaintiff to a foreseeable danger that she

16 would not otherwise have faced,” and (2) the officer acted “with

17 ‘deliberate indifference’ to a ‘known or obvious danger.’”

18 Martinez v. High, 91 F.4th 1022, 1028 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,

19 145 S. Ct. 547 (2024); see also Murguia, 61 F.4th at 1111.

20 Plaintiffs contend that the defendant officers placed

21 F.R. in danger when they prevented him from being transported to

22 the hospital in a family member’s private vehicle. (See J.R.

23 Dep. at 13:1-17:26; A.L. Dep. at 16:21-24, 22:22-23, 24:23,

24 30:12-31:16, 33:6-16).

25 In Maxwell v. County of San Diego, the defendant

26 officers prevented an ambulance from transporting the plaintiff,

27 who had suffered a gunshot wound, to the hospital. 708 F.3d

28 1075, 1080-81 (9th Cir. 2013). The Ninth Circuit held that the

1 state-created danger exception applied because the officers found

2 the plaintiff “facing a preexisting danger from [a] gunshot

3 wound” and “[i]mped[ed] access to medical care,” which “amounts

4 to leaving [the plaintiff] in a more dangerous situation.” Id.

5 at 1082.

6 The defendant officers similarly found F.R. facing a

7 preexisting gunshot wound. But unlike in Maxwell, the defendant

8 officers prevented a private vehicle, not an ambulance, from

9 transporting F.R.; they were aware an ambulance was on the way

10 and provided medical assistance to F.R. before paramedics

11 arrived; and they did not interfere with F.R.’s transportation to

12 the hospital via ambulance. (See J.R. Dep. at 15:27-17:4; A.L.

13 Dep. at 24:5-23, 28:2-10; Pecsi Dep. at 25:25-27:23; Zepeda Dep.

14 at 24:22-25:12; Young Body Camera at 19:52:14-19:53:18; Johannes

15 Body Camera at 19:54:22-19:57:22.)

16 Under these circumstances, it was not “foreseeable ‘as

17 a matter of common sense’” that refusing to allow F.R.’s family

18 to transport him to the hospital would increase the danger faced

19 by F.R.5 See Murguia, 61 F.4th at 1116 (quoting Martinez v. City

20 5 In the context of ruling on defendants’ motion to

dismiss the state-created danger claim, based strictly on the

21

allegations of the complaint, the court came to a different

22 conclusion. (Docket No. 15.) At that time, the court reasoned

that the allegations of the complaint were sufficiently analogous

23 to the facts of Maxwell to state a claim. See Est. of F.R. v.

County of Yuba, No. 2:23-cv-00846 WBS CKD, 2023 WL 6130049, at *2

24 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 19, 2023). However, the allegations made at the

pleadings stage are substantially different from the facts that

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presumably emerged during discovery and are now before this

court. The operative complaint paints a picture of officers who

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detained F.R.’s family at gunpoint, prioritized investigating the

27 shooting over saving F.R., and did nothing to aid F.R. while

preventing F.R.’s family from intervening, thereby causing his

28 death. (See FAC ¶¶ 22-32, 45.) The record before the court

1 of Clovis, 943 F.3d 1260, 1274 (9th Cir. 2019)). To the

2 contrary, waiting for the ambulance led to F.R. receiving medical

3 attention within minutes. And there is no evidence before the

4 court indicating that F.R. would have received medical care more

5 quickly had his family members transported him to the hospital,

6 which was located approximately 2.2 miles away. (See Docket No.

7 26-1 at 69-70.) Cf. Maxwell, 708 F.3d at 1082 (state-created

8 danger exception applied where the plaintiff faced a preexisting

9 danger due to a gunshot wound and there was “evidence [the

10 defendants] affirmatively increased that danger by preventing her

11 ambulance from leaving”) (emphasis added).

12 For the foregoing reasons, the state-created danger

13 exception does not apply.6 See id. at 1080-82; Vargas, 783 F.3d

14 at 973–74 (no state-created danger claim where officers prevented

15 mother from transporting her daughter to the hospital and waited

16 for paramedics to arrive, and daughter subsequently died of an

17 underlying medical condition not caused by the officers). See

18 also Waldron v. Spicher, 954 F.3d 1297, 1306 (11th Cir. 2020)

19 (“an unsuccessful, negligent, or reckless . . . interference with

20 a bystander’s rescue attempt” does not constitute a substantive

21 due process violation) (quoting Hamilton v. Cannon, 80 F.3d 1525,

22

provides no support for those allegations, but rather

23 demonstrates that the officers knew emergency medical assistance

was en route and themselves provided medical aid. Based on the

24 evidence before it, the court can no longer conclude that this

case is analogous to Maxwell.

25

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6 Even if the officers’ conduct exposed F.R. to a

foreseeable danger, the state-created danger claim would still

27 fail because, as discussed above, the evidence is insufficient to

support a finding that defendant officers were deliberately

28 indifferent. See Martinez, 91 F.4th at 1028.

1 1532 (11th Cir. 1996)). Accordingly, summary judgment in

2 defendants’ favor will be granted on the state-created danger

3 claim.

4 C. Special Relationship (Second Claim)

5 “The Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause

6 generally does not confer any affirmative right to governmental

7 aid, even where such aid may be necessary to secure life,

8 liberty, or property interests.” Patel, 648 F.3d at 971.

9 However, under the “special relationship” exception, state actors

10 may be held liable for their omissions where they “‘take[] a

11 person into [their] custody and hold[] him there against his

12 will.’” Id. at 971–72 (quoting Deshaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t

13 of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 199-200 (1989)). This exception

14 exists because “a state cannot restrain a person’s liberty

15 without also assuming some responsibility for the person’s safety

16 and well-being.” Id. at 972.

17 A claim premised on the special relationship exception

18 is a variety of substantive due process claim. See id. Even if

19 F.R. was in custody such that a special relationship existed,

20 this claim fails because there is no underlying substantive due

21 process violation. A substantive due process violation exists

22 where the officers’ conduct “shocks the conscience.” See Lewis,

23 523 U.S. at 846–47. As discussed above, the evidence establishes

24 that the officers’ conduct did not shock the conscience.

25 Accordingly, summary judgment in defendants’ favor will be

26 granted on the special relationship claim.

27 D. Unreasonable Post-Seizure Care (Third Claim)

28 Under the Fourth Amendment, “[o]fficers must provide

1 objectively reasonable post-arrest care” to an individual in

2 police custody. Rosales v. County of San Diego, 511 F. Supp. 3d

3 1070, 1091 (S.D. Cal. 2021) (citing Tatum v. City & County of San

4 Francisco, 441 F.3d 1090, 1098 (9th Cir. 2006)). “The Ninth

5 Circuit has not precisely defined the contours of what it means

6 to provide ‘objectively reasonable post-arrest care.’” Henriquez

7 v. City of Bell, 14-cv-196 GW SS, 2015 WL 13357606, at *6 (C.D.

8 Cal. Apr. 16, 2015). “However, the Fourth Amendment analysis

9 generally concerns whether the defendant’s conduct was reasonable

10 under the totality of the circumstances, viewed from the

11 perspective of a reasonable person on the scene.” Rosales, 511

12 F. Supp. 3d at 1091 (citing Plumhoff v. Rickard, 572 U.S. 765,

13 774–75 (2014); Tatum, 441 F.3d at 1098).

14 The Tatum case is instructive. There, the Ninth

15 Circuit concluded that the arresting officers had provided

16 objectively reasonable post-arrest care where they “promptly

17 summon[ed] the necessary medical assistance” and monitored the

18 plaintiff’s medical condition. 441 F.3d at 1093, 1099. The

19 court held that “a police officer who promptly summons the

20 necessary medical assistance has acted reasonably for purposes of

21 the Fourth Amendment, even if the officer did not administer” a

22 particular type of care. See id. at 1099.

23 Here, the defendant officers were aware that medical

24 assistance was already on the way, and Pecsi contacted dispatch

25 to request that the paramedics enter the scene immediately upon

26 arrival. (See Pecsi Dep. at 25:25-27:23; Zepeda Dep. at 24:22-

27 25:12.) Even if the officers did not provide medical aid prior

28 to the arrival of Deputy Young, the Fourth Amendment does not

1 “require an officer to provide what hindsight reveals to be the

2 most effective medical care” for an arrestee. Tatum, 441 F.3d at

3 1098. Medical assistance had already been summoned by the time

4 F.R. was allegedly seized, and the Fourth Amendment required no

5 more. See id. at 1099.7 See also Cato v. County of San

6 Bernardino, No. 5:20-cv-02602, 2023 WL 5505012, at *12 (C.D. Cal.

7 July 3, 2023) (granting summary judgment in favor of officers on

8 Fourth Amendment post-seizure care claim where it was not clear

9 who called for medical aid, but it was undisputed that “medical

10 staff had already been summoned”); Lawrence v. Las Vegas Metro.

11 Police Dep’t, 451 F. Supp. 3d 1154, 1171 (D. Nev. 2020) (granting

12 summary judgment on Fourth Amendment post-seizure care claim in

13 favor of all three officers who responded to a shooting where

14 only one of them summoned medical assistance). Accordingly,

15 summary judgment in defendants’ favor will be granted on the

16 post-seizure care claim.

17 E. Qualified Immunity

18 Even if plaintiffs had established genuine disputes of

19 material fact precluding summary judgment on the constitutional

20 claims, the defendant officers would still be entitled to

21 qualified immunity because they did not violate clearly

22 established law. See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232

23 (2009) (“Qualified immunity is applicable unless the official’s

24

7 This court previously reasoned that the instant case

25

was factually distinguishable from Tatum and plaintiffs had

stated a claim for unreasonable post-seizure care because, inter

26

alia, “it is not clear from the complaint that the officers

27 involved did call for assistance at all.” See Est. of F.R., 2023

WL 6130049, at *3. The court reaches a different result here

28 because the evidence in the record is to the contrary.

1 conduct violated a clearly established constitutional right.”).

2 Based on the authorities discussed above, a reasonable officer in

3 defendants’ position would not understand that his conduct

4 violated plaintiffs’ constitutional rights. See Saucier v. Katz,

5 533 U.S. 194, 202 (2001) (“The relevant, dispositive inquiry in

6 determining whether a right is clearly established is whether it

7 would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was

8 unlawful in the situation he confronted.”).

9 IV. State Claims

10 Because the court grants summary judgment on

11 plaintiffs’ federal claims, it no longer has federal question

12 jurisdiction. A district court “may decline to exercise

13 supplemental jurisdiction” over state law claims subject to that

14 jurisdiction if “the district court has dismissed all claims over

15 which it has original jurisdiction.” See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3);

16 see also Acri v. Varian Assocs., Inc., 114 F.3d 999, 1001 n.3

17 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (district courts may sua sponte decline

18 to exercise supplemental jurisdiction).

19 Here, as in “the usual case in which all federal-law

20 claims are eliminated before trial,” the “balance of factors to

21 be considered under the pendent jurisdiction doctrine -- judicial

22 economy, convenience, fairness and comity -- [points] toward

23 declining to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state-law

24 claims.” See Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350

25 n.7 (1988). Accordingly, the court declines to exercise

26 supplemental jurisdiction and will dismiss plaintiffs’ remaining

27 state law claims, but passes no judgment on the merits of those

28 claims.

——— eI IRIE IE I OE IRIDIUM ES

1 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that defendants’ motion for

2 summary judgment (Docket No. 24) be, and the same hereby is,

3 | GRANTED as to the federal claims. The state claims are DISMISSED

4 WITHOUT PREJUDICE pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). The Clerk of

5 | Court is directed to close the case.

6 | Dated: May 29, 2025 / td . ak. AY /

7 WILLIAM B. SHUBB

9 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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